Impact Assessment of EU Non‐Legislative Rulemaking: The Missing Link in ‘New Comitology’

Impact assessment (IA) has gone from an innocuous technical tool typically used in the pre‐legislative phase to an instrument at the heart of the European institutional machinery. However—in deviation from its roots as a tool governing delegated rulemaking in the US—most experience with IA in the EU has been gathered in a legislative context. Against the background of the recent evolution of the EU's old ‘comitology’ system into a two‐track system of delegated acts and implementing measures, this contribution discusses in three parts the ‘whys,’ ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of extending IA to ‘non‐legislative rulemaking.’ It explores various aspects of the rulemaking process that IA—if properly applied—could strengthen: consultation, control and quality.     

‘Caminante,no hay camino,se hace camino al andar’1: EU Citizenship,Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification

Abstract: This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the ‘judicial incrementalism’ that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI , the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter‐arguments to the proposal are discussed.     

European Agencies' Rulemaking: Powers,Procedures and Assessment

This article aims at identifying European agencies' rulemaking powers, mapping the procedures through which such powers are exercised and assessing the existing procedural arrangements. The first section analyses the main forms of European agencies' rulemaking. It shows, on the one hand, that not all European agencies are actually engaged in the adoption of administrative rules, on the other hand, that European agencies carrying out rulemaking activities tend to converge on two specific forms of rulemaking, namely participation in the adoption of binding implementing rules and regulation by soft law. The second section, devoted to mapping the procedures through which rulemaking powers are exercised, argues that the two main types of European agencies' rulemaking cannot be said to be subject to a really common procedural framework. In both cases, the emerging procedural rules implement the same principles of transparency and participation and rely on the same consultation mechanism, sometimes complemented by regulatory impact assessment. Yet, proceduralisation has an uneven development: while the establishment of a procedural discipline is quite common with reference to participation in the adoption of binding implementing rules, regulation by soft law remains largely under‐proceduralised. The last section proposes an assessment of the European agencies' rulemaking procedures. Two main shortcomings are identified: the asymmetry between the tendency to proceduralise the adoption of binding implementing rules and the parallel tendency to keep informal the process of adoption of soft law measures; and the too rudimental development of consultation.     

行政立法不作为研究

所谓行政立法不作为,是指特定行政立法机关未依照上位法的规定,未尽到合理的立法责任,在合适时间以合适的方式或者程序,展开立法创制、修订或废止活动的行为。行政立法不作为危及了公民、法人或者其他组织的权益以及社会公共利益,行政立法机关因此应该承担相应的法律责任。在控制行政立法不作为上,应该强化授权行政立法规则的完善以及妥当地处理好立法裁量权的使用,并加强行政自制、各级人民代表大会常务委员会和社会公众对立法不作为的监督。     

Beyond Kyoto: The EU's Contribution to a More Sustainable World Economy

The EU has been leading the world fight against climate change since the late 1990s. This activism on the international scene has served as a stimulus for a common action against global warming that has, in the last 10 years, become a world referent and the central issue in the EU environmental policy. The most relevant initiative is the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme (ETS), adopted in fulfilment of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, the EU adopted a new set of measures on climate and energy for the post‐Kyoto period (2013–2020). This new legal framework, coupled with the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, represents the EU's commitment to promote a more sustainable European and world economic model.     

Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the EU Member States contain substantially similar clauses, including free movement of capital and investor‐to‐state dispute resolution. Article 307 EC provides for the primacy of pre‐accession treaties over the EC Treaty and simultaneously requires the Member States to eliminate their mutual incompatibilities. The European Court of Justice has declared that free movement of capital clauses of Austrian and Swedish pre‐accession extra‐EU BITs are incompatible with the EC Treaty as they will impede any restrictions on the movement of capital imposed as future Community legislation. A similar ‘free movement of capital’ clause is present in all extra‐EU BITs of the Member States, whether pre‐ or post‐accession. Article 307, however, does not apply to the post‐accession treaties which are equally capable of contriving the same consequences of impeding the application of the EC Treaty. In addition, the application of intra‐EU BITs provides investors from BIT party states access to the investor‐to‐state dispute resolution which is not available to investors from the Member States who do not have BITs with those Member States. This is discrimination and may distort the principle of equal treatment within the EU. Furthermore, the newly acceding EU States are facing extensive arbitral claims for carrying out the BIT‐EU conflicting obligations within their respective territories.     

