省会城区“县权公开”试水

<正> 就是要让权力清单"理"得明白,权力行使"用"得明白,权力公开"说"得明白,权力监督"看"得明白与睢宁、成安有别,成都市武侯区是"县权公开"试点中唯一的省会城市中心城区,区位差异意味着政治生态与改革环境的迥然不同。     

城市变迁中的双重吸纳——基于国家与城市关系的历史视角

城市化同时是政治权力重构的过程。具体而言,在不同的历史阶段,城市的发展有一个从城市国家到国家城市的身份转变。当城市进入国家政治之后,国家与城市不可避免地把自身的权力结构嵌入了对方政治体系之中,从而形成了复杂的政治关系。这种关系既体现在国家的形成中,也体现在城市的转型过程中。现代城市的发展在很大程度上仍然是一个国家与城市权力关系调整的过程,国家无法吞噬城市,城市也无法侵蚀国家,城市与国家在双向的政治吸纳中实现城市主体的独立性,也维护着国家的整体性。     

十一届三中全会以来党的领导制度改革的法制化取向

党的领导制度的两个重要方面是党内民主和党政关系。十一届三中全会以来,党的领导制度改革实际上是以法制化为取向,健全和完善民主集中制的法制系统。本文论述党内民主法制化、党政关系法制化的改革历程、成就及有关理论问题党内民主法制化改革从三个方面进行：健全党的代表大会制度和集体领导制度;完善党内选举制度,保障党员民主权利;加强党内民主监督,逐步形成强有力的监督体系。推进党政关系法制化必须坚持三条基本原则：坚持党对国家政权的领导;依法确立党与国家政权的职能关系,形成权力制约机制;党必须在宪法和法律的范围内活动,加强党政关系的法制化建设。党政关系法制化的关键环节应是执政党与国家权力机关的关系。党的领导权力和人大的监督权力是最高层次的权力平衡制约关系,决定着其他各级各类权力关系     

“一把手”体制:历史体认、制度检讨与改革进路

"一把手"作为长期流行于我国政治生活的特定术语,承载着特定的权力规则,反映着特定的体制形态。"一把手"过分集权的领导体制是引发诸多政治弊病的发源点,亦是深化改革进程中亟待突破的关节点。本文以"一把手"体制生成与演进的脉络梳理、不同时期制度创新的绩效评价、改革难点问题的认定为考察背景,以2014年以来山西等地开启的"一把手"限权改革为实践分析样本,从科学划分党政主要领导的职能权限、形成不同属性权力之间的制衡关系、保持持续递增的刚性执行力等方面,提出了以节点攻坚推进体系构建的改革进路。     

中国地方政府行政首长问责制度的制度设计缺陷及影响

海南省等地方政府行政首长问责制度主要内容包括问责主体、问责对象、问责内容和实现机制。它的特点是问责主体与问责对象行政隶属关系的明晰,构成了典型的等级问责关系;问责内容广泛,涉及等级问责、职业问责、法律问责和政治问责等内容;通过直接界定和参照执行的方式确定了两类问责对象;单一的政府行政负责人启动机制,决定了问责的行政内部垂直领导的实现途径。这一制度设计的缺陷及影响是:由“单一问责主体和启动机制可以实现多类问责内容的问责效果”的假设难以成立,引发问责效果难以实现的问题;由“地方党委书记不过问行政问责”的假设不成立,导致问责执行中可能存在的党政冲突问题;由“‘部门行政首长’和‘政府行政首长’在决策权力与责任方面一致”的假设不成立,带来的对政府行政首长决策责任如何界定及合理问责的问题;由“体制外信息提供者可以充分获取必要的信息和行使相应的权力”的假设不成立,带来的监督者难以到位的问题。     

民族国家构筑的同质异向:南京国民政府与云南地方实力派关系的考察

南京国民政府时期中央权威与云南地方实力派的关系,大致经历了观望中的"模糊"、相对融洽、猜忌与防备、"斗而不破"到最终的分道扬镳等五个阶段。作为地方民族依附型的云南地方实力派,其与国民政府中央的关系是民族国家构筑过程中,中央权威与地方主义关系的重要内容之一。云南地方实力派与中央的对立意识一定程度上系中央政治权威影响的结果。在民国民族国家构筑的过程中,地方实力派与中央权威政治视野的转换存在着同质异向关系,表面与中央政治权威存在冲突,但根本政治目标也是民族国家。地方实力派的存在是民国社会、经济、政治制度在转变过程中权力分配失衡的体现,他们的存在及其在地方的实践,也是民族国家构筑过程中的有益探索。     

