Governance in the Age of Digital Media and Branding

The politicization of government communications requires intense control. Centralization of government power accompanies advances in information and communications technology, as political elites use branding strategy in an attempt to impose discipline on their messengers and on media coverage. The strategic appeal of public sector branding is that it replaces conflicting messages with penetrating message reinforcement. Among the notable features are central control, a marketing ethos, a master brand, communications cohesiveness, and message simplicity. Together these features work to conflate the party government and the public service, which perpetuates trends of centralization. Using Canada's Conservative government (2006–2015) as a case study, public sector branding explains the hyper control over government communications and demonstrates why these developments can be expected to last, regardless of which party or leader is in control.     

Revisiting Politicization: Political Advisers and Public Servants in Westminster Systems

In recent times much has been made of the threat some argue is posed by political advisers to the impartiality of the Westminster civil service. Drawing on survey of senior New Zealand civil servants, this article examines the degree to which political advisers are perceived as a threat to civil service neutrality and describes the form taken by that threat as variously perceived. On the evidence reported, it is suggested that traditional understandings of “politicization” need to be reconceptualized if they are to fully account for the nature of the relationship between political and civil service advisers. To existing conceptions of politicization, therefore, the article proposes adding another: “administrative politicization,” allowing for different gradations of politicization to be identified, and enabling a nuanced assessment of the nature and extent of a risk to civil service neutrality that, the data suggest, is not as great as is sometimes alleged.     

How Vigilant is the Vibrant Civil Society in Bangladesh? A Survey-based Analysis

Although international development organizations and donor countries regard civil society organizations (CSOs) as the best instrument for institutionalizing democracy in third world countries, few of these organizations have successfully influenced government policies or played a role in consolidating democracy. Based on survey data and empirical observations, this article will argue that civil society in Bangladesh may be noteworthy for its contributions to development and social welfare but that it can hardly contribute to democracy. CSOs participate in vibrant grassroots social services. However, they lack the necessary participatory attributes for proper interest articulation and monitoring of the state, resulting in a less vigilant civil society. The article links civil society's non-vigilant nature to co-optation and politicization by political forces.     

Clarity of responsibility and economic evaluations

Convincing scholarly evidence shows the economy directs the mass public's support for parties and leaders. But the extent of economic voting depends on a country's “clarity of responsibility.” According to several scholars, political clarity is important because it determines whether people link national economic performance to the parties in government. This study explores a potential second role, which involves how clarity moderates the strength of partisan-motivated reasoning. Clarity of responsibility makes the economy more or less central to party politics. It could therefore moderate people's motivation to rationalize economic facts in a biased direction. Using cross-national survey data, this study tests this possibility by examining economic disagreement between people who support a party in government and those who support the opposition. Results from a Bayesian multilevel regression show that partisan disagreement varies systematically with clarity of responsibility. This finding raises new questions about cross-national differences in economic voting.     

The impact of women above the political glass ceiling: Evidence from a Norwegian executive gender quota reform

Women have historically been underrepresented in democratic assemblies, particularly in top positions with executive powers. Most gender quota reforms address this by mandating a more equal gender representation on election lists. In contrast, a 1992 legislative reform in Norway required parties' candidate lists for the local executive board to comprise at least 40% politicians of each gender. This legal change was not only exogenously imposed by a higher-level government, but also generated distinct quota-induced constraints across Norwegian municipalities. We exploit the resulting variation in ‘quota shocks’ using a difference-in-differences design to identify the quota's effect on women's political representation as well as local public policies. We find that more women enter the executive board after the reform, though spill-overs on women's representation in the local council and on the probability of a female mayor or top administrator are weak. We also find no consistent evidence for shifts in public policies due to increased representation of women in positions with executive powers.     

Parteien und Bürgermeister in der Repräsentativen Demokratie. Kommunale Konkordanz- und Konkurrenzdemokratie im Vergleich

Analogous to Lehmbruch’s model, two ideal types of representative democracy may also be distinguished in respect of local politics. Proportional democracy is characterised by a low degree of party politisation of both parish councils and mayors. This holds for the nomination period, on the hustings, for the election and during government, and induces the dominance of the mayor in all periods. Local competitive democracy, however, may be described in terms of a less influential mayor in all phases and a high degree of party politisation. There is empirical evidence that patterns of proportional democracy prevail in Baden-Wuerttemberg, whereas North Rhine-Westphalian communities are dominated by actors’ constellations similar to the competitive democracy model. These differences can be explained by diverging communal laws, a lower degree of party organisation in Baden-Wuerttemberg, and a lower average population size in the southern communities. Legal conditions, the degree of party organisation and population size as independent variables can be subsumed into an index of proportional democracy, which may be helpful for a preliminary indexing of communities in other German Laender states.     

