Self-defence, Defence and Pre-emption

Military supporters and critics often find each others' positions on war preposterous. The divergent attitudes of these two groups may derive from their view about the analogy, or lack thereof, between war and self-defence, an issue recently highlighted by the controversial question of 'pre-emption'. In general, bombing campaigns conducted abroad are better understood as pre-emptive acts of war than as literal acts of 'self-defence'. The support by governments of the weapons export trade is also difficult to reconcile with the 'self-defence' interpretation of war. Accordingly, those who reject 'pre-emptive defence' on the grounds that it exceeds the parameters of 'self-defence' should, in consistency, oppose bombing campaigns and the exportation of weapons as well.     

Corruption experiences and attitudes to political,interpersonal, and domestic violence

It is understood that corruption can change the incentives to engage in political violence. However, the scope for corruption to change attitudes toward the permissibility of violence has received less attention. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we argue that experiences of corruption in the social environment are likely to shape individual attitudes toward violent behavior. Using Afrobarometer data, we document a statistically significant and sizable relationship between an individual's experience of paying bribes and their attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. These relationships are evident, and not significantly different, for men and women and are robust to the inclusion of variables capturing the local incidence of corruption, local norms regarding violence, and a proxy for the local incidence of violence with the community. Corruption is associated with permissive attitudes to violence even after controlling for the perceived legitimacy of the police and courts.     

Individual value priorities,education, and political tolerance

Extensive research on political tolerance identifies numerous social, psychological, and political sources of attitudes toward political dissenters. Much of this research underscores the salutary influence of education on greater acceptance of diversity, although some sophisticated work questions the strength of the linkage between education and tolerance. This study has two principal goals. First, it attempts to point to an alternative source of tolerance that has been given very little attention in the extant literature. Specifically, it argues that increases in political tolerance may be tied to the broad-based value shift allegedly sweeping through advanced industrial society. Second, research reported in this paper provides more evidence for the robustness of the education-tolerance relationship and offers one possible explanation for why this relationship exists. It suggests that one of the reasons higher education tends to be linked with greater tolerance is because it leads to individual value priorities that are conducive to greater openness to political diversity. A multivariate model of political tolerance is estimated that demonstrates modern versus traditional values contribute most to variation in tolerant attitudes, followed by education. The explanation of indirect effects of education on tolerance through its direct impact onvalues receives empirical support as well. The endeavor concludes by outlining some tentative predictions concerning the attainment of a more tolerant polity that would fare well when evaluated by the liberal democratic theory yardstick.     

Young people,parents and radical right voting. The Case of the Swiss People’s Party

It is commonly found that young people tend to adopt the political party choice of their parents. However, far less is known about the applicability of this theory when investigating radical right support. Using the Swiss Household panel data (1999–2007), this study empirically identifies the relationship between parents’ preference for the Swiss radical right party SVP and their attitudes toward immigrants and the EU, and their offspring’s preference for the SVP. Disaggregating fathers’ and mothers’ influence reveals that in particular, mothers’ SVP support plays a role in SVP support among young people, even after controlling for educational similarities. We also demonstrate that girls are more likely to be influenced by their mothers than are boys. Furthermore, parents’ negative attitudes toward the EU exert a positive influence on their children’s radical right voting, independent of their voting pattern.     

Risk Attitudes and Political Participation

This article contributes to existing explanations of political participation by proposing that citizens’ attitudes towards risk predict participation. I argue that people who are risk accepting participate in political life because politics offers novelty and excitement. Analyses of two independent Internet surveys establish a positive, significant relationship between risk attitudes and general political participation. The analyses also suggest that the relationship between risk attitudes and action varies with the political act: people who are more risk accepting are more likely to participate in general political acts, but they are no more or less likely to turn out in elections. Further analyses suggest that two key mechanisms—novelty seeking and excitement seeking—underlie the relationship between risk attitudes and political participation.     

Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning during Russia's Transformation

When the Soviet Union collapsed, most Russians had lived their entire lives in a quintessentially authoritarian culture. Having been socialized in this environment, how could citizens acquire the attitudes and behaviors necessary to support a new, more pluralistic regime? Cultural theories of political learning emphasize the primacy of childhood socialization and hold that altering initial attitudes is a decades‐long process that depends on generational replacement. Institutional theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances regardless of socialization. Lifetime learning integrates the competing perspectives. Multilevel models using New Russia Barometer data from 1992 to 2005 confirm the persistence of some generational differences in Russian political attitudes but demonstrate even larger effects resulting from adult relearning. Lifetime learning provides the most comprehensive account and suggests that Russians would quickly acquire the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to democracy—if Russian elites supply more authentic democratic institutions.     

Tea Party support and perceptions of local economic conditions

Researchers have long studied the underpinnings of voter perceptions of national economic conditions. Of growing interest though, is the effect of local economic evaluations on approval and voting behavior. Even though individuals engage more directly with the local economy than with that of the nation, perceptions of local conditions are colored as much by individual attitudes and demographics as by objective measures. Metropolitan area unemployment rates strongly predict local evaluations, but so do education, age, sex, and political attitudes. Of particular interest, even controlling for objective conditions, support for the Tea Party strongly predicts more negative evaluations and overpowers most other sources of bias.     

