Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal Concepts?

The article considers the reasons why the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judges need legal concepts when they pronounce their judgments. It points out that the ECJ as a law‐interpreting and an ipso facto law‐making court needs legal concepts to communicate results of its interpretative and law‐making enterprise. The article also shows how in the context of Article 234 EC preliminary ruling procedure legal concepts become useful tools of portraying ECJ judgments as mere products of interpretation and not as the results of subsuming the facts of the case into a legal provision. It is by means of application of legal concepts, that the ECJ judges are able to justify that they are not overstepping the mandate they have been entrusted with. In the same time the use of legal concepts enables them to engage in dialogue with national judges, who seek guidance as to the content of EC law rules, and to maintain a strong doctrine of precedent. Most importantly, however, the use of concepts promotes coherence which, the article maintains, is the primary source of Community law's authority, and thus constitutes the foundational technique of persuading the relevant audience that Community law is indeed a legal system.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Constitutional Pluralism Revisited

This essay revisits the theory of constitutional pluralism. This theory was first developed in the EU context as a way of understanding and defending the absence of a broadly agreed source of final authority in the relationship between national and supranational (EU) legal systems and their respective appellate courts in the context of the significant increase in supranational jurisdiction around the time of the Maastricht Treaty 25 years ago. The essay argues that the theory of constitutional pluralism remains relevant today, in particular offering better explanatory and justificatory accounts of the EU than any of the singularist (or monist), holist or federalist alternatives. Its continuing relevance, however, depends on a more explicit focus on the political underpinnings of the legal and judicial dimensions of constitutional pluralism than has typically been the case in the literature, and on more detailed consideration of the preconditions, forms and limits of constitutional initiative in the contemporary phase of unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy of the EU.     

The Law of the Land

This article considers the status of foreign precedents in national courts. It examines possible reasons for courts referring to them and concludes that, absent some incorporating convention, judges cannot ever be said to have an obligation to refer to them. But it also shows that there is nothing unprincipled about national courts choosing to treat foreign precedents as persuasive authority, notwithstanding that there are some good reasons, especially in the context of constitutional adjudication, for cautioning against this. It is also suggested that no satisfactory argument can be adduced to support the proposition that a national court must never rely on foreign precedent as the sole reason for modifying the indigenous common law – though it seems very unlikely that judges would ever need (still less want) to rely on foreign precedent in this way.     

Italian Courts,the ECJ and Transfers of Undertakings: A Multi-Speed Dialogue?

The paper seeks to analyse certain paradigmatic cases of dialogue—or, indeed, non-dialogue—between national judges and the ECJ, though within the (still possibly emblematic) limits of a focus on the law on the transfer of undertakings. The analysis is less concerned with portraying the detailed impact of the ECJ's decisions on the domestic legal order, and is focused more upon the 'modality' of the dialogue to date carried out between Italian and European judges. The logic, which guides this dialogue (or, the lack of its evolution), furnishes us with a better understanding of the production, circulation and impact of ECJ jurisprudence. This dialogue seems to be characterised, by non-uniform, or multi-speed, developments. On the one hand, Article 177 references have been concentrated around the theme of undertakings in critical difficulties or subject to a creditors' arrangement procedure. In this area, the Italian courts have engaged in explicit dialogue with the ECJ and have made the greatest effort to read—not without some technical-juridical struggle—the national norm in the light of the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive and its interpretation by the ECJ. By contrast, however, with regard to other specific issues (in particular, those concerning subcontracting) it is apparent that not only were the Italian courts (and the Corte di Cassazione in particular) loathe to enter into direct dialogue with the ECJ, but also that the ECJ's jurisprudence, built up through dialogue with other national courts, was not even consulted in an effort to guarantee an interpretation of national norms, in conformity with Community law.     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.     

