The Growing Power and Autonomy of House of Commons Select Committees: Causes and Effects

This article is an examination of the rising prominence of House of Commons select committees during the 2010–2015 Parliament, which takes into account the impact of the Wright reforms. The new system of electing committee chairs and members is explored as a central reform that has burnished the autonomy, independence and credibility of the committees. In addition, the characteristics of the coalition government and circumstances entailed by a two‐party executive are seen as factors that have made more robust the neutrality of the committees, which have been looked to ever more urgently as impartial scrutineers of government policy and personnel. As the system has been strengthened and received greater attention from the government, the public and the media, select committees have also come to present a platform upon which certain members and chairs have grown their profile. This phenomenon in turn has added to the desirability of roles on committees, which now present an alternative career route to the ministerial ladder.     

Legislative Committees as Uncertainty Reduction Devices in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies

Most research on committees in multiparty legislatures in parliamentary democracies focuses on their role in solving intra-cabinet delegation problems. Using a straightforward spatial model, this article discusses how committees can also solve uncertainty problems that arise in settings characterised by unstable coalitions, weak governmental agenda control and a lack of government change. In order to explore empirically how committees solve these problems, the article focuses on the success (and later decline) over the last 30 years of the sede legislativa, a law-making procedure that formalises ‘universalism’ in Italian legislative committees. The statistical results largely confirm the theoretical expectations.     

Developing Multilateral Surveillance Tools in the EU

The development of the infrastructure of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is an unaddressed topic in scholarly debates. On the basis of secondary literature on the European Employment Strategy, it is hypothesised that a conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level on the side of member states limits the choice for a policy instrument to the OMC, and is a driving force behind the development of its infrastructure. From empirical findings on the OMC e-Europe it shows that for the development of the infrastructure of an OMC on a policy field, a need for an instrument has to be present that can neutralise the conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level.     

Committees in legislatures: A property rights perspective

Without the imposition of some institutional structure, a legislature is a non-exclusive resource, and legislators will have a tendency to overuse the resource and reduce its productivity. The committee system is a method for granting property rights over the legislature's agenda by subdividing the agenda and assigning each committee rights over a portion of the agenda. Just as common grazing ground could be more productive if it were subdivided and assigned to individual owners, the legislature is more productive if access to the agenda is subdivided and assigned to committees.Ownership rights to committee assignments are allocated based on seniority because this makes the rights more secure and therefore more valuable to their owners. In the United States Congress, the seniority rule replaced a system in which assignments were made at the discretion of party leaders. In the former system, legislators needed to expend effort to retain their assignments, which diminished their ability to use their assignments productively. Because individuals can use resources more productively if they do not have to be concerned about protecting their ownership interest, the seniority system enables the legislature to be more productive in producing legislation.     

Before There Was Enron,There Was Orange County: A Study of Local Government Financial‐Oversight Committees

Recent financial scandals in some of America's largest corporations have prompted popular speculation that a similar crisis may occur within the public sector and, therefore, that government and nonprofit organizations should be required to adopt financial oversight practices similar to those that are mandated of publicly‐traded corporations in the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. One of those mandated practices—the use of financial‐oversight committees—is already a common practice in public organizations, though little is known about its effectiveness. This study uses a national sample of local governments to examine whether financial‐oversight committees improve financial control and strengthen stakeholder confidence in financial reporting. The findings provide preliminary support for the use of financial‐oversight committees as an effective tool to improve financial accountability in local government.     

The many faces of EU committee governance

Committees linking national administrations and the EU level play a crucial role at all stages of the EU policy process. The literature tends to portray this group system as a coherent mass, characterised by expert-oriented ‘deliberative supranationalism’, a term developed through studies of comitology (implementation) committees. This article builds on survey data of 218 national officials in 14 member states who have attended EU committee meetings. These groups exhibit important common features: expert knowledge rather than country size plays a pivotal role in the decision making process; across types of committee, participants evoke multiple allegiances and identities. In spite of loyalty to national institutions, there is also a sense of belonging to the committees as such, though with significant variation among types of committee. Council and comitology groups are strongly intergovernmental, while Commission committees seem more multi-faceted. The primary aim here is to give an empirical account, but the main observations are interpreted from an institutional and organisational perspective.     

CLASSIFICATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Scrutiny committees of the Thirty-Third Parliament (1983-84) are classified as undertaking work in one or more of the following categories: legislation; nonlegislative policy; administrative oversight; and information systems for increased accountability. Only Senate committees scrutinise legislation. The majority of scrutiny committees examine non-legislative policy. In contrast, administrative oversight work (compliance and efficiency) is undertaken by a relatively small number of committees. Information systems for increased accountability are a special category and represent the work of several committees particularly in respect of statutory authorities. Reports on non-legislative policy and administrative oversight are classified against the functional classifications of expenditure used in Budget Statement No. 3. In seeking to explain limited policy scrutiny in areas such as taxation and social security and welfare, one cannot ignore the effects that the strategic priorities of adversary politics have on bi-partisan committee inquiry. From classification and related comment one can question whether there is insufficient scrutiny of legislation, insufficient oversight of the administration and too much policy scrutiny. This in turn opens up the broader question of the overall direction and scope of scrutiny committee activity.     

