A 'European' Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich

This paper discusses the present ‘legal consciousness’ literature and seeks to identify two different conceptions of legal consciousness. Most of this literature originated in the United States, but there has also been a growing interest in issues of legal consciousness in Europe. The use of the term ‘legal consciousness ’ in these European discussions is, however, remarkably different from its use in the United States literature. It is argued that the most commonly used ‘American ’ conception of legal consciousness reflects important ideas of Roscoe Pound and asks: how do people experience (official) law? By contrast, a European conception of legal consciousness, which was first introduced by the Austrian legal theorist Eugen Ehrlich, focuses on: what do people experience as ‘law ’? After both perspectives are applied in a case‐study of a run‐down neighbourhood in the Netherlands, it is concluded that future studies of legal consciousness may benefit from an integration of the two conceptions.     

Socio‐legal Studies in France: Beyond the Law Faculty

This article is the third in an occasional series dealing with the development, current status, and future of socio‐legal studies in selected countries. It follows articles by Kim Economides (Aotearoa/New Zealand) and Harry Arthurs and Annie Bunting (Canada). In this article we argue that in France one can identify work that corresponds to the key strands of socio‐legal research in Anglo‐American societies but that ‘socio‐legal’ as a category of research and scholarship does not have the presence it has in the United Kingdom. French law faculties continue to be strongly shaped by a traditional disciplinary orthodoxy rooted in a highly and distinctively structured form of doctrinal analysis. In the first part, we explain the relatively limited presence of socio‐legal studies in French law faculties in terms of the historical and institutional mechanisms by which disciplinary closure has been created and maintained around traditional orthodoxies. But in the second part we will trace the presence – predominantly outside law faculties – of significant fragments of socio‐legal practice in the scholarship of law and allied disciplines.     

Law as a Parasitic Discipline

British university law schools are undergoing a radical change in the nature of legal research and scholarship. They were once dominated by pure doctrinal analysis but the new generation of legal scholars are either abandoning doctrinal work or infusing it with techniques and approaches drawn from the humanities and the social sciences. This essay argues that this change will lead to a greater ability to provide law students with a truly liberal education and will also enable the law school to take a much greater part in the intellectual debates to be found elsewhere in the university.     

The impact of “empirical facts” on legal scholarship and legal research training

Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (“empirical facts”). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how “empirical facts” are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.     

The Paradox of American Critical Legalism

Duncan Kennedy's essay is a reprint from his recently published book. We hope to draw attention to Kennedy's work among students of European integration since we believe his analysis to be relevant both to the specific debate on the impact of European integration upon private law and to comparative legal study in general. European legal scholarship has only recently begun to examine the problems of private legal integration. The late appearance of private law in the integration arena is due to a primarily instrumental understanding and strategic use of law in the European market-building project: only once legal ‘barriers to trade’ were eliminated and national regulatory law replaced by Europeanised norms, did the degree to which the core institutions of ’private‘ law had been (indirectly) affected by the integrationist logic become apparent. Comparative legal research, however, has benefited from this awakening of interest. European Commission projects have widened the scope of and intensified comparative studies in Europe. Equally, experience gained from the ‘Integration Through (Public) Law’ project has led to a new private legal debate on the impact of national traditions, the concept of legal cultures and the social functions of private law. Accordingly, whilst Duncan Kennedy's deliberations on the history of American legal thought and the differences between American and European legal cultures are generally to be commended for their sensitive treatment of the specificities of the civil law system and the common law heritage, they are equally of particular topical concern since in addition to highlighting America's ‘utter faith and utter distrust in law,’ they also investigate the fundamentally different approaches adopted towards ‘the project law’ within each of the member states of the EU. If European private lawyers are to come to terms with the problems of integration and convergence, they must first tackle these deep-seated divergences between their own national legal cultures.     

Law's Social Forms: A Powerless Approach to the Sociology of Law

Since the law and society movement in the 1960s, the sociology of law in the United States has been dominated by a power/inequality approach. Based on a sociological distinction between the forms and substances of law, this article outlines a “powerless” approach to the sociology of law as a theoretical alternative to the mainstream power/inequality approach. Following Simmel and the Chicago School of sociology, this new approach analyzes the legal system not by its power relations and patterns of inequality, but by its social forms, or the structures and processes that constitute the legal system's spatial outlook and temporality. Taking a radical stance on power, this article is not only a retrospective call for social theory in law and society research, but also a progressive effort to move beyond US‐centric sociolegal scholarship and to develop new social science tools that explain a larger variety of legal phenomena across the world.     

Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became applicable in May 2018. Due to the GDPR's extraterritorial scope, which could result in massive fines for U.S. companies, comparative data privacy law is of great current interest. In June 2018, California passed its own Consumer Privacy Act, echoing some of the provisions of the GDPR. Despite the many articles comparing the two schemes of law, little attention has been given to the foundation of these laws, that is, what exactly encompasses the data referred to by these laws? By understanding how the term “personal data” or “personal information” is defined in both jurisdictions, and why these definitions and the treatment of protected data are so different, companies can strategize to take advantage of these developments in the European Union. After explaining the differences in how data is treated in the United States and the European Union by exploring the definitions, regulations, and court cases, we will explore the five legal strategy pathways that companies might pursue with respect to the legal aspects of data transfer and privacy law compliance. While these strategies range from ignoring the law to adopting the European model worldwide, this analysis of legal strategy reveals a means for companies to gain a competitive advantage through their adoption of a worldwide compliance scheme.     

Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch

The article discusses the roles of founding principles of the EU with the method of doctrinal constructivism, thereby explaining this specific approach to legal scholarship. At the same time it proves the usefulness of the constitutional approach to EU law. Core characteristics of the EU legal order should become more tangible.     

A Case for Applying the Theoretical Semiotics in the Practice of Trade Mark Law

The application of semiotics in trade mark law is an interdisciplinary endeavour in its infancy. The author traces its genesis in recent years and situates it within the context of general theoretical approaches, in particular of an interdisciplinary kind, appearing in the trade mark law literature in the past. The purposes for which such theories are applied, and questions of methodology arising from this, are examined. In particular, it is observed that semiotic theory has, by and large, been used for the purpose of debating legal policy in trade mark law (especially in the United States), and that this has given rise to argument about the extent to which semiotic theory can exert any normative force of its own upon the law. This article offers a different perspective. It is sought to demonstrate the usefulness of theoretical semiotics in solving trade mark law questions in practice. The author emphasises that this involves no threat to orthodox legal problem-solving methodology (whatever one may think of the orthodoxy), and in particular does not require the normative use of semiotic theory. Taking as a starting point the concept of ‹trade mark use’, and having regard to trade mark law and literature in Europe, the United States and Australia, the author proceeds to demonstrate the proposed approach by reference to some current problems in trade mark infringement.     

Internal and external method in the study of law

Legal theory and scholarship are currently characterized by a division between traditional, doctrinal methods and approaches derived from extra-legal disciplines. This paper proposes a different though related distinction between two methods of understanding law and interpreting authoritative legal texts.Internal method reflects the viewpoint of the participant in a legal system and traditional doctrinal study; it is practical and decision-oriented. Limitations on the range of arguments and interpretations employed are accepted in order to render its results serviceable for practical tasks.The purposes of external method are cognitive and theoretical; it is oriented toward a comprehensive philosophical and scientific rationality. Its premises and results are therefore not restricted by received professional opinion or social or institutional restraints, and may reflect the conceptual resources of extra-legal disciplines.The paper discusses the antecedents of these methods, describes the structure of each and relations between them, and suggests that the criterion of internal method is practical effectiveness, that of external method truth or falsity.     

THE FORM OF REFORM: REVISITING THE CHOICE AMONG A CREED,A CODE,AND A CATALOGUE

In the past, international Evidence law reformers have focused primarily on substantive evidentiary doctrines. However, for reforms to be effective, the courts and legislatures must state the revised doctrines in a form that promotes the overall objectives of the legal system. The basic choice facing reformers is among a creed identifying broad goals, a code stating flexible principles, and a catalogue prescribing detailed rules. In the past, especially in the United States, there was a consensus among Evidence scholars that the code format is preferable. However, if a key objective of a national legal system is to encourage pretrial disposition of cases, the courts and legislatures should give serious thought to utilizing a catalogue format. That format is especially attractive in the doctrinal areas such as privilege in which evidentiary rules are intended to affect primary behavior outside the courtroom.     

The Splendors and Miseries of Constitutional Reasoning in Times of Global Crisis: A Critical Look from the Realist Perspectives of Semiotics

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the rescue fund that may grant loans to struggling euro zone governments by issuing bonds, collectively by the euro zone members. The implementation of the ESM spawned a lot of legal challenges brought to higher judicial authority in Ireland, Austria, Estonia, Germany and Poland. In the fall of 2012 the ESM was subject to legal analysis in the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Delivering much anticipated rulings in legal challenges to the legal provisions establishing the ESM, courts avoided upsetting the complex arrangements in question by producing legal decision of direct political import and letting EU bailout measures go forward. In looking over different critical responses, we have seen an argument raised by media and legal scholars, according to which courts’ capitulation before the power of financial markets in the EMS rulings represents “a sign of judicial crisis” that marks the weakness of modern European jurisprudence. In light of their importance, we undertake a preliminary semiotic analysis of the ESM rulings of the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Our analysis aims at discerning the crucial aspects of those rulings is performed on the basis of different semiotic methodologies combined with the refined ideas of the Scandinavian analytical school of the doctrinal study of law. In traditional legal studies there seems to be a taken for granted assumption that there is one analytical way to dissect judicial reasoning of the supreme courts. This paper argues that the manner of analyzing the constitutional reasoning needs to be congruent with the particular research methodology.     