城市发展中的权力结盟——基于城市增长、精明增长和再城市化的演变视角

城市权力结构变迁伴随着城市增长、精明增长和再城市化的全过程。在不同的阶段,城市政府、政府官员、企业、媒体等各种社会力量在城市经济增长的目标下形成了联盟。同时,当权力结盟是在不完善的市场体制下进行时,权力结构及其运作过程就难以受到其他政治主体的制约。精明增长对城市增长之间的理论替代,既意味着城市的边界受到了限制,也意味着权力结盟必须遵循边界约束,即城市发展必须与社区权力联系起来,并以紧凑的城市空间提供更加协调的公共生活。但是伴随着再城市化的进程,精明增长理论中的城市理想仍然可能被新的社会隔绝所打破,城市发展仍有可能进入新一轮的权力冲突之中。     

试论我国社会主义初级阶段的党政关系

一随着经济体制改革的深入发展,政治体制的改革也已经提上了议事日程.邓小平同志指出:"改革的内容,首先是党政要分开,解决党如何领导,如何善于领导的问题.这是关键."(邓小平:《建设有中国特色的社会主义》增订本,第140页)可见,深入探讨社会主义初级阶段的党政关系,对于指导社会主义政治体制改革,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义.     

中国城市“钱袋子”的权力:来自38个城市的问卷调查

预算改革为城市人大加强预算监督提供了重要的契机。通过对全国38个拥有立法权的城市进行的问卷调查发现,经过十余年的预算改革,城市人大预算监督已经开始从原来的程序性监督迈向实质性监督,但呈现出明显的强弱差异。初步的统计分析发现,人大自身的角色认知、阻力认知、组织能力,政府内部的行政控制、政治支持和财政部门的配合都对人大预算监督存在着影响。不过,阶层回归分析发现,最显著的影响因素是阻力认知、组织能力以及财政部门的配合。     

中国政治体制改革的三个关键问题

推进中国政治体制改革，必须关注执政党内部的民主建设，切实削弱党内一把手的权力；必须关注横向上的党政关系。改革和完善党的执政方式；必须关注纵向上的中央与地方关系，建构互信、共赢的良性互动格局。     

Multi-Year Forecasting and Municipal Budgeting

The "black hole" of budget theory still is, after 50 years, budget preparation—much effort goes in but little seems to come out. This article examines municipal forecasting as a means of reforming this first stage of the budgetary process. Drawing on evidence from a cross-sectional study, we find that forecasting is likely to be within the cognitive limits of most municipal budget directors Moreover, budgetary forecasting can be structured to reflect previous and current political concerns.     

Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The Budget-Execution Process in West Virginia Cities

Budget execution traditionally has been defined as a straightforward process of implementing the budget as approved. Research into the process has been limited, particularly with regard to local government budgets. This article examines the rebudgeting process using a case study of 15 West Virginia cities. Rebudgeting displayed a consistent pattern for the various budget categories—personnel, contracts, commodities, capital, and contributions—closely resembling the "increase-then-decrease" pattern seen in the overall budget. Empirical data on budgetary adjustments and structured interviews with city finance officials helped to describe budget changes and explain probable causes and effects of behavior during budget execution for these smaller cities. Budget changes were found to be the result of managerial necessity and the exercise of discretion to generate and distribute surpluses.     

Fiscal Federalism, European Stability Pact, and Municipal Investment Finance: A Microdata Analysis of Spanish Municipalities

In countries where subnational governments control a large partof the public finances, the central government's ability tokeep its commitment to the European Union's Stability and GrowthPact can be a difficult matter. European rules demand that theoverall budget be balanced over the medium term; applying thisrule at subcentral level may unduly reduce capital outlays andlocal budgetary autonomy. This article examines the possibleimpact of budgetary stability legislation on the capital expenditureof Spanish municipalities. The empirical findings suggest thatthe new budgetary stability framework will oblige municipalitiesto (i) limit their investments, (ii) raise the tax burden, or(iii) reduce the funds allocated to other budget items. We believethe Spanish municipal experience is generalizable to other federalcountries in Europe that are facing hard budget constraintsand high earmarked grants.     

Budgetary constraints and municipal revenue forecasting

Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.     

