Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?

A military coup abruptly ended Ould Taya’s authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regime’s fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Taya’s own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatus’s withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military junta’s firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritania’s malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization. ^1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘A balance sheet of Africa’stransition to democratic governance’, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51. ^2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, ‘Mali’s decade of democracy’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 73–9; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar N’Diaye,‘Not a miracle after all ... Côte d’Ivoire’sdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities’,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89–118. ^3. Alfred Stepan, ‘Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 64–84. ^4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were ‘bright’, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, ‘The origin and evolutionof Mauritania’s second republic’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 575–96. ^5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992). ^6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de l’ère pluraliste’,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 31–9. ^7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today. ^8. ‘El Hor’ means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom. ^9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, ‘Ethniccleansing’, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45. ^10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted. ^11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Taya’s attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, L’Islamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005). ^12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate. ^13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006. ^14. Author’s interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004. ^15. Mahamadou Sy, L’enfer d’inal (L’Harmattan,Paris, 2000). ^16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Taya’s brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali). ^17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674. ^18. See Philippe Marchesin, ‘Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques’, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27. ^19. Stepan, ‘Paths’, p. 76. ^20. See ‘Petit coup d’Etat entre amis’, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005. ^21. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’s stalled democratisation’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93. ^22. Peter Da Costa, ‘Democracy in doubt’, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60. ^23. Boubacar N’Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,‘Not Yet Democracy’: West Africa’s slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 107–37. ^24. Cedric Jourde, ‘"The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania’, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 421–40. ^25. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The effect of Mauritania’s"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget"’,African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. ^26. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, p. 193. ^27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See ‘Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels’ regime"faces outside political pressure’ (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006). ^28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 3–27. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaway’s ’semi-authoritarianismof decay’ category, pp. 21–3. ^29. William Case, ‘New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy’,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83–104. ^30. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, pp. 122–6. ^31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982). ^32. Jennifer Widner, ‘Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation’, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 151–74; Larry Diamond, ‘Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation’, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, ‘Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration’, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 4–5. ^33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, ‘Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars’,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8. ^34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,‘Mauritania’s foreign policy: in search of protection’,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288–300.For example, the military council’s No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group. ^35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, ‘Ilévite le face à face’, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1. ^36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, ‘La tension’, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2. ^37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, ‘MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal"’,Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 34–7. ^38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, ‘La Mauritanie dans l’ordreinternational’, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 11–19. ^39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7. ^40. Ibid, p. 10. ^41. N‘Diaye, ‘Not a miracle’, p. 105. ^42. Stepan, ‘Paths’, pp. 77–8. ^43. See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?’, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005). ^44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23. ^45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national ‘income or consumption’, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent. ^46. Moussa Diop, ‘Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!’, L’éveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3. ^47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005. ^48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004). ^49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002–2003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 207–11. ^50. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66. ^51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it. ^52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson’, pp. 10–11.     

Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi

International migration from Malawi has changed profoundly sincecentrally organized mine migration to South Africa ended inthe 1980s. Contemporary movements are more diverse and lesstied to labour, as informal trade has developed alongside. Thisarticle replaces a common ‘productivist’ perspectiveon migration with a decentralized approach, using ethnographicobservation and anthropological case studies to understand interrelatedflows of people and goods. It shows how in an emergent informalmarket for South African goods in Mzimba, Malawi, price informationdoes not structure trade practices. Historical continuitiesin the socio-cultural organization of illegal migration, ratherthan liberalized market forces, shape this economic configuration,including price formation. The research for this article was financed by the NetherlandsFoundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).Data were collected in Mzimba district, Lilongwe, Blantyre (Malawi),and Johannesburg (South Africa) in the period from April 2004to March 2005. ^1. Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and dependence in BlackAfrica: historical origin’, Journal of Peace Research9, 2 (1972), pp. 106, 115. ^2. David A. McDonald, Lephophotho Mashike, and Celia Golden, ‘Thelives and times of African migrants and immigrants in post-apartheidSouth Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.), On Borders:Perspectives on international migration in southern Africa (St.Martin’s Press, New York, 2000), pp. 168–95. ^3. In the 1990s, migration to South Africa has expanded enormously,and alongside it, regional trade. See Jonathan Crush and DavidA. McDonald, ‘Transnationalism, African immigration, andnew migrant spaces in South Africa: an introduction’,Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, 1 (2000), p. 2. Theincrease in regional trade is difficult to quantify as muchof this trade is informal in nature and does not appear in officialfigures. ^4. See, among others, Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman,South Africa’s Labor Empire: A history of black migrancyto the gold mines (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991). ^5. Dunbar Moodie, Going for Gold: Men, mines, and migration (Universityof California Press, Berkeley, 1994). ^6. Harold Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in SouthAfrica: from segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society1, 4 (1972), p. 433. ^7. For an example of this phenomenon in another context, see JensA. Andersson, ‘Administrators’ knowledge and statecontrol in colonial Zimbabwe: the invention of the rural–urbandivide in Buhera district, 1912–80’, Journal ofAfrican History 43, 1 (2002), pp. 119–43. ^8. See the numerous interesting studies published by the SouthernAfrican Migration Project (URL: http://www.queensu.ca/samp). ^9. Hopes for a re-opening of TEBA remained alive, though, and werefed by election promises in Malawi’s first multipartyelections in 1994. See among others ‘More light on TEBA;not in UDF manifesto’, Malawi News, 5–11 November1994, p. 4. See also Wiseman C. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi governmentand South African labour recruiters, 1974–92’, Journalof Modern African Studies 34, 4 (1996) pp. 623–42; WisemanC. Chirwa, ‘ "No TEBA. . . forget TEBA": the plight ofMalawian ex-migrant workers to South Africa, 1988–1994’,International Migration Review 31, 3 (1997), pp. 628–54. ^10. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi government’, p. 627; JonathanCrush, ‘Migrations past: an historical overview of cross-bordermovement in southern Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.),On Borders, p. 15. Labour recruiting agencies competing forlabour in (colonial) Malawi were the Witwatersrand Native LabourAssociation (WNLA), and the (Southern) Rhodesian Native LabourBureau (RNLB). The agencies were later renamed as The EmploymentBureau of Africa (TEBA) and the Rhodesian Native Labour SupplyCommission, respectively. ^11. F.E. Sanderson, ‘The development of labour migration fromNyasaland, 1891–1914’, Journal of African History2, 2 (1961), pp. 259–71; G. Coleman, ‘Internationallabour migration from Malawi, 1875–1966’, Journalof Social Science (University of Malawi) 2 (1972), pp. 31–46;Robert B. Boeder, Malawians abroad: The history of labor emigrationfrom Malawi to its neighbors 1890 to the present (PhD thesis,Michigan State University, Ann Arbor, 1974). ^12. Robert E. Christiansen and Jonathan G. Kydd, ‘The returnof Malawian labour from South Africa and Zimbabwe’, Journalof Modern African Studies 21, 2 (1983), p. 311. ^13. Ibid, p. 324. ^14. J.K. van Donge, ‘Disordering the market: the liberalisationof burley tobacco in Malawi in the 1990s’, Journal ofSouthern African Studies 28, 1 (2002), p. 105. This is not tosay that tobacco production solely relies on migrant labour. ^15. In the period 1977–1998, average annual intercensal growthrates in rural areas were highest in tobacco-producing areassuch as Kasungu District (4.4 percent) in the Central Region,and Traditional Authority (TA) Mpherembe (5.3 percent) in MzimbaDistrict in the Northern Region. Lowest growth rates were concentratedin the poor and densely populated southern districts, such asChiradzulu (1.4), Mulanje (1.6), Phalombe (1.5), and Thyolo(1.7). See Figure 2. ^16. In western Mzimba, and possibly elsewhere in the Northern regionwhere average education levels are higher than in the rest ofMalawi, people look down upon labouring in the low-paid tobaccosector. For figures on education levels, see T. Benson, J. Kaphuka,S. Kanyanda, and R. Chinula, Malawi: An atlas of social statistics(National Statistical Office of Malawi/IFPRI, Zomba/Washington,2002), p. 51. ^17. Bridget O’Laughlin, ‘Missing men? The debate overrural poverty and woman-headed households in Southern Africa’,Journal of Peasant Studies 25, 2 (1998), p. 10. ^18. ‘91 Malawians deported’, The Daily Times, 9 December1994, p. 1. This is not to suggest that the South African governmentdid not deport Malawians before 1994. See Boeder, Malawiansabroad, p. 155, for an example from the 1930s. ^19. Information obtained by the author from the Malawian consulatein Johannesburg, South Africa, March 2005. ^20. Before 1994, transport in Malawi was highly problematic as government-controlledbus services were limited. With liberalization, matola (pick-upsand lorries) greatly improved rural transport, while minibusservices and foreign bus companies facilitated respectivelyrural–urban and international mobility. Exchanging foreigncurrency was equally problematic before liberalization; withouta passport and proof of recent travel, banks could refuse toexchange. ^21. Deanna Swaney, Mary Fitzpatrick, Paul Greenway, Andrew Stone,and Justin Vaisutis, Lonely Planet Southern Africa (Lonely Planetpublications, London, 2003), p. 222. ^22. Zimbabwe’s decreased popularity is also evidenced by thenumerous Zimbabwe-born youths of Malawian descent waiting forthe processing of a Malawian passport at the Department of Immigrationin Blantyre. ^23. The persistence of unequal sex distributions in the extremenorth of the country is a further indication of the popularityof Tanzania as a destination for, especially, male migrants(see Figure 2). ^24. Mzimba’s transport sector thus emerged before economicliberalization. In the 1980s, some South Africans started thebusiness by investing in vehicles and using Mzimba drivers.By the early 1990s, the South Africans had left the businessaltogether and Malawians took their place. ^25. R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire,Vol. II: East-Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 1949),pp. 564–68; Leroy Vail and Landeg White, ‘Tribalismin the political history of Malawi’, in Leroy Vail (ed.),The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (James Currey,London, 1989), pp. 151–92; Leroy Vail, ‘The makingof the "Dead North": a study of the Ngoni rule in northern Malawi,c. 1855–1907’, in J. B. Peires (ed.) Before andafter Shaka: Papers in Nguni history (Institute of Social andEconomic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978), pp.230–67. ^26. John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875–1940(CLAIM, Blantyre, 2000), p. 152. See also Sanderson, ‘Thedevelopment of labour migration’, p. 260. ^27. For instance, figures for the 1930s suggest that fewer Malawianswere working in mining related jobs (recruited through WNLA)than in other sectors of the South African economy, notablydomestic services and industry. See Boeder, Malawians abroad,p. 168. ^28. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004.For an earlier account of Malawian migrants’ travel problems,see E.P. Makambe, ‘The Nyasaland African labour "Ulendo"to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of the "highwaymen," 1903–1923’,African Affairs 79, 317 (1980), pp. 548–66. ^29. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004. ^30. Records of the Employment Service Division of the MGLR suggestthat entering into official labour contracts when already inSouth Africa was common in the early 1970s. The numerous ‘typical’Ngoni, Tumbuka, and Tonga names (such as Jere, Makamo, Kumwenda,Chirwa) appearing on these lists further suggest that, in particular,migrants from northern Malawi were familiar with this procedure.Malawi National Archives, file: 14 ESD/SU/34, Lists of Malawiansentering into contracts of employment, 1969–1975. ^31. The aim of anthropological case studies — also referredto as the ‘case-study method’ — is not topresent representative cases, but to illuminate wider socialpatterns and processes through the study of the particular.Here, the cases are used to illustrate the social processesat work in new social phenomena. See Max Gluckman, ‘Ethnographicdata in British social anthropology’, The SociologicalReview 9 (1961), pp. 5–17. ^32. Malawians advertise their services in daily newspapers or neighbourhoodweeklies, under categories such as ‘domestic workers’or ‘gardeners’. Often they explicitly state theirMalawian origin. ^33. This development seems to be confirmed by population figures(see Figure 2): TA M’Mbelwa in western Mzimba was Malawi’sonly TA where male absenteeism increased in the period 1987–98. ^34. In 2004, all booking-offices in Mzimba district have been closed.Stories of cheating transporters who suddenly disappear withthe money paid in advance have made people more cautious. ^35. The term is seen locally as a reference to the brand name —Caterpillar — of big ground-work machinery used for roadconstruction. ^36. Alongside the market for South African goods thus developedan informal money-transfer market, as illegal immigrants haveno access to South Africa’s banking system. Transporterscarry cash remittances of migrants, while migrant businessmenhave set up more sophisticated money transfer systems, operatingsimilarly to official agencies such as Western Union (whichdoes not operate in South Africa). ^37. Lindela is a repatriation centre near Johannesburg for illegalimmigrants awaiting deportation. See SAHRC, Lindela at the Crossroadsfor Detention and Repatriation: An assessment of the conditionsof detention (South African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg,2000). ^38. For example, an ongoing survey among international bus passengersleaving Lilongwe for Johannesburg indicates that 61 percentof the travellers originating from Mzimba district (n = 294),expects to be accommodated by a relative upon arrival. ^39. Due to lack of uniformity in the products traded, reliable pricecomparisons between the Johannesburg and Mzimba markets aredifficult to make. Common model mobile phones, such as the Nokia3310, are an exception. In 2005, a used Nokia 3310 fetched some300–400 rands in Johannesburg, which amounts to 5,700–7,600Malawian kwacha. In Mzimba, these phones are usually sold for5,000–6,000 kwacha.     

Telecentres and transformations: Modernizing Tanzania through the internet

This article argues that a discourse which constructs the Internetas an inclusive development tool that can be deployed in strategiesfor modernizing Africa has become hegemonic among developmentdonors and telecommunications organizations. Based on researchcarried out in and around three Internet cafes in Dar es Salaam,and one Multipurpose Community Telecentre (MCT) in Sengerema,this article takes issue with this discourse and suggests thatthe geographies of inclusion and exclusion created by the Internetare more complex. For Tanzania’s information and communicationtechnologies (ICT) elites, the Internet will shape the populationinto knowledge- and market-seeking, productive citizens, stimulatingnational growth. For Internet cafe users and non-users, theInternet has become a marker of modernity, a way for peopleand places to indicate their relative level of development,and Internet use is currently dominated by leisure, communicationand information relating to global popular culture. However,the article demonstrates that development interventions whichturn the symptoms of poverty into technical problems to be solvedwith technological responses are inherently flawed, since thefailure to deal with the causes of poverty means that the majorityof Tanzanians continue to be excluded from the ‘informationsociety’. An earlier version of this article was presented at the AfricanStudies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, 11–14November 2004, and to the Postcolonial Seminar at the Universityof Leicester, 8 December 2004. ^1. World Bank, Knowledge for Development: World development report1998/99 (Oxford University Press, NY, 1998). ^2. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001: Making new technologieswork for development (Oxford University Press, New York, NY,2001). ^3. Donors include Department for International Development (DFID),Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swedish Agencyfor International Development (SIDA) and United States Agencyfor International Development (USAID) (the Leland Initiative);NGOs include the International Institute for Communication andDevelopment; multilateral initiatives include the InternationalTelecommunications Union (ITU), the G8 (Dot Force), United NationsEconomic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (the African InformationSociety Initiative) and United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization (UNESCO). ^4. D. Ott and M. Rosser, ‘The electronic republic? The roleof the Internet in promoting democracy in Africa’, Democratization7, 1 (2000), pp. 137–55. ^5. M. Jensen, The African Internet – A Status Report, 2002,<http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm> Accessed on27 October 2002. ^6. M. Castells, End of Millennium. The Information Age: Economy,society and culture, Vol 3 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998), p. 161. ^7. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, p. iv. ^8. Accenture, Markle Foundation, and UNDP, Creating a DevelopmentDynamic: Final report of the digital opportunity initiative,2001, <http://www.opt-init.org/framework.html> Accessedon 30 October 2002, p. 68. ^9. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001; World Bank, Knowledge forDevelopment; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21^st Century?(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2000). ^10. R. Cline-Cole and M. Powell, ‘ICTs, "virtual colonisation"and political economy’, Review of African Political Economy31, 99 (2004), pp.5–9; K. Gyekye, ‘Philosophy, cultureand technology in the postcolonial’, in E. Eze (ed.),Postcolonial African Philosophy: A critical reader (Blackwell,Oxford, 1997), pp. 25–44; F. Nyamnjoh, ‘Global andlocal trends in media ownership and control: implications forcultural creativity in Africa’, in W. van Binsbergen andR. van Dijk (eds), Situating Globality: African agency in theappropriation of global culture (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands,2004), pp. 107–46; Y. Z. Ya’u, ‘The new imperialismand Africa in the global electronic village’, Review ofAfrican Political Economy 31, 99 (2004), pp. 11–29. ^11. R. Meier, ‘Late-blooming societies can be stimulated byinformation technology’, Futures 32 (2000), pp. 163–81;D. Polikanov and I. Abramova, ‘Africa and ICT: a chancefor breakthrough?’, Information, Communication and Society6, 1 (2003), pp. 42–56; M. B. Robins and R. L. Hilliard(eds), Beyond Boundaries: Cyberspace in Africa (Heinemann, NH,2002). ^12. M. Green, ‘The birth of the "salon": poverty, "modernisation"and dealing with witchcraft in southern Tanzania’, paperpresented at the American Anthropological Association AnnualMeeting, Chicago, 18 November 2003; S. F. Moore, ‘Post-socialistmicro-politics: Kilimanjaro, 1993’, Africa 66, 4 (1996),pp. 587–606. ^13. United Republic of Tanzania, National Information and CommunicationsTechnologies Policy (Ministry of Communications and Transport,Dar es Salaam, 2003). ^14. The three urban cafes were located in Dar es Salaam, where atotal of 279 customers completed open-ended questionnaires overthree days in August 2001. One city-centre cafe attracted mostlybusiness, government and office workers, while the other twocafes were located on main roads in the residential suburbsof Mwenge and Magomeni. The fourth location was the Internetcafe at the Sengerema Multipurpose Community Telecentre, wherethe same open-ended questionnaire was put to 265 customers inAugust 2003. Semi-structured interviews with customers and focusgroup discussions with non-customers were held, and 299 townresidents were interviewed to contextualize the questionnaireresponses. ^15. ‘Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank: A regime changes’,The Economist, 2 June 2005; T. Kelsall, ‘Shop windowsand smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicizationof Tanzania’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40, 4(2002), pp. 597–620; C. Mercer, ‘Performing partnership:civil society and the illusions of good governance in Tanzania’,Political Geography 22 (2003), pp. 741–63. ^16. United Republic of Tanzania, National Information and CommunicationsTechnologies Policy, p. 1. ^17. Ibid. ^18. Ibid. ^19. Accenture et al., Creating a Development Dynamic. ^20. SIDA, A Country ICT Survey for Tanzania (SIDA, Dar es Salaam,2001). ^21. Ibid. ^22. National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania Household Budget Survey2000/01 (National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 2002). ^23. World Bank, Tanzania Country Brief, 2004, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/TANZANIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:287345~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:258799,00.html>Accessed on 20 June 2004. ^24. The main donors have been IDRC, ITU, UNESCO and Danida, in collaborationwith other international partners including the British Council,Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNDP, World HealthOrganization (WHO) and national governments. ^25. COSTECH, Progress Report to International Development ResearchCentre (IDRC) as from January 2001 to February 2003 (COSTECH,Dar es Salaam, 2003). ^26. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^27. Planning Commission and Regional Commissioner’s OfficeMwanza, Mwanza Region Socio-Economic Profile (Dar es Salaam,1997). ^28. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^29. Tanzania Cotton Board, Prices Paid to Farmers for the Last 12Years, n.d., <http://www.tancotton.co.tz/Producer%20price%202001-02%20season.htm>Accessed 15 May 2004. ^30. Sengerema MCT, Annual Report 2002 (Sengerema, 2002). ^31. COSTECH, Progress Report to IDRC, p. 1. ^32. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^33. COSTECH, Progress Report to IDRC. ^34. In 1999, a major ISP in Dar es Salaam analyzed the materialbeing accessed by its customers and found that 55% of it wascategorized as pornography (personal communication). ^35. See, e.g. <www.clickz.com, http://www.pewinternet.org/> ^36. B. Wellman and C. Haythornthwaite (eds), The Internet in EverydayLife (Blackwell, Oxford, 2002), p. 18. ^37. Ibid. ^38. A. Bahi, ‘Internet use and logics of social adaptationof youth in Abidjan cybercafes’, CODESRIA Bulletin 1–2(2004), pp. 67–71. ^39. W. van Binsbergen, ‘Can ICT belong in Africa, or is ICTowned by the North Atlantic region?’, in W. van Binsbergenand R. van Dijk (eds), Situating Globality: African agency inthe appropriation of global culture (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands,2004), pp. 107–146. ^40. International Development Research Centre, ‘African Telecentres:A pioneering experience’ (unpublished document), n.d. ^41. D. Miller and D. Slater, The Internet: An ethnographic approach(Berg, Oxford, 2000). ^42. L. Mehta, ‘From darkness to light? Critical reflectionson the World Development Report 1998/99’, Journal of DevelopmentStudies 36, 1 (1999), pp. 151–61. ^43. Van Binsbergen, ‘Can ICT belong in Africa’, pp.111–115. ^44. World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21^st century?, p. 2. ^45. J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’,depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Universityof Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1994). ^46. B. Weiss, ‘Thug realism: inhabiting fantasy in urban Tanzania’,Cultural Anthropology 17, 1 (2002), p. 100. ^47. C. Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernity in West Africa (Universityof Chicago Press, London, 1999). ^48. A. Perullo, ‘The life that I live: popular music, agency,and urban society in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ (unpublishedPhD dissertation, Indiana University, Indiana, 2003); Weiss,‘Thug realism’. ^49. N. Ng’wanakilala, Mass Communication and Development ofSocialism in Tanzania (Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam,1981), p. 63. ^50. Perullo, ‘The life that I live’. ^51. A. Appadurai, ‘Disjuncture and difference in the globalcultural economy’, Public Culture 2, 2 (1990), pp. 1–23;D. Miller, ‘Could the Internet defetishise the commodity?’,Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21, 3 (2003),pp. 359–72. ^52. J. Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and meanings ofurban life on the Zambian copperbelt (University of CaliforniaPress, London, 1999), p. 212. ^53. All unattributed quotations refer to interviews conducted duringfieldwork. ^54. From fieldnotes. ^55. From fieldnotes. ^56. K. Askew, Performing the Nation: Swahili music and culturalpolitics in Tanzania (University of Chicago Press, London, 2002). ^57. Sengerema MCT, Annual Report, p. 6. ^58. Guardian, 6 August 2001. ^59. Ibid., 24 July 2001. ^60. Daily News, 27 June 2001. ^61. Askew, Performing the Nation. ^62. Miller and Slater, The Internet. ^63. See, e.g., A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural dimensionsof modernity (University of Minnesota Press, London, 1996);Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity; U. Hannerz, ‘Epilogue:on some reports from a free space’, in B. Meyer and P.Geschiere (eds), Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of flowand closure (Blackwell, Oxford, 1999), pp. 325–30; B.Meyer, ‘Visions of blood, sex and money: fantasy spacesin popular Ghanaian cinema’, Visual Anthropology 16 (2003),pp. 15–41; Weiss, ‘Thug realism’. ^64. W. Arens and I. Karp (eds), Creativity of Power: Cosmology andaction in African societies (Smithsonian Institution Press,London, 1989); I. Kopytoff, ‘Ancestors as elders in Africa’,Africa 41, 2 (1971), pp. 129–42. ^65. My thanks go to Clare Madge for this insight. ^66. Weiss, ‘Thug realism’.     

Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area

Recent decades have seen an escalation in interethnic resourceconflicts and banditry among pastoralists in the Kenya-Ugandaborder region, fuelled by a growing number of small arms. Statemanagement has been largely unsuccessful and often counterproductivein reducing numbers of small arms. The creation of paramilitaryinstitutions in rural Kenya and Uganda are an example of howlegal arms are entering communities and intensifying the conflictsfurther. Understanding the sources and mechanisms of arms acquisitionis a significant step in curbing the violence. The main sourcesand routes, and the current costs of arms and ammunition areprovided. More important however is to appreciate the complexreasons behind the demand for small arms. Relationships withstates, alienation of pastoral land, cultural issues and questionsof livelihood are all examined, using empirical evidence collectedby the author between 2001 and 2005. ^1. Interview with Rev. John Lodinyo, pastor of Baptist Church,Kiwawa, 31 May 2001. The officer-in-charge of the police notedthat the number of Pokot looking for pasture had increased becauseof the dry spell in the district at the time. ^2. Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, ‘Pastoral politicsin the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK47 as change agent’,Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3 (2000), pp. 407–30;Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL), ‘TheKarimojong response to disarmament: six months later’,(Unpublished report, ADOL/Pax Christi, Netherlands and Kampala,2002); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and SmallArms: The Kenya–Uganda border region’ (Consultancyfor Saferworld, London, 2003). ^3. Interview with former resident district commissioner in Kotido,2 February 2003. ^4. Interviews with victims of small arms injuries including a 15-year-oldvictim in Kanwata, Karamoja, 2001–4. ^5. How the figure is arrived at is unclear: see ‘Disarm them’East African Standard <http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news_s.php?articleid=28071>(30 August 2005). ^6. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBO), ‘National Populationand Housing Census’, (Government report, Kampala, 2003). ^7. For details, see David Anderson, ‘Stock theft and moraleconomy in colonial Kenya’, Africa 56, 4 (1986), pp. 399–416;Richard Hogg ‘The new pastoralism: poverty and dependencein northern Kenya’, Africa 56, 3 (1986), pp. 319–32;Kennedy Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Armsin the North Rift, Northeast Africa (University of Bradford,Unpublished PhD thesis, 2005); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘PastoralistConflict in the Horn of Africa’ [Consultancy for AfricanPeace Forum (APFO)/Saferworld/University of Bradford, 2001];Derrick Belshaw and Joshua Malinga, ‘The Kalashnikov economiesof the Eastern Sahel: cumulative or cyclical differentiationbetween nomadic pastoralists’ (Unpublished report, DevelopmentStudies Association, South Bank University of East Anglia, 1999);Suzette Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable: cattle raidingamong the Kuria’ in G. Aijmer and J. Abbink (eds), Meaningsof Violence: A cross-cultural perspective (Berg, Oxford, 2000),pp. 101–21. Bruno Novelli, ‘Karimojong TraditionalReligion’ (Comboni Missionaries, Kampala, 1999); AugustoPazzaglia, The Karimojong: Some aspects (Camboni Missionaries,Bologna, 1982). ^8. Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Armed Pastoralist Conflicts and PeaceBuilding in Karamoja: The Role of Gender’ [Consultancyfor Netherlands Development Agency (SNV), Kampala, 2005]. ^9. Interviews in Karamoja, various sources, 2001–4. ^10. ‘50,000 guns in wrong hands, says Michuki’ DailyNation <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category-id=1&newsid=56059>(29 August 2005). ^11. Belshaw and Malinga ‘The Kalashnikov economies’. ^12. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Anderson,‘Stock theft’; Natalie Gomez and Kennedy Mkutu,‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building capacity fordevelopment in Karamoja, Uganda’ (Consultancy for SNV/PaxChristi, Kampala, 2004); Mkutu, Armed Pastoralist Conflict .. . the Role of Gender; Ton Dietz, Pastoralists in dire straits:survival strategies and external interventions in a semi aridregion at the Kenya/Uganda border: Western Pokot, 1900–1986(Instituut Voor Sociale Geografie, University of Amsterdam,Amsterdam, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1987); National Council ofChurches of Kenya/SNV/Semi-arid Rural Development Project (SARDEP)‘Pacifying the valley: an analysis of the Kerio valleyconflict’, (Report NCCK/SNV/SARDEP, Nairobi, 2001). ^13. Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable’; Michael Fleisher,‘Cattle raiding and household demography among the Kuriaof Tanzania’ Africa 69, 2 (1999), pp. 238–55. ^14. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms. ^15. John Sislin, John Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka, and Jeffrey Weigand,‘Patterns in arms acquisitions by ethnic groups in conflict’,Security Dialogue, 29, 4 (1998), pp. 393–408. ^16. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Mkutu,‘Armed Pastoralist Conflict’. ^17. For example, the first time I interviewed the Honorable DavidPulkol, the former external security officer for Uganda in 2001,he was on a campaign trail. ^18. Kotido, Panyangara, Nakapelimoru, Kachire, Moroto, Loputuku,Lokitelekapes, Lokitelebu, Kalapata, Losilang, Kanwat Iriri,Namalu, Kangole, Nakiloro, Amudat, Karita, Kotido, Rupa, Musasiaand Kampala in Uganda and Kapenguria, Kachiliba, Alale, Nauypong,Kiwawa and Kunyao in Kenya. ^19. KIA is the senior institution for training upper level policymakers in Kenya. I worked there from 1997 to 2005 (colleaguesadministered the questionnaire whilst I was on sabbatical). ^20. This consisted of officers based in finance, home affairs, transport,the judiciary and foreign affairs. ^21. Communications with Philip Gulliver, Ton Dietz, Michael Bollig,Ben Knighton and John Lamphear. ^22. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^23. Kenya National Archive, Turkana history, Turkana political records,miscellaneous, 1921–45 TURK 159, DC/TURK3/1, p. 90. ^24. Awoundo Odegi, Life in the Balance: Ecological sociology ofTurkana nomads (ACTS, Nairobi, 1990); James Barber, ImperialFrontier (East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968), pp.91–106; Augusto Pazzaglia, The Karimojong. ^25. Barber, Imperial Frontier. ^26. Interview with Ael Ark Lodou, Member of Parliament for Dodothin Moroto, Uganda, 12 November 2004. ^27. Interview with James Chere, former raider and Chief of Rupain Moroto, 3 January 2003 and October 2004. ^28. Samuel Makinda, ‘Conflict and superpower in the Horn ofAfrica’, Third World Quarterly, 4, 1 (1982), pp. 93–103;For analysis of countries supplying arms to the Horn of Africaduring the cold war, see also Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for theHorn: U.S. security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953–1991(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991). ^29. Interviews with eyewitnesses and others in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^30. Interviews in Panyangara, Kotido, Moroto and Namalu, 2001–4. ^31. Charles Ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in Northern Uganda: thechanging significance of cattle raids’, (Report, Centrefor Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^32. Interviews 2001–4. I did meet some young men who had foughtin DRC but were now jobless and originated from the Karimojongarea. ^33. Ibid. ^34. Jan Cappon, ‘Why do communities want arms? Controllingthe demand for small arms, the search for strategies in theHorn of Africa and in the Balkans’, (Report, The Hague/PaxChristi, Netherlands, 2003). There is increasing evidence ofracketeers, but more work needs to be done on this secretivearea. Some evidence exists in Kennedy Mkutu, Guns and Governance:Pastoralist conflict and small arms in the North Rift (JamesCurrey, Oxford, forthcoming). ^35. National Assembly of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary SelectCommittee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and OtherParts of Kenya, (National Assembly, Nairobi, Government Press,1992). ^36. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. ^37. The term vigilante here refers to a self-appointed body of citizensorganized to maintain order in their local community. For moreon vigilantes, see Les Johnston, ‘What is vigilantism?’British Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (1996), pp. 220–36.For the metamorphosis of vigilante in Karamoja region and itscurrent status, see Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance andSmall Arms. ^38. Interviews with Father John Bosco in Amudat, and others, 2001–4. ^39. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^40. Interviews in Karamoja, November 2004. By the end of 1995, theUgandan government was spending over 60 million UgSh per monthto pay vigilante in Karamoja alone. See ‘Government spendsSh.60m on Karamoja vigilantes’, Daily Monitor, 9 October1995. ^41. Gomes and Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’. ^42. Interview, name withheld, in Kampala, 17 May 2003. ^43. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^44. Interview with resident district commissioner, name withheld,in Karamoja, 2004. ^45. Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms (chapter4). ^46. The Monitor, 22 March 2000. ^47. Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) and Organisationof African Unity (OAU) pastoral community harmonization meetingheld at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale, Uganda, May 2001. ^48. These were recognized by their language especially in Bokora:interviews in Lotome, November 2004. ^49. For more on the disarmaments, see Mkutu, ‘Guns and Governance’;Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist conflict and small arms: thechallenges of small arms and insecurity and attempts at managementin Karamoja, Uganda’ (Paper presented at the NortheastAfrica Seminar, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology,University of Oxford, 30 January 2004); From 2004 to January2006, 1,068 arms have been recovered forcibly and voluntarilyin the four districts of Karamoja. See Daily Monitor, 9 January2006. ^50. Confirmed by interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^51. Interviews in kraals in Karamoja, 2003–4. ^52. ‘Protests as state disarms homeguards over clashes’,Daily Nation, 29 November 2004; ‘Police reserves werea threat to security’, Kenya Times, 21 April 2004; ‘KenyaPolice reserve force is disbanded,’ Daily Nation, 10 April2004. ^53. Interview with UPDF soldier in Namalu, 28 January 2003. ^54. Interviews in Namalu, January 2004. The author personally visitedthe kraal where the animals were raided and witnessed the gravesof the children who had been killed in the crossfire. ^55. Interview with Amudat hospital personnel, January 2003; interviewswith several members of the Karimojong and Upe Pokot communityconcurred in 2004. ^56. Interview with Roman Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld,Karamoja 2004. ^57. Interviews with elders in Alale, Kenya, August 2002, and visitto the scene. This was not reported in any press. ^58. Interview with karachunas in Kangole, July 2001; interviewsin Musasia, Nakaplimoru and Pangayangara in September–November,2004, confirmed this. ^59. Interview with elder Koritantoyo in Nakiliro, 2 February 2003. ^60. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^61. Interviews in Karamoja, Uganda and in West Pokot, Kenya, 2001–4,and phone and e-mail communications, 2005. In Namalu and Kangolein Karamoja, warriors could be seen chewing miraa (Khat). ^62. Interview with a SPLA soldier, name withheld, Moroto, 20 June2001. ^63. Ibid. ^64. Interview with James Chere, former raider and now chief of Rupain Rupa, 2003 and 2004. ^65. ADOL ‘Arms trafficking in the border regions of Sudan,Uganda and Kenya’ (Unpublished report ADOL, Kampala, 2001),pp. 202–10. ^66. Interview with elder in Moroto, 20 June 2001. ^67. In the field in October 2004, reliable sources in Karamoja indicatedthat Kony was spotted in Lira. Interviews in Kotido with variouspeople, including Local Council Fives, and in Kanawat, February2003, also confirmed Kony as a source of weapons to pastoralists. ^68. Interviews in Losilang and Kachile, Jie, October–November2004. ^69. Interviews with Somali businessmen who own mines in Karamoja,2003–4; interviews in Moroto, Nikloro and Namalu and visitsto mining areas. ^70. Interviews in Namalu and Mbale, name withheld, 20 June 2001. ^71. Observed in Namalu and Kangole in Uganda and in Alale in Kenya. ^72. Sandra Gray, ‘A memory of loss: ecological politics, localhistory, and the evolution of Karimojong violence’, HumanOrganization 59, 4 (2000), pp. 401–18. ^73. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, p.11. ^74. Father Joachim Omolo Ouko, ‘Clearly famine caught govtnapping’, Kenya Times, 5 January 2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/05jan06/editorials/comm1.html>(5 January 2006). ^75. Interviews in Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Nikoloro and observation,2003. ^76. Riamiriam, ‘The policy advocacy role of Civil SocietyOrganizations (CSOs) in Karamoja: The challenges and successes’(Unpublished report, Riamiriam, Moroto, 2005). ^77. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, pp.17–18; for numbers of cows paid for brides, see Mkutu,‘Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms’,p. 167; ADOL, ‘Karamoja response to disarmament’. ^78. Interview with Peter Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja, in Kampala,January 2003. ^79. Interview with Father John Bosco who is a victim of a gunshotin the knee, St Joseph’s Mission, Amudat, 28 January 2004. ^80. Interviews in Karamoja and West Pokot in Kenya, 2001–4. ^81. Interviews, visits and observations. ^82. West Pokot was formerly known as West Suk. ^83. KNA, District Commissioner West Suk, Annual Report, 1945, pp.2–3. ^84. Interviews and observations, 2001–4. ^85. Ben Knighton, ‘The state as raider among the Karimojong:where there are no guns they use the threat of guns’,Africa 73, 203 (2003), pp. 427–55. ^86. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 443–46;‘Residents plead for army bases at border’, DailyNation, 7 June 2002 <http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/today/News/News11.html>(7 June 2002); the government of Kenya was accused of killingresidents under the guise of ‘security operations’.Other examples include the Wagalla, Malkamari and Garissa massacres,where thousands of people were killed and property worth millionsdestroyed. ^87. See ‘Leaders foiling guns surrender plan, says DC’,Daily Nation, 19 September 2004 <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=57473>(20 September 2004). The DC noted that, of the 2,600 arms surrendered,the majority were defective, and some residents were still withholdingthose in good condition. ^88. Ben Okudi, ‘Causes and effects of the 1980 famine in Karamoja’(Report, Center for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^89. Interviews and phone communications Karimojong, NGOs and governmentofficials in Karamoja, 2004–6; Office of the Prime Minister(OPM), ‘Karamoja integrated disarmament and developmentprogrammes: creating conditions for promoting human securityand recovery in Karamoja, 2005–2008’ (Governmentreport, Kampala, June 2005). ^90. Interviews with warriors in Panyangara, Kanawat and Kotido inKaramoja, February 2003 and November 2004. ^91. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 426–55. ^92. Not all the UPDF are raiders, in my experience in the fieldsince 2000, I found a lot of them to be very helpful; the conditionsin which they operate need to be considered. ^93. Interviews in Panyangara, Kacheri, Kotido, Musisia, Loputukand Moroto, November 2004. ^94. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^95. Interviews with warriors and others, Nakapelimoru and Panyangara,August 2005. ^96. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^97. Interview with warriors in Panyangara airstrip, 7 October 2004;interviews with Lotirir mothers’ group and women in Rupanear Moroto, September 2004. ^98. Interviews in Karamoja, September–November 2004. ^99. Interviews with young Ekwete brew sellers in Jie County andLoputuk, September–October 2004. ^100. Interviews in Kanawat and Kotido, February 2003, and in Losilangand Kachire, November 2004. In some places, there is no governmentadministration. ^101. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^102. Interview with Pastor Samuel Kotiyot, Amudat, 31 May 2001. ^103. Interviews in Kachire, Panyangara and Kanawat, November 2004.Kotido also came up with the same figures. ^104. Interview with reformed raider in Kanawat, 2004. ^105. Interview with Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld, 19June 2001 and January 2003. ^106. Interviews in Kotido town, November 2004. ^107. Interview, name withheld, in Alale, 2006. ^108. See Standard Team, ‘Minister: Sh28b needed to fight famine’,Sunday Standard, 8 January 2006; See also John Korir, ‘60billion livestock threatened’, Kenya Times, 4 January2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/04jan06/business/buns7.html>(4 January 2006).     

AIDS, security and the military in Africa: A sober appraisal

This article examines four accepted wisdoms about HIV/AIDS andAfrican armies and in each case concludes that substantial revisionis necessary in the light of emerging evidence. First, it appearsthat military populations do not necessarily have a higher prevalenceof HIV than civilian populations. HIV levels in armies dependon many factors including the demographics of the army, itspattern of deployment, the nature and stage of the epidemicin the country concerned, and the measures taken to controlthe disease by the military authorities. Second, although theepidemic has the potential to undermine the functioning of nationalmilitaries, and may have done so in isolated instances, armiesin general are well placed to withstand the threat. Third, evidencethat war contributes to the spread of the virus is meagre andsuggests that we should be concerned primarily with specificrisks that conflict may entail including population mobilityand changing sexual networks. Lastly, the hypothesis that AIDShas the potential to disrupt national, regional, and internationalsecurity remains speculative. ^1. Roger Yeager, Craig Hendrix, and Stuart Kingma, ‘Internationalmilitary Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiencysyndrome policies and programs: strengths and limitations incurrent practice’, Military Medicine 165, 2 (2000), pp.87–92. ^2. S. Kingma, ‘AIDS prevention in military populations: learningthe lessons of history’, International AIDS Society Newsletter,4, March 1996, pp. 9–11. ^3. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military: UNAIDS point of view’,UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, May 1998 (http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub05/militarypv_en_pdf.pdf,9 January, 2005). ^4. A.E. Pettifor, H.V. Rees, A. Steffenson, L. Hlongwa-Madikizela,C. MacPhail, K. Vermaak, and I. Kleinschmidt, HIV and SexualBehaviour Among Young South Africans: A national survey of 15–24year olds (Reproductive Health Research Unit, University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2004). ^5. According to a South African AIDS Law Project press releaseof 23 October 2003, ‘the SANDF has however excluded andcontinues to exclude job applicants with HIV from employmentin the SANDF’ (http://www.alp.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=229,16 April, 2005). ^6. Yigeremu Abebe, Ab Schaap, Girmatchew Mamo, Asheber Negussie,Birke Darimo, Dawit Wolday, and Eduard J. Sanders, ‘HIVprevalence in 72,000 urban and rural army recruits, Ethiopia’,AIDS 17, 12 (2003), pp. 1835–40. ^7. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^8. Olive Shisana, Leickness Simbayi, and E. Dorkenoo, ‘SouthAfrica’s first national population-based HIV/AIDS behaviouralrisks, sero-status and media impact survey (SABSSM) researchproject’ (Third Quarterly Progress Report, Household Survey2002, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 2002). ^9. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military’, UNAIDS TechnicalUpdate, 1998 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/aidsleadership/dls_AIDS_military_may14.pdf,July 21, 2004); ‘Military populations’ AIDS Briefs(http://www.heard.org.za/publications/AidsBriefs/sec/military.pdf,December 22, 2005). ^10. Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, ‘HIV/AIDS in the Ethiopian military:perceptions, strategies and impacts’ (unpublished paper,2002). ^11. A. Adefalolu, ‘HIV/AIDS as an occupational hazard to soldiers– ECOMOG experience’ (Paper presented at the 3rdAll Africa Congress of Armed Forces and Police Medical Services,Pretoria, 1999), pp. 4–11. ^12. M. Fleshman, ‘AIDS prevention in the ranks – UNtarget peacekeepers, combatants in war against the disease’,African Recovery 15, 1–2 (2004), pp. 9–10. ^13. The same was true in Thailand, where the army responded in advanceof the government. ^14. ‘HIV/AIDS and Uniformed Services: Analysing the Evidence’.Expert Meeting, Cape Town, December 6–7, 2004 called byUNAIDS and attended by Alan Whiteside. ^15. Edward Hooper, Slim (Bodley Head, London, 1990); Edward Hooper,The River: A journey to the source of HIV and AIDS (Penguin,London, 2000), pp. 42–9. ^16. Robert Shell, ‘The silent revolution: HIV/AIDS and militarybases in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Consolidating Democracy,Seminar Report Series (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, East London,2000), pp. 29–41. ^17. Reinhard Kaiser, Paul Spiegel, Peter Salama, William Brady,Elizabeth Bell, Kyle Bond, and Marie Downer, ‘HIV/AIDSseroprevalence and behavioral risk factor survey in Sierra Leone,April 2002’ (Center for Disease Control and Prevention,Atlanta, GA, 2002). ^18. C. Mulanga, S. Bazepeo, J. Mwamba, C. Butel, J.-W. Tshimpaka,M. Kashi, F. Lepira, M. Carael, M. Peeters, and E. Delaporte,‘Political and socio-economic instability: how does itaffect HIV? A case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,AIDS 18, 5 (2004), pp. 832–4. ^19. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^20. Tim Allen, ‘AIDS, security and democratic governance’,The Hague, 2–4 May 2005. Presentation at expert seminar. ^21. Paul Spiegel, ‘HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displacedpopulations: dispelling myths and taking action’, Disasters28, 4 (2004), pp. 322–39. ^22. African Rights, Rwanda: Broken bodies, torn spirits; livingwith genocide, rape and HIV/AIDS (African Rights, Kigali, 2004);V. Randell, ‘Sexual violence and genocide against Tutsiwomen. Propaganda and sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide:an argument for intersectionality in international law’,Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33, 3 (2002), pp. 733–55. ^23. Kaiser et al., ‘HIV/AIDS seroprevalence’. ^24. P. Fourie and M. Schönteich, ‘Africa’s newsecurity threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in southern Africa’,African Security Review 10, 4 (2001), pp. 29–44; M. Schönteich,‘AIDS and age: SA’s crime time bomb’, AIDSAnalysis Africa 10, 2 (1999), pp. 1–4. ^25. Rachel Bray, ‘Predicting the social consequences of orphanhoodin South Africa’ (Working Paper No. 29, Centre for SocialScience Research, University of Cape Town, 2003).     

What harm? Kenyan and Ugandan perspectives on khat

What harm does khat actually do to users and the communitiesin which they live? In this article, the health-related, social,economic, and religious arguments of Kenyans and Ugandans forand against khat consumption are reported. The medical evidencefor harm from khat is far from compelling, and the East Africandebate on khat is informed by local political discourses thatoften are closely connected to issues of ethnicity and the controlof resources. As a result, the harm attributed to khat consumptionis contested. The objective of most local efforts to curb theuse of khat in East African towns is the reduction of socialand economic ills. Yet, eliminating khat consumption would notreverse the problems that it is identified as causing. ^1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ^2. See, for example, Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, Drugs and Narcoticsin History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995); JohnGoodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sheratt, Consuming Habits:Drugs in history and anthropology (Routledge, London and NewYork, 1995). ^3. Daniel M. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life or the devil’scud? The debate over qat (Catha edulis) in Yemeni culture’,in Ross Coomber and Nigel South (eds), Drug Use and CulturalContexts: ‘Beyond the west’ (Free Association Books,London, 2004), pp. 101–118. ^4. Ezekiel Gebissa, Leaf of Allah: Khat and agricultural transformationin Harerge, Ethiopia 1875–1991 (James Currey, Oxford,2004). ^5. UNODCCP, The Drug Nexus in Africa (UN Office for Drug Control& Crime Prevention Monographs, Vienna, 1999); H.M. Adamand R. Ford (eds), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options forSomali communities in the 21^st century (Red Sea Press, Lawrencevilleand Asmara, 1997). ^6. Neil Carrier, ‘Miraa is cool: the cultural importanceof miraa (khat) for Tigania and Igembe youth in Kenya’,Journal of African Cultural Studies, forthcoming. ^7. ESRC Award (RES-143-25-0046): ‘The Khat Nexus: trans-nationalconsumption in a global economy’. ^8. The British colonial authorities attempted to ban khat in Kenyabetween 1945 and 1956 but found regulation unworkable. ^9. Paul Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation in Kenya’sMeru District (University of Florida, unpublished PhD thesis,1994). ^10. Neil Carrier, The Social Life of Miraa: Farming, trade and consumptionof a plant stimulant in Kenya (University of St Andrews, unpublishedPhD thesis, 2003). ^11. M. Ahmed and M. Garret, Proceedings of a Seminar on Khat andHealth (Tower Hamlets Health Strategy Group, London, 1994);H.A. Utteh, ‘The plight of Somali refugees in Europe,with particular reference to Germany (1993)’, in Adamand Ford, Mending Rips, pp. 449–59. ^12. Mark Horton and John Middleton, The Swahili: The social landscapeof a mercantile society (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000). ^13. Interview with Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr of Lamu. ^14. Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation. ^15. Interview with Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr. ^16. Thanks to Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr and committee members for providingcopies of campaign correspondence. Photocopies of correspondencein the possession of the author. ^17. Undated leaflet, issued by Nairobi office of UNODC, is entitledKHAT: (Catha edulis). ^18. UNODC, KHAT: (Catha edulis). ^19. See, for example, John Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise: Theinstitutionalized use of the drug qat in North Yemen (ReidelPublishing Company, Dordrecht, 1987). ^20. M. Dhadphale and O.E. Omolo, ‘Psychiatric morbidity amongkhat chewers’, East African Medical Journal 65, 6 (1988),pp. 355–9. ^21. M. Kithure, ‘Price of miraa. Your brain or the twig’.The Daily Nation, Nairobi, 17 May 2001. ^22. Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation; Carrier, The SocialLife of Miraa. ^23. W.J. Eggling, The Indigenous Trees of the Uganda Protectorate(The Government of the Uganda Protectorate, London, 1951), p.79. ^24. Carrier, ‘Miraa is cool’. ^25. New Vision published articles on khat on 20 January 1994, 25May 1994, 26 May 1994, and 19 December 1994. Reviewed by SaidiFamau. ^26. 30 May 1998, New Vision. ^27. A.O. Ihunwo, F.I.B. Kayanja, and U.B. Amadi-Ihunwo, ‘Useand perception of the psychostimulant, khat (Catha edulis) amongthree occupational groups in south western Uganda’, EastAfrican Medical Journal 81, 9 (2004), pp. 468–73. ^28. The interviewers, Musa Almass and Mzee Hasan, were trained bySusan Beckerleg. The results were analysed using SPSS12. ^29. There is little research on the effects of khat on libido, potency,and fertility. However, Hakim found a weak association betweenkhat use and abnormal seminal fluid analysis profiles. See.L.Y. Hakim, ‘Influence of khat on seminal fluid amongpresumed infertile couples’, East African Medical Journal79, 1 (2002), pp. 22–28. ^30. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^31. See Gebissa for an account of the spread of Ethiopia khat linkedto the introduction of modern transportation in the Horn ofAfrica. See also Carrier, ‘The need for speed’,Africa, forthcoming. ^32. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 237. ^33. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, p. 108. ^34. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 194. ^35. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^36. See Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation; Carrier, The SocialLife of Miraa. ^37. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 193. ^38. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 18. ^39. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, p. 104. ^40. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 232. ^41. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^42. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, pp. 111–12. ^43. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 108. ^44. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 3. ^45. A. Almeddom and S. Abraham, ‘Women, moral virtue and Tchat-chewing’,in M. MacDonald (ed.), Gender, Drink and Drugs. (Berg, Oxford,1994), pp. 249–58. ^46. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 11. ^47. Almeddom and Abraham. ‘Women, moral virtue and Tchat-chewing’,pp. 249–50. ^48. Ihunwo, et al., ‘Use and perception of the psychostimulant,khat’, p. 472.     

