European remedial coherence in the regulation of non-consensual disclosures of sexual images

The non-consensual dissemination of sexually explicit images or videos for no legitimate purpose represents a serious sexual violation by means of breaching an individual's ability to control their own sexual identity. This article argues that the only adequate legal response to this behaviour is targeted criminal regulation, and that action on a regional level is within the European Union's competence by virtue of Article 83(1) TFEU. The approaches of EU Member States to the phenomenon through targeted criminal law are examined in order to extract positive and negative elements of the respective regulatory systems. Drawing on the experiences of these States, as well as on existing EU criminal directives, a draft directive is included to illustrate what form a European regional system of criminal regulation may take.     

Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority

The European Union institutional package launched in response to the financial crisis used Article 114 TFEU as its legal basis. The author explores the legal basis for one of the European Supervisory Authorities recently established – the European Banking Authority (EBA). The use of Article 114 TFEU, the main Treaty basis used to harmonise laws in order to further the internal market, as the foundation for the EBA, is considered in detail. A paradox of contemporary EU institutional law is assessed here, considering whether on the one hand, the EBA is functionally both too narrow and too broad as a matter of law, while on the other hand, it may prove to be central to restoring confidence in EU regulatory powers, rendering it ‘too big to fail,’ despite its slender foundations in Article 114 TFEU.     

The European Commission's Guidance on Article 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?

The European Commission has for the first time issued a document expressing its official position on the enforcement of Article 102TFEU which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position on the Common Market. The Commission Guidance on enforcement priorities in applying Article 102TFEU to exclusionary abuses (adopted in December 2008) has ended a review of about four years. Given the increased enforcement of Article 102TFEU at the European level and the fact that many national provisions in the EU on unilateral conduct are modelled after Article 102TFEU, how the Commission intends to enforce Article 102TFEU is crucial for the application of competition law and the undertakings subject to it under European and/or national laws. The review period was preceded by severe criticisms of the Commission's approach to Article 102TFEU for protecting competitors instead of competition and for being insufficiently grounded in modern economic thinking. At the heart of the review and the discussions surrounding it lay the question of the objective of Article 102TFEU. Some, including the Directorate General for Competition claimed the objective to be ‘consumer welfare’, whereas some argued that ‘consumer welfare’ cannot be adopted as the objective at the expense of the protection of the competitive process. This article critically reviews the Commission Guidance, with an eye to assessing the ultimate objective of and the test of harm under Article 102TFEU. After discussing whether the Guidance indeed sets priorities, it examines the general approach of the Guidance to exclusionary conduct. It points out that despite there being some welcome novelties in the Guidance, there are also suggestions therein whose legitimacy and legality are questionable. Reflecting on the Guidance as a soft‐law instrument, the article argues that although regarding the objective of Article 102TFEU, the Commission's apparent tendency towards ‘consumer welfare’ is not unlawful, the reform of Article 102TFEU to bring it more in line with modern economic and legal thinking seems to be far from complete.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Civil Protection Cooperation in EU Law: Is There Room for Solidarity to Wriggle Past?

This article provides insight into the under‐researched area of civil protection cooperation and disaster response capacity in EU law. It discusses how the mechanisms set up by the EU have assisted Member States in supporting one another when faced with natural or man‐made disasters, including those perpetrated by terrorists. In particular, the article provides a critique of the Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clause, which has introduced the principle of solidarity within the EU's security strategy. The author explores the broadened notion of ‘threat’ in Europe and assesses the significance of the Solidarity Clause vis‐à‐vis the level of commitment required by Member States for its coherent implementation. The article then contrasts Article 222 TFEU with the mutual defence clause of Article 42 (7) Treaty on European Union (TEU), and finally points into certain ‘grey areas’ that may have a diminution effect upon the political message concerning the EU as a community based on solidarity.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

Holding to Account a Possible European Public Prosecutor Supranational Governance and Accountability Across Diverse Legal Traditions

The Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the Member States of the European Union (EU) to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) with competence to prosecute, in the courts of the Member States, crimes against the financial interests of the Union. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the Member States may unanimously, or through flexible cooperation where nine Member States agree, establish such a European-level prosecution body, with the possibility for its powers to be extended by unanimity to include serious crime having a cross border dimension or affecting more than one Member State. Within the legal traditions of the Member States, means of holding prosecution authorities to account vary considerably. Probably the strongest form of accountability exists in the civil law tradition of Member States that permit appeals to judicial bodies for decisions not to prosecute, which contrasts with the traditional common law reluctance to even give reasons for not prosecuting. Similarly, the ways in which prosecution authorities interact or overlap with police functions, and thus with general mechanisms of police and/or bureaucratic accountability, differ. Some of the particular features of EU cooperation suggest additional accountability issues, notably, questions concerning competence spill-over and problems of remoteness. This paper seeks to address how to conceptualise governance and accountability of a possible EPP outside of the context of a trial (the latter entailing a type of open legal accountability that can be studied in its own right) and including the question of the definition of competences.     

