Understanding Perspectives on WMD and Why They Are Important

Although contemporary jihadist terrorists are most well known for perpetrating operations that generate mass casualties, they also conduct violent acts that yield fewer victims, such as beheading hostages. Examining the religious and cultural contexts that surround jihadist beheadings, developments in new media, and drawing on examples from the Chechen Wars and the Iraq War, this article argues that jihadists have employed this tactic for a range of reasons, including obtaining ransom payments, hampering foreign investment, discrediting transitional states, and recruiting supporters. It also suggests that jihadists' beheading of their captives corresponds with aspects of cosmic war, particularly on how religious terrorists' desires to please a deity and secure a place of honor in the hereafter has devalued the lives of both captor and prisoner. Consequently, contemporary jihadist beheading is an outgrowth of the practice of terrorist hostage taking. As this article goes to press (February 2007) UK authorities disrupted a terrorist cell allegedly plotting to behead British Muslim soldiers who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to broadcast the filmed executions through jihadist websites. Journalists have described the intended beheadings and their dissemination as “Iraq-style.” There is no doubt that jihadist beheading became more widely known as a result of the Iraq conflict. However, the beheadings in Iraq were largely used to recruit future jihadists and to demonstrate jihadists' strength to their potential support base, the global Muslim community. In contrast, the alleged UK beheading plot was aimed at striking terror into Muslims living in the UK so that they would not support or serve their government. Indeed the Iraq beheadings were intended to persuade, and the UK plot was intended to dissuade. These alleged activities suggest that contemporary jihadist beheading is not only an extension of hostage-taking, it is also an independently evolving terrorist tactic.     

The Obstacles to Foreign Aid Harmonization: Lessons from Decentralization Support in Indonesia

Relying on a new institutional economics analysis of transaction costs, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasizes donor harmonization as an intermediate objective for increasing the effectiveness of foreign assistance in bringing about development outcomes. Surveys on adherence to the Paris Declaration commitments so far suggest that foreign aid donors are lagging behind targets. This paper explores the political and bureaucratic obstacles faced by bilateral and multilateral aid organizations trying to harmonize aid at the country level. Looking at foreign support for the decentralization and local governance sector in Indonesia??where a ??bold experiment?? in harmonization failed to bring about improved donor coordination??I find evidence that the lack of harmonization can be linked to some of the characteristic pathologies of foreign aid: the dominance of the strategic interests of some donors and the structure of bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies. These traditional problems work through a pathway that is underexplored in the literature: by enabling a lack of coordination among agencies within the recipient government, donors create barriers to harmonization of their own programming. However, I conclude by noting that government coordination failure may not be as much of a problem as donors make it out to be. Decisions about governance and decentralization are necessarily contentious and political. In the case where donors succeed in bringing about government coordination in the interest of their own harmonization, they risk exercising harmful leverage that leads to premature resolution of domestic policy disputes, thereby undermining the Paris Declaration principle of country ownership.     

Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.     

Problems of Coordination in Field Administration in Bangladesh: Does Informal Communication Matter?

The main thrust of the article is to analyze the state of problems of inter-organizational coordination in the upazila (second tier of local government) in Bangladesh. It also explains to what extent informal communication matters for inter-organizational coordination. Based on empirical data collected in 2009, findings of the study suggest that a number of factors have facilitated non-existence of inter-organizational coordination at the upazila. These factors include lack of division of activities, dualism in control over officers, lack of proper functioning of the committees, and dual authority in disbursement of funds and its impact on timely disbursement. Findings also suggest that in the absence of coordination among different departments, informal communication has been observed to be one of the prominent mechanisms of ensuring coordination. However, existence of factors like lack of willingness to be engaged in informal communication and lack of cooperation has hindered the process of building informal communication among different departments. Despite having some problems this research has concluded that informal communication has helped the process of coordination among different departments while they are carrying out their responsibilities.     

