论法律运行中的不确定性

法律运行中的不确定性受诸多因素的影响,由于我国是成文法国家,在适用法律过程中主要是运用演绎推理,而作为大前提的法律规则、作为小前提的案件事实以及法律适用过程中都可能表现出不确定。因此,应从诸多方面加以完善来实现对法律不确定性的约束。     

从语言模糊到裁判确定——一个有关司法过程的语言叙事

法律存在于语言之中,法律的意义是透过语言而实现的。由于主客观方面的原因,法律语言具有模糊性。司法过程的核心问题是法律与事实的结合。作为司法过程重心的事实的确定、规范的找寻和涵摄的演绎无一不与法官的言说密切相关,可以说是法官的言说才使得因语言模糊而造成的法律与事实的不确定性得到界说,从而获得了有关案件的妥当的裁决。司法过程就是一个法官有关事实与规范的语言叙事。     

知识产权民事裁判的考量因素

一、法律因素法律因素是指法院审理民事案件时应严格遵守法律规范,保证裁判依法为之。法律是司法的基础,司法是法律的延伸,法律因素因此成为民事裁判应考量的首要因素。我国实体法与程序法均规定裁判必须以法律为依据。如民法通则第六条规定民事活动必须遵守法律,法律即为当事人的行为标准和法院的裁判依据;民事诉讼法第七条规定人民法院审理民事案件,必须以事实为根据,以法律为准绳。在司法实践中,绝大部分案件特别是常规性案件主要依据法律即可作出裁判,这是由司法的本质所决定的。     

论司法裁判中的法律事实

法律事实与客观事实并无直接联系,主客观统一的属性决定法律事实作为司法裁判事实基础的正当性。无论在那种模式中,法律事实都是法官在严守法官职业道德的前提下,依据经验法则及法律规范,通过逻辑推理,对案件事实进行自由裁量的结果。     

论法律事实的判断

法律事实的判断是司法活动的关键环节,而如何从一堆错综复杂的证据中发现并找到一个能让法官定案的法律事实,则要根据不同类型的案件、不同的争议事实、不同的诉辩主张进行判断。本文即对如何判断法律事实进行了论证和归纳。     

法律中的事实——论法律事实的形成及其客观化

法律事实的形成过程是司法过程的弱点所在。法律事实的形成过程包括两个阶段：一是由生活事实通过证据和证明规则的过滤，形成案件事实；二是案件事实经过实体法规范的裁剪、组合後形成法律事实，其中有实体法规范的作用。法律事实的形成过程中涉及到很多判断因素，具有一定的主观性。法律事实形成过程的客观化包括两个方面，即心证公开和判决理由公开。     

裁判事实如何形成

对于司法过程中的事实问题,始终存在着多种分类。大多数都是在静态意义上对事实进行划分;事实只有在司法过程中才有意义,事实需要在司法过程中进行动态的考察。从客观事实的发生、案件事实的陈述到裁判事实的建构,是诉讼参与人、法律规范、证据等各种因素整合的结果。裁判事实的最终形成是在法律理性主导下进行的事实演化;事实的形成是一个动态的过程,静态意义上的分类并不是司法过程中事实的真实形态。     

检察官自由裁量权与自由裁量能力

检察官的自由裁量权存在于对法律的理解上、对案件事实的认定上。存在于法律规定与案件事实的对接中。影响检察官行使自由裁量权的思想因素，主要表现在检察官的实质性思维倾向。检察官自由裁量能力的培育主要是“寻找”法律的能力培育、认定案件事实的能力培育，以及将法律规定与案件事实对接的能力培育。     

客观事实与法律事实的法学思辨

在诉讼实践中,难免要涉及对案件事实的判断,如何科学理性的对案件事实作出判断,还事件以本来面目,避免冤假错案的发生,这就需要正确理解客观事实和法律事实的区别。本文从司法实践可行性的角度分析了两者的联系与区别,并探讨了两者的关系     

司法机关与媒体的良性互动

新闻媒体为吸引眼球,在报道司法案件时往往与司法独立要求、司法程序规则和法律事实诉求产生矛盾与冲突,以至于社会公众对案件的是非曲直莫衷一是,影响了司法判断的明确性和司法权威。本文试从媒体审判与司法公正双视角探讨司法机关如何更好地处理与媒体之间的关系。     

刑法的调整对象

刑法有没有自己独立的调整对象,一直是国内外刑法学界争议的焦点。我国刑法学界和法学界通说都认为刑法没有自己独立的调整对象。但是,如果刑法真的没有自己独立的调整对象的话,区别刑法和其他部门法的依据主要在于调整手段的不同的话,那么,为什么调整同样的社会关系要用不同的调整手段呢?是否完全只能靠立法者来决定什么是刑法的调整范畴?那么,这样又怎么能够防止立法者可能产生的误差呢?因此,刑法应该有自己独立的调整对象。研究刑法的调整对象只能从刑法和其他部门法之间的区别中来界定,而刑法和其他部门法的区别就在于刑法调整的是破坏法律制度的行为,即刑法的调整对象是破坏法律制度的行为。     

公司契约理论研究

公司虽然是一种企业组织 ,但是公司并非仅仅是一种法人格 ,它实际上是公司股东之间的一种契约 ,此种契约像一般民事契约一样是股东意思表示的合意 ,一旦具备契约的构成要件即对公司和公司股东产生法律上的约束力。这就是公司契约理论。公司契约理论的提出具有重大意义 ,将为我国公司的自由设立和市场经济的发展提供重要根据。我国公司法完全有必要采取该种理论。     