“Legality with a Vengeance”: Reclaiming Distribution for Sociolegal Studies

The law and society community has argued for decades for an expansive understanding of what counts as “law.” But a content analysis of articles published in the Law & Society Review from its 1966 founding to the present finds that since the 1970s, the law and society community has focused its attention on laws in which the state regulates behavior, and largely ignored laws in which the state distributes resources, goods, and services. Why did socio‐legal scholars avoid studying how laws determine access to such things as health, wealth, housing, education, and food? We find that socio‐legal scholarship has always used “law on the books” as a starting point for analyses (often to identify departures in “law in action”) without ever offering a programmatic vision for how law might ameliorate economic inequality. As a result, when social welfare laws on the books began disappearing, socio‐legal scholarship drifted away from studying law's role in creating, sustaining, and reinforcing economic inequality. We argue that socio‐legal scholarship offers a wide range of analytical tools that could make important contributions to our understanding of social welfare provision.     

论诸法学流派对法律方法的理论支援

法律方法理论不仅受规范法学理论的制约和支持,而且也受其他法学流派的制约和支持。不同法学流派所支持的具体法律方法不尽相同。如价值法学之于价值衡量、社会法学之于事实替代、规范法学之于效力识别、经济分析法学之于利益衡量、多元论法学之于法律续造等,都更容易产生支持效果。尽管不同法学流派各自支持不同的法律方法,但这不否定某一法律方法受多个法学流派理论支援的情形,也不否定一个法学流派可以支持多种法律方法的情形。     

Policy and disparity: The punishment of infanticide in Britain and America

In the United States, studies of maternal infanticide (and female violent behavior in general) have been rare. Children represent about 35% of female perpetrated homicide victims and there is reason to believe that this number may be significantly higher based on estimates concerning SIDS deaths. Infants face a homicide rate approximately four times higher than that of the general population in much of the industrialized world. Infanticide has historically been relegated to the legal category of homicide in the U.S. This is significantly different than in most industrialized countries. This article argues that the lack of specific public, legal, and medical policy in the United States concerning infanticide results in random inequity of charges, dispositions, sanctions, and treatment of offenders. This situation is unnecessary as demonstrated by British and European legal systems, and is in direct opposition to the policy of minimizing disparity.     

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS: WHY ARE FAMILY PRACTICES SO DIFFERENT FROM LEGAL THEORIES?

Debates about child custody following parental separation often have been framed in terms of a battle between the competing rights of different family members. In the United States, advocates of mothers’ rights square off against proponents of fathers’ rights, with each side claiming to truly represent children's rights. Of course, not all advocates lay claim to children's rights in contact and custody disputes merely as a tactical maneuver. Some experts believe that children are entitled to (and benefit from) their own, independent legal advocate in custody cases. In theory, at least, the position that children lay claim to a third set of independent rights is strongly held in Europe, more strongly than in many U.S. states, because of the adoption of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in Europe, but not in the United States. In this article, we examine children's rights in custody disputes from a European perspective, particularly children's legal right to contact with their parents, as well as the children's right to be heard in custody and contact disputes. We find that, despite differences in legal theory, tradition, and family demographics, European countries ultimately face a familiar reality: Custody and contact disputes are, in reality, more about renegotiating family relationships than they are a matter of a mother's, father's, or child's rights.     

并非有一种值得期待的宣言——我们时代的法学为什么需要重视方法

每一个时代都有自己的独特的法律现象或法律问题,各个时代的法学必须针对这些现象或问题提出新的解释或解决方案。中国法学现今的问题是:对什么是法学之“学”,尤其什么是法学的性质和立场并没有统一而明确的认识;知识生产无序化的现象;法学不能为实践提供智力支持。针对上述问题,我们的对策是:一是让法学的知识兴趣从政策定向转向司法定向;二是使法学视角返归实在法;三是法学向方法的回归。法学方法论的研究,从一个侧面为我们的法学建构提供一种观照的镜鉴,一种特殊的精神气质和建立法学知识标准的某种进路。我们可以对一切缺乏方法论支持的所谓学术创造提出最低限度的质疑。     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.