Transnationalizing democracy promotion: The role of Western political foundations and think‐tanks

Promoting democracy has developed into a common activity performed by a variety of actors in the post‐cold war world. While it is states and international institutions that receive most of the attention devoted to this increasingly important issue‐area, other non‐state actors also engage in democracy promotion. This article examines the activities of two such actors: political foundations ‐ quasi‐governmental organizations established in a number of advanced states ‐ and think‐tanks ‐ private institutions traditionally engaged in research and policy advocacy. It argues that the role and impact of these actors deepen the transnationalization of democracy promotion, which has important consequences for the international politics of democratization and international relations more generally.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

Indonesia Returns to the International Stage: Good News for the United States

Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country, third largest democracy and home to the world's largest community of Muslims, has returned to the international stage. Indonesia's membership in a number of important global communities-it resides physically in Asia but is part of the broader Muslim world, the developing world, and the community of democracies-makes it an important international actor. Many Americans assume that common democratic values will translate into shared foreign policy goals and cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. The two countries do share significant interests, such as counter terrorism, maritime security, and a wariness of China, but also hold starkly different positions on the Middle East peace process and global trade issues. Democracy provides opportunities for the two-thirds of Indonesians who hold anti-American views to influence foreign policy, making it costly for Indonesian leaders to cooperate with the United States. Indonesia's return is good news for America, but the relationship needs to be managed skillfully to maximize benefits for both sides.     

On flexible containment

The doctrine of containment has been a principal element of American foreign policy for four decades. But there has been a major change in the Communist world; it is no longer a monolithic bloc. Many Marxist governments, including some Communist regimes, are not satellites or allies of the Soviets. Indeed, some are more anti‐Soviet than many noncommunist states. Yugoslavia and China do not serve Soviet expansionism; their security and economic interests are closer to the West. More and more Communist regimes, faced with mounting social and economic difficulties, must turn to the West, which has so much more to offer in the economic and technological spheres. Consequently, differentiation and disintegration within the Communist alliances are inevitable. Pluralism in the Western democracies is a source of strength. In despotic countries and blocs, pluralism would sound the death knell of tyranny and of despotic centralization.

The emergence of Gorbachev as a dynamic leader flexible in his relations with noncommunist countries makes the rigid containment practices of the postwar decades decidedly outdated and counterproductive. The international chessboard has become a game of movement, sensitivity, and subtlety. Consequently, the United States should use in its international relations the concept of pluralism that we have used so successfully at home. This means differentiation among the various Marxist regimes, calibrating our policy with flexibility toward each country's policy and situation affect our national interests.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

U.S.—Soviet relations: The global village and the free flow of information∗

For the past sixty‐seven years, the Council on Foreign Relations has dedicated itself to enlarging the public dialogue on matters affecting U.S. foreign policy and international affairs. This effort is to be commended. It stands as a testimony to your strong sense of civic responsibility, and it illustrates yet another way in which America's private and public sectors cooperate in matters of national concern.

Forty‐one years ago, Foreign Affairs published the landmark article—"Mr. X"— calling for a bold new approach to the challenges of the post‐war world. At that time, the international structure and order inherited from the nineteenth century had collapsed, and attempts to replace it were directed from two philosophically distinct and antagonistic power centers. This was the era of the Cold War.

America met those challenges with a sense of daring and determination. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO—these stand as testimonials to imaginative leadership and effort. The renewed vitality of Western Europe and Japan—protected by the shield of a strong and effective deterrence—are a measure of its success.

Today, America faces another historic challenge occasioned neither by war nor post‐war dislocations. Rather, it results from changes set in motion by a new and powerful dynamic which in recent years has exploded onto the world scene—the grand spectacle of the Information Revolution.     

Feedback loops in a world of complexity: a cybernetic approach at the interface of foreign policy analysis and international relations theory

Feedback in foreign policy occurs when a state's foreign policy affects the international context of that state and those changes in context subsequently impact on the state's future foreign policy decisions. In this way, feedback loops can develop, which may become self-reinforcing and in which foreign policy and international context continuously affect each other. Even though such processes are ubiquitous especially in a globalized world, they have hitherto received little systematic attention. We introduce cybernetics as a perspective that puts such feedback effects at the centre of attention and provides an accessible sequential framework for analysing them. Such a cybernetic analysis not only demonstrates the significance of feedback processes in foreign policies but also speaks to several recent debates in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. In particular, it highlights processes of learning and change, of non-linearity and indeterminacy, and enables the researcher to integrate insights from structure- and agency-based approaches. We outline the merits of a cybernetic analysis by discussing the effects of feedback in the United States' War on Terror.     

Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence in Perspective

ABSTRACT

Small states are just as easily seduced by status and glory as other states. When conceived as situated in a stratified international society, small states acquire an inherent tendency to overcome their disadvantage in conventional power terms through the pursuit of status. Hence, it is precisely because of their position in the international hierarchy, not in spite of it, that strategic ideas based on state size stimulate foreign policy change in small states. This mechanism provides an explanation to the question why the small state of Qatar has pursued such a high-profile diplomatic strategy since its emergence in the late 1990s.     

Israeli-Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications

The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, culminating in the “Gaza flotilla” affair of June 2010, are part of a reorientation in the Turkish foreign policy over the past several years: a move away from the West and toward Muslim states and non-state groups, including such radical actors as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. This article reviews the rationale for the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. It then documents deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. Next it examines how changes in Turkey's twenty-first century strategic environment, as well as in the domestic arena, led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. And finally, it assesses the impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

试析文莱对外关系的特点

1984年1月1日独立后,文莱从本国实际出发,积极利用各种有利条件发展对外关系。在政治交往中,广泛参与各种国际组织和地区性组织,发展与世界各国的友好关系;在经济层面上,利用本国的资源优势扩大与世界各国的经济往来;同时加强与穆斯林世界的友好交往,从而在国际交往中获得主动,维护国家利益。     

Concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism: narrating the self-reform of the Muslim Other

Since 9/11, the terrorist is often awarded the position of the radical Other: the personified existential threat to the West. The counterterrorism strategy presented by the Danish government describes itself as covering a ‘broad spectrum’ of efforts. It includes an ‘active foreign policy’ in relation to the Muslim world and an ‘active integration policy’ in relation to Muslim migrants. Both inside and outside the nation-state, efforts range from ‘hard power’ security strategies of elimination and control involving military, police and intelligence operations, to ‘soft power’ strategies of information, partnerships and dialogue. This article analyses Danish counterterrorism policy narratives to identify the concepts of dialogue implied and the positions awarded to less-than-radical Muslim Others. This article finds that Muslims might – especially after the Danish Muhammad cartoon affair – in counterterrorism dialogue find a position for talking back, even if it is still a position circumscribed by control and securitisation.     

How to Change Your Foreign Policy in 100 Days: A New Course with the Prodi Government?

Conventional wisdom has it that the new government of Romano Prodi managed to effect a significant “shift” in Italy's foreign policy away from the course of the centre-right in the proverbial first 100 days of government. A number of discontinuities with the foreign policy of the Berlusconi government have been invoked, ranging from Italy's relations with Europe and its transatlantic posture, to its engagement with areas of crisis such as the Middle East. But these claims have to be substantially qualified. In fact, it appears that the foreign policy of the Prodi government has rather pragmatically blended elements of change and continuity, and that the shift which has occurred in some areas should be understood more as a combination of domestic and international developments than a result of the change in government alone. Moreover, in order to really change Italy's foreign policy – and change it for the better – the government should focus on a different set of priorities, mainly the institutions, instruments, politics, and ideas of foreign policy.     

American foreign policy: A look ahead

The author reviews recent foreign policy achievements of the U.S. government. Relations with PRC and USSR are seen as having set the stage for further lessening of hostilities. The strong centres of power emerging in Europe and Japan are seen as requiring new frameworks for increasing cooperation, particularly in the areas of military deterrence vis‐à‐vis adversarial power centers and in the establishment of new and more equitable monetary and trading relationships. Relations with Third World countries are discussed. A large thrust of American foreign policy in the coming years is seen as devoted to the creation of a stable international system which is less dependent on the contribution of the United States.     

