On Law and Morality. A Dialogue

Abstract. The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a "minimum content" of natural law is not said to be "law," but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are "right answers" to moral questions.     

Legitimacy in a Postcolonial Legal System: Public Perception of Procedural Justice and Moral Alignment Toward the Courts in Hong Kong

Legitimacy is said to be comprised of two underlying constructs: obligation to obey and moral alignment. However, legitimacy studies are mainly derived from contexts where the legal system has evolved naturally and is said to reflect the values of society. There is a paucity of research measuring public perceptions of legitimacy in postcolonial settings such as Hong Kong where the legal system was initially transplanted and many of its values may not reflect those of the local population. Procedural justice has been asserted to be a primary antecedent by which legal authorities improve their legitimacy and moral alignment. This study examines whether procedural justice is positively associated with legitimacy and moral alignment with the courts. Moreover, this study tests whether legitimacy is positively associated with cooperation with the courts. Using a random survey of the Hong Kong general population, both questions are answered in the affirmative. Implications are discussed.     

The experimental psychologist in court

This special issue comprises articles by psychologists, legal scholars, and ethicists on the ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists. In it the major ethical questions facing the prospective expert witness are clarified, and alternative positions on these issues are defined and debated. Fundamentals of moral reasoning are discussed, and the realities of interaction with a judicial system that subjects the psychologist to a variety of pressures and limitations are made apparent. The aim is not to offer final answers to complex ethical questions, but rather to provide a framework within which the questions can be considered by the individual psychologist.The conference on ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists was supported by National Science Foundation grant No. ISP-8209940. We thank Rachelle Hollander of the Ethics and Values in Science and Technology Program, Joe Young of the Memory and Cognitive Processes Program, and Eric Juengst of the National Endowment for the Humanities for their help in bringing about the conference.     

Principle,Proceduralism, and Precaution in a Community of Rights

Abstract. This paper presents a sketch of the way in which an ideal‐typical community of rights, Gewirthia, responds to the so‐called “internal problem of authority.” Notwithstanding the deep moral consensus in Gewirthia, where citizens are fully committed to the Principle of Generic Consistency (requiring that agents respect one another’s freedom and basic well‐being), Gewirthians make no claim to “know all the answers.” In consequence, public governance in Gewirthia needs a strategy for dealing with the many kinds of disputes—disputes that relate to matters of both principle and practice—that require authoritative settlement. In this context, having outlined the nature of (and justification for) the procedural strategy that Gewirthia adopts in order to resolve such disputes, we discuss the range of regulatory questions that are potentially moot in Gewirthia, and focus on three hard cases in which the State might argue for a precautionary licence—namely, where there is a dispute about indirect and speculative harm to rights‐holders, about harm to arguable rights‐holders, and about the possible corrosion of the conditions that are essential for the sustainability of a moral community.     

Requirement‐Sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment

Requirement‐sensitive legal moralism is a species of legal moralism in which the legitimacy of turning moral into legal demands depends on the existence of a legitimate moral requirement, producing a legitimate social requirement, which can then ground a legitimate legal requirement. Crucially, each step is defeasible by contingent or instrumental, but not intrinsic moral factors. There is no genuinely moral sphere (e.g., a private sphere) in which the law is not to interfere; only contingent, non‐moral factors can defeat this. Using William A. Edmundson's Three Anarchical Fallacies as a foil, this idea is spelled out; it is shown why considerations based on the harm principle, consent, and the fact of pluralism do not immediately defeat it, but several problems with Edmundson's account are examined to point out where the idea could be further developed.     

疑难案件、司法判决与实质权衡

在疑难案件的审理中,经常可以发现,一些法律规则之外的因素影响了司法判决的做出。如何认识与评价这一现象？这些因素是否不可避免？如果是,这是否就意味着司法判决失去了客观性、确定性与合法性？文章通过考察几个中国司法实践中所出现的疑难案件,以及一些理论上的探讨,回答了上述问题,并得出结论：在疑难案件中,一个完整的法律论证必然要将某些法律之外的因素涵括进来;或者说,一个包含了法外因素的论证将更为真实、更为完整,从而也是更值得被接受的。     

Digital Hercules?

Is there a limit to what computers can do? In many areas, the facts of today put the sceptics of yesterday in the wrong. Who would have thought twenty years ago that a chess computer could ever beat the human world champion? With respect to computer programs for solving legal problems, the question is not whether they are possible, for they exist. In law, at least two important questions remain. First, whether such programs can eventually perform as good as, or better than humans. Second, whether the use of computers will alter the law and legal adjudication. These two questions are discussed in this article against the background of a comparison of chess and law. The answers give rise to certain premonitions. If the computer is used as an aid in legal decision making, it should be used in awareness of its limitations and idiosyncrasies.     

