National-Level Family Policies and workers’ Access to Schedule Control in a European Comparative Perspective: Crowding Out or In,and for Whom?

Abstract

This paper examines national-level family policies in a comparative perspective, to see whether they “crowd out” company-level family-friendly policies, namely schedule control. Further, it examines whether this relationship varies for different types of family policies, and for different groups of workers – i.e. distinguished by gender, parenthood status and skill divisions. The paper uses data from 27 European countries in 2010, and applies multilevel random slopes models with cross-level interaction terms. Results show that generous national-level family policies, in particular work-facilitating policies, “crowd in” company-level schedule control provisions, especially for high-skilled workers. However, very generous leave entitlements seem to crowd out schedule control provision.     

Expanding the scope and content of morality policy research: lessons from Moral Foundations Theory

Scholars have not precisely defined morality policy, and Smith (Policy Stud J 30(3):379–395, 2002) urged an empirical taxonomy be used to identify those policies. We argue that Moral Foundations Theory offers a methodology for empirically identifying issues with moral content. We inventory 15 issues in parliamentary studies of “conscience” voting, 14 morality policies in western democracies compiled by Studlar (in: Mooney (ed) The public clash of private values: the politics of morality policy, Chatham House Publishers, New York, 2001), and then survey MFT empirical studies to identify 22 issues with moral content. Based on this universe of 37 issues, three journals are content analyzed to determine the coverage given them and to outline productive lines for future research.     

Liberal Versus Conservative Stinks

In a recent Public Opinion Quarterly article “Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony?,” John Zipp and Rudy Fenwick pit themselves against “right-wing activists and scholars,” citing our scholarship (Klein and Stern in Academic Questions 18(1): 40–52, 2005a; Klein and Western in Academic Questions 18(1): 53–65, 2005). Here, we analyze Zipp and Fenwick’s characterization of our research and find it faulty. We, then, turn to their self-identification “liberal vs. conservative” findings and show they concord with our analysis. If one feels that it is a problem that humanities and social science faculty at 4-year colleges and universities are vastly predominantly democratic voters, mostly with views that may called establishment-left, progressive, or status-quo oriented, then such concerns should not be allayed by Zipp and Fenwick’s article. We commence the article with a criticism of the “liberal versus conservative” framework because it is the source of much of the confusion surrounding controversies such as the one over the ideological profile of faculty.     

On credit and blame: disentangling the motivations of public policy decision-making behaviour

While the idea that policy-makers are motivated by the desire to earn “credit” for their work has a long history, policy studies since Weaver (J Public Policy 6(4):371–398, 1986) have also used the concept of “blame” to help understand these often observed but little studied aspect of policy decision-making activity. Observed credit- and blame-related activities range from the agenda-denial behaviour of politicians to the use of policy evaluations to paint overly positive pictures of the effectiveness of policy efforts. Despite their frequent invocation by analysts, however, the status of “blame” and “credit” and their component parts is not well understood and different uses and conceptions of the term abound in the policy literature. This article addresses three issues surrounding the concepts which require clarification: first, the relationship between “blame” and “credit” as motivators of policy agents and activities; second, the related but not synonymous behavioural notions of “blame avoidance” and “credit claiming” and their relationship to more primordial ideas of “blame” and “credit”; and third, the notions of “reactive” versus “anticipatory” blame avoidance and credit claiming. The article develops a framework to help move the discussion of these three issues and of the basic concept forward. It argues that blame especially should be studied more widely from the view of the public as well as that of the public official, and that both concepts should be analysed as part of the larger issue of the legitimation of public actions, rather than, as is often the case, solely as an aspect of the utilitarian calculations and risk management activities of politicians and officials.     

“Illegalizing” Families: State,Status, and Deportability NPS Christian Bay Best Paper Award Winner,APSA 2018, Boston

There is a paradox within United States immigration policy. Immigration policy separates families while also promising family unity. We address this paradox by arguing that state actors use “family” as a state-granted status. The state perceives some households as families and grants them benefits, while forcing other households to live as legal strangers. Individuals may form familial relationships, but the privileges and status of family are controlled by state actors and institutions. When state actors separate low-wage immigrant worker families, the state's family-status-granting power keeps these workers and their families in a state of “deportability”-a legally ambiguous limbo-satiating business interests and securing a captive low-wage workforce. Lacking legal legitimacy, but financially and socially tied to their families and communities in the U.S., these immigrants have few options but to accept off-the-radar work and to raise their children while living as “outlaws.”     