Russia's economic and strategic interests in North-East Asia

  Since the middle of the 1990s and especially after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency Russia started to pursue an active foreign policy in North East Asia, an area considered vital for Russian national political, economic and strategic interests. While continuing to use every available method to conduct this policy Moscow placed special emphasis on promoting economic cooperation with the neighboring states, not in the least because of the development needs of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The current trends on the world energy market as well as the growing energy requirements of Russia's neighbors help to make at this stage exploration of Russian rich energy resources in East Siberia and around the Sakhalin Island to be one of the most attractive areas of regional economic cooperation. Even though these developments help to meet some of the current Russian requirements in foreign investments and modern technologies Russia is clearly interested in extending the scope of regional cooperation to other areas as well. In particular, Russia is interested in promoting its industrial exports. Another prospective area of its cooperation with regional states may cover joint transport projects – from construction of international gas and oil pipelines to linking Russian and Korean railway systems.     

The latest Turkish–Greek détente: instrumentalist play for EU membership,or long‐term institutionalist cooperation?

The recent thaw in bilateral Greek–Turkish relations is promising, yet insufficient for future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. The main reason lies in the prevalence of instrumental‐strategic thinking on the part of both states. Neither Greece nor Turkey has approached the settlement of their disputes from a perspective that would imply an eagerness to build a collective identity based on the institutional norms of European international society as represented by the European Union. On the contrary, Europeanisation has not been an end in itself but a means for the materialisation of their preconceived national interests. The underlying motivation behind their attempts to reach a solution appears to have arisen from instrumental concerns vis‐à‐vis both the EU and each other. The dynamics of their independent relations with the European Union seem to have compelled them to come to a modus vivendi over these issues, since otherwise their relative status vis‐à‐vis the EU would likely deteriorate. This article will discuss the main aspects of the latest Turkish–Greek cooperation process within the framework of rationalist instrumentalist and sociological institutionalist debate in international relations theory. It will be contended that a lasting and long‐term cooperation between the two countries can only follow the formation of collective identities and common national foreign policy interests, particularly as they relate to the European Union framework.     

Refugee movements in the post-Cold War era

"This article briefly describes the scope and dimensions of contemporary refugee movements by analyzing some of the forces which shape these flows. Democratization, problems of nationality and minority rights, and structural, political, economic, environmental and social changes in the post-Cold War world (especially in large parts of the developing world and in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), are likely to result in growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in the years ahead. Refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly regarded not only as a major humanitarian challenge but as a political problem and a threat to the national security of Western states. Refugee policy involves much more than defining or adjudicating claims for asylum, safe haven and refugee status for those who seek to enter or stay in the West. It is now apparent that an effective response to these issues will have to involve major Western foreign policy and international actions." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Promotion of democracy as a foreign policy instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to international idealism

The promotion of democracy abroad was a much published issue in ‘European’ foreign policy during the 1990s. Based on five case studies, this article argues that the policy had very clear limitations to it. The limits were mainly imposed by the high priority given to security, and secondly they were the result of the institutional structure and the political‐bureaucratic culture of the European Community. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the policy declarations on democracy were not important to the European Community/European Union and to the member states. The issue was definitely important, but that was because it served other purposes. First, the promotion of democracy abroad was conceived as one among a number of instruments promoting European security in the post‐cold war era. Secondly, promotion of democracy internationally contributed to the higher profile in world affairs that Europe had sought since 1958. And thirdly, this international profile might have pushed the integration process forward within Europe.     

‘I'm glad I'm not a Saudi woman’: the First Gulf War and US encounters with Saudi gender relations

On 6 November 1990, nearly 50 Saudi women staged a protest against the ban on women operating motor vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Occurring in the midst of the First Gulf War, the women's protest was a political statement about the harsh restrictions placed on women in the Middle Eastern country which both reflected and influenced Saudi society’s encounter with their American allies during the war. When United States (US) military personnel flooded into Saudi Arabia during the war, they were shocked at the way American servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women throughout the country. This article explores Americans' reactions to their encounter with Saudi gender relations during the war and argues that the poor treatment of women in Saudi Arabia—which Americans dubbed ‘gender apartheid’—caused many Americans to question the longstanding US alliance with the conservative Muslim country. In doing so, US journalists, military personnel, scholars and the general public began to demand that concern about women's rights should be integrated seriously into US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.