‘Tolling for the luckless,the abandoned and forsaked’: Therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law as applied to prisoners and detainees by forensic psychologists

Objectives. There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic jurisprudence as both a filter and lens for viewing the extent to which the legal system serves therapeutic or anti‐therapeutic consequences. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists. The paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic jurisprudence, and forensic psychology. Method. Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules. Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights. Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required. Conclusion. As duty‐bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core values of freedom and well‐being in rights holders (in this instance, prisoners and detainees with a mental illness). The paper proposes that human rights principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, and in‐turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.     

Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.     

The One-System View and Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Eliminativism

Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: IS THERE ANY THERE THERE?

Despite tremendous growth in the field, there have been many challenges to law and the behavioral sciences. The most colorful expression is Abel's charge that "questions and answers have begun to sound a comfortable, but rather boring 'clackity-clack.'" On one hand, the achievements of the field cannot be ignored by those who want to think about law seriously. On the other hand, all approaches to the field are flawed and are likely to remain that way. Help in solving the problems of the field might come from a thorough interdisciplinary approach, calling on the contributions of all social sciences while recognizing the limitations of each; knowledge of a minimum amount of law and legal method, but with full awareness of how legal thought may distort definitions of problems; and knowledge of the questions posed by broader social theories in light of an empirical refining of their large explanations.     

Cloning: can it be good for us? An overview of cloning technology and its moral implications

Adequate answers to moral questions about cloning require a working knowledge of the science and technology involved, both present and anticipated. This essay presents an overview of the current state of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology (SCNT), the type of cloning that now permits whole organism reproduction from adult DNA. This essay explains the basic science and technology of SCNT and explores its potential uses. Next, this essay notes remaining scientific obstacles and unanswered moral questions that must be resolved before SCNT can be used for human reproduction. Attention is given to aspects related to cloning for therapeutic and research purposes.     

Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders

I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer an adjudicative theory in the realm of non-ideal theory: I adopt a view of law that has achieved consensus in legal philosophy, make some plausible assumptions about human politics, and then consider directly the question of how judges should reason. Ultimately, I argue that judges should be cognizant of the goods that are at stake on particular occasions of adjudication and that this requires treating legal requirements transparently, i.e., as sensitive to their moral justifications.     

Arising from the dead: challenges of posthumous procreation

The medical capabilities derived from modern reproductive technology, such as in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation, have enabled physicians and scientists to intervene in the procreative process in innumerable ways. However, this intervention in the natural reproductive process raises both moral and legal concerns. In this Article, Professor Schiff explores some of the conflicts that may result when an individual or couple elects to cryopreserve gametes or embryos and subsequently, one or both of the contributors dies, or when gametes are harvested from a dead body. This Article will specifically address the moral and legal responses to circumstances where the decedent has either clearly expressed opposition to posthumous use of the reproductive material or else the decedent's intent regarding posthumous use of the material is ambiguous. By discussing philosophical and moral positions relating to personhood and the body and analyzing legal issues such as reproductive choice and organ donation, Professor Schiff creates the necessary format to examine and recommend the proper legal treatment of this controversial aspect of posthumous procreation.     

论法学的科学性问题

法学的实践性实际上是与法学的科学性联系在一起的.在历史上,有学者(比如冯·基尔希曼)认为,法学作为"科学"从理论上说是无价值的,它并非"科学".应当看到,法学是一门以"问题-决定"为中心、以某个特定的在历史上形成的实在法秩序为基础、采取诠释-评价的论证方式来探求法律问题之答案(解决法律问题)的(实践)规范性诠释科学,它...     

Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty, and Mercy

What is cruelty? How and why does it matter? What do the legal rejection of cruelty and the requirements of mercy entail? This essay asks these questions of Lucius Seneca, who first articulated an agent-based conception of cruelty in the context of punishment. The hypothesis is submitted that the answers to these questions offered in Seneca’s De clementia constitute one of the turning points in the evolution of practical reason in law. I conclude, however, by arguing that even the mainstream punitive practices of contemporary western societies fail to meet the modest imperatives of the rejection of cruelty and the unconditionality of mercy propounded by Seneca.     

Is embryo research and preimplantation genetic diagnosis ethical?

The legal position in the UK on embryo research and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is outlined and contrasted with the position in other EU countries. The "gradualist" position of the UK on the moral status of the embryo is defended on the basis of an argument that precaution must be applied in proportion to the degree to which the embryo has developed to display components of agency, on the assumption that mortality is categorically binding and requires agents to be granted rights and that it cannot be known with certainty that the embryo is not an agent. The extent to which this argument, when combined with vicarious protections that the embryo should receive in order to protect the rights of other agents, limits embryo research and PGD, is discussed. It is concluded that the complexities that attend deliberation about the moral problems attending embryo research and PGD are such that the proper response to these problems is via the procedures of political democracy to achieve accountable answers rather than "correct" answers. This allows for a variety of judgements.