Leaving Security in Safe Hands: identity,legitimacy and cohesion in the new Afghan and Iraqi armies

Built by outside powers and targeted against local insurgents, the new national armies of Afghanistan and Iraq are fragile institutions. The legitimacy of these forces is limited in the deeply divided societies in which they exist. Whereas low levels of legitimacy exert a disintegrative pressure upon an army, cohesion counterweighs such pressure. This article engages the theory of military unit cohesion for the purpose of increasing understanding of the challenges to cohesion faced by the new armies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Two main sources of legitimacy for the new armies are discussed: the (ethnic/sectarian) composition of the forces, and their respective missions. Challenges to cohesion are found to depend on how soldiers are recruited and units composed: ethnically/sectarian mixed units may disintegrate because of weak horizontal cohesion; homogeneous units (particularly when recruited as groups and not individually) may splinter off because of weak vertical cohesion. The article also argues that promoting an image of the army as ‘national’ within a society may reduce disintegrative pressures.     

Social services to claim legitimacy: comparing autocracies’ performance

ABSTRACT

Autocrats cannot rule by repression and co-optation alone, and need to instil some sense of legitimacy in the populace. Lacking democratic legitimacy, and being in shortage of other identity-based sources of diffuse support, legitimation claims in post-Cold War autocracies increasingly rests on rulers’ ability to achieve concrete outcomes, including the improvement of citizen living conditions. However, autocracies differ from each other, and different institutional arrangements could influence a leader’s ability to deliver social services, and chase performance-based legitimation. Accordingly, this article compares the social service performance of different post-Cold War authoritarian regimes. The analysis demonstrates that so-called electoral autocracies outperform single-party and military regimes, although they show a capacity to provide for their citizens that is similar to hereditary regimes. These findings suggest that the legitimacy returns of introducing semi-competitive and participatory institutions could grow exponentially. Besides procedural legitimacy, these institutions could help rulers pursue legitimation through social services.     

Democracy promotion and ODA: a comparative analysis

Scholars of democracy promotion foreign aid often claim it has substantially increased, yet they shy away from explaining by how much, nor investigate comparative trends in giving. This paper attempts to fill this void by addressing the following: (1) Has democracy promotion aid increased since the end of the Cold War? (2) Has the ‘assumed’ trend of increasing aid persevered through the difficulties encountered in democratizing Iraq? (3) Did aid increase from states that supported the invasion of Iraq compared to states that did not? The author's analysis purports that the answer is yes to the first two, yet it is harder to draw conclusions regarding Iraq. Another finding, contrary to claims in the scholarly literature, in terms of percentage and overall spending, the USA gives more democracy promotion aid than the EU. The author hopes this work stimulates research into the role of democracy promotion in the Arab Spring to consider historical trends in giving.     

冷战初期越共结盟政策的缘起与形成(1947—1950)

冷战初期,越南共产党试图延续其自建国以来带有中立色彩的对外政策,极力避免法越战争国际化。但在冷战向亚洲蔓延、法越战争进入僵持阶段、中国革命形势快速发展、美法关系升温等因素的作用下,越共逐步走上了结盟之路。1950年初,越共追随中共倒向以苏联为首的社会主义阵营标志着其结盟政策的形成。该政策不仅导致越共获得了足以改变战场形势的军事援助,并促成了以中国支援越南进行民族解放斗争为主要形式的中越准军事同盟。更重要的是,越共借社会主义阵营的外交承认解决了法国选择扶植保大政府所引发的政权合法性危机,这也是越共实施结盟政策的直接动因。     

From Intervention to Retrenchment: Poland's Strategic Culture and the 2011 Libyan Campaign

Abstract

The willingness of successive Polish governments to support and participate in US-led multilateral military interventions—such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq—has been explained in terms of Poland's prevailing strategic culture. Yet in 2011 Poland opted to exclude itself from participating in the NATO campaign against Libya. It is argued that this was not a counter-cultural decision, but was instead a case of one strategic subculture supplanting another. The support that the government received from opposition politicians and the press can be taken as evidence that the policy did not represent a radical departure from Poland's strategic culture.     