Judicial Independence and Political Representation: Prussian Judges as Parliamentary Deputies, 1849–1913

The outrageous history of German judges during the Third Reich should not so structure historical research as to distract historians from examining their role in the nineteenth century. Prussian judges played an important role in electoral politics by serving as parliamentary deputies between 1849 and 1913. This essay poses and answers two questions: What was the political, legal, and social setting that led to judges sewing in parliament? And, why did their number decline after 1877? Theoretical discourses of separation of powers, construction of a Hegelian “general estate,” and independence of the judiciary converged with administrative‐legal‐constitutional developments in Prussia begun under the absolutism of the eighteenth century and professional and personal interests of judges to bring them into parliament, often as members of the liberal opposition. But success in the liberal project of building a national state, including legal reform, professionalization, and the advent of mass politics, reduced the need and attraction for judges in parliament, resulting in a decline after the 1860s.     

Breaking the Principle of Secrecy: An Examination of Judicial Dissent in the European Constitutional Courts

As “oracles of the law,” judges are trained to provide certainty and guidance within an often‐uncertain legal landscape. Nowhere is this statement truer than in the civil law tradition, where the idea of legal certainty has been prized as a “supreme value.” Despite this tradition, dissenting opinions are now quite common within most European constitutional courts. Using new data from five countries and interviews with constitutional court judges and clerks, I investigate factors that contribute to dissent on constitutional courts. Results indicate that legal and policy characteristics matter, but so do judicial backgrounds and the issues reviewed.     

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of “weak” and “strong” pluralism has to be reassessed because “weak” jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.     

Transnational Jihadism and the Role of Criminal Judges: An Ethnography of French Courts

Lower national courts are increasingly asked to perform a transnational role, being directly involved in major geopolitical issues such as conflicts, migration, and transnational terrorism. Based on an ethnography of French criminal courts, this article aims to examine this emerging role of national lower courts as transnationalized players. Through an examination of terrorism prosecutions in France and the positions of the different judicial actors, it is argued that lower criminal courts, acting within a transnational context, can offer more robust resistance to states’ policies than supreme courts. This is because of the routine and the banality of their function and the direct interaction with the accused persons coupled with the judges’ own professional ethos and notion of judicial independence. Unlike supreme courts, whose role is more visible, and thus under the constant scrutiny of the political branches of the state, lower courts can operate in a more distant, independent space.     

Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

The level of generality or of abstraction used to describe a precedent, a right, or the legislative intent behind a statutory provision or constituent purpose behind a constitutional provision can have a decisive impact on the outcome of a case. Characterising it in narrow terms has the effect of reducing the scope of decision of a judgment; conversely, a broader characterisation provides more leeway for a judge in a case to encompass its facts within the precedent, right or purpose in issue. The issue raised by the level of generality problem is the extent to which courts have a discretion or freedom of manoeuvre as to the level of generality they decide upon, and thus whether generality and abstraction are manipulable in the hands of judges and are not really predetermined by the legal sources in question or an established judicial method of interpretation. Uncontrolled judicial discretion of this kind is problematic from the point of view of the rule of law and democracy, especially when adjudication concerns constitutional provisions, the equivalent in the EU being interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the EU Treaties; reversal of ECJ interpretation through Treaty amendment is particularly difficult to achieve because it requires unanimous coordination by the Member States. This article examines two alternative ways of determining the correct or appropriate level of generality issue in ECJ interpetation, coherence or the legal traditions of the Member States, and argues in favour of the latter as a less subjective method. Application of the two alternative approaches is tested in two areas of EU law, state liability and criminal law.     