Effet utile and the (re)organisation of national judiciaries: A not so unique institutional response to a uniquely important challenge?

The current repurposing of the principle of effet utile of European Union law can be found in the revolutionary steps taken by the Court of Justice in its application of Article 19 TEU. The implicit goal of this recent body of case-law is to equip national judges with the tools to resist domestic judicial reforms that affect their freedom to adjudicate independently. Considering Simmenthal to Unibet, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses to the latest case-law relating to the organisation of national judiciaries, this article contends that, while the case-law on judicial independence is unprecedented, the Court of Justice has gone to great lengths to ensure that the developments in EU law precipitated by its rulings are grounded in established doctrine. They follow a line of case-law that builds on the principle of primacy of EU law and the obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law in the domestic legal order. Further, the current trajectory is for Article 19 TEU to form the operational basis of review of any judicially minded reforms, whether they be organisational (Article 19 TEU, together with Article 47 CFREU), limit actually or potentially the freedom for dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice (Article 19 TEU together with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 CFREU) or where they reduce the protection of the value of the rule of law (Article 19 TEU, Article 2 TEU, Article 49 TEU and Article 47 CFREU), with potential implications for the effective application in EU law of the principle of mutual trust.     

The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing?

The lack of fairness in asylum responsibility sharing within the EU has been a persistent problem demanding an urgent solution. This article seeks to inform the on‐going debate on European solidarity instruments from a constitutional law perspective by taking the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility pursuant to Article 80 TFEU as its reference point. The article sees this principle as an important mechanism in both the enhancement of fairness in responsibility sharing and the protection of refugees. It argues that the combined reading of Article 80 TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides a strong reason to doubt the constitutionality of the Dublin III Regulation, and any decision reforming the asylum regime should take this view into account. Despite its limited enforceability, Article 80 TFEU can play an important role as an interpretation tool, in particular in the assessment of the legality of solidarity instruments.     

The Legality of the EU's Stand-Alone Approach to the Climate Impact of Aviation: The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol

The aviation sector is not yet covered by the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Taking into account the fact that aviation increasingly contributes to climate change, the European Commission adopted a proposal for legislation to include aviation in the EU ETS. The proposal foresees the inclusion of internal EU flights as well as external flights to and from the Union within the EU ETS. On 20 December 2007, EU Environment Ministers reached political agreement in the Environment Council on the basis of a new compromise text tabled by the Presidency. However, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as various stakeholders, does not consider that the EU has the competence to include aviation within the EU ETS. A crucial point concerning the legality of including aviation in the EU ETS is the fact that Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol states that the parties 'shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation . . . working through the International Civil Aviation Organization . . .'. This article reviews the legality of the EU's stand-alone approach, focusing on the European and international legal framework and taking into account the express role given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol.     

Education,Languages and Linguistic Minorities in the EU: Challenges and Perspectives

Although, with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, two provisions of EU primary law now refer to ‘minorities,’ there are no explicit EU competences and policies to promote the rights of minority groups in education. Nevertheless, EU law has a strong potential to impact the educational rights of linguistic minorities in Member States. To evaluate the right to access education, with an emphasis on the needs of minorities to preserve their identity, this paper first discusses the EU's relevant competences in education (Part II) and then in languages (Part III). Based on the analysis of relevant EU provisions, the paper concludes that EU law is unlikely to offer meaningful protection to linguistic minorities without explicitly endorsing their educational rights. However, to do so, the EU needs a stronger competence in education and minority rights.     

The federalism dimension of proportionality

EU Treaties contain an arsenal of purpose-defined and ambiguous competences that are enjoyed by EU institutions, yet devote little attention to the restraining impact of EU competences on Member States' autonomy and policies. While the focus has traditionally been on subsidiarity to deal with competence issues, the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Weiss revitalises the discussion on the potential of proportionality to guide competence issues. This inquiry seeks to highlight both the existing traces of competence proportionality employed by the Court to allocate competences as well as the potential of the proportionality standard to temper the spillovers on Member States' autonomy accruing from the exercise of EU competences. While the Treaty restricts proportionality to reviewing the use (not existence) of EU competences, the Court has implicitly employed proportionality considerations to verify the existence of EU competences. In addition, drawing from established case law, competence proportionality assessments could rely on an effect-based substantive review in combination with procedural duties allowing a meaningful balancing of national autonomy against the dynamics of deeper integration.     

Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meanings and Interpretations

Research that has been conducted over the last decades shows that neither the scope of application nor the exact meaning of Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC) is clear from its wording. This article seeks to clarify its meaning through analysis of the drafting of the Article as well as the use of it by the EU's institutions and by the Member States. Article 345 TFEU, formerly Article 295 EC and, before that, Article 222 EEC, is an Article that limits, but not prevents, the application of the TFEU Treaty as a whole to the way in which rules of a Member State deal with the right of ownership of undertakings. The conclusion can be drawn that Article 345 TFEU only concerns the private or public ownership of undertakings, with which the Community shall not concern itself and which can thus be regulated by the Member States themselves. Most importantly, the Article does not concern the content of the right of ownership, nor the objects of a right of ownership. It does therefore not form an obstacle to the development of a European property law.     

Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’

Governing bodies have significant autonomy in the organisation of professional sport in the EU, a situation now supported by Article 165 TFEU. However the post‐Lisbon competence for sport does not grant any exemption for practices that infringe fundamental freedoms or competition law; such infringements can only be justified where they are a proportionate response to an inherent need in that sport. The football ‘transfer system’ has been the subject of a series of EU law challenges, but continues to place obstacles in the way of the free movement of players between Member States and may restrict the ability of most clubs to compete for the elite players. Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions in transfer dispute cases have entrenched this situation, and recent evidence casts doubt on both the ability of the authorities to justify the current system and the 2001 decision by the European Commission to sign it off as being an acceptable balance between the rights of the stakeholders.     

‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation doctrine. Second, the European legislator has also insisted on political safeguards within delegated legislation. Under the Rome Treaty, ‘comitology’ was the defining characteristic of executive legislation. The Lisbon Treaty represents a revolutionary restructuring of the regulatory process. The (old) Community regime for delegated legislation is split into two halves. Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power.     

The Last Bite of the BITs—Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration

According to Article 267 TFEU, national courts of the EU Member States can (and sometimes must) ask for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the interpretation and application of Community law, including international treaties and recommendations, and on the validity of Community secondary legislation. In this way, it is ensured that EU citizens are treated equally throughout the Union. However, this is not applicable when it comes to arbitral proceedings, be they commercial or investment arbitrations. The Court does not accept references for preliminary rulings from arbitral tribunals. For this reason, respondent states in international arbitral proceedings have argued that arbitration and EU law are utterly incompatible. In their submissions as respondents in arbitral proceedings, EU Member States have argued that, as a result of EU accession, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been automatically terminated. In subsidiary, they sometimes claim that, due to their incompatibility with EU law, BITs cannot apply. But if BITs are not applicable anymore, there are few remedies left for investors within the EU.     

Surveying the Foundations: Article 80 TFEU and the Common European Asylum System

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which states that the European Union’s asylum policy will be based on the principles of solidarity and the fair-sharing of responsibility. However, no guidance is given as to the nature and content of these principles. This contribution seeks to explore the relationship between these two concepts and to assess the extent and nature of their presence within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This contribution begins with an outline of the CEAS and presents its newly-codified foundation, Article 80 TFEU. This reveals that the CEAS may be considered a solidarity mechanism, but that the essential uncertainty as to the meaning of Article 80 is problematic when attempting to gauge the success of the CEAS as an expression of solidarity. The second part considers methods for allocating responsibilities for refugee status determination and protection between states, demonstrating that fair-sharing is both more widely accepted as the basis for solidarity and less problematic than the most common alternative—allocation according to states’ voluntary assumptions of responsibility. The final part explores expressions of fair-sharing within the CEAS and considers its limited success and numerous flaws.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

从欧盟扩大看GATT/WTO关于关税同盟补偿谈判的规定与实践

2004年5月,欧盟正式扩大到25国,其共同贸易政策自动延伸适用到新入盟国,导致部分关税税率升高和贸易政策趋严,给盟外其他WTO成员造成经贸利益减损。WTO其他成员有权根据GATT第24条、第28条以及关于解释这两条的谅解等规定,要求欧盟做出补偿性调整。本文对关税同盟补偿谈判的法律基础、主要内容、谈判程序和主体等进行了分析和探讨。作者认为,关税同盟补偿问题的妥善解决,将对区域经济一体化趋势下更好地维护多边贸易框架的合理性做出贡献。     

An optional European contract law code: Advantages and disadvantages

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties’ choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. a core of information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived.