The insanity defense to suicide

The certification of suicide as the manner of death can result in either the complete loss or a significant reduction in life insurance benefits to the victim's survivors. It is, thus, not uncommon for these beneficiaries to contest suicide as the manner of death. Insanity is a recognized defense in law against suicide. It is recognized in law that, in some cases, an insane man cannot intentionally destroy himself. However, it is also recognized that life insurers can exclude suicide by an insane man from coverage. This article discusses the common law doctrines upon which the insanity defense to suicide is based, with references to judicial opinions from cases which involve contested suicides and the issue of insanity.     

"Insanity" in civil law

The issue of "insanity" is rarely alluded to in the area of civil law. As a consequence, the legal standard for insanity is not clearly understood by many psychiatrists. The standard derives from case law and is based upon statutory law in the criminal sector. A civil case will be presented where the question of "insanity" was raised. In this case an individual committed suicide and his insurance company refused to pay the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy based upon a provision in his policy that excluded payment in situations of suicide. His beneficiaries sued, claiming that the deceased was insane at the time of his suicide and therefore not responsible for his actions. The standard for insanity in New Jersey and the reasoning of the psychiatrists will be presented.     

When it pays to be insane: three unusual legacies of insanity

Although the law generally does not permit an individual to profit by his own wrongdoing, that equitable principle may be inapplicable in the case of an individual who has been adjudicated insane (and therefore has not committed a wrong in the eyes of the law). This paper discusses three unusual legacies of a determination of insanity: the inheritance cases (permitting the insane killer to inherit from his own victim), the life insurance cases (permitting the beneficiary to recover when the insured commits suicide while insane), and the effect of insanity on publication rights agreements in sensational criminal cases.     

Moral wrongfulness and insanity: a New Zealand sample

Introduction: This study sought to identify the common characteristics amongst defendants found legally insane, compared to those who were psychiatrically evaluated yet convicted of their crime. Method: A retrospective review of court-ordered psychiatric court reports and legal outcomes was conducted, for all defendants referred for insanity evaluations in the largest city in New Zealand (and its surrounding rural regions) for a 7-year period. Results: The majority (60%; 37) of those referred for evaluation were found legally insane. The opinion regarding moral wrongfulness was the single factor that differentiated successful insanity defendants from those who were found guilty. Conclusions: Despite the centrality of the insanity defence to forensic psychiatry, few studies internationally consider characteristics of those found insane, particularly in comparison with those who are found guilty. Psychiatrically evaluated defendants in this sample were relatively homogenous, perhaps due to the court liaison nurse screening process.     

Deconstructing the Criminal Defence of Insanity

The significance of this article is in its deconstruction of the criminal insanity defence in a meta-legal critical context. The article’s objective is to critically review beliefs that the insanity defence was designed solely for public protection from insane violent people, or, for criminal deterrence. Arising from the long and continued use of the Roman Law concept of non compos mentis, the question arises as to what has become of the practical meaning of the term “insanity”, when used as a defence. The article tries to show that the defence of insanity is a public act of judicial denunciation against the accused, while the accused may have no effective responsibility for the crime. Argument begins with a critical discussion on the character of common-place denunciation as an appeal to public agreement. Then, it follows how the idea of “manifest criminality”, of the 1800s, might be cognate to modern ideas of “manifest madness”, linking into the origins of the English special verdict of insanity. This will allow a short critical analysis of the M’Naghten Case. Argument is completed with analysis of a psychologists’ expert construct of insanity and its relationship to jury perception. The article will suggest strongly that arguments based on the common law rules of insanity tend to expose juries more to denunciation of the accused, than to a reasoned account of the nature of his insanity and to the defects in his responsibility. Duly persuaded jurors would tend to acquiesce and participate in the denunciation of an accused person, whose unusual and unhealthy behaviours emanated from his sufferings by dint of his unbearable circumstances.     

'Manifest Madness': Towards a New Understanding of the Insanity Defence

This article introduces a new concept which can serve as a theoretical frame for understanding the way in which insanity is proved for the purposes of the criminal law. With reference to George Fletcher's concept of 'manifest criminality', it introduces the concept of 'manifest madness'. This concept constructs madness (a shorthand for the types of mental abnormality known to the criminal law as insanity) in criminal law as evident to lay observers, and its meanings, which are derived from collective knowledge of it, as encoded in the defendant's acts. Through an historical analysis of the way in which insanity has been proved in criminal law, the article argues that 'manifest madness' is useful for understanding how knowledge about insanity is structured in the criminal courtroom. The concept of 'manifest madness' provides a frame that incorporates evidentiary and procedural features of the insanity defence that have resisted systematic theoretical analysis.     

Criminal insanity in 19th-century Ireland,Europe and the United States: Cases,contexts and controversies

The insanity defence has a lengthy, complex history. This article provides a concise, comparative background to the evolution of criminal insanity legislation and institutions for the mentally ill in the nineteenth century, with particular reference to Ireland and the United States. Three key themes are identified and explored: (a) the emergence of the insanity defence in the nineteenth century (e.g. the McNaughtan Rules); (b) conditions in nineteenth-century asylums and institutions for the ‘criminally insane’ (with particular reference to overcrowding, physical illness and asylum deaths); and (c) nineteenth-century considerations of criminal responsibility in women with mental illness (with particular reference to medical and judicial views of the relevance of menstruation, pregnancy and child-birth). These themes are explored through review of historical literature (with particular reference to the work of Dr. Isaac Ray, founding father of forensic psychiatry in the United States) and examination of previously unpublished archival material from the Central Criminal Lunatic Asylum, Dublin.     

Forensic psychiatry and the birth of the criminal insane asylum in modern Italy

This paper focuses on the creation of the criminal insane asylum in Italy between unification in 1861 and World War I. The establishment of criminal insane asylums was a triumph of the positivist criminology of Cesare Lombroso, who advocated for an institution to intern insane criminals in his classic work, Criminal Man (1876). As a context for the analysis of the birth of the criminal insane asylum in Italy, this essay also outlines the history of the insanity plea in Italian criminal law and the young discipline of psychiatry during the fifty years after Italian unification.     

Two year's experience under Utah's mens rea insanity law

The author examined the records of the seven defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) under Utah's mens rea insanity law during the first two years of its operation. In all of the cases the attorneys, judges, and experts seemed unaware of the new law or confused about its meaning. Examination revealed that the findings of insanity were negotiated with either ignorance of or indifference to the mens rea law. Under the mens rea NGI law, the rate of insanity findings for Utah increased.     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part IV: The insanity defense and the Ultimate Issue Rule

In the wake of Hinckley, widespread public dissatisfaction with the role of psychiatrists in insanity defense litigation prompted Congress in 1984 to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit psychiatric testimony on the ultimate legal issue of whether or not a defendant is insane. APA's Statement on the Insanity Defense served as the ably articulated premise for this evidentiary amendment. APA argued that in going beyond their psychiatric expertise by answering ultimate issue questions as to whether defendants are legally insane, experts are likely to confuse the jury and undermine public confidence in psychiatry. APA also asserted that there was an impermissible logical leap between scientific psychiatric inquiry and moral-legal conclusions on the ultimate issue of insanity. This article reviews the origins, history, and vicissitudes of the Ultimate Issue Rule and analyzes the Statement on the Insanity Defense from both a legal and psychiatric perspective on the issue of whether psychiatrists should answer the ultimate question in insanity cases. The analysis suggests that APA's conclusions are not supported on scientific or evidentiary grounds, but may be warranted as a policy consideration to safeguard the public image of psychiatry.     

Incapacity of the Mind Secondary to Medication Misuse as a Not Criminally Responsible Defense

The manifestations of disorders of the mind may play a role in the occurrence of criminal behavior. In the majority of the cases, the presence of a psychiatric disorder is cited as the reason that an individual was not fully aware of his behavior. However, other conditions, such as seizure disorders or hypoglycemia, have also been linked to an inability to understand the nature and consequences of one's actions. On occasion, these situations can be explained by a state of automatism that may be described as insane or noninsane. In this article, we describe the case of a 77‐year‐old man, suffering from Parkinson's disease, where the issue of criminal responsibility associated with incapacity of the mind secondary to medication misuse was raised. We elaborate on the thinking behind this opinion and the implications according to Canadian law. Although the legal outcome of this case is specific to our jurisdiction, the clinical implication may be common to any patient suffering from a similar condition and may inform physicians, families, and lawyers.     

Insanity plea: predicting not guilty by reason of insanity adjudications

Using 35 variables and discriminant analysis procedures, it was found that, of 133 male defendants entering the insanity plea in Colorado, 87 percent were classified correctly into the disposition groups "adjudicated insane" and "convicted." Most positively related to an insanity adjudication were a psychiatric evaluation of insanity and a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Negatively related to the insanity verdict were diagnoses of substance use and personality disorders.     

The Insanity Exemption to Other than Honorable Discharge for the Purpose of Claiming Benefits: The Role of the Mental Health Examiner

Former service-members are barred from veteran benefits if their character of discharge is other-than-honorable due to willful and persistent misconduct. One exception is if it is determined that the service-member was legally insane at the time of the behaviors resulting in discharge. Offering an expert opinion on a mental state years or decades in the past is complicated. Yet, cases involving such opinions are assigned to veterans affairs-based mental health professionals without additional training or resources. This article fills this gap by discussing the unique legal statutes that define insanity for the purpose of benefit eligibility. In addition, it shares available resources and highlights themes resulting from having opined in such cases and having reviewed 30 Board of Veterans Appeals decisions involving claimed insanity.     

精神病辩护：历史、社会与现实

精神病辩护制度在普通法国家具有长久之历史,特别在美国,其不仅具有比较完善的刑事责任能力法则,而且其精神病辩护的案件也备受社会各界瞩目。而精神病辩护制度、相关立法或者司法实践活动并不是与世隔绝、生活在真空中的产物,其受到社会、政治、伦理道德等各种因素的影响。同时,即使在精神病辩护制度最为发达的美国,与人们印象中不同的是,实际上精神病辩护并未获得多大的成功,从而形成想象与现实的落差。对于我国而言,应从精神病辩护制度之历史、社会与现实多个视角或者因素考虑,从而确立一种渐进的或者改良的中国刑事责任能力法则或者辩护制度。     

Evaluating insanity

In place of the individualistic-subjective approaches to insanity evaluations, a specific criterion-based construct of insanity is proposed and examined. This construct entails the presence of a severe mental disorder which has substantially impaired the individual's cognitive and/or behavioral control. The construct was tested through the utilization of a specifically designed protocol (RCRAS) on 73 insanity evaluations from three forensic settings. Estimates of inter-rater reliability were obtained by indepedent rating of 25 cases, and yielded satisfactory to exceptionally high reliability coefficients (mean kappar=0.77). Results of a discriminant analysis and MANOVA generally confirmed the validity of the construct, demonstrating that insane patients were evaluated as having more severe psycho-pathology and a greater loss of cognitive and behavioral control.     

AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INSANITY DEFENSE*

Results from a public opinion survey of knowledge, attitudes, and support for the insanity defense indicate that people dislike the insanity defense for both retributive and utilitarian reasons: they want insane lawbreakers punished, and they believe that insanity defense procedures fail to protect the public. However, people vastly overestimate the use and success of the insanity plea. Several attitudinal and demographic variables that other researchers have found to be associated with people's support for the death penalty and perceptions of criminal sentencing are also related to support for the insanity defense. Implications for public policy are discussed.     

Insane Arsonists: An Early 21st Century Sample

We studied all individuals (n = 41) who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity for arson and who were committed to a California state psychiatric hospital on October 1, 2016 in a cross‐sectional analysis. This group of insane arsonists contained 33 (80.5%) males and eight (19.5%) females with a mean age at the time of the index arson of 35.9 years. At least 87.8% (n = 36) were considered to not have been participating in psychiatric treatment at the time of the index arson. Five (12.2%) of the insane arsonists had previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity for arson or had been convicted of having committed arson. Our findings suggest that lack of participation in psychiatric treatment was the most important factor in contributing to the index arson and the most important problem to be addressed in subsequent psychiatric treatment plans.     

精神病辩护制度研究——基于美国精神病辩护制度的思考

由于刑事责任的承担要求行为人对自己行为的社会危害性有认识和控制能力,某些精神病人对自己行为的社会危害性没有认识或无法控制,因而无法对自己的行为承担刑事责任,精神病也就成了刑事辩护的重要事由。在美国刑事审判中,精神病是无罪辩护的重要理由,判例法与刑事立法共同形成了一套较为完善的精神病辩护制度。在美国,精神病辩护制度的存废问题一直备受争议;精神病法律标准处于变化之中,各法域标准不一;精神病辩护的提出、审理程序、证明责任分配与证明标准、裁定及专家证人的作用有其特点;因精神病而判无罪者的关押与释放形成了特定规则。我们可以借鉴其制度的某些合理因素,健全和完善我国的精神病辩护制度。     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

The Effects of Motive Information and Crime Unusualness on Jurors' Judgments in Insanity Cases

This study investigated the effects of motive information and crime unusualness on mock jurors' judgments in two homicide cases in which the defendant pleaded insanity. Undergraduates (N = 371) read case information and rendered a verdict, estimated the probability that the defendant was insane, and made additional judgments about the defendant's mental state. The defendant was more likely to be judged insane if the crime was oddly committed rather than committed in a typical manner. Prosecution motive information also affected judgments; the defendant was considered more sane if the prosecution presented evidence of a strong, reasonable motive. Evidence of a crazy, unreasonable motive, presented by the defense, caused jurors to see the defendant in one of the cases as more insane.