Local government reform in South Africa: An analysis of financial management legislative compliance by municipalities

South African local government has undergone radical transformation. The reform process included a local government financial management best‐practice technical assistance programme (MFMTAP) targeting financial management and especially budget quality reform. Dollery and Graves (2009) earlier examined the efficacy of the South African National Treasury (NT's) municipal budget funding compliance technique for measuring adherence to the Municipal Finance Management Act's (MFMA) budget funding requirements using a single metropolitan municipality case study. This article further evaluates the robustness and validity of the funding compliance instrument as a reform performance measurement tool by comparing the results of four geographically and demographically different municipalities. Also introduced is a performance ‘trend’ instrument similar to a ‘Likert scale’ for comparing municipal performance. Optimal tax revenue theory is invoked to examine this key revenue variable for producing a compliant budget. The article finds the ‘budget funding’ reform component of the Best‐Practice Technical Assistance (BPTA) programme presently ineffective and unsustainable. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

China’s Local Political Turnover in the Twenty-First Century

This paper provides empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in China in the twenty-first century. Employing the city-level turnover data of political leaders in China between 2000 and 2018 and utilizing the fixed effects ordered logit model, we find that the likelihood of promotion of local leaders rises with their economic performance. This relationship holds more firmly in the municipal party secretary. The probability is also found to decrease with the economic performance of their immediate predecessors and neighboring cities. This finding is robust to various robustness tests. We interpret the finding as evidence that the relative economic performance (peer effects) also contributes to the local political turnover, in particular within a province. Moreover, after the Third Plenary Session of the 18^th CPC Central Committee, a material change in the personnel arrangement within the party arises and this promotion mechanism shows a dynamic change. Our study sheds some light on the growing literature emphasizing the relationship between political turnover and economic performance.

     

The first word and the last word in the budgetary process: A comparative institutional analysis of proposal and veto authorities

This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. We examine: (i) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (ii) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (iii) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process.     

How Weak Recognition and Measurement in the Federal Budget Encouraged Costly Policy: The Case of "Supervisory Goodwill"

The budget process is the primary means by which federal policymakers allocate resources. The failure of the budget to recognize and measure the full cost of federal programs encourages the Congress and president to skew resource allocation toward policies whose budgetary costs are underestimated. These "low-cost" policies often increase costs to taxpayers without providing taxpayers with benefits. Recent examples of this phenomenon are found in the "supervisory goodwill" cases. This article reviews these cases, the budgetary weaknesses they identify, the influence these weaknesses had on legislators, and the unnecessary costs for taxpayers that result from the supervisory goodwill policy. Specifically, the federal budget did not recognize the cost that would result from encouraging financial institutions to assume the assets and liabilities of insolvent savings and loans. The budget's recognition of costs failed a second time by not recording expenditures when the government abrogated its contracts with acquirers. Both actions raised costs to taxpayers unnecessarily. In addition to analyzing budgetary weaknesses and their potential costs, this article also reviews two proposed budgetary reforms that could address the budgetary failures highlighted by the supervisory goodwill cases.     

Deficits, Soft Budget Constraints and Bailouts: Budgeting after the Norwegian Hospital Reform

In the 1990s, the Norwegian hospital sector was characterized by soft budgetary constraints and increasing budget deficits. This was one of the main antecedents of the 2002 hospital reform, where the central state took over ownership of the hospitals from the counties. Arguably, the centralization of ownership, financing and production would harden the budget constraints and increase the budgetary discipline. This analysis shows that this has not been accomplished. Instead, the production has been far above what was planned, and the deficits higher than ever. Two stages of the post-reform budget processes are analyzed: first, the stage where the central state set the budgets and sends signals of budgetary rules (whether the state sends signals of soft or hard budget constraints), and second, how the central state handled deficits in the hospital sector as they emerged (whether the hospitals was bailed out or not). The conclusion is that the central state neither set a hard budget constraint nor managed to stay firm as deficits turned up. It is argued that three mechanisms explain the prevailing problems of managing the hospital sector: uncertainty of the hospitals' financial situation during the transition phase; minority governments; and specific features related to the organization of the budgetary process in parliament.     

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

The influence of institutions on budgetary behavior at the federal level is the subject of this article, which examines the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. While its impact on budgetary priorities and growth seems modest at best, the Act has had a substantial impact on the process of budgetary decisionmaking, the nature of budgetary debate, and the budgetary strategies employed within Congress. These new and generally dysfunctional forms of congessional budgetary behavior are consequences of a budgetary reform that attempted to transfer many of the resource allocation procedures of the Executive branch to a legislative context. The transfer of many Executive branch budgetary procedures has led to the appearance within Congress of budgetary behavior previously confined largely to the Executive branch. The article also discusses attempts to render the congressional budget process more compatible with the legislative environment, analyzing the modifications in the original budget process that have been effected and proposed in recent years.Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the Workshop on Budgetary Control in the Public Sector, Brussels, Belgium, October 13–14, 1983, the meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, October, 1983, and the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September, 1983. Allen Schick, Robert X. Browning, Alex Hicks, Robert Strauss, John R. Hibbings, Evelyn Brodkin, and Rod Kiewiet provided helpful comments, and Pamela Reyner provided secretarial assistance. All remaining deficiencies are the responsibilities of the authors.