A Poisson model of incidents of international terrorism in the United States

Abstract

Various haphazard, and often uncoordinated, efforts have been devoted to discouraging and combatting terrorism. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable lack of quantitative studies of the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the problem of international terrorism will eventually be a focus for operations researchers. A factor fundamental to any OR study is an understanding of the underlying generating process for incidents of terrorism. Based on incidents of terrorism from 1968 to 1974, this paper notes that the Poisson is a good model for the occurrence of incidents of international terrorism in the United States. Results of both chi‐square and Kolmogorov‐Smirnov tests are presented. Finally, an unusual result, inconsistent with popular beliefs, is noted.     

The need for international cooperation in combating terrorism

Abstract

As this paper briefly notes, an elaborate international legal system has been established to combat terrorism. But this system has two primary deficiencies: There are serious gaps in the current law and the law already on the books is not being implemented vigorously. The paper examines the specific nature of the gaps and recommends the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, of a committee to oversee implementation of the antiterrorist conventions. The paper also examines some recent work of a less well‐known branch of the United Nations, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. Finally, the paper considers the possibility of establishing an international criminal court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking and related acts of terrorism, a proposal that is currently on the agenda of the United Nations International Law Commission.     

International cooperation in the field of international political terrorism

Political terrorism is defined. The various forms of international terrorism are enumerated. Types and manifestations of terrorism are discussed as well as their differentiation according to objectives and means. The necessity of international cooperation to deal with the problem is discussed, and five fields of possible cooperation are listed. The following existing multilateral conventions are dealt with: the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971. It is stressed that there is a need for a general convention of cooperation or, at least, border agreements, treaties of extradition, and mutual judicial assistance. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) is discussed as an agreement meant to “deprivilege poltical offenses.”     

The threat of international terrorism in the united states: The police response

Abstract

As the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis unfolded, leaders of the UN coalition against Iraq became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorism accompanying the initiation of hostilities with Baghdad. Such concerns were reinforced by Iraqi warnings and by Baghdad's long association with international terrorist movements. Ultimately, however, the Iraqis proved unable to make effective use of terrorism to support their war effort. This failure resulted for a variety of reasons including effective counterterrorism measures by the allies. Additionally, a number of other nations with terrorist linkages pressured their terrorist clients to refrain from helping Saddam Hussein. They did this for reasons of their own that nevertheless supported allied strategy. Finally, the Iraqis’ lack of any precrisis preparation for terrorist action meant that they were simply unable to mount more than a few ineffective operations.     

The United Nations decade of international law

This articles is written in a personal capacity and should not be attributed in any way to the ICAO Secretariat or the United Nations.     

International terrorism

In this article, it is argued that the U.S. ICBM force has no strategic value and should be dismantled. The article outlines a post‐cold war U.S. strategic nuclear force and proposes how this dyad force fits a strategy rather than offering a strategy to fit within the force. Deterrence theory anchors the analysis here. Second, this article asserts that U.S. security will be enhanced in the next century with Russian‐American cooperation on nuclear issues. Moving to a dyad now is step one in that direction, which in turn changes the perception of U.S. strategic weapons.

As weapons proliferate, deterrence against renegade nations and groups must become the cornerstone of U.S. doctrine. A dyad force and Russian‐American cooperation, both steps that restructure U.S. doctrine, will begin a process that deters these nations or groups.

This article depicts how each leg of the U.S. triad that remains following the START II treaty is a continuation of START I logic and planning. In other words, the article attempts to show how the rationale for a START II treaty force does not mirror a changed world. The purpose of this evidence is not to be dogmatic or critical but to strengthen the argument that U.S. nuclear strategy is still reflective of a bygone era.