Towards a New Politics: Citizenship and Rights in Contemporary Argentina

The emergence of a human rights movement represented a cultural turning point in many Latin American societies. The movement's struggle acted as a catalyst for political learning, triggering a profound renovation of the region's democratic traditions. The most impressive development has been the emergence of a rights-oriented discourse that reunites two elements that populist forms of self-understanding had kept separate: democracy and the rule of law. Cultural innovation gave birth to a new form of politicization that greatly differs from the movementist and corporatist practices of past populist movements, for the former is guided by a liberal concern: establishing clear institutional boundaries between state and civil society. Through the analysis of a series of citizens' initiatives and movements, the paper analyzes this new form of politicization and its contribution to the authorization and effectivization of rights as institutions.     

How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation on Party Platform Change

Considerable ambiguity exists regarding the effect of government/opposition status on party platform change. Existing theories predict that (1) it has no effect, (2) opposition parties change more, (3) opposition parties change more after several spells in opposition, and (4) parties’ responses vary because of different goal orientations. We propose that a party's aspiration to office, measured by its historical success or failure in entering office, determines a party's reaction to being in opposition or government. We hypothesize that, because of loss aversion, parties with low office aspiration change more when they are in government than when they are in opposition. Conversely, parties with high office aspiration change more as opposition party than as government party. We find evidence for these hypotheses through a pooled time‐series cross‐sectional analysis of 1,686 platform changes in 21 democracies, using the Comparative Manifesto Data and an innovative measure of party platform change.     

Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies

In this interview Harry Howe Ransom, a leading American scholar of intelligence studies over the past 50 years, discusses how he entered the field and his views regarding some key intelligence topics. Foremost on his research agenda has been the study of whether in democratic societies secret agencies can operate side-by-side with an otherwise open government without violating basic civil liberties – the difficult balancing act between the need for security, on the one hand, and the cherished value of liberty, on the other. He has also been a leading critic of intelligence politicization, noting in this interview that there is a tendency for intelligence systems to provide information they think their top bosses want to hear, and for the top bosses – more often than not – to do what they wish in spite of intelligence to the contrary. Professor Ransom began his research into intelligence as a young political scientist at Harvard University and continued this work throughout his subsequent distinguished career at Vanderbilt University and into his retirement years.     

Restraining the Governors: The Nordic Experience with Limiting the Strong State

The combination of a tradition of arbitrary royal government and popular intolerance, with the existence of extensive, unitary and highly centralized institutions of government, and with the dominance of government by a single, reformist party for more than a half century would seem a potent recipe for governmental abuse of individual and minority group rights. That is especially true in the absence of the formal constitutional safeguards used to preserve rights elsewhere Yet the Nordic democracies have in fact proved exemplary in protecting civil liberties Why? This article challenges the view that Nordic political societies are consensual historically or by nature, and it describes the limited traditional institutional checks on abuse of individual and minority rights by government Instead it finds the basis for the Nordic democracies' excellent record in civil liberties in the combination of (1) the development of new, non-traditional institutional checks on government. (2) the use of direct democracy as a check on parliamentary majorities. (3) the pervasive use of corporatist channels encompassing the major oppositional interest groups to draft and implement legislation, and (4) the effective constraints placed on decisions by parliamentary majorities by the pattern of fierce partisanship in the finely balanced parliamentary party constellation These protections for individual and minority liberties arise primarily from the assumption that basic conflicts of interest are a fact of political life and that they should be institutionalized.     

Bureaucratic dilemmas: Civil servants between political responsiveness and normative constraints

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.     

Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third‐Party Influence on Protests and Repression

Ukraine's anti‐government protests in 2013–2014, and the ensuing removal of President Yanukovich, raised much speculation about Russia's role in the outcome of the crisis, as well as more general questions related to third‐party influence on domestic protests and repression. Does third‐party assistance to the government increase the level of government repression or deter protesters? Does the leader removal indicate that foreign involvement was a failure? Or can a third party gain from involvement, even if its protégé leader is removed from power? We model external influence on the onset of protests and repression as a game between the government, the protesters, and a third party that supports the government. The main finding is that a third party may “bankroll” repression against the protesters, even at the risk of the removal of their protégé leader, with the goal of deterring future protests within its sphere of interest.     