The politics of beer: analysis of the congressional votes on the beer bill of 1933

Nine days after he took office in March 1933, Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to amend existing federal Prohibition policy so as to allow for the sale and consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. Over the following 8 days, the so-called “beer bill” was proposed, debated, passed and signed into law. This study analyzes the political decision making behind one of FDR’s earliest New Deal policies. Specifically, we consider how voter preferences, representatives’ ideologies, national party affiliations, and the influence of special interests affected legislative decision making. We find that special interests and party affiliations were particularly important drivers of congressional voting behavior.     

Children,COVID, and confusion: How frontline workers cope with the challenges of vaccine mandates

With the emergence of COVID-19, many governments around the world co-oped non-health actors into enforcing comprehensive mandatory vaccination policies. Implementing these policies can be challenging, creating irreconcilable goals and problems with knowledge and understanding of areas outside the implementers’ direct field of expertise or scope of work. We know very little about how such frontline workers cope with these challenges associated with implementing policies whose goals lie well outside their remit (which we describe as generating exogenous policy pressures), and what this means for the operation of the policies. This article uses policies in place prior to the pandemic to fill this gap. It examines attitudes and experiences of frontline childcare educators who implement Australia's No Jab, No Play childhood vaccine mandate policies within the states of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria. Through qualitative analysis of interview and focus group data, we find that these frontline workers cope with moral conflict, confusion, and a lack of knowledge by moving against clients: they rigidly follow the rules beyond legislative requirements, and sometimes break them, generating a new coping category we call ‘rigid rule breaking’. However, their need to employ coping strategies is informed by the extent to which government has designed the policy to coerce the behaviour of the providers, families, or both. The implementation of more coercive variants of No Jab, No Play policies deviates more from what legislators intended, while providers given scope to make their own decisions about enrolling unvaccinated children report satisfaction in their decision-making.

Points for practitioners

• Australian state mandatory vaccination policies generally require childcare providers to exclude unvaccinated children.
• Street level bureaucrats face pressures when implementing coercive policies exogenous to their remit.
• They may simplify policy implementation in ways that counter governments’ goals.
• Actors given more discretion about passing on coercion to policy targets demonstrate better understanding and ownership of policies.

     

Informal Service Access in Pro-Cyclical Welfare States: A Comparison of Electricity Theft in Slums and Regular Residential Areas of Montevideo

Abstract

It is often thought that political incumbents in developing countries abandon the poor during economic crises because of narrow and pro-cyclical welfare policies. In contrast to that view, this article argues that informal transfers for those excluded from the welfare state represent an example of “social policy by other means”. During dire economic conditions, democratic incumbents, who need the support or acquiescence of dislocated groups, expand irregular access to the electricity service counter-cyclically. Comparative time series data from slums and residential areas of Montevideo show that electricity losses respond to the political provision of both informal social insurance and informal redistribution.     

Serving Clients When the Server Crashes: How Frontline Workers Cope with E‐Government Challenges

Implementing e‐government in the contemporary American state is challenging. E‐government places high technical demands on agencies and citizens in an environment of budget austerity and political polarization. Governments developing e‐government policies often mobilize frontline workers—also termed “street‐level bureaucrats”—to help citizens gain access to services. However, we know little about how frontline workers cope in these challenging circumstances. This article fills this gap by examining frontline workers implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Based on a qualitative analysis, the authors find that frontline workers “move toward clients” when coping with stress: they bend the rules, work overtime, and collaborate in order to help clients. They are less inclined to “move away” or “move against” clients, for instance, through rigid rule following and rationing. In other words, frontline workers try to serve clients, even “when the server crashes.” Frontline workers, then, can play a vital role in the successful implementation of e‐government policies.     

