Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment

I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so‐called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution to the problem—the puzzle can be recreated with other plausible closure principles. The problem can be solved by restricting the social facts thesis to legal rules, rather than applying it to all legal propositions. Properly construed the social facts thesis does not apply to facts about what legally ought to be the case.     

司法决策中的“父爱主义”管制逻辑

在包括赵春华案在内的诸多引发舆论关注的争议案件中,法官或许并非不是不懂得如何利用社科法学的判断能力与法教义学的裁判技术去弥合司法标准与公众认知之间的巨大断裂,而更可能是基于其“父爱”式的社会“管制”取向而对司法后果的实质合理性问题做出了“爱之深,责之切”的价值决断。在中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成的历史背景下,为了保证良法的颁行能够导向预期的善治,法律必须以其作为“社会交往机制”的系统潜力而彰显其公理性与司法的合理性。只有首先确立基于交往原则和承认社会自主性的权力逻辑与法律决策结构,那种体现“人性化”“人文化”和“人权化”的方法论逻辑才有可能在法律的运作中获得国家体制官僚无法武断拒斥的实效。     

Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law

In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche presents a history of metaphysics that can also be read as a history of jurisprudence. Nietzsche shows how—via Platonism, Christendom, Kantianism, and utilitarianism—the “real” or “true” world of ideals gives way to an “apparent” phenomenal world that is itself ultimately brought into question. This article shows how 20th-century legal thought, broadly construed, also moves away from “ideals” of law toward an understanding of law as observable social phenomena. It suggests that the move to the “apparent” world in legal thought raises questions similar to those raised by Nietzsche's work: Does sociological law point to a nihilistic destruction of the legal tradition or to a joyous possibility of overcoming that tradition?     

“Legality with a Vengeance”: Reclaiming Distribution for Sociolegal Studies

The law and society community has argued for decades for an expansive understanding of what counts as “law.” But a content analysis of articles published in the Law & Society Review from its 1966 founding to the present finds that since the 1970s, the law and society community has focused its attention on laws in which the state regulates behavior, and largely ignored laws in which the state distributes resources, goods, and services. Why did socio‐legal scholars avoid studying how laws determine access to such things as health, wealth, housing, education, and food? We find that socio‐legal scholarship has always used “law on the books” as a starting point for analyses (often to identify departures in “law in action”) without ever offering a programmatic vision for how law might ameliorate economic inequality. As a result, when social welfare laws on the books began disappearing, socio‐legal scholarship drifted away from studying law's role in creating, sustaining, and reinforcing economic inequality. We argue that socio‐legal scholarship offers a wide range of analytical tools that could make important contributions to our understanding of social welfare provision.     

“需要国家干预说”的法哲学分析

“需要国家干预说”是 20世纪中国经济法学最重要的学说之一。有限理性假设、国家适度干预、经济民主、社会公平、经济法治是其基本的法哲学叙事立场。国家是干预需要的满足者,“需要”是通过干预重建经济自由秩序的法律理由。国家超越市场利益关系对经济进行干预调节,国家干预由此构成经济法的基本哲学范畴与法理标志。经济宪政哲学是国家干预经济的法哲学进路,通过经济民主机制设定的干预才能避免经济专制,国家与社会成员共同分享经济权力才能保障干预的社会性与民主性,干预的达成并非一定为了公共,公共中的个体主义是结成公共的价值指引。     

Rules,Institutions, Transformations. Considerations on the “Evolution of Law” Paradigm

The article's main objective is to test the merits of the evolutionary paradigm as it has been applied first to social phenomena and then more specifically to the legal domain. In a preliminary move, a set of the available concepts of law is worked out. A discussion of the idea of evolution and of its use in the social sciences follows. Functionalism and systems theory are scrutinized, with a close eye to the new doctrine of “autopoiesis.” Once an institutional and normative concept of law is agreed upon, attempts to introduce an “evolutionary” paradigm are deemed—the article contends—to be unfruitful. The article concludes that, if law needs a metaphysics, it should be one which allows for change, transformation and the emergence of the radically new. A social universe without gaps, all possible forms of which are determined from the beginning, will end up as the opposite of what we are used to considering as the practice of law.     

Jurisprudence and Communication: Secular and Religious

In considering Van Schooten’s study of the Eric O. case (s.1), I ask whether the different approaches taken by the two different “legal institutions”—the prosecuting authorities on the one hand, the courts on the other—are reflective of different images of warfare (a semantic difference) or of the different images each group holds of its own role (a pragmatic difference). If we consider these two “legal institutions” as distinct semiotic groups (s.2), is there an inevitable “communication deficit” (Van Schooten) between them (and the public) and how does this relate to the Hartian account of such a “crisis in communication” (s.3)? I agree with Van Schooten about the role of underlying images in the construction of legal sense, and relate this to the issue of intuitional judgment, both in and outside the law (s.4). I then turn to comparable issues which arise in my other research area, Jewish law, which reflects quite different ideological premises (s.5), reviewing the original (biblical) conception of the (intuitive) role and functions of judges (s.5A), decision-making, justification and consequentialist ethics in postbiblical Jewish law (s.5B), and the conclusions drawn, not least for the pragmatics of communication, in a recent research study on the wife’s rights in divorce. Paradoxically, I argue (s.5C), that the system rests at base on trust rather than objective truth. But trust, too, is a form of meaning, and susceptible to semiotic analysis. I suggest, in conclusion (s.6), that this is an issue which should be treated more seriously in the theory of secular law and legal communication.     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

Under the Law: Legal Consciousness and Radical Environmental Activism

A growing body of sociolegal scholarship focuses the study of law away from formal texts and legal institutions and toward the experiences and perceptions of “everyday” citizens. This study introduces seventeen “radical” environmentalists who engage a repertoire of tactics that includes some actions that involve relatively severe forms of illegality. This research seeks to investigate the role of civil disobedience and lawbreaking within the radical environmental movement and the corresponding legal consciousness of movement actors. Utilizing ethnographic fieldwork and content analysis, this analysis suggests that Ewick and Silbey's (1998 ) three‐tiered model of legal consciousness is an operative starting point, but could be enhanced through theoretical expansion. This study proposes a new category of legal consciousness—Under the Law—that views the law as the protector and defender of a social order that is fundamentally illegitimate. Under the Law is qualitatively different from existing conceptualizations of legal consciousness and reaffirms the mutually constitutive nature of law and society.     

Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?

The idea that particular legal institutions are artifacts is not new. However, the idea that the “law” or “legal system” is itself an artifact has seldom been directly put forward, due perhaps to the ambiguities surrounding philosophical inquiries into law. Nevertheless, such an idea has recently been invoked more often, though not always developed in detail in terms of what the characterization of the “law” or “legal system” as an artifact entails ontologically, and what consequences, if any, this has for philosophical accounts of law. As a result, the primary aim of this paper is to attempt an inquiry into what the claim that “law” by its nature or character is an artifact entails, and what an artifact theory of law might look like.     

论比例原则在经济法中的适用

被誉为“公法皇冠”的比例原则在经济法中的适用具有可行性和必要性。比例原则的“相对普适性”为其在经济法中的适用提供了法理基础,引入比例原则不仅可以回应经济法现代性的内在诉求,还是贯彻经济法理念和基本原则的必然要求。比例原则在经济法中的适用范围涵盖“权力—权利”和“权利—权利”二元法律关系结构,但是,特殊紧急状态和合意行为应排除比例原则的适用。囿于比例原则的抽象性,有必要构建其在经济法中的类型化适用路径:以法律关系结构为划分依据,通过“目的正当性—适当性—必要性—均衡性”的差异化认定标准,塑造“宽松”和“相对严格”的审查基准模型。     

论中国和平发展与国际法的交互影响和作用

和谐世界是中国和平发展重要的外部社会基础,而国际法是构建和谐世界不可或缺的法律基础和保障。在国家间相互依存和经济全球化的“地球村”里,一方面,国际法为中国和平发展创造和平与安全的外部环境、建构公正和公平的国际竞争秩序和提供国际合作的法律保证；另一方面,中国和平发展的对内和对外发展战略势必要受到国际法越来越多的约束。与此同时,中国和平发展必然对国际法的和平与发展主题以及人权、法治和民主等普遍核心价值做出重要的贡献。     

“Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response

The author responds to comments reappraising “Critical Legal Histories” (CLH) (1984). CLH critiqued “evolutionary functionalism,” the idea that law is a functional response to a typical modernizing process. CLH argued that “society” was partly constituted of legal elements and that law was too indeterminate to have reliably regular functional effects. CLH has been misinterpreted as calling for a return to internal histories of “mandarin” doctrine: all it said was that some doctrinal histories were valuable, without privileging them. This response clarifies that the relations of law to society and social change, and of high‐level official law to everyday local law are distinct issues. CLH is mostly moot today, since social‐legal historians have incorporated its insight that legal concepts are embedded in everyday social practice. But other fields have revived deterministic Whiggish accounts of progressive development and of law functional to it—to which CLH's critique still seems relevant.     