Party Structure,Information, and Coalition Durability: The Relevance of NATO in the Global War on Terror

Using the test cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, this study illustrates how alliances work to mitigate the conflicting frames that party structure and media access provide in the Global War on Terror, which leads to more cohesiveness in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led coalition in Afghanistan as opposed to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The approach utilized here extends the theory on alliance capability and uncertainty by arguing that alliances reduce uncertainty among member states on a strategic objective. This is particularly relevant when examining asymmetric, limited conflicts, where party structures and media access can work to disseminate conflicting frames to a domestic populace, who then can pressure their leader to withdraw from a coalition. The implications of these findings lend support to the continued relevance of NATO in the twenty-first-century security arena.     

The Arab Spring: last episode of the Cold War

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory and developing its regime-related dimension, this article analyses the involvement of external powers in Arab Spring conflicts. Libya, Syria and Bahrain are used as case studies showing that Western support for the incumbent regime or for its adversaries was not based on a choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Rather, it was motivated by a pattern of amity and enmity inherited from the Cold War period. The surprising survival of this pattern was due to the three authoritarian regimes’ inability to reform; to the ensuing preservation of their Cold War era perception in the West; and to Russia's new availability as an external patron. Consequently, the article argues that the Arab Spring can be perceived as the last, belated episode of the Cold War. However, its political consequences put an end to the last features inherited from the pre-1989 period and open a new Middle Eastern era.     

The Brazilian military after the Cold War: In search of a mission

What purpose should Brazil’s armed forces serve in upcoming years? Democratization, the end of the Cold War, and Brazil’s economic crisis have prompted an unprecedented debate over this question by narrowing the range of tasks that the Brazilian military can pursue. This article investigates civilian and military support for various possible military roles and analyzes their compatibility with civilian control. It argues that the political weakness of the current government, the economic crisis, and growing social unrest militate against an expansion of the military’s conventional external defense mission and in favor of non-combatant domestic functions. This has begun to occur despite military enthusiasm for the former and military reservations about the latter. The military’s adoption of multiple domestic assignments in a country with a tradition of military interventionism poses risks to civilian control.     

What factors increase the probability of Chinese interventions in intrastate wars?

This study examines the question: What are the factors that increase the probability of Chinese interference in intrastate wars? Chinese behaviour concerning intrastate wars was examined using multivariate logistic regressions. The analyses included the general behaviour of China regarding interference in intrastate wars, Chinese support of violent non-governmental organizations and of state governments. Both were also studied separately for the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. Among the covariates that were examined, several emerged as possible explanations for China's behaviour: geographic contiguity, adversary regime type, and China's relative military capabilities. Furthermore, differences were found between Chinese support of violent non-governmental organizations and of governments in intrastate wars. Different results were also obtained for Cold War and post-Cold War eras.     

Crafting democratic control of the military in South Korea and the Philippines: the problem of military factions

This article explores how a military's organizational character (cohesion or lack thereof) shapes military officers' attitudes toward new civilian leadership in democratizing South Korea and the Philippines. It suggests that a factionalized military makes civilian control much more difficult and the route to democratic consolidation highly unstable and incomplete for three reasons. First, in the factionalized army, individual officers' allegiance is directed toward their factional leaders, not toward the military as a unified body and the civilian leadership. Second, factionalized military will create ‘monitoring’ and ‘sanctioning’ problems for civilians. Finally, competition among various factions in the military promotes officers' appetite for political domination. The structured-focused analysis of democratization in South Korea and the Philippines clearly sustains the theoretical arguments. The study implies that the institutionalization of civilian control of the military in democratizing nations depends on new leaders' ability/willingness to remove military factions and rebuild the armed forces into a cohesive organ.     

Managerial capacity in conflict environments: Management effects of private military and security companies in Iraq

An enduring challenge of public administration research is examining whether public management affects the delivery of public policy results. This study extends managerial influence to include public policy delivery in an active conflict environment. Individual manager training is critical in conflict environments because limited bureaucratic capacity and general environmental confusion are common. Organizations under stress use substitute managers. We argue that substitute managers' effectiveness is conditioned by two factors: managerial capability and networking capability. We examine substitute managers in a unique context, the US–Iraq War. Managers coordinated private military and security companies (PMSCs) to provide coalition forces and the civilian population with multiple services. We argue that managers with prior management experience and network capability are more effective substitute managers. The results suggest that managers with prior experience and networking capability are associated with decreases in civilian casualties. The results provide important policy insights into public management and defence policy.     