The Democratic Deficit in the States

We study how well states translate public opinion into policy. Using national surveys and advances in subnational opinion estimation, we estimate state‐level support for 39 policies across eight issue areas, including abortion, law enforcement, health care, and education. We show that policy is highly responsive to policy‐specific opinion, even controlling for other influences. But we also uncover a striking “democratic deficit”: policy is congruent with majority will only half the time. The analysis considers the influence of institutions, salience, partisan control of government, and interest groups on the magnitude and ideological direction of this democratic deficit. We find the largest influences to be legislative professionalization, term limits, and issue salience. Partisanship and interest groups affect the ideological balance of incongruence more than the aggregate degree thereof. Finally, policy is overresponsive to ideology and party—leading policy to be polarized relative to state electorates.     

The State as Architect of Political Order: Policy Dynamics in German Health Care

The focus of this article is on the state as an actor that can create, rearrange or even destroy established structures of interest representation. Through small, often almost overlooked, and sometimes even failed interventions, governmental policies create a legacy that can serve as a springboard for further political action. This policy dynamic is triggered by “architectural” activities of the state, aiming at the structure of the interest group system. This kind of policy bears the potential not only to manipulate the structure, but also the preferences and strategies of interest groups so as to overcome their veto-power. The case of German health care reform policies since the late 1970s is used to illustrate how suck a kind of governmental “design” has exerted a decisive impact on the structure of the policy field, culminating in an unexpected legislative success for the federal government.¹     

Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?

The purpose of political campaigns in democracies is to provide voters with information that allows them to make “correct” choices, that is, vote for the party/candidate whose proposed policy or “position” is closest to their ideal position. In a world where political talk is often ambiguous and imprecise, it then becomes important to understand whether correct choices can still be made. In this paper we identify two elements of political culture that are key to answering this question: (i) whether or not political statements satisfy a so-called “grain of truth” assumption, and (ii) whether or not politicians make statements that are comparative, that is contain information about politicians’ own positions relative to that of their adversaries. The “grain of truth” assumption means that statements, even if vague, do not completely misrepresent the true positions of the parties. We find that only when political campaigning is comparative and has a grain of truth, will voters always make choices as if they were fully informed. Therefore, the imprecision of political statements should not be a problem as long as comparative campaigning is in place.     

The effect of legislature size on public spending: evidence from a regression discontinuity design

What is the effect of legislature size on public spending? An answer to this question is provided by Weingast et al. (J Polit Econ 89(4):642–664, 1981), whose “law of 1/n” posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending. Because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies, and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects, but only bear a fraction of the costs (projects are financed from the common tax base), fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives. In this paper, I test the validity of the “law of 1/n” using a dataset of 9325 German municipalities between 2008 and 2010. Through the application of a regression discontinuity design, many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for German municipalities can be determined. The results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies, which generally supported the implications of the “law of 1/n”. For the years 2008–2010, I find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in German municipal councils.     

Elk management and policy in southern Greater Yellowstone: Assessing the constitutive process

The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, USA, is recognized globally as a model for land and wildlife conservation, management, and policy. A major policy problem in the region is the highly contentious winter feeding of elk (Cervus elaphus) on 23 government feed grounds in western Wyoming through cooperative management under several state and federal agencies. Numerous non-governmental groups and concerned citizens are also affected by elk management or seek to contribute to management policies. The long-term controversy shows that this issue centers on how management and policy should be made and who should be involved in decision-making—the constitutive policy process. This paper examines and appraises the constitutive process in this case, including how competency, authority, and control are allocated. It also looks at how institutions, analytic techniques, procedures, and people are structured, selected, and included or excluded in decision-making processes. Our data come from a multi-method approach over the past decade, including participant-observation, historical literature, interviews, media analysis, and technical reports. Our analysis shows that institutional dynamics severely constrain the scope of deliberations, the production of practical problem definitions, and the search for improvements in elk management. We recommend that participants focus on the constitutive level of policy making, i.e., the underlying structure and functioning of policy processes, learn how these elements function and affect processes and outcomes, and learn to configure them in ways that embody democratic principles, serve common interests, and resolve policy problems.     