A Cross-National Comparison of the Internal Effects of Participation in Voluntary Organizations

This article draws on two recent and largely untapped sources of data to test empirically the Tocquevillian argument about the impact of involvement in civic organizations on individual attitudes and behaviors. Our analysis is based on two related studies – the European Social Survey (ESS) and the US 'Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy' (CID) survey – that incorporate innovative and detailed measures about respondents' involvement in voluntary associations in nineteen European countries and in the United States. These surveys provide us not only with rich individual-level data within a cross-national comparison, but they also allow us to develop and test a new measure of civic involvement that distinguishes between different levels of participation. After employing our 'civic involvement index' in pooled and individual country analyses, we find general support for the Tocquevillian argument. On average, those persons with greater levels of involvement in voluntary organizations also engage in more political acts, have higher life satisfaction and are by and large more trusting of others than those who do not. These findings highlight the general importance of actual involvement as opposed to nominal membership.     

The Statecraft Effect: Assessment,Attitudes, and Academic Honesty

Abstract

This article uses a multimethod research design to compare Statecraft to non-Statecraft assignments and courses along three dimensions: student engagement, political attitudes, and academic honesty. The results indicate that Statecraft increased student engagement and academic honesty. In terms of political attitudes, students generally remained on the left side of the political spectrum, but shifted toward the right and became more hawkish by the end of a semester. Changes in attitude are more strongly associated not with playing Statecraft, but taking a political science class by the coauthor, or some other external variable. Statecraft, however, did reduce support for pacifism.     

Children's acquisition of political opinions

This paper reports and discusses the results of a survey of English and Welsh schoolchildren aged 11–18, conducted in March–May 2003, covering their attitudes to and knowledge of politics, politicians and political issues. It concentrates in particular on the way these attitudes develop as pupils get older, and also discusses the sources of information on which young people depend, and which may be the key to developing this neglected political ‘market’. It finds that pupils are unenthused by politics, but not ‘apathetic’. Both knowledge and interest increase as pupils grow older; however, negative or cynical attitudes to politicians and to political parties seem to grow at the same time. Yet young people also hold positive attitudes to the electoral process in general, though many do not accept that they will have a ‘duty to vote’ when old enough. The media, though distrusted, is the principal source of information, though it is clear that the family is highly influential; schools seem less influential. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links

This article analyses the links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration in 11 European countries. It does so by using data from the 2008 European Social Survey and the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Data Base on political parties and European integration. In addition to mapping the Eurosceptic orientations of political parties and their voters, the article examines the degree to which attitudes towards the EU and voting for populist radical parties are connected to each other. The results lend support to the hypothesis that most populist radical right parties have managed to establish links with their voters regarding European integration. The analysis also shows that links between populist radical right parties and their voters tend to be stronger for those parties that adopt more extreme negative positions towards European integration.     

The Catastrophic Link Between the Importance and Extremity of Political Attitudes

The catastrophe theory of attitudes (Latané and Nowak, 1994) predicts that unimportant attitudes act as continuous dimensions, with normal distributions and gradual changes in evaluation, while important attitudes act as categories, with bipolar or unipolar extreme distributions and catastrophic (abrupt) changes in evaluation. A major derivation from this theory is that attitude importance and extremity should be correlated, with more important attitudes being more extreme. This prediction was confirmed for 14 specific political issues at both the group and the individual level, as well as for political involvement and general liberalism. However, general political involvement was not related to the extremity of evaluation for specific issues; similarly, partisanship predicted extremity of general liberalism but not extremity on specific issues. Results suggest that attitude importance and extremity must be measured at corresponding levels of specificity in order for a relationship between them to hold. These results have implications for attitude change in both individuals and societies.     

A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification

The standard treatment of party identification makes several untested assumptions, especially that citizens can identify with only a single party and that political independence is just the opposite of partisanship. A more general possibility is that several attitudes must be taken into account: attitudes toward the Republican party, the Democratic party, political independence, and political parties generally. A literal reading of the usual party identification is consistent with this multidimensional interpretation. Citizen ratings of the two parties turn out to be virtually uncorrelated, as are ratings of independence and political parties, confirming this multidimensional view. Strength of identification and strength of independence are separate in this model, which explains some of the anomalies in the current literature, including intransitivities in relationships with other variables and weak correlations involving independence. New questions included in the 1980 CPS National Election Study support this interpretation and provide a new understanding of political independence.     

Economics,politics, and the cycle of presidential popularity

Does the economy hold the key to the ups and downs of the popularity of American presidents? This study, which is based on quarterly data from 1961 to 1980, employs stochastic models for time series (Box-Jenkins). For inflation, though not for unemployment, the findings confirm a significant effect at a lag of one quarter. The worries of political leaders about the inflation side of macroeconomic performance appear to be justified. Nevertheless, the influence of noneconomic factors such as international events, the Vietnam War, and Watergate proves even more potent. Moreover, presidential popularity is subject to a cycle whereby each president begins his service with an unearned popularity bonus that subsequently erodes. Economic performance is not found to be responsible for this inauguration-erosion cycle, but neither are rallies, wars, or scandal.     