解读包公故事中的罪与罚

包公听讼断狱故事 ,突出的也是“罪与罚”的价值取向。正是基于这一原因 ,本稿在讨论包公故事中的法律问题时 ,首先标举“罪与罚”这个题目。除此之外 ,这一安排也有先“实体法”后“程序法”的技术考虑。值得引起我们思考的是 :在现实社会生活中 ,纠纷无论如何不会出现民事纠纷与刑事犯罪之间比例如此“悬殊”的情形。那末 ,何以馀以故事特别强调“罪与罚”这一主题呢 ?这正是本文着重研究的     

齐玉苓案批复之死——从该批复被忽视的解读文本谈起

长期以来,"齐玉苓案批复"被认为是我国"宪法司法化"的重要标志。其实,与该批复同日登载的两篇文章对批复中的"宪法"解读出不同的含义,前者意指宪法典,而后者为"教育法"。这足以表明"齐玉苓案批复"形成之初就存在重大缺陷,该批复既不应成为宪法司法化的突破口,也不应成为合宪性解释的样本。在该批复废止后,需要正确处理两方面问题:不能将有条件适用的合宪性解释方法彻底否定;不能将围绕批复所做的完善我国侵权法体系的努力全面否定。     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

A Dive into Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament

This article analyses the Article 50 TEU debate and the argument that for the UK Government to trigger the formal withdrawal process without explicit parliamentary authorisation would be unlawful, because it would inevitably result in the removal of rights enjoyed under EU law and the frustration of the purpose of the statutes giving those rights domestic effect. After a brief survey of Article 50, this article argues first of all that the power to trigger Article 50 remains within the prerogative, contesting Robert Craig's argument in this issue that it is now a statutory power. It then suggests a number of arguments as to why the frustration principle may be of only doubtful application in this case, and in doing so it re‐examines one of the key authorities prayed in aid of it ‐ the Fire Brigades Union case.     

Shaping the Structure of Legal Opportunities: Environmental NGOs Bringing International Environmental Procedural Rights Back Home

Research on legal opportunity structures has focused on how existing law, standing rules, and the costs of litigation shape the likelihood that social movement groups will mobilize the law. Yet there has been relatively little research on how and why legal opportunity structures change over time. This article focuses on a case study of the mobilization of procedural environmental rights contained within the Aarhus Convention. It addresses the following empirical puzzle: how did rights that were designed to help Eastern Europeans achieve environmental democracy eventually contribute to a reshaping of the structure of legal opportunities in Britain? Through a two‐step historical process‐tracing analysis that relies on a social constructivist theoretical approach, this research shows that environmental groups mobilized Aarhus rights in a number of ways and across different judicial venues, resulting in an evolution over time of the meaning of access to justice so that it included being “not prohibitively expensive.” This research builds on previous work to show that civil society agents are not passive agents situated within legal opportunity structures but instead are strategic actors who can develop and shape access to justice through policy entrepreneurialism and litigation.     

Reason‐Giving in Administrative Law: Where are We and Why have the Courts not Embraced the ‘General Common Law Duty to Give Reasons’?

This article has two aims. Firstly, it explores a body of modern challenges to administrative reason‐giving, decided in the five‐year period 2014–2018. Three main themes are drawn out: outright failures to give reasons now seem to be a rare occurrence; a number of considerations help to ensure that at least an outline of reasons is usually offered by decision‐makers; common law fairness plays a limited role in testing the adequacy of reasons. Secondly, it addresses the question of why the courts have not embraced a ‘general common law duty to give reasons.’ Four factors are discussed: doubts that introducing a general duty would add something of substance to the law; difficulties inherent in developing a general formulation of the reasons required; weaknesses in the ‘hortatory’ case for a general duty and weaker commitment on the part of judges than academics to generality as a central feature of administrative law doctrine.     

Entrapment Through the Lens of the Actio Libera in Causa

The entrapment defense is a puzzle of long standing. One the one hand, we are offended by the government’s subjecting someone vulnerable to extreme temptation. It seems like something anyone might fall prey to. On the other hand, it is hard to explain why someone who actually commits, or attempts a crime, and who would be liable if anyone other than the government had tempted him, should escape punishment. His blameworthiness seems the same. This essay seeks to illuminate this puzzle by showing how it parallels the long-standing debate surrounding the criminal law problem of the actio libera in causa—situations in which someone seeks to escape liability by contriving to put a certain defense in place, such as provoking his victim into attacking him, so that he can then kill him in self-defense. The parallels between the two problems do not serve to resolve either, but make them appear in a rather different light.     

Resources, Rights, and Environmental Regulation

Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, there were significant expectations that it would promote the development of environmental rights and extend remedies for environmental harm. This has not been the case, but then the expectations were probably always false. The paper points to three reasons why: the retention of a strong model of parliamentary sovereignty; the need to mould human rights principles alongside the common law; the traditional reluctance of the courts to determine questions of utility where questions of resource allocation arise. The paper concludes by reflecting on whether one would hope, in any case, to advance the cause of the environment through the mechanism of the Convention and suggests that there may be reasons to doubt the wisdom of this approach.