A novel understanding of experimentation in governance: co-producing innovations between “lab” and “field”

What do experiments do for governance? Along with pragmatist and performative conceptions, we argue that they do not test already existing conditions of governing, but actively transform such conditions. Experiments help to realize specific models of governance by co-producing collective knowledge and material practices. We analyze a series of experiments with “emissions trading” in the USA between 1968 and 2000. The historical perspective shows how different types of experiments worked together: experiments in the laboratory and in the field supported each other in creating epistemic and political authority. This “ping-pong between lab and field” produced subjects and objects, facts and values, knowledge and power and aligned them in a new socio-material configuration, thus realizing emissions trading as a new form of governance.     

Better than Nothing: How Policies Influence Political Participation in Low‐Capacity Democracies

A growing body of policy feedback work demonstrates that citizens' experiences with public policy influence the way they participate in politics. Most of this work takes place in advanced industrial democracies, but the nuances of policy design influencing participation in advanced democracies are often irrelevant for those in low‐capacity democracies. This study extends the policy feedback framework to address how policies might “feed back” differently in low‐capacity countries with uneven basic service delivery. In low‐capacity democracies, the most salient distinction is between those who have access to basic state‐provided services and those who do not. Using original data collected in Zambia, it demonstrates that those who have even marginal access to state services have higher levels of political engagement and political participation than those without access, indicating that imperfect extension of services may help boost democratic citizenship in developing countries.     

Born Weak,Growing Strong: Anti‐Government Protests as a Signal of Rebel Strength in the Context of Civil Wars

All rebel organizations start weak, but how do they grow and achieve favorable conflict outcomes? We present a theoretical model that allows for rebel organizations to gain support beyond their “core” and build their bargaining power during fighting. We highlight that rebel organizations need to win over crucial parts of society to generate the necessary support that allows them to attain favorable civil conflict outcomes. We find empirical support for the argument that low‐income individuals who initially fight the government (rebel organizations) have to convince middle‐class individuals to turn out against the government to gain government concessions. Empirically, we demonstrate that government concessions in the form of peace agreements and the onset of negotiations become more likely when protest occurs in the context of civil conflicts.

Replication Materials

The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MYDZNF .

     

Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976–1998

Do “niche” parties—such as Communist, Green, and extreme nationalist parties—adjust their policies in response to shifts in public opinion? Would such policy responsiveness enhance these parties' electoral support? We report the results of statistical analyses of the relationship between parties' policy positions, voters' policy preferences, and election outcomes in eight Western European democracies from 1976 to 1998 that suggest that the answer to both questions is no . Specifically, we find no evidence that niche parties responded to shifts in public opinion, while mainstream parties displayed consistent tendencies to respond to public opinion shifts. Furthermore, we find that in situations where niche parties moderated their policy positions they were systematically punished at the polls (a result consistent with the hypothesis that such parties represent extreme or noncentrist ideological clienteles), while mainstream parties did not pay similar electoral penalties. Our findings have important implications for political representation, for spatial models of elections, and for political parties' election strategies.     

From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

When regulators are faced with practical challenges, policy instrument choice theories can help them find the best solution. However, not all such theories are equally helpful. This paper aims to offer regulators a better alternative to the current policy instrument choice theories. We will specifically address the shortcomings of “smart regulation theory” and present an alternative that keeps the best of that theory while remediating its weak points. Some authors (Böcher and Töller 2003; Baldwin and Black 2008) say that smart regulation theory does not address institutional issues, compliance type-specific response, performance-sensitivity and adaptability of regulatory regime. We have resolved these problems by merging the smart regulation theory with the policy arrangement approach and the policy learning concept. We call the resulting approach “regulatory arrangement approach” (RAA). The central idea of the RAA is to constrain the almost infinite “smart” regulatory options by: the national policy style; adverse effects of policy arrangements of adjoining policies; the structure of the policy arrangement of the investigated policy and competence dependencies of other institutions. The reduction can be so drastic that the potential governance capacity falls below the smart regulation threshold. In other words, no smart regulatory arrangement can be developed in that institutional context unless policy learning occurs. In addition, a “smart” regulatory arrangement is no guarantee that the policy will succeed. For this reason, the performance of the regulatory arrangement is measured and evaluated. Performance below a certain threshold indicates that the regulatory arrangement needs to be adapted, which then results in policy learning. We illustrate the usefulness of this new approach with a secondary analysis of the Flemish sustainable forest management policy.