Considering Mixed Mode Surveys for Questions in Political Behavior: Using the Internet and Mail to Get Quality Data at Reasonable Costs

Telephone surveys have been a principle means of learning about the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and voters. The single mode telephone survey, however, is increasingly threatened by rising costs, the declining use of landline telephones, and declining participation rates. One solution to these problems has been the introduction of mixed-mode surveys. However, such designs are relatively new and questions about their representativeness and the intricacies of the methodology remain. We report on the representativeness of a post election mixed-mode (Internet and mail) survey design of 2006 general election voters. We compare sample respondent means to sample frame means on key demographic characteristics and examine how mail and Internet respondents differed in terms of attitudes, behaviors and demographics. We find that overall the Internet respondents were representative of the population and that respondent choice of mode did not influence item response. We conclude that mixed-mode designs may allow researchers to ask important questions about political behavior from their desktops.     

Local Officials’ Support for PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit Engagement,Economic Stress,and Politics

Nonprofit property tax exemption has become a major policy issue as the collapse of the housing market, the Great Recession, and property tax caps have threatened local tax collections. Consequently, many local governments have sought to obtain payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) from charities that are formally exempt from property taxes. Using a 2010 survey of local government officials in Indiana, this article examines whether support for PILOT policies is related to officials’ personal involvement with nonprofits, their views on government–nonprofit relationships, the type of position they hold, the level of economic distress in the county, local political conditions, and local nonprofit wealth. The findings support most of these hypotheses but also show that attitudes toward PILOTs appear to be shaped by somewhat different concerns than attitudes toward services in lieu of taxes (SILOTs).     

Gendering the vote for populist radical-right parties

ABSTRACT

Why do more men than women vote for populist radical-right (PRR) parties? And do more men than women still vote for the PRR? Can attitudes regarding gender and gender equality explain these differences (if they exist)? These are the questions that Spierings and Zaslove explore in this article. They begin with an analysis of men's and women's voting patterns for PRR parties in seven countries, comparing these results with voting for mainstream (left-wing and right-wing) parties. They then examine the relationship between attitudes and votes for the populist radical right, focusing on economic redistribution, immigration, trust in the European Union, law and order, environmental protection, personal freedom and development, support for gender equality, and homosexuality. They conclude that more men than women do indeed support PRR parties, as many studies have previously demonstrated. However, the difference is often overemphasized in the literature, in part since it is examined in isolation and not compared with voting for (centre-right) mainstream parties. Moreover, the most important reasons that voters support PRR parties seem to be the same for men and for women; both vote for the populist radical right because of their opposition to immigration. In general, there are no consistent cross-country patterns regarding gender attitudes explaining differences between men and women. There are some recurring country-specific findings though. Most notably: first, among women, economic positions seem to matter less; and economically more left-wing (and those with anti-immigrant attitudes) women also vote for the PRR in Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland; and, second, those who hold authoritarian or nativist views in combination with a strong belief that gays and lesbians should be able to ‘live their lives as they choose’ are disproportionately much more likely to vote for PRR parties in Sweden and Norway. Despite these findings, Spierings and Zaslove argue that the so-called ‘gender gap’ is often overemphasized. In other words, it appears that populist radical-right parties, with respect to sex and gender, are in many ways simply a more radical version of centre-right parties.     

The Real Winner's Curse

Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict and lead to lower violence. However, this argument ignores the response of established elites when (1) their interests are threatened by the policy stance of new political actors and (2) elites have a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left‐wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in a one standard deviation increase in violent events by right‐wing paramilitaries. We interpret this surge in violence as a reaction of traditional elites to offset the increase in outsiders' access to formal political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that violence by left‐wing guerrillas and other actors is unaffected and that violence is not influenced by the victory of right‐wing or other new parties in close elections.     

Nonparticipation as Self-Censorship: Publicly Observable Political Activity in a Polarized Opinion Climate

In a polarized opinion climate, people may refrain from participating in publicly observable political activities that make them vulnerable to scrutiny and criticism by others who hold opinions that differ from their own. We took a dispositional approach to testing this claim by determining whether people who are relatively more influenced by the climate of opinion when choosing whether or not to voice an opinion, measured with the Willingness to Self-Censor scale [Hayes et al. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 17 (2005) 298], are also relatively less likely to engage in public political activities. In a poll of residents of the United States, we found that even after controlling for interest in politics, political ideology, ideological extremity, political efficacy, attention to political news, dispositional shyness, frequency of political discussion, and demographics, dispositional self-censors reported having engaged in relatively fewer public political activities over the prior 2 years compared to those less willing to censor their own opinion expression. These results are consistent with our interpretation of political participation as a social process that is governed in part by the social psychological implications of participation to the person. At a larger theoretical level, our findings connect the literature on opinion perceptions and opinion expression with research on political participation.