浅议思想与表达二分法

思想与表达的二分法是著作权法上的一项基本原则。这一原则构成了著作权法的核心,它意味着著作权法只保护作者具有独创性的表达,而并不保护作者的思想。思想与表达的二分,缓解了信息自由与著作权法之间的一种内在张力,从而为著作权法的体系构建奠定了基础。该制度是一个异常复杂的制度,本文主要从学习的角度来探讨思想与表达的二分。     

被误读的“思想/表达二分法”——以法律修辞学为视角的考察

"思想/表达二分法"是著作权法中一项极富特色的裁判规则,它关乎的是成本收益的利益衡量与价值取舍,而不关乎思想与表达在事实层面是否可分,学界对此的解读往往混淆了事实问题与价值问题,没能揭示其扮演的真正角色及所发挥的修辞功能。作为一项价值法则,"思想/表达二分法"无法向我们提供统一普适的裁判标准,它依赖法官在个案中基于具体情势自由裁量,正是法官的创造性努力,定纷止争的目标才得以实现。     

版权法中思想与表达二分法的含义

思想与表达二分法是著作权领域的重要原则,其含义即是版权法只保护作品的表达,而不保护作品所体现的思想,它不仅激励了作者的创作,划定了著作权保护的范围,并且平衡了整个社会和著作权人的利益,是知识产权领域的重要原则。     

浅论思想表达二分法——以计算机程序为视角

本文从理论视角和具体运用视角阐述思想表达二分法的运用。理论上,思想表达二分法来源于"阿尔泰"案,确定了用"三步检验法"将"思想"与"表达"区分。本文认为运用该方法对计算机程序进行版权意义上的保护会产生两个问题,第一是经过合并原则,场景原则和公有领域要素之后,该表达是不受版权保护(版权性是否还存在?)还是复制者的复制行为不认为是侵权?第二是计算机程序的版权法保护存在的问题。在具体运用上,本文选取了我国的一个案件,对其进行分析。最后,认为虽然"思想"与"表达"的界限模糊,但是对其二分以及"三步法"要作为一种不可抛弃的理念牢记于心。     

论软件界面的知识产权保护

我国对软件界面的知识产权保护制度与美欧一样都以版权法中的“思想/表达”二分法为基本原则,然而“思想/表达”二分法与软件界面知识产权均衡的不一致造成其不确定性以及难以适用等缺陷。我国相关法律中有关软件界面的保护规定过于笼统,造成“有法难依”和国外厂商滥用知识产权阻碍我国软件产业发展的局面。从软件界面的网络经济学特性出发,应以是否存在网络经济效应为界面元素受保护的界线,从而与软件界面的知识产权均衡保持一致。将网络经济效应原则引入我国相关法规中,能够弥补我国当前软件界面知识产权保护制度的不足。     

从语义和功用上探析思想与表达二分法

思想与表达二分法原则从其产生至今已有一百多年的历史,其已为许多国家和主要国际版权条约所采纳;由于"思想"一词具有隐喻性,因此很难划分思想与表达的范围,这成为了版权法界一大难题;思想与表达二分法有其存在的价值,是版权法保证社会利益和个人利益平衡的必要工具,因此有必要对其深入研究。     

我国著作权法立法应引入二分法原则与合并原则

思想与表达二分法原则在许多国家立法以及国际条约中都有明确规定,我国的立法中于2001年的《计算机软件保护条例》中有所规定,但2001年修订的著作权法并未纳入该原则。随着网络信息技术的发展,思想与表达二分法原则在实践运用中面临许多新的挑战,二分法原则的例外——合并原则有其引入的必要性。应在我国著作权法立法体系中纳入思想与表达二分法原则及合并原则的方式。     

版权侵权分析体系下的教材与教辅

本文拟在“独创性分析、思想与表达二分法和合理使用判断”的经典版权侵权分析体系下对现有的义务教育教材以及未经授权的教材辅导读物的关系进行分析,得出三类教辅侵权的结论。     

为什么著作权法不保护思想

思想/表达(idea/expression)二分法是著作权法上的一项基本制度.它意味着著作权法只保护作者具有独创性的表达,而对于思想,无论是否具备独创性,都不予保护.     

著作权法与公有领域研究

公有领域不仅在当代的著作权国内立法和国际条约中存在,作为支撑著作权制度的基石,在早期著作权法中即被确立.基于公有领域不断遭到削弱的现实,著作权法中确立公有领域具有重要意义.作者原创性作品中包含的公有素材构成了公有领域的基础.公有领域原理还可以从洛克理论以及利益平衡原理加以认识.公有领域与公共利益以及思想与表达二分法之间也存在密切联系.     

“存疑有利于被告人”原则的正确理解适用

"存疑有利于被告人"的思想源于古希腊自然法思想之正义观。作为一项法律规范,它最早出现于古罗马时期。在法律文化的变迁过程中,罪刑法定、无罪推定、刑法谦抑主义、正当程序等刑事法律思想为该原则的形成提供了思想滋养与理论支撑。但是,由于缺乏对该原则内涵的准确把握,导致我国司法实践中至今仍存在多种滥用该原则的现象,这不仅损害了司法公正,也削弱了刑法的法益保护机能。所以,对该原则的使用范围、使用条件和使用阶段需要从司法实践出发认真思考。     

论思想的财产权地位

思想具有价值性,需要获得一定程度的法律保护。但思想没有外化为一定的可感知的形式,其界限无法予以确定,加之绝对性的财产权是一种对世权,效力范围广泛,对思想赋予普通财产权保护将会违背公共利益,故思想不应成为普通财产权的客体。虽然思想表达两分法要求思想上不应存在版权,但一些版权法规则与制度在一定程度上带有保护思想的附带效应。不同于版权的是,专利权的客体是思想,是一种形诸一定的产品或一定的方法、通过权利要求书加以限定和表达的具体性思想。尽管思想上不应存在普通财产权和版权,但从实现相对关系中思想提供者与思想接受者之间公平正义的角度出发,对思想赋予一定程度的相对权保护还是可行的。     

著作权法中思想与表达二分法之合并原则及其实证分析

思想与表达的合并原则又称思想表达识别的例外原则。它只存在于特定的表达形式中,即表达与思想难以区分,甚至必须被认为混合在思想中。合并原则关注的是作品的表达性成分和作品表达体现的思想是否难以区分,或者表达性成分很有限以致他人的相同或相似的表达不构成侵权。合并原则在著作权司法实践中具有适用价值。     

Comparative vs. Transcendental Approaches to Justice: A Misleading Dichotomy in Sen's The Idea of Justice

This paper examines the distinction drawn by Amartya Sen between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and its application to Rawls' doctrine. It then puts forward three arguments. First, it is argued that Sen offers a limited portrayal of Rawls' doctrine. This is the result of a rhetorical strategy that depicts Rawlsian doctrine as more “transcendental” than it really is. Although Sen deploys numerous quotations in support of his interpretation, it is possible to offer a less transcendental interpretation of Rawls. Second, the dichotomy between transcendental and comparative approaches to questions of justice is partly misleading, insofar as any plausible moral doctrine has both transcendental and comparative elements. Transcendental elements are necessary to avoid the confusion between the general acceptance of a norm, value or principle and its justification. A comparative view highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self‐defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls “conglomerate theory,” and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory. The paper concludes with the argument that conglomerate theory does not aim to produce complete moral orderings, but rather a comparative approach with transcendental elements, as a form of weak transcendentalism.     

Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes

Copyright law, for most of its history, has been exempt from the requirements of the First Amendment free speech and press clauses. As copyright law has expanded in scope and duration, scholars have begun to raise questions about its First Amendment immunity. This essay examines the fundamental conflict between copyright doctrine and the First Amendment. Although courts have been quick to dismiss the application of free speech standards to copyright disputes, the proper relationship between these two areas of the law is less than clear. The essay explores the current understanding of the intersection of free speech and copyright, largely derived from the work of Professor Melville Nimmer. It analyzes the difficulties with two specific doctrines by which the Supreme Court of the United States has justified copyright's free speech immunity – the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine – then concludes by offering a new approach to applying the First Amendment to copyright law in a more robust manner.     

Monopoly defeating mechanisms: Will they function in the digital world?

History reveals that ‘copyright’ was originally monopolistic (in the early fifteenth century) and remained so until the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1709. Since then copyright has striven to maintain a delicate balance between incentive to authors and avoiding monopolistic stagnation. To achieve these goals, certain monopoly-defeating mechanisms have been adopted such as: fair use, public domain, the idea/expression dichotomy and the exhaustion doctrine. Recently, however, with the implementation of new laws: for instance the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1988), the EU Copyright Directive (2001), and the implementation of the EU Copyright and Related Rights Regulation amending the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, there is a growing concern that the mechanisms which were enacted to defeat the monopoly will not work in the digital medium. With the provision of affixing technological measures to copyrighted works and the non-application of the exhaustion doctrine in the digital world, arguably the monopoly defeating mechanisms have been disabled. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the way monopoly defeating mechanisms are becoming non-functional in the digital world. Furthermore, the study also demonstrates how the European Copyright Directive and the UK implementation of the Directive has transgressed the boundary of exclusive rights set by the two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties – the World Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) – and copyright law, thereby strengthening the copyright owner's rights in a way that was never intended by the WIPO treaties or by copyright law. Consequently, the new laws have also shifted copyright's attention from commercial pirates to non-commercial individual users. The study aims to demonstrate how the shift took place and finally, trace the recurrence of the monopoly; giving rise to a situation where there is no fair use/dealing, no public domain, no idea/expression distinction and no exhaustion doctrine.     

形象权转换性使用规则研究

未经许可借用他人形象制作虚拟人物角色和动漫表情包的现象越来越普遍,应该完全保护个人的肖像权还是为公众自由创作虚拟人物形象和表情包留出空间值得思考。形象权制度下的一系列判例借用版权合理使用制度中的转换性使用规则平衡形象权保护和公众的表达自由,能为如何平衡个人的肖像保护和公众的参与创作和表达带来借鉴。本文通过分析转换性使用规则在形象权案例中的运用,提出应调整转换性使用规则以增强适用该规则判定形象权案例的稳定性。     

论公司有限责任制度

公司有限责任制度的核心是公司责任与公司成员责任的分离,股东作为投资者无须对公司的债务承担除了其投资之外的进一步的责任。该制度的建立与发展对调动潜在投资者投资的积极性、发展规模经济、促进公司法律制度完善等方面功不可没。有限责任制度有其客观存在的价值,但并非十全十美,这主要表现在该制度被不当利用而对债权人和其它利益相关者造成的损害,实践中各国多采用有限责任制度例外适用来补救该制度之不足。由于历史原因,我国公司有限责任制度的设立和实施存在诸多问题,必须采取必要的措施完善我国的有限责任制度。     

裁判思维下的公司机会原则——以《公司法》第149条为中心

公司机会原则的适用主体总体上可以准确地界定为董事、高级管理人员和控股股东,不包括监事和独立董事。公司机会的认定取决于是否源于职务便利获取,而不应限定为是否在执行职务过程中获取。公司机会原则与竞业禁止存在竞合,但是两者又各有不同,不应将二者混淆。公司机会原则与保密义务存在牵连,需要分清。违反公司机会原则,公司享有归入权和损害赔偿请求权。特定情形下,公司可以向机会提供的第三人索赔。