The European parliament and the co‐decision procedure: A reassessment

In this paper, I reassess the co‐decision legislative procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Specifically, I examine the dispute as to whether co‐decision enhanced or diminished the European Parliament's influence over EU law making. Employing a combination of formal analysis of the different stages of the procedure and evidence from its actual operation, I argue that Garrett and Tsebelis’ claim that co‐decision reduces Parliament's legislative powers is both theoretically and empirically unsupported. The implications for the Parliament's position within European politics are evaluated in the conclusion.     

欧盟461/2004反倾销规则研究

2004年3月,欧盟颁布了461/2004反倾销规则,该规则是对欧盟现行反倾销基本条例的最新补充.该规则对欧盟原反倾销法律实体和程序方面进行的修改,充分体现了近年来国际上关于反倾销立法的潮流:反倾销作为WTO允许的贸易保护手段,其立法既应保证反倾销措施能有效地得以实施也应不断保持透明度.欧盟461/2004反倾销规则在这方面值得包括中国在内的其他WTO成员国借鉴.     

Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule‐Making Procedures: A Research Agenda

The existence or non‐existence of procedural rules for executive rule‐making in the EU is not merely a ‘technical’ question free of constitutional value choices. This article argues that constitutional principles, such as transparency, openness and participatory democracy, highlighted by the Treaty of Lisbon constitute decisive normative standards for the design of administrative procedures in the EU, with a considerable impact on substantive outcomes. We apply such principles to executive rule‐making procedures in the EU, highlight the salience of this discussion and argue that systematisation of executive rule‐making procedures is needed in order to implement constitutional principles in a complex and plural environment.     

The European Parliament in Treaty Reform: Predefining IGCs through Interinstitutional Agreements

Abstract:  Despite the fact that Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) are an established part of the mass of informal and formal rules structuring EU decision-making and interinstitutional relations, there is as yet no common understanding of their role and functions in the institutional and legal system of the EU—neither in political science nor legal studies. Tracking the evolution of the European Parliament's competencies in three areas where IIAs figure prominently—comitology, legislative planning, and the establishment of procedures to hold the Commission accountable—this article seeks to show that the European Parliament strategically uses IIAs as instruments to wrest competencies from the Council and the Commission. Having no formal say in treaty reform, the European Parliament 'creates facts' through informal but politically binding IIAs hoping that, once established, it can achieve a later codification of its new rights at IGCs. Viewed this way, the analysis of the role of IIAs in Treaty Reform could help to explain a still under-researched puzzle in European integration theory, namely the incremental parliamentarisation of the institutional system of the EU over the last two decades.     

Why Is Fast Track the Way to Go? Justifications for Early Agreement in the Co‐Decision Procedure and Their Effects

Since the introduction of the co‐decision procedure by way of the Maastricht Treaty, the procedure has been transformed considerably. One of the most striking innovations is the possibility to adopt a legislative act in first reading. This article aims to answer the questions whether the increasing use of this fast track procedure is in line with Treaty provisions and/or intra/inter‐institutional rules, and what the effects are of these stipulations. The empirical findings presented in this study indicate that two reasons for taking the fast track gain dominance in the practical political process, ie the political priorities of the Council and European Parliament (EP) and whether these actors consider a legislative file as urgent. From a study of two directives, it becomes clear that this dominance of factors has consequences for the type of early agreement reached (first or early second), the quality of the adopted legislation and its implementation at the national level.     

Pluralism,Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co‐equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’, a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault‐free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.     

From vocational training to education: the development of a no‐frontiers education policy for Europe?

This article focuses on developments towards an EU educational policy. Education was not included as one of the Community competencies in the Treaty of Rome. The first half of the article analyses the way that the European Court of Justice and the Commission of the European Communities between them managed to develop a series of substantial Community programmes out of Article 128 on vocational training. The second half of the article discusses educational developments in the community following the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Whilst the legal competence of the community now includes education, the author's argument is that the inclusion of an educational competence will not result in further developments to mirror those in the years before the Treaty on European Union. If the 1980s were a decade of expansion, the medium‐term future is likely to be one of consolidation.     

The Eurogroup,power and accountability

This article considers the role of the Eurogroup in EU decision‐making, a topic that is under‐theorised, more especially given its importance in the overall EU schema. The Eurogroup's power has grown very considerably, largely because of the enhanced role that it has been accorded as a result of the financial crisis, with the result that its power no longer accords with the Treaty provisions that specify its function. The article sets out the Treaty foundations of the Eurogroup, examines its role in EU decision‐making, the rationale for its increased power, and the extent to which it is politically and legally accountable.     