Constitutional Review in the Mega‐Leviathan: A Democratic Foundation for the European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves, among other things, as a constitutional court for the EU. This means that it possesses the legal right to strike down both EU and national laws it deems irreconcilable with treaty provisions. In the present article, we shall draw on Hans Kelsen's theory of democracy to argue that the ECJ's competence to review and invalidate legislation is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the EU's legal system as a whole.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

The National Judiciary—Sword of European Court of Justice Rulings: The Example of the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence

The role of the national judiciary in enforcing EC law, and particularly European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, has been largely neglected by empirical legal and political science research. Existing research has categorised the role of the national judiciary as either shielding national legislation from the ECJ or as serving as a ‘sword’ to foster integration and to force change on reluctant governments. This article sides with the second assumption and attempts to empirically assess it using the example of the patient mobility jurisprudence by the ECJ, the so‐called Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. The three case studies on France, the UK and Germany show that national courts played an important role in overcoming the resistance against this jurisprudence: via a multiplication of national court cases that contradicted domestic legislation they forced the legislator to end judicial uncertainty.     

Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges

One of the central controversies in the judicial behavior literature is the extent to which judges' ability to act according to their ideological preferences is affected by their location in the judicial hierarchy. Judges on intermediate appellate courts have different decisionmaking environments than high court judges. As a result, the goals of lower appellate court judges may differ from those of their superiors: the quest for legal accuracy may compete with the desire to pursue policy preferences. Analysis of the reversal rate of the U.S. circuit courts of appeals offers insight into the extent to which these judges balance the pressures of their own policy preferences with the desire to achieve the legally accurate result in cases they decide.     

Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People's Judges in South Russia

Which criteria do Russians use to evaluate the fairness of their judges, and how does perceived fairness of actual trials influence general beliefs about Russian courts? Lay assessors at courts in South Russia were asked about their experience serving on mixed courts. The justice of the verdicts rendered and the fairness of judges partly explain the respondents’ view of national courts. According to the results, the respondents are also using similar criteria for fairness as Americans or Germans. The social and psychological group effects in a Russian court of lay assessors exhibit a striking similarity to other Western tribunals.     

The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited

This article analyzes how the judicial politics sparked by the European Union's (EU) legal development have evolved over time. Existing studies have traced how lower national courts began cooperating with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply EU law because this empowered them to challenge government policies and the decisions of their domestic judicial superiors. We argue that the institutional dynamics identified by this ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ proved self‐eroding over time, incentivizing domestic high courts to reassert control over national judicial hierarchies and to influence the development EU law in ways that were also encouraged by the ECJ. We support our argument by combining an analysis of a dataset of cases referred to the ECJ with comparative case study and interview evidence. We conclude that while these evolving judicial politics signal the institutional maturation of the EU legal order, they also risk weakening the decentralized enforcement of European law.     

Interpretation of Law and Judges Communities

The principle of omnia sunt interpretanda refers to the derivational conception and derivational theory of interpretation. The principle appears in disputes concerning the role of a judge in the process of interpretation, and this has produced an effect that Polish theory of law is currently getting closer to the conceptions presented in the American debate on activism and textualism. In the practice of jurisdiction, the principle of omnia sunt interpretanda is mostly invoked outside theoretical context. It becomes a manifestation of a new dimension of judicial independence, namely an independent authority over the meaning of legal text. In the following paper the legal cultures and legal theories involved in the dispute are being disclosed in order to put in question the possibility of achieving a clear result of interpretation against a background of a crisis of the relations between law and law-making state, which manifests itself in the peculiar process of legal institutions becoming autonomous in relation to state institutions. In this context, the aforementioned principle constitutes the manifestation of the way in which courts come up with a new definition of the role of the third (sui generic) power. The certain organizational requirements placed upon the courts (especially the SAC and provincial administrative courts) are being scrutinized in order to find out in which mode it is possible to at least reduce the degree of inconsistency of the results of interpretation. Here, the attempt to organize a community of judges for the activities of legal interpretation undertaken by them plays a crucial role.     

Pluralism,Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co‐equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’, a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault‐free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.     

Pluralism and Integrity

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This paper argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The integrity and coherence of European law is best preserved by considering that both the national legal order and the international or European legal orders adopt sophisticated views of their own limits.