Committee bias in legislatures with a high degree of party cohesion: Evidence from Danish municipalities

The institution of committees in democratic legislatures has for years been said to bias policy making because the preferences of committee members differ from, and are more alike than, those of other legislators due to self‐selection to the committees. Based on an analysis of United States Senate committees, Hall and Grofman suggested in 1990 that the preferences of committee members primarily diverge from, and are more alike than, those of non‐committee members on policy issues that are salient to constituencies or at least to an easily definable segment of constituencies. This article argues that the logic of Hall and Grofman should in fact be reversed in legislatures characterised by highly cohesive parties. Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that in such legislatures the preferences of committee members are more likely to be alike than those of non‐committee members in the committees that work with policy issues of less salience to constituencies. Using a large‐scale comparative design comprising data collected in 2008 on the spending preferences of 1,348 Danish local politicians, evidence is found supporting this hypothesis. This finding points to the importance of considering the role of parties when assessing committee bias.     

Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures

This article explores how new groups can be marginalized after they gain representation in the legislature. We use data from six Latin American legislatures to examine the effect of institutional and political factors on how traditionally dominant male political leaders distribute scarce political resources—committee assignments—to female newcomers. In general, we find that women tend to be isolated on women's issues and social issues committees and kept off of power and economics/foreign affairs committees as the percentage of legislators who are women increases, when party leaders or chamber presidents control committee assignments, and when the structure of the committee system provides a specific committee to deal with women's issues. Thus, to achieve full incorporation into the legislative arena, newcomers must do more than just win seats. They must change the institutions that allow the traditionally dominant group to hoard scarce political resources .     

Congressional Activism in the Foreign Policy Arena: A Case Study of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

This article analyzes congressional activism during an international crisis. Using the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a case, this study explores executive–congressional relations during a time when immediate policy responses are needed. A content analysis of policy statements made during committees, on the House floor, and on the Senate floor is used to investigate the specific policy ideas proposed by members of Congress. The models presented pay particular attention to the actions of Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) members, in relation to other more common predictors of congressional activism. In addition to the results for CBC members, other conclusions indicate that foreign policy leaders in Congress are international affairs policy experts without serious concerns of being defeated in their next election.     

Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motives?

This paper examines the motivation ofpolitical action committees in theircampaign contributions. The paper estimatesthe effect of contributions on the 1996House of Representatives elections and onthe candidates' policy stances.Contributions to challengers have a largeimpact on election outcomes but incumbentreceipts do not. On four of the five issuesexamined, interest groups responded tocandidate positions rather than givingfunds to influence them. These results areconsistent with an electoral motive forcontributions. Some evidence is presentedthat contributions to incumbents may begiven to secure unobservable services forthe PAC.     

社区居民委员会与业主委员会的权利结构及其在北京市政策执行中的演化

在城市社区中,居民委员会和业主委员会是两个非常重要的自治组织,这两个理论上看似相辅相成的自治组织在现实中却关系复杂,复杂关系的背后实际上是政府的政策在左右。本文通过对北京市社区中居民委员会和业主委员会相关政策的研究,特别是对政府政策取向以及相关组织的利益关系的剖析,发现政府厚此薄彼的政策取向以及控制寻租机会是问题的核心,解决问题的关键在于政策设计应以尊重权利为要义,在具体的制度安排上应以控制腐败、防止附加性政策为核心,在具体行政活动中应以依法行政为基本操守,唯其如此才能防止魔鬼隐藏在政策细节中作祟。     

KEEPING SODA IN SNAP: Understanding the Other Iron Triangle

Participants in SNAP have always been allowed to use their taxpayer-funded benefit to purchase Sugar Sweetened Beverages (SSBs). Despite an acute public health crisis surrounding the consumption of unhealthy products including SSBs, especially among the low-income citizens who also qualify for SNAP benefits, this policy has yet to be changed. Interviews with policy participants in Washington, D.C., reveal that change is being blocked by a culture of “personal responsibility” in America, plus three specific political forces: corporate lobbying primarily by the beverage and food retail industries; a desire by liberals to defend SNAP as income support for the poor even if nutrition outcomes are sub-optimal; and institutional inertia within the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural committees of Congress. In the 2018 farm bill debate, this “iron triangle” of bipartisan resistance to change was strong enough to block even a pilot study of SSB restrictions in SNAP.     

Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House

Models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re-election interests of incumbent legislators. Attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the notion lives on, nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system. In the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents. Contrary to this simplifying characterization, the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress. Some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences. Jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions. We suggest here that these realities warrant a re-opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics. Our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member's vote share, and that assignment to a narrowly focused (specialized) committee does not.     

The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments,economic interests,and campaign contributions

This paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984, 1986, and 1988 California Assembly elections. The study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant Assembly standing committees. A non-parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes. The empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in Assembly elections, substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity.     

Selfish and Cooperative Voting: Can the Majority Restrain Themselves?

At every scale from small committees to national elections, voters face tradeoffs between self-interest and the common good. We report three experiments in which participants vote for policies with real payoffs at stake. We manipulate self-interest by randomly assigning participants to two groups in society with different policy payoffs. Participants in the majority group are confronted by a simple choice between a policy that is better for themselves or a policy that is best for society. Overall, we find a clear effect of self-interest: Participants are more likely to choose the policy that earns them more money, compared to participants in the other group, even when the policy is detrimental to the common good. Simultaneously, we observe considerable levels of cooperative voting among participants in the majority, ranging from 47% to 79% across different payoff regimes. Finally, participants were not more cooperative when voting compared to when they chose between the same policies with a lottery or leader institution, departing from the hypothesis that voting institutions promote cooperative motives. We discuss implications for multiple literