The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on Revenue Volatility: Evidence from Colorado

Much of the research on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) focuses on the impact that limits have on the size of the public sector or the distribution of expenditures at the state and local levels. While these results shed light on the extent to which TELs succeed in reducing government spending, they do not have much to say about the impact of TELs on government budgeting or financial planning, despite the fact that voters support TELs in the hope of reducing government inefficiency (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1980; Ladd and Wilson 1982). This paper examines the effect of TELs on the stability of government revenues; sound tax policy entails controlling the volatility of revenues in order to plan more effectively for the future. Using panel data from Colorado's Division of Local Government as well as the Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, this paper examines the impact of Colorado's 1992 Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR) on local government finances. Results from difference‐in‐difference estimation suggest that TELs increase revenue and expenditure volatility.     

State Tax and Expenditure Limitations,Business Climate,and Economic Performance

The influence of state‐level tax and expenditure limitations on economic performance within the framework of the state's business climate is examined using a family of parametric and nonparametric tests of subsample equivalency. An index of tax and expenditure limitation strength or restrictiveness developed by Poulson is used to test for patterns in 84 separate measures of economic performance, business vitality, and development capacity. In general, we find no evidence that tax and expenditure limitations are associated with higher levels of economic performance or business climate. There is limited evidence that tax and expenditure limitations are associated with a poorer business climate and lower economic performance in some cases.     

Fiscal Structure and the Post-Proposition 13 Fiscal Regime in California's Cities

Two and a half decades after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, California state and local governments continue to feel the intended and unintended effects of tax and expenditure limitations. While considerable time has passed since voters enacted Proposition 13, the effects of the property tax revolt continue to be dramatic. This article examines the fiscal structure of California's city governments from 1972 to 2002. The analysis reveals that California's cities have become less reliant upon property tax revenues and more reliant upon charges and fees, and have not increased reliance upon sales tax revenues as much as expected.     

Tax and Spending Limits in Colorado

In 1992, Colorado voters approved the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR), which severely limits the growth of revenues and spending by state and local governments. TABOR was layered over two earlier revenue-restricting measures. Throughout the 1990s, the state enjoyed a robust economy and the effects of these restrictions were largely masked. However, government funding for several basic services in Colorado was rapidly slipping. When Colorado went into recession, the effects of these restrictions were fully felt for the first time, but neither the governor, legislature, nor policy nonprofits have been able to find a way out of the budget bind.     

Effects of the Form of Government and Property Tax Limits on Local Finance in the Context of Revenue and Expenditure Simultaneity

This paper examines the impact of the form of government and state‐imposed property tax limits on municipal finance. We suggest that municipal revenues and expenditures are determined concurrently and estimate revenue and expenditure functions as simultaneous equations. We use the instrumental variable approach and fixed effects to address revenue and expenditure endogeneity. By testing the model on a cross‐section of rich municipal data for fiscal year 2002, we find evidence that revenues and expenditures are simultaneously determined, that potentially binding state‐imposed property tax limits effectively restrict local revenues and that the form of government is a significant predictor of local expenditures.     

Constitutional Tax and Expenditure Limitation in Colorado: The Impact on Municipal Governments

Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) have become a pervasive influence on local government fiscal affairs. Explanations for the spread of TELs suggest that voters thought local government was growing more than needed. Thus, TELs were intended to constrain growth and reduce the size of local governments. This article's purpose was to determine the impact of two separate kinds of TELs, one a property tax measure, and the other a comprehensive revenue and expenditure limit, upon the growth of municipal governments in Colorado. Using a panel data set on municipal budgets (1975–1996), the article demonstrates three major points: 1) the effectiveness of a TEL in achieving reductions in local government revenue and spending growth depends upon the nature of the TEL; 2) the comprehensive TEL did effectively constrain growth and reduce local government reliance on the property tax, despite the local options for exemption; and 3) TELs do not have uniform impacts among governments of different population.     

Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments

This paper uses comprehensive data on state and local tax and spending limitations for forty-nine states between 1976 and 1990 to estimate the effects of these limits on the fiscal relationships between state and local government. Results indicate that tax and spending limits on local governments are only partially effective in reducing revenues because political agents bypass limitations by transferring revenue reliance to unconstrained revenue sources, or because unconstrained levels of government take on additional revenue responsibilities. In particular, the empirical analysis demonstrates that binding local government fiscal constraints are associated with reductions in local revenues and increases in state aid to local governments. In contrast, state government limitations are related to reductions in both state and local own source revenues.     

Budgeting during a Recession Phase of the Business Cycle: The Georgia Experience

This article describes the impact of the nation-wide recession on Georgia revenue and spending decisions in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal years. The state's strong economy and conservative revenue estimating practices historically provided a hedge against revenue shortfalls during a recession phase of the business cycle. However, when state revenue collections for FY 2002 were 5 percent less than collections for the prior fiscal year, several gap-closing measures became necessary, including state agency spending reductions and substitution of bond proceeds for tax revenues. These revenue and expenditure gap-closing measures were intended to enable the governor to achieve his policy initiatives while maintaining a balanced budget. The state's Rainy Day Fund remained full and was held in reserve for budget balancing in FY 2004, if necessary. Budget balancing during the current recession has been made possible by the state's practice of not overcommitting to program increases and tax cuts during the expansion phase of the business cycle, and by effectively framing the issue of fiscal restraint.     

State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties, 1990–1993: De Facto Federalism

States experienced considrable fiscal stress during the first four years of the 1990s. This has led to changes in five policy areas: (1) state financial aid; (2) local revenue diversification; (3) "sorting out" of responsibilities between the state and local governments; (4) tax and spending limitations; (5) and mandate relief. Some of the most significant changes occurred in California, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin.     

State Government Expenditure Determinants and Tax Revenue Determinants Revisited

The primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes; that the preferences of public officials, and the decision processes used to act on those preferences, matter. State government data (state only, not state and local) from 1980, 1985, and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models. A previous (Merrifield, 1991) state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables, but it was based only on 1985 data (49 observations). The larger data set (147 observations), including better data for some of the variables, indicated that most of Merrifield's (1991) findings are robust. The state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis, as well as the hypotheses about specific variables. The expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants, and comparisons with results published in the literature. Though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models, the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses.     

Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local Fiscal Effects

This article empirically investigates the effects of introducing statewide measures to limit the ability of local jurisdictions to raise revenue or make expenditures. It does so in intervals of five years over a 25-year period, using fiscal observations for 31,804 units of local government in 787 metropolitan counties across the contiguous United States. Specifically explored is the effect of tax and expenditure limitations on the variation in revenues and expenditures between general purpose governments and school districts within county areas. Rather than imposing a uniform constraint across jurisdictions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are associated with increased variation across both general purpose and school district revenues and expenditures and, by implication, increased service differentials. Effects are found to be asymmetric, with increased variation greatest within counties comprising the urban core and those with relatively more disadvantaged populations. The implications are that TELs are most constraining on the ability of governments serving economically less prosperous and at risk populations to meet public service needs. Such differential effects are of more than questionable merit and are the result of the application of blunt instruments to what is often an undemonstrated need. The outcome impairs both the efficiency and responsiveness of the local public sector.     

New Hampshire's tax-base limits: An example of the Leviathan model

This study views the lack of an income tax on wages and salaries and a general sales tax in New Hampshire as tax-base limits. I use the Leviathan model to analyze the differences between the fiscal system in New Hampshire and the fiscal systems in Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts. Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts do not have the tax-base limits that New Hampshire has. From 1957 to 1989, New Hampshire had lower state and local government tax and expenditure levels than the other three states, more rapid population growth, lower welfare expenditures but comparable levels of expenditures for several of the major public services, and a more competitive structure of state and local government.     

Capital Budgeting and Management Practices: Smoothing Out Rough Spots in Government Outlays

Public capital budgeting and management literature recommends long‐term capital and fiscal planning practices to prevent large fluctuations in outlays caused by fiscal stresses. This study extends the literature by examining the effects of long‐term capital planning and management practices such as the use of a capital budget, separate impact analyses, and the use of bond financing and dedicated revenue sources on capital spending volatility. The empirical results confirm that several of these practices smooth out state government capital outlays that vary because of socio‐economic and financial factors.     

Demokratie als öffentliches Gut?

Political Science neglect classical insights on constitutional and economic conditions of the so called “tax state” as a fiscal institutional architecture sui generis. While studies in Political Economy focus on distribution quality of the welfare state or compare budgets from local to international level fiscal research should also consider the capitalist structure of tax paradigm again. Only after such a regeneration the discipline could better reflect old and new democratic challenges of fiscal problems. Recalling former theories of interdependencies between fiscal, constitutional and ideological orders, this article suggests to make sense of conceptualizing democratic regime itself as prime public good. Because if it is fiscal sovereignty that is foremost to produce with democracy’s budget it should be easier to analyze tax state driven regressive effects of democratic integrity.     

State Tax Cuts of 1995: Is Something New Afoot?

Perhaps the hottest fiscal topic in state capitals in 1995 was tax cuts. When legislatures convened in January, it appeared possible that states were on the verge of an unprecedented wave of tax cuts. The Republican landslide of November 1994 swept into office many new governors and legislators who had campaigned on reducing taxes. Governor Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey was considered a role model by many of them. Perhaps state tax policy was about to take a major new direction. According to some reports, that is precisely what happened. For example, Stephen Moore, Director of Fiscal Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, wrote the following introduction to his overview of state tax policies:1 1995 is shaping up to be the biggest tax-cutting year in more than 10 years…. [T]he supply side philosophy that low tax rates and expenditure controls are the key fiscal tools to state economic competitiveness now appears to be the new governing philosophy in state capitals from Albany to Sacramento. The Pete Wilson, Lowell Weicker, Jim Florio soak-the-rich philosophy of the early 1990s has been nearly universally repudiated across the states. Meanwhile, “Whitmanomics,” named after tax-cutting Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey, is spreading rapidly to other states. In fact, there was a wave of state tax cuts in 1995 with about half of the states enacting reductions of some kind. But it appears premature to draw the strong conclusion that this marked a radical change in state fiscal policy. State legislatures trimmed or rejected most of the proposals for large tax cuts. Most of the 1995 tax cuts were small or modest in size Rather than a new departure, they are consistent with past policies at similar points in the business cycle. It is also possible, however, that something new really is afoot. Conservative anti-tax forces are gaining strength in the states, just as they are at the federal level. If it were not for prospective federal aid cuts, state tax policy really might become more conservative. But the shift of federal responsibilities to states will represent a formidable obstacle to large state tax cuts in the coming years. This article places the tax cuts of 1995 in perspective. It begins with a detailed discussion of ambiguities'in defining and measuring tax reductions and increases. This discussion can be applied to any time period and will remain relevant after concern     

The Political Economy of India's Fiscal Federal System and its Reform

This article examines recent and potential reforms in India'sfiscal federal system. We summarize key federal institutionsin India, including tax and expenditure assignments, and mechanismsfor Center–state transfers. We discuss the institutionalprocess by which reforms can and do take place, including therole of academics, political influences, and especially institutionssuch as the Finance Commission. In contrast to the past, recentcommissions have played a greater role in articulating an agendafor fiscal federal reform, which then proceeds through politicalbargaining. This change has taken place in the context of, andbeen influenced by, broader economic reform in India.     

Simulation of a Constitutional Spending Limit for a Conservative State: With Dynamic Adjustment and Sensitivity Analysis

Longstanding concern about the rate of state and local government spending growth, strengthened by “Great Recession” economic and fiscal conditions, sustains advocacy of constitutional amendments to cap the growth of state and local taxes or spending. For some states, interest recently changed to necessity, and current constitutional limits—most notably the California experience with the Gann Spending limit (1979–1990) and the Colorado experience with its Taxpayer Bill of Rights (1992‐present)—contain numerous valuable lessons for fiscal restraint proponents. We use those lessons, and others, to develop a constitutional spending limit (CSL) for Utah, and describe a CSL simulation for the state for 1990–2009. In contrast to what an “Institutional Irrelevance Perspective” suggests for a politically conservative state such as Utah, we find that Utah would have seen large and robust CSL impacts from setting the spending growth rate at school‐age population plus inflation for K‐12 education funding, and at population plus inflation for remaining nonexempt state spending.¹ Those impacts include a reduced tax burden, sizable reserves to cope with emergencies, elimination of fiscal crises, and expanded personal income. Extensive sensitivity analysis identifies the key underlying factors and demonstrates the robustness of those findings. We compare the Utah results to a 1990–2009 CSL simulation for California, and a 1995–2009 CSL simulation for Ohio.     

The Case Against Balanced Budgets

A proposal by the Fahey government in late 1994 to amend the NSW state Constitution so as to require 'balanced' budgets is one of a number of signs which suggest that the simple notion that total government expenditure should not exceed total tax revenue has gained real influence in Australia, particularly at the state level. This article explains why fiscal responsibility does not require overall budget balance. A balanced budget requirement of this type is not appropriate even if one were to make allowances for recession-induced ('cyclical') deficits, and to seek to ban only 'structural' deficits. The reason for this is there are inherent irregularities in capital expenditure, and only through varying debt levels is it possible to reconcile reasonable stability of tax levels with stable levels of provision of public services (including services from public capital infrastructure).     

The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of Local Finances

Diminished local government autonomy and increased fiscal centralization in the hands of state government are the consequences of the restrictions on the local property tax imposed in the western states in the past twenty years. While the trend is a national one, it is more evident in the West than in other regions. Statewide voter initiatives account for some of the restrictions, particularly the more severe ones, but legislatures and governors also impose these limitations. In tracing the recent course of the centralization of local finance, this article details the property tax restrictions adopted in individual western states, examines the initiative and conventional legislative sources of these actions, and provides quantitative and qualitative evidence for the centralization thesis. In many western states the property tax has lost much of its local character, becoming in large part a fiscal and political tool for state policymakers.     

Worldwide experience in sales taxation: Lessons for North America

Worldwide fiscal experience over the past twenty-five years indicates steady expansion in the political and academic constituency for expenditure taxation, including indirect taxes on consumption. Retail levies have emerged as the preferred method of indirect taxation of consumption, as older, pre-retail sales taxes have proven unsuited to modern economic structures. Increasingly, reform of sales taxation has involved a shift to one particular form of tax, the European Community type of value-added tax (VAT). This consumption tax option is again a topic of policy debate in North America, particularly in Canada where a VAT was under active consideration in 1985.This paper sifts through worldwide experience with broad-based sales taxes to identify lessons for tax policy in North America both in the short and longer-run. It indicates that the reputation of such taxes as regressive instruments may have been much exaggerated, and that in any case methods are available, particularly in Canada, for resolving equity issues in sales taxation. The VAT is shown to have marginal economic and administrative advantages over single-stage federal retail taxes in both Canada and the US. However, these advantages are not nearly so significant as in European countries where the VAT was adopted there. Further, sensible debate over the merits and limitations of the VAT in North America will call for much closer scrutiny of the problems unique to this form of tax. Finally, three political issues that were not significant in Europe will likely have an important bearing on any future choices of sales tax instruments, both in the U.S. and in Canada.