Accredited to Africa: British diplomatic representation and African experience,c. 1960–95

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Red Star Ascending,Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

Adaptation and the foreign policy bureaucracy: The experience of federal states

Members of the Commonwealth do not use the title ‘ambassador’ for the heads of diplomatic missions which they send to one another. Instead, they use the title ‘high commissioner’. This article firstly examines how the office of high commissioner emerged to meet the representational needs of states owing allegiance to a common sovereign. Secondly, it explains why the office survived the transformation of the British empire into the modern Commonwealth of sovereign states. Thirdly, the article considers the factors that continue to make the office appealing to its holders and a diplomatic asset to their states.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office, the admiralty, and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936-37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

“As Far as His Army Can Reach”: Military Movements and East–West Discord in Germany, 1945

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith.     

International Relations Studies in the USSR/Russia: Is there a Russian National School of IR Studies?

This article discusses the development of Soviet/Russian international relations (IR) studies starting from the end of Second World War until the present. It reveals that Soviet IR studies were based on a mixture of realism and Marxism–Leninism, with realism predominating. It was a very important feature of the Soviet understanding of IR, and it continues to have a strong influence even now on both the study and practice of IR. The author then analyses barriers to the formation of a national school in IR in the Soviet Union. The contemporary state of Russian IR studies is also discussed. The article demonstrates how political changes in the country led to a transformation of Russian IR studies (with the emergence of new IR institutions, new journals, and new universities in and outside Moscow). Influences on Russian IR studies from different national schools (American, British, and French) are also touched upon.     

'What's in a name?' The curious tale of the office of high commissioner

Members of the Commonwealth do not use the title 'ambassador' for the heads of diplomatic missions which they send to one another. Instead, they use the title 'high commissioner'. This article firstly examines how the office of high commissioner emerged to meet the representational needs of states owing allegiance to a common sovereign. Secondly, it explains why the office survived the transformation of the British empire into the modern Commonwealth of sovereign states. Thirdly, the article considers the factors that continue to make the office appealing to its holders and a diplomatic asset to their states.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office,the admiralty,and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936–37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, 1980–1981

Although not unexpected, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was still largely a shock to the West. It was the first time since the Second World War that the Soviets had directly intervened in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. Despite the intervention eventually being seen as Moscow's ‘Vietnam’ the West was initially unsure about what the invasion meant for stability in the region or the future conduct of East–West relations. In response to the crisis the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) proposed that Afghanistan revert to a neutral and non-aligned status in an attempt to create the basis for a viable political settlement, one that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw troops without losing face. It launched the proposal in early 1980, lobbying other countries to support and champion the idea, culminating in a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in July 1981. In this early phase of Soviet intervention the British proposals were premature but not without merit. They anticipated the strategy the Soviets would eventually adopt in their attempt to achieve an orderly withdrawal.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Sailing through the Cold War: Indian Navy's Quest for a Submarine Arm, 1947-67

ABSTRACT

It took approximately two decades for the Indian Navy to acquire submarines even when the first naval plan prepared by the Naval Headquarters in New Delhi and informally submitted to the British Admiralty in September 1947 contained an active submarine component. Other littoral navies in the Indian Ocean went for submarines much earlier. Using Indian, British, and U.S. archives, this article argues that the delay in India’s submarine arm was largely a result of the vagaries of the Cold War. Both Britain and the United States wanted the Indian Navy to contribute to the Western effort for a collective defense against the communist threat, which was largely conceived to be submarine based. This resulted in a surface heavy force structure. However, as India’s threat perceptions changed in 1960s, its quest for submarines gained momentum. When negotiations with the Western powers did not result in anything concrete, Indian Navy turned to the Soviets for initiating its own submarine arm. This decision had long-term implications for the Indian Navy as its underwater fleet thereafter remain dependent upon Soviet assistance for the rest of the Cold War.     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.     

A ‘missed opportunity’ for peace? Harold Wilson,British diplomacy,and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war,February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American ‘hawks’, as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war – the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam – which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

A 'missed opportunity' for peace? Harold Wilson, British diplomacy, and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war, February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American 'hawks', as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war - the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam - which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

Exit Britain: British Withdrawal From the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947–1948

The British decision to withdraw from the Palestine mandate in 1947–1948 may at first glance appear contradictory to British strategic interests. The Middle East and Palestine were vital to Britain's Cold War strategy, and its government repeatedly stated the need for a continued British presence in the region to prevent Soviet expansion. Why then withdraw from Palestine just as the Cold War started? The traditional explanation is that Britain withdrew because of economic exhaustion and its inability to remain a great power. But this article shows that economic and strategic considerations both contributed to the decision to withdraw. Britain's involvement in Palestine threatened to undermine its relations with the independent Arab states, and the decision to withdraw from Palestine was therefore taken in the hope that this would secure Britain's position in the rest of the Middle East.     

The red air force in Italy, 1944: A case study in the formation of British Policy to the Soviet Union in world war II

In March 1944, the Soviets requested permission to base some aircraft in southern Italy. As the area was under Anglo-American control, this raised some significant issues concerning wartime cooperation with the Soviets. Once it was set up, the base (at Bari) was used to send an unannounced mission to the Communist part of the Greek resistance movement. This paper considers the development of British attitudes towards these Soviet activities and demonstrates how the issue throws light on the making of British policy towards the USSR at this time: the conflicting views in different departments concerning the best method of handling the Soviets and the strategic significance of Soviet activities in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.