法律认知和法律原则：情感、效率与公平

情感、效率、公平是人们认知活动中惯常的三个进程。对应这三个进程,人们对法律的认知有一些基本的原则。这些认知互动既可能形成社会自发秩序,也可能为法学提供一个基于认知背景的分析框架,有助于法学应对实践问题。“公平主导”的一个简单回答是,面对不同场合,情感、效率、公平三种进程被激活的程度不同。大体上,家庭场合激活情感,工程场合激活效率,市场和法律则更激活公平。在实践中,公平主导的法律原则由于比较接近主流社会认知,所以法律规范在社会中往往可能“自执行”,无需全靠外界监督或者激励。公平原则也有其自身的局限。虽然规范和原则很重要,是社会秩序的母体。但是,公平原则并不能解决所有问题。缺乏制度上的法治,光靠情理法是不足的。所以现代社会形成了规则化解决纠纷的机制,这就是二阶意义上的法律。     

Carl Schmitt on the Secularisation of Religious Texts as a Resacralisation of Jurisprudence?

Carl Schmitt, an increasingly influential German law professor, developed a provocative and historically oriented model of “political theology” with specific relevance to legal scholarship and the authorship of constitutional texts. His “political theology” is best understood neither as an expressly theological discourse within constitutional law, nor as a uniquely legal discourse shaped by a hidden theological agenda. Instead, it addresses the possibility of the continual resurfacing of theological ideas and beliefs within legal discourses of, for instance, sovereignty, the force of law and states of emergency (or “exception”) that present themselves as relentlessly secular, even—in the case of Kelsenian jurisprudence—”scientific”. This article illustrates and then critically evaluates Schmitt’s theory in terms of the authorship of constitutional texts in particular. It includes two case studies—genocidal colonial land appropriation and Kelsenian positivism in order to illustrate aspects of his political theology. Whilst Schmitt is defended against reductionist interpretations, I show that there remains considerable unfinished business before a Schmittian approach to legal theory merits full acceptance.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

Everyone Knows the Game: Legal Consciousness in the Hawaiian Cockfight

Past legal consciousness research has revealed a great deal about what individuals think and do with regard to law, but less attention has been paid to the social processes that underpin these attitudes, beliefs, and actions. This article focuses particularly on a “second‐order” layer of legal consciousness: people's perceptions about how others understand the law. Ethnographic observations and in‐depth interviews with cockfighters in rural Hawaii reveal how law enforcement practices not only affect cockfighting rituals, but are embedded within them. Police practices and informal rules work in concert to shape fighters' second‐order beliefs. These beliefs have implications for participants' understanding of central concepts, including order, disorder, and illegality. Examining legal consciousness from a second‐order perspective also underscores that notions of legitimacy are constantly created and recreated. Recognizing legitimacy's inherently relational nature helps us understand how experiences of law are synthesized into beliefs—for example, when an unusual police action directed toward a subgroup of fighters compromised the law's legitimacy for them. Foregrounding the relational nature of legal consciousness offers scholars a means to better understand and operationalize the dynamic nature of human relationships to law.     

Globalization through the Lens of Palace Wars: What Elite Lawyers' Careers Can and Cannot Tell Us about Globalization of Law

Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth's three studies—Dealing in Virtue (1996), The Internationalization of Palace Wars (2002), Asian Legal Revivals (2010)—trace the globalization of law through “palace wars” among elites for positions in the “fields of state power.” They conclude that globalization occurs through links among elites engaged in their domestic palace wars, which independently establish the symbolic power of law in each state. The article argues that while Dezalay and Garth provide an invaluable new starting point for further research, they do not adequately consider an emerging field of research documenting alternative pathways of legal development pursued by local activists inside and outside the new states of the Global South.     

认识全球化的"问题化"进路——对中国法学"全球化论辩"中理论问题的追究与开放

对全球化本身做"问题化"理论处理首先便要求对中国法学的"全球化论辩"进行分析和反思,因此在本文中,我首先把中国法学之"全球化论辩"的"四步骤套路"转换成了一种参照性背景;其次通过把"全球化是经济全球化还是多维度的全球化"与"法律全球化"这两个问题转变成了对具体问题的分析进路,对中国法学的"全球化论辩"进行一般性的厘清和分析:在对中国法学两种对立的全球化论说的分析中,我批判了那种"经济主义"的全球化论说,认为全球化是一个多维度的既依凭民族国家又脱离民族国家的社会变迁过程;同时,本文也分析了与上述两种全球化学说紧密联系的中国法学学者有关"法律全球化"争辩之"肯定"、"否定"和"折衷主义"三种观点及其背后不同的理据。