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

The politics and ethnography of environmentalisms in Tanzania

This article explores the forms of environmentalism flourishingin Tanzanian villages and district and central government. Itargues that their apparent unity should be explained by severalfactors. In central government, there is support for environmentalistpolicies because they generate revenue. In local government,environmentalism diverts attention away from bureaucratic failure,while simultaneously being the subject of intense politickingamong the legislature. In villages, environmentalism reflectsrealities of environmental change, different ecologies of agriculturalactivity, competition and jealousy and the manipulation of officialdiscourse. This article highlights the diversity of sourcesof environmentalist prominence in different sites of politicalactivity. ^1. The word used for ‘waste’ is translated from theSwahili: ‘jangwa’. It is also translated as ‘desert’but can be used in a wide variety of contexts and scales. Ihave heard it used to describe small patches of land, and itis also the name for the Sahara. It can be used in both aridlowlands and humid mountains [cf. C. Conte, ‘The forestbecomes a desert: forest use and environmental change in Tanzania’sWest Usambara mountains’, Land Degradation and Development10 (1999), pp. 291–309]. I prefer the term ‘waste’because its central notion is lack of productivity, rather thanaridity. ^2. <http://www.ippmedia.com> Accessed on 18 October 2002. ^3. Cf. O. B. Rekdal, ‘When hypothesis becomes myth: the Iraqiorigin of the Iraqw’, Ethnology 37, 1 (1998), pp. 17–38. ^4. R. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial expansion, tropical islandEdens and the origins of environmentalism (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1995); J. Fairhead and M. Leach, Misreadingthe African Landscape (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1996); R. Neumann, Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over livelihoodand nature preservation in Africa (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, CA, 1998); D. Brockington, Fortress Conservation:The preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania (JamesCurrey, Oxford, 2002). ^5. J. P. Brosius, ‘Analyses and interventions: Anthropologicalengagements with environmentalism’, Current Anthropology40, 3 (1999), pp 277–309. ^6. J.-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The politics of the belly(Longman, London, 1993); J.-F. Bayart, S. Ellis, and B. Hibou,The Criminalisation of the State in Africa (James Currey, Oxford,1999); P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works (James Currey,Oxford, 1999). ^7. J. M. Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public: the problem of landgrabbing in contemporary Kenya’, Africa Today 47 (2000),pp. 7–28. ^8. The constituency building reached the British press. Cf. ‘Kenya’srulers clear way for drought and disaster by felling forestfor votes’, The Independent (London), 16 January 2002,p. 14. ^9. J. M. Klopp, ‘ "Ethnic clashes" and winning elections:the case of Kenya’s electoral despotism’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 35 (2001), pp. 473–517. ^10. P. Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology andfood production in West Africa (Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead,UK, 1985); M. Leach and R. Mearns, The Lie of the Land: Challengingreceived wisdom on the African environment (James Currey, Oxford,1996). ^11. M. Leach and J. Fairhead, ‘Fashioned forest pasts, occludedhistories? International environmental analysis in West Africanlocales’, Development and Change 31 (2000), pp. 35–59. ^12. J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’,depoliticisation and bureaucratic state power in Lesotho (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1990). ^13. Cf. R. A. Schroeder, ‘Community, forestry and conditionalityin the Gambia’, Africa 69, 1 (1999), pp. 1–22. ^14. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works. ^15. Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public’. ^16. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The origin of the Black Act(Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1975); J. Scott, Weapons of theWeak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (Yale UniversityPress, New Haven, CT, 1985); B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, UnhappyValley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa (James Currey, London,1992). ^17. J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1979). ^18. R. Willis, A State in the Making. Myth: history and social transformationin pre-colonial Ufipa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington,IN, 1981). ^19. See S. Charnley, ‘Communal resource use and migrationinto the Usangu plains, Tanzania’ (PhD thesis, StanfordUniversity, California, 1994); P. B. Coppolillo, ‘Thelandscape ecology of pastoral herding: spatial analysis of landuse and livestock production in East Africa’, Human Ecology28, 4 (2000), pp. 527–60; F. Cleaver, ‘Reinventinginstitutions: bricolage and the social embeddedness of naturalresource management’, European Journal of DevelopmentResearch 14, 2 (2002). ^20. J. Ford, The Role of Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A studyof the tsetse fly problem (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971); J.Igoe and D. Brockington, ‘Pastoral land tenure and communityconservation: a case study from north-east Tanzania’,Pastoral Land Tenure Series 11 (IIED, London, 1999); J. G. Galaty‘Pastoral and agro-pastoral migration in Tanzania: factorsof economy, ecology and demography in cultural perspective’,in J. W. Bennett and J. R. Bowen (eds), Production and Autonomy:Anthropological studies and critiques of development (UniversityPress of America, Lanham, MD, 1988), pp. 163–83. ^21. E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991(Abacus, London, 1994), p. 236. In 1961, US military expenditurewas 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); and althoughit was to decline (just over 5 percent in the 1970s), it remaineda powerful trope for explaining US economy, society and politics.Indeed the military-industrial complex is still important nowwith the Cold War won and US military expenditure down to lessthan 4 percent of GDP. ^22. Tanzania Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, A Review of theWildlife Sector in Tanzania. Volume 1: Assessment of the currentsituation (Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and the Environment,Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1995). ^23. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, United Republicof Tanzania, Tourism Master Plan. Strategy & Actions, April2002 <http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/tourismmasterplan.pdf>Accessed on 9 November 2004. ^24. Brockington, Fortress Conservation. ^25. K. Hart, The Political Economy of West African Agriculture (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1982). ^26. DANIDA, Overview of Donor Supported Environmental Activitiesin Tanzania (Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,1999). Spent in 1 year, this would be equivalent to just over4 percent of the country’s GDP. ^27. Leach and Fairhead, ‘Fashioned forest pasts’, pp.47–9. ^28. W. A. Rodgers, T. T. Struhsaker, and C. C. West, ‘Observationson the red colobus (Colobus badius tephrosceles) of Mbisi forest,Southwest Tanzania’, African Journal of Ecology 22 (1984),pp. 187-94. ^29. J. Igoe, ‘Ethnicity, civil society, and the Tanzanianpastoral NGO movement: the continuities and discontinuitiesof liberalized development’ (PhD thesis, Boston University,Boston, MA, 2000). ^30. Mr. Mbegu’s stance on the forest, and emphasis of theimportance of the red colobus monkey, encouraged villagers toname him Mr. Colobus. His name was unfortunately similar tothe Swahili for the black and white colobus. ^31. D. Brockington, ‘Communal property and degradation narratives:debating the Sukuma immigration into Rukwa Region, Tanzania’,Cahiers d’Afrique 20 (2001), pp. 1–22. ^32. Ibid. ^33. Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, Reporton the Commission of Corruption (Dar es Salaam, United Republicof Tanzania, Tanzania, 1996). ^34. Brockington, ‘Communal property’; D. Brockington,‘Local government, taxation and natural resource management:corruption, accountability and democratic performance in Tanzania’,Development and Change, forthcoming. ^35. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. ^36. I was unable to discuss the purpose of the visit and its causewith the representatives. However, the circumstances and languagedo suggest that villagers were exploiting government rhetoric.This explanation was favoured by people in the valley with whomI discussed the case. The result of their complaints was a largepublic meeting which unearthed many of the problems of governanceunderlying the grievances. See Brockington, ‘Communalproperty’. ^37. With good reason — the concentrating of dung in kraalsis sometimes referred to as ‘nutrient stripping’and forms an important part of the patch dynamics of semi-aridrangelands. ^38. One of the most lively contests in the village while I was therewas between two herders who had broken that agreement. ^39. This is a Sukuma innovation. Weeding parties I observed containedmixtures of residents and immigrants. ^40. Nicknamed Chuma (steel) because it was so tough. ^41. The importance of herd boy skill was underlined by the lamentof a (Fipa) herd owner whose herd boy was going to leave hisemployment and who had remarkably managed to guard his cattlefor 3 years without causing any case of crop damage. ^42. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft Oracles and Magic Among theAzande (OUP, Oxford, 1937), p. 82, 540; C. Geertz, Local Knowledge:Further essays in interpretive anthropology (Basic Books, NewYork, NY, 1983), p. 75. ^43. ‘Local knowledges’ here could cover a vast arrayof understandings and beliefs in all parts of the world. Ithas proven particularly productive to consider the incoherence,incompleteness and lack of co-ordination of Western knowledgesand certain areas of supposed expertise (R. Grove-White, ‘Newwine, old bottles? Personal reflections on the new BiotechnologyCommissions’, Political Quarterly 72 (2001), pp. 466–72). ^44. J. Fairhead and M. Leach, Science, Society and Power: Environmentalknowledge and policy in West Africa and the Caribbean (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2003). ^45. Leach and Fairhead ‘Fashioned forest pasts’, p.35. ^46. K. Milton, Loving Nature: Towards an ecology of emotion (Routledge,London, 2002). ^47. I am grateful to Dr. John Lonsdale for this point. ^48. It is indicative of the importance of environmental concernsin Tanzania that its value can be equated with that of development.I have heard a funeral peroration for a village chairman whichconcluded with the praise that he had tried hard to bring developmentand conserve the environment. ^49. As the manager of the Mkomazi Game Reserve of northern Tanzaniatold me in 1994, when justifying the eviction of herders fromthe reserve — we cannot have these people living out therelike animals, they must develop.     

Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina(OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economicand political activity in the country’s urban areas. Thisarticle employs a national probability sample survey to analysethe popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmarkevent. It shows that the application of state repression succeedsat some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintendedeffects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that themain victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom statesecurity agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest.Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we showthat it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to ruralareas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover,the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other stateinstitutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldenedits victims, deepening polarisation between political partiesand fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement. ^1. Disturbing accounts of the human toll are given by the CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence,Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabelelandand the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 (Legal Resources Foundation,Harare, 1997) and Richard Werbner, Tears of the Dead (EdinburghUniversity Press, Edinburgh, 1991). On systematic electoralviolence, see Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF strategies in generalelections, 1980–2000: discourse and coercion’, AfricanAffairs 104 (2005), pp. 1–34. On the violence associatedwith land invasions and crackdowns on journalists, see StephenChan, Robert Mugabe: A life of power and violence (I.B. Taurus,London, 2003) and Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A memoirof Zimbabwe (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2004). ^2. For an insightful collection of current analyses by a varietyof Zimbabwean commentators, see David Harold-Berry (ed.), Zimbabwe:The past is the future (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004). ^3. ‘Zimbabwe police target minibuses’, BBC News, 24May 2005. ^4. The Joint Operations Command - comprised of army, police, prisons,and intelligence heads - coordinates military and security affairsand, on these matters, now carries greater policy weight thanthe civilian cabinet. A senior state intelligence officer wasquoted as saying that ‘the operation is meant to reducethe number of people in the central business district so that,if violence erupts, it would be easy to contain.’ ZimOnline (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005. JournalistBaffour Ankomah, usually sympathetic to Mugabe, also reportedthat ‘the operation was the brainchild of Zimbabwe’sintelligence community’ designed to forestall ‘aUkrainian-style revolution’ New African (London), October2005, reprinted in The Herald (Harare), 4–5 October 2005. ^5. Government of Zimbabwe, ‘Response of the Government ofZimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on OperationMurambatsvina/Restore Order’ (Harare, 2005). ^6. ‘Rallying cry belies Mugabe’s fear of voter revolt’,The Times (UK), 31 March 2005. ^7. Compared to the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF’sshare of elected seats rose from 62 to 78, and the MDC’sshare fell from 57 to 41. With the support of an additional30 appointed MPs in the 150-seat House, ZANU-PF therefore enjoyeda two-thirds majority, enough to change the constitution. ^8. Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ‘Statement on the 2005parliamentary elections’, Harare, 3 April 2005. See alsoCarole Andrews and Bryn Morgan, ‘Zimbabwe after the 2005parliamentary elections’, Research Paper No. 05/58 (UKHouse of Commons Library, London, August 2005). ^9. ‘Police in Zimbabwe arrest 9000 traders’, Guardian(UK), 24 May 2005. ^10. ‘Zimbabwe government continues blitz’, AssociatedPress, 5 June 2005. ^11. ‘U.N. condemns Zimbabwe for bulldozing urban slums,’New York Times, 23 July 2005. ^12. United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabweto Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina bythe UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka (United Nations, New York, 18 July 2005),p. 7. ^13. ‘UN chief Annan’s statement on Zimbabwe demolitions’,Reuters, 22 July 2005. ^14. ‘Zimbabwe steams ahead with demolitions’, Mail andGuardian (SA), 26 July 2005. ^15. See ‘UN envoy says Zimbabwe’s crisis is deepening’,Business Day (SA), 7 December 2005 and ‘New threat ofurban demolition’, IRIN - Integrated Regional InformationNetworks (UN), 7 April 2006. ^16. For information on country coverage and research methods, seewww.afrobarometer.org. ^17. The sampling frame was the Government of Zimbabwe, Central StatisticalOffice, Census 2000 Zimbabwe: Preliminary results summary (GovernmentPrinter, Harare, 2003). In drawing the national probabilitysample, we followed the standard Afrobarometer sampling protocol,which can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.For ease of access to the present article, we did not burdenthe text with extensive methodological apparatus. If readershave queries about data collection or analysis, they are invitedto visit the website or contact the authors directly. ^18. ‘Zimbabwe takes harsh steps in major cities to counterunrest’, New York Times, 2 June 2005. ^19. Action Aid International/Combined Harare Residents Association,A Study on the Impact of ‘Operation/Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’ in 26 Wards of Harare High Density Housing Areas(AA/CHRA, Harare, July 2005). ^20. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission (2005), p. 8. ^21. Ibid., p. 34. ^22. ‘Annan may take up Mugabe invite’, The Scotsman(UK), 26 July 2005. ^23. ‘Mugabe hoping to sidestep Mbeki and Annan’, SundayIndependent (SA), 24 July 2005. Zimbabwe’s Ambassadorto the UN also branded the report ‘exaggerated’,BBC News, 27 July 2005. ^24. The margin of sampling error for a survey with 1048 respondentsis plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level ofconfidence. The confidence interval around the point estimateof 54 percent for OM victimization is therefore between 51 and57 percent. This result almost exactly replicates the findingof an earlier survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.Based on a national probability sample of similar size (n =1041) and using the same question, MPOI found in July-August2005 that 55 percent of respondents reported that they or theirimmediate families were affected. See Eldred Masunungure andAnyway Ndapadzwa, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005: Post-Parliamentarysurvey report (MPOI, Harare, August 2005). ^25. Census 2002, p.1. ^26. This guesstimate is conservative compared to the Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe’s claim of 3.4 million Zimbabweans livingabroad in 2004 (www.homelinkzimbabwe.com) and various journalisticaccounts of 3 million or more, for example by Geoff Hill, WhatHappens After Mugabe? (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p. 2. ^27. The World Bank’s African Development Indicators says 43percent are under age 14 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004),p. 309. ^28. Or, taking sampling error into account, between 2.55 and 2.85million. ^29. Survey respondents may have used an especially broad subjectivedefinition when defining an OM victim as a member of their ‘immediatefamily’. There is also a small risk that some victimswere double-counted as members of more than one respondent’sextended family. Either way, we doubt that we have undercounted. ^30. Squatter settlements were unapproved, but many of them had existingcourt judgments that prevented the government from removingthem without providing alternative accommodation. Some shacksin urban areas even had planning permission. ^31. ‘Msika officially launches operation Garikai’, TheHerald (Harare), 30 June 2005. Also ‘Zimbabwe: operationlive well struggles to take off’, IRIN - Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (UN), 19 August 2005. ^32. In Zimbabwe, as in other African countries, young and unemployedpeople are least likely to vote. ^33. Mass Public Opinion Institute, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005 (MPOI,Harare, 2005) p. iii. ^34. Note: the percentage figures should be treated with cautionas the number of cases is small (n = 56). ^35. Sixty percent of these respondents were urban versus 34 percentrural. ^36. 35 percent among the former versus 37 percent among the latter. ^37. 41 percent among the random sample of adults, 45 percent amongdisplaced persons. ^38. For 2004 estimates of institutional trust, see Michael Bratton,Annie Chikwana, and Tulani Sithole, ‘Propaganda and publicopinion in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary AfricanStudies 23, 1 (2005), pp. 77–108. ^39. According to an official report, ‘Police had been approachedby local authorities to help in enforcing Council by-laws, whichwere being ignored . . . (and) to relocate street kids, vagrants,touts and vendors who were causing chaos in town.’ ZimbabweRepublic Police, ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police response toallegations of deaths suffered during Operation Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’, (Harare, August 2005). ^40. This slight adjustment lies within the margin of sampling errorfor a single survey. ^41. Pearson’s r = 0.271, p < 0.001. ^42. By 9 percentage points: 71 percent for OM victims versus 80percent for non-victims. ^43. ‘Price of basics soars beyond reach of poor Zimbabweans’,Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 20 March 2006. ^44. Pearson’s r = 0.962, p < 0.001. Indeed, these indicatorsare so closely correlated that either could act as a proxy forthe other. ^45. The proportion of MDC supporters who said they did not trustthe ruling party ‘at all’ rose from 49 percent inApril 2004 to 62 percent in October 2005. ^46. Although the results of the bye-election of May 2006 in Budirirosuggest the mainstream MDC headed by Morgan Tsvangirai has littleto fear from the breakaway MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara. ^47. See International Crisis Group, ‘Post-election Zimbabwe:What next?’ Africa Report No. 93 http://www.crisisgroup.org(7 June, 2005). ^48. Eldred, Masunungure, Anyway Ndapwadza, and Noma Sibanda, ‘Supportfor democracy and democratic institutions in Zimbabwe’,Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 27 http://www.afrobarometer.org(March 2006). ^49. International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s operationMurambatsvina: the tipping point?’ Africa Report No. 97,p. 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org (17 August, 2005). ^50. ‘African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s humanrights abuses’, The Guardian (UK), 4 January 2006.     

ERRATUM

The editors regret that a number of errors were uncorrectedin the article by Bruce Berman, ‘Ethnicity, patronageand the African state’ (African Affairs, No. 388, July1998, pp. 305–341). This erratum slip should be pastedopposite p. 305 at the beginning of the article.     

Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race

In what is now Sudan there occurred over the centuries a processof ta'rib, or Arabization, entailing the gradual spread of bothArab identity and the Arabic language among northern peoples.After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of 1898, British colonialpolicies favoured a narrow elite from within these ‘Arab’communities. Members of this elite went on to develop a conceptionof a self-consciously Sudanese Arabic national identity, inthe process adapting the term ‘Sudanese’ (sudani),which derived from an Arabic word for blackness and previouslyhad servile connotations. At decolonization in the 1950s, thesenationalists turned ta'rib, into an official policy that soughtto propagate Arabic quickly throughout a territory where scoresof languages were spoken. This article considers the historicaldiffusion of Sudanese Arabic-language culture and Arab identity,contrasts this with the post-colonial policy of Arabization,and analyses the relevance of the latter for civil conflictsin Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and, more recently, Darfur.Far from spreading Arabness, Arabization policy sharpened non-Araband, in some cases, self-consciously ‘African’ (implyingculturally pluralist) identities. Arabization policy also accompanied,in some quarters, the growth of an ideology of Arab culturaland racial supremacy that is now most evident in Darfur. This publication was made possible in part by grants from theCarnegie Corporation of New York (Carnegie Scholars Program,2006) and the University Research Foundation of the Universityof Pennsylvania, but the statements made and views expressedare solely the responsibility of the author. The author wouldalso like to thank Benjamin F. Soares, Karin Willemse, VijayBalasubramanian, and two anonymous referees for their feedbackon earlier drafts of this article; the African Studies Centreat the University of Leiden for hosting the seminar (April 2007)where this work was first presented; and Tukufu Zuberi, EveTroutt Powell and the Africana Studies Center of the Universityof Pennsylvania for organizing a symposium on Darfur (1 March2007) that helped to bring ideas into focus.     

ERRATA

The Editors regret that the following mistakes occurred in thetext of the article ‘The Great West African Drought, 1972–74’,by Jonathan Derrick, which appeared in the October 1977 numberof the journal. The main reason for these mistakes was a breakdownin communications between the editors and the author, whilethe article was being processed for publication. P. 540—line 36: The word ‘population’ shouldbe inserted after ‘West-Indian style’. P. 543—line 33: ‘1969–70’ should read‘1970–71’. P. 544—line 34: ‘Ivory Coast’ should read‘Upper Volta’. P. 546, Table: The Maiduguri figures are incorrect and shouldbe ignored (The author apologizes to the source of the statisticsfor this misquotation). P. 548—line 12: ‘eruption’ should read ‘irruption’. P. 564—note 69 refers to the sentence ‘In fact ...for tax’, not to the preceding sentence. P. 569—note 87: ‘Protection’ should be ‘Production’. P. 571—note 94 should be deleted. P. 582—line 34: ‘affected’ should be ‘effective’.      

Corrigendum

It is regretted that in the article ‘Africanist Studiesin Italy’, in the April 1970 issue of African Affairs,Professor Castro, the author of Richerche sul matrimonio a terminenel diritro islamico, was erroneously referred to as ‘thelate F. Castro’. We tender our sincere apologies to ProfessorCastro.     

Correction

Professor Kenneth Robinson has written to African Affairs apologizingfora slip of the pen in his review of A. H. M Kirk-Greene'sBiographical Dictionary of British Colonial Governors, Vol.I (Africa) (p. 588 of the October 1982 issue): ‘I wrotethat ‘Sir Gerald Creasy did not accompany the Secretaryof State to West Africa in 1928 but the Parliamentary UnderSecretary, Mr Ormsby-Gore’. The visit was, of course,as the Dictionary correctly records, to Ceylon and Malaya. Ican only grovel.’     

Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China Africa Relations

In the wake of China's Year of Africa in 2006, China–Africarelations are currently the subject of unprecedented attention.However, although those relations are widely covered they arealso under-researched. This article offers an introduction toChina–Africa relations, covering background to the historyand politics of Chinese involvement in the continent and identifyingareas of further research. It concludes by calling for the studyof China–Africa relations to develop a culture of seriousresearch beyond current ‘dragon in the bush’ preoccupationsand so engage a complex subject that is about to become a mainstreamissue in African politics. The author is grateful to Nina Sylvanus, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira,Chris Alden, and especially Nai Rui Chng and Deborah Brautigamfor helpful comments on an earlier version.