Editor's note

Abstract

In this article the author investigates the degree to which regional political relationships as well as domestic political stability have changed as a result of the Gulf War. As the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, Latin America, and elsewhere attempt to democratize, often with American support, the countries of the Gulf, at least on the governmental level, appear largely immune to this trend. This is belied somewhat by popular desires for political liberalization as well as cynicism about America's aims in the region. The political future and stability of this key part of the world is further complicated by the changing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia who share a distrust for Iraq if little else. Thus, despite the Gulf War, many of the key issues that have traditionally influenced the Gulf region remain salient even after significant modifications in the status of the regional power‐holders.     

Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and China

This article seeks to test the validity of ‘balance of threat’ theory as propounded by Stephen Walt that states react to imbalances of threat. It takes into account the factors enumerated by Walt to explore threat perceptions of Pakistan and the strategy they developed to cope with security threats. It attempts to take an overview of Pakistan's security dilemma its responses in twin time frames: the Cold War period (1980–1989) and the post-Cold War period (1990–2000) with relevance to the contemporary period. Pakistan's arms acquisition, upgradation in sophistication of arsenals, increase in fund allocation in defence have all been its tangible tactics to neutralize India's military superiority. Pakistan explored Pan-Islamism to bring the support of the Islamic states. Pakistan also resorted to an active alliance with China, to increase its competency. From a theoretical angle, this article adopts a realist viewpoint, focuses on security concerns of state actors.     

Counter-COIN: Counterinsurgency and the Preemption of Strategy

The notion of “counterinsurgency” (COIN) has for some years been the central concept driving military operations in Afghanistan, and before that, in Iraq. It constitutes the dominant idea influencing much current military planning of the major Western powers. This study questions the assumptions and relevance of the thinking behind counterinsurgency doctrine. It suggests that the ultimate effect of its dominance is to reduce the highly contingent nature of war to a list of techniques, the application of which are regarded as a sufficient precondition whenever states deem that they are confronted by conflicts that can be described as an “insurgency.” Such assumptions are both arbitrary and risk crowding out necessary, although by their nature very difficult, political judgments that are required for the effective construction and implementation of strategies that seek to ensure that the ends sought are proportional to the means employed.     

Foreign aid: An instrument for fighting communism?

In this paper, we test the argument that the sizeable reduction in aggregate aid levels in the 1990s was due to the end of the Cold War. We test two different models using a dynamic econometric specification on a panel of 17 donor countries, spanning the years 1970–97. We find aid to be positively related to military expenditures in the former Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, but not in the 1990s, suggesting that the reductions in aid disbursements are driven by the disappearance of an important motive for aid. We also study the effect on aid allocation, but here we do not find any robust effects of the end of the Cold War.     

Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making

My concern here is for the dramatic new method of democratic constitution making, one that I call post-sovereign in the sense that the constituent power is not embodied in a single organ or instance with the plenitude of power, and all organs participating in constitutional politics are brought under legal rules. This method is the democratic alternative to revolutionary constitution making that all too easily steps over the threshold to dictatorship. And, this was the method that was reluctantly adopted in Iraq. Yet, because of what happened in Iraq, future international efforts during military occupations are likely to avoid the instruments used in that country. In this sense, this essay is part a rescue operation, an attempt to redeem the still redeemable. In what follows, I would first like to present the developed new paradigm of constitution making, as it has been first developed in Poland and Hungary and fully realized in South Africa, making the relevant comparisons with the two classical models of democratic constituent power originating in America and France. I would like to show that all components of the model are significant and mutually reinforcing, including the role of the constitutional court that is the most important clue to the newness of what is involved. Next, I would like to argue that, while the application of constitutionalism to the process as well as the result of constitution making seems to be a conscious part of these new efforts, this move in my view does not represent a sufficient solution of the problem of legitimacy. The second part of the essay will therefore focus on that question, trying to formulate a hypothesis that could serve as a beginning point for a normative theory of democratic post-sovereign constitution making. The third part will reconsider the very old problem whether beginnings can be mad legitimate.