Non‐Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty: Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts

The reform of comitology and the introduction of the new instrument of delegated acts in the Lisbon Treaty were followed by protracted negotiations on the implementation of both articles. This article examines the resultant system that has emerged for both types of non‐legislative instruments. In the area of implementing acts, a new regulation sets out important changes: a reduction in the number of procedures, the extension of the scope to trade defence measures and the replacement of a referral to the Council with a new appeal committee. With respect to delegated acts, the search for an overarching framework resulted in a Common Understanding. Our analysis not only demonstrates the need to go beyond the treaty provisions in understanding the nature of non‐legislative rule making in the EU, but also emphasises the importance of informal procedures and non‐binding agreements in fully assessing the nature of non‐legislative rule making in this area.     

Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality

Abstract:  The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a complex new typology of acts, distinguishing between legislative, delegated and implementing acts. This reform, the first since the Treaty of Rome, will have an impact on some of the most contested topics of EU law, touching several central questions of a constitutional nature. This article critically analyses which potential effects and consequences the reform will have. It looks, inter alia, at the aspects of the shifting relation between EU institutions, the distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States, as well as the future of rule-making and implementation structures such as comitology and agencies.     

Security,privacy and freedom and the EU legal and policy framework for biometrics

The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the granting to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the same legal force as the Treaty has lent a new impulse to the consideration of fundamental human rights by the European Union (EU). The question remains, however, as to how this legal discourse, centred upon human rights, is actually shaping the EU regulatory framework in specific policy domains. The aim of this paper is to critically appraise the ways that the fundamental rights of security, privacy and freedom guaranteed by the Charter are being construed in the context of EU law and policy on biometrics, an ethically and morally sensitive security technology whose development and use are being actively promoted by the EU. We conclude that the interpretation of the pertinent rights, as well as their balancing, owes a great deal to the goals of EU policies for research and development, and under the auspices of Freedom, Security and Justice, shaped largely by political and economic considerations. These considerations then tend to prevail over ethically or morally-based legal claims.     

论规章制定中听证程序的完善

《规章制定程序条例》第14条确定了规章制定中的听证程序,但听证程序的适用范围、法律依据、法理内涵等都没有一个清晰的界定从而导致规章制定中听证程序极其不完善。基于此种现实我们对该问题作了较为系统的探讨,认为目前我国规章制定中听证程序在程序适用范围上的瑕疵是规章规制事项的有限适用、程序主体上的瑕疵是行政系统起主导作用、程序效力上的瑕疵是软约束力。因此,我国规章制定中听证程序必须符合下列要件：听证程序典则的法形式性、听证程序适用范围的普遍性、听证程序定位的正当程序性、听证程序效力的法强制性。     

EU Constitutionalism in Flux: Is the Eurozone Crisis Precipitating Centralisation or Diffusion?

The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to mark the end of an almost‐decade‐long period of treaty reform. After the tumult of the failed Constitutional Treaty, the settlement it imposed struck a sustainable balance between the competing forces of centralisation and the diffusion that characterise European integration. Yet this constitutional settlement is now threatened by the Eurozone debt crisis and official responses to it, most notably the proposed fiscal compact. A prevalent view regards the crisis as an opportunity to complete the process of political and economic union that the Maastricht Treaty began. However, this article cautions against such a view, which would jettison the post‐Lisbon Treaty constitutional settlement in favour a peculiar kind of German‐led, intergovernmental centralisation. Whether the crisis response measures achieve their stated aims remains to be seen, but the integration project will be reconfigured in the process. Thus, EU constitutionalism is bound to remain in a state of flux.     

The ECB's performance under the ESM treaty on a sliding scale of delegation

Two opposing theories explain the European Central Bank's (ECB) far‐reaching powers: principal‐agent and trusteeship. This article situates both theories on a sliding scale of delegation, with agents on one end of the spectrum, and trustees on the other. Applying this new perspective to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) allows us to understand how the ECB, positioned on the agent side of the scale by the ESM Treaty, slides towards the trustee side in practice. This way, the article identifies two problems. Firstly, the ECB assumes a ‘zone of discretion’ that is not captured by the control mechanisms, thereby disregarding an essential feature of delegation. Secondly, the rationale of the Meroni doctrine, judicial review, is disregarded given the insufficient protection against the ECB's actions. These findings become increasingly important with the long‐term aim to incorporate the ESM in the EU legal order.