How voters' perceptions of junior coalition partners depend on the prime minister's position

Recent studies document that voters infer parties' left‐right policy agreement based on governing coalition arrangements. This article extends this research to present theoretical and empirical evidence that European citizens update their perceptions of junior coalition partners' left‐right policies to reflect the policies of the prime minister's party, but that citizens do not reciprocally project junior coalition partners' policies onto the prime minister's party. These findings illuminate the simple rules that citizens employ to infer parties' policy positions, broaden understanding of how citizens perceive coalition governance and imply that ‘niche’ parties, whose electoral appeal depends upon maintaining a distinctive policy profile, assume electoral risks when they enter government.     

Assessing Party Effects on Local Policies: a Quarter Century of Progress or Eternal Recurrence?

There is substantial evidence of a significant link between parties and the overall scale of council activity. However, party effects vary considerably across services: the impact of parties is stronger on redistributive policies than on infrastructure or on the police and fire services. The evidence offers little support for the view that the primary policy making role of parties is mediative: additive party effects are far more significant than mediative party effects. As far as measures of party strength are concerned, the results for seat share are usually more significant than the results for outright control. Finally, policies are more strongly influenced by Labour party strength than by Conservative party strength, and left and right party effects are particularly strong when central government is controlled by Labour and the Conservatives respectively.     

Which Party Gets the Mayoralty? A Multivariate Statistical Investigation of Danish Local Government Formation

In non‐presidential multiparty systems, it is not only the voters but also coalition formation after the election that decides the government of the community. Some national‐level studies investigate which parties are most likely to win the Prime Minister's office. The aim of this article is to investigate the same question at the local level: What makes a party more likely to win the post of mayor? The article finds that party size and change in size are important along with experience and ideological centrality. The results are similar to those obtained at the national level, and this study thus expands the scope of these explanatory variables. However, the study also shows that being a large party is not sufficient for a party to have a good chance of winning the mayoralty. Furthermore, norms guiding appropriate behaviour seem important in addition to instrumental behaviour. It appears that parties that are popular in the electorate benefit from being perceived as more deserving of the mayoralty than others.     

Does Reinvention Need Reinvention? Lessons from Tmncated Managerialism in Britain

Since the 1970s, reformers have pressed innovation in Whitehall management. However, the reinvention efforts by both the Thatcher and Major governments under the banners of public choice and managerialism have led the reform movement to a dead end. Using interviews ranging from 1978 to 1993 and drawing upon the works of public management theorists, this article analyzes the obstacles to reinventing government in the UK. Namely, the politicization of the process coupled with HM Treasuy's stronghold on expenditures has limited managerial discretion and built mistrust of veforms among civil servants. Rather than creating an environment conducive to innovations in public management, the UKs efforts have deepened the divide between policymakers and administrators.     

Retrospective pledge voting: A comparative study of the electoral consequences of government parties’ pledge fulfilment

Does pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy, the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties’ performance to their previous electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that a government party's electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance. A government party that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory representation in democratic regimes. Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility.     

Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq

The concept of ‘politicization’ of the US intelligence services, and in particular the CIA, has been debated by scholars for many years. However, it has also been easily dismissed by those investigating recent US foreign policy, as in the Robb-Silberman Commission's assurance over the 2003 Iraq War that ‘the Intelligence Community needs to be pushed’. This essay seeks an extension of the critique of politicization by considering the historical context since the formation of the CIA. It seeks an application of that critique by putting forth, when evaluating the policy and operations of the George W. Bush administration, the notion of an ‘alternative network’ within the government. The argument is that politicization must be linked to a conception of ‘Executive power’, both within the American bureaucracy and in the projection and rationalization of US aims overseas.     

Unveiling Nepal's Civil Society

The main purpose of this paper is to provide information about Nepal's civil society as far as possible, as the same has become much contested in recent years. The article looks into the different traditions (from traditional to post-modern) of civil society in Nepal as an endeavour to take stock of where it stands vis-à-vis with various factors in the context of economy, polity, and society. The paper argues that, although Nepal has a very long tradition of civil society, the extant one is highly politicized. Part of the problem with politicization lies with perpetual political instability and part with the way civil society has come to be understood. In the context of Nepal, there are yet no clear tools developed to map the civil society. It concludes that one cannot have water-tight compartmentalization of civil society and other societies as they are interdependent, but when civil society groups lose the civility factor, they are bound to face legitimacy questions—which perhaps is the case in Nepal.