Stand-alone private antitrust damages: (how) should competition authorities react?

The European Commission has recently set up a framework that facilitates the access to the courts by victims of antitrust injury, even in the absence of a ruling by a competition authority (so-called stand-alone private damages, or SPD, actions). Here, I study a game where both public and private antitrust enforcement play a role. Plaintiffs face information acquisition costs (evidence-gathering) if they want to bring an SPD action, but they do not internalise the opportunity cost of the courts?? resources. First, I show that any gain in deterrence has to be traded off against costly litigation and enforcement costs, and that these tradeoffs are heterogeneous across market sizes. Second, taking the competition authority??s actions as exogenous, SPDs can improve welfare only if the competition authority is sufficiently effective: private damages are a complement to (good) public enforcement, not a substitute. Third, a resource-constrained competition authority, upon the introduction of SPDs, should investigate a larger proportion of industries (even at the cost of a higher error rate). That is, whilst a ??hands-off?? approach might have been warranted absent SPDs, this is no longer true once stand-alone actions are introduced.     

Taming digital gatekeepers: the ‘more regulatory approach’ to antitrust law

Antitrust enforcement and competition policy in the digital economy is high on the agenda of authorities and policymakers. The distinctive features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms apparently require a rethinking of the antitrust regime. Several reform proposals point to the need to integrate the antitrust toolkit with ex ante measures since there is a risk that ex post enforcement would be too slow to successfully keep markets competitive and contestable. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut.     

Ready or not? A systematic review of case studies using data-driven approaches to detect real-world antitrust violations

Cartels and other anti-competitive behaviour by companies have a tremendously negative impact on the economy and, ultimately, on consumers. To detect such anti-competitive behaviour, competition authorities need reliable tools. Recently, new data-driven approaches have started to emerge in the area of computational antitrust that can complement already established tools, such as leniency programs. Our systematic review of case studies shows how data-driven approaches can be used to detect real-world antitrust violations. Relying on statistical analysis or machine learning, ever more sophisticated methods have been developed and applied to real-world scenarios to identify whether an antitrust infringement has taken place. Our review suggests that the approaches already applied in case studies have become more complex and more sophisticated over time, and may also be transferrable to further types of cases. While computational tools may not yet be ready to take over antitrust enforcement, they are ready to be employed more fully.     

Why don't courts treat hospitals like tanks for liquefied gases? Some reflections on health care antitrust enforcement

In this article, I use the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 2004 report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition as an occasion to comment on two specific issues that have arisen in health care antitrust: the recent string of losses by the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases and an antitrust exemption for physicians to bargain collectively with health insurers. One of the more salient facts about health care antitrust enforcement is the notable recent lack of success of the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases. This may be due to judges and juries holding views of hospital markets as being different from markets for other goods and services. My conclusion is that hospitals are an industry with unique attributes, but nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry. Countervailing power is an issue that has come to the fore in health care antitrust. Physicians have explicitly asked for legislative exemption from the antitrust laws in order to bargain collectively with insurance companies, as a means of counteracting insurers' monopsony power. It is not clear that health insurers possess significant monopsony power. Even if they do, bestowing monopoly power on physicians will not necessarily improve matters. Active antitrust enforcement in insurance markets is the correct response, not blanket exemptions for providers.     

Empirical assessment of the role of economic analysis in the Russian antitrust: Why is economic analysis used?

Economic analysis is an important tool for the modern antitrust. This article provides an empirical study of its role in the Russian antitrust law enforcement practice in order to answer the following question: Has the understanding of the usefulness and importance of economic analysis in the Russian antitrust been achieved, or has economic analysis been applied formally? The study is based on the sample of official records on published decisions by the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, created specifically for this research.     

面对,接受,处理,放下

"面对,接受,处理,放下。这是任何人面对一起不幸事件时都应有的态度。"李双江之子李天一涉嫌强奸案被炒作得沸沸扬扬。这起事件引发"网民的狂欢",除了对被害人的怜悯与同情外,更多的是对李天一的痛责,恨不得要司法机关立即从肉体上消灭之,还有就是对李双江夫妇教子无方的嘲讽与抨击,等等。面对这种巨大的喧嚣,我援引一个故事来谈"接纳"的观点:国际著名教育专家麦道卫博士的女儿上中学时有一天问他:"爸爸,要是我这会儿怀孕了,你怎么处理?"他回答说:"我是一名布道家,教了一辈子的亲子教育,要是你     

雪莲,地瓜,爆米花

大家都说《泰囧》好看,很搞笑的喜剧片,要我去看。抱着用一部喜剧来给我的生日当天划一个圆满句号的想法去看的电影,看完才知道,你把它当一部单纯的喜剧来看,未免太肤浅;你把它当一部人生励志片来看,未免太凝重。徐朗和王宝,是我们这个世界上两类人的写照。一类,不在乎吃饭,顾不上挑水,更忙不到砍柴,他们的心中只有一个老周。若为老周故,吃饭挑水皆可抛。一类,吃饭即吃饭,挑水即挑水,随遇而安,砍柴时若是能见到一抹晚霞简直此生不     

朝审,秋审,热审

《明史·刑法志》:“天顺三年令每岁霜降后,三法司同公、侯、伯会审重囚,谓之朝审.”明朝每年在规定时间内将法司在押的重囚,引到承天门外,三法司会同稿·刑法志》:“秋审亦原于明之奏决单,冬至前会审之.”按清律规定,凡严重危害“社稷”的犯罪,应立即处决的,称“斩立决”.如危害性较小或有可疑者,暂判“斩监候”或“绞监候”,缓期处决,延至秋天由九卿重审.秋     

王凤启盗伐林木,为窝藏赃物,当场使用暴力,致人死亡,被判处死刑

一九八二年十月,吉林省吉林市中级人民法院公开审理了王凤启等四人因运输盗伐的林木,为窝藏赃物,抗拒民兵检查,当场使用暴力致人死亡一案。 被告人王凤启、韩喜生、王凤明、韩景阳于一九八二年六月十八日二十三时许,赶两辆车运盗伐的木材。当行至镇郊公社春田六队时,被民兵翟凤双等人发现截住,令其将木材送到生产队。被告人王凤启用木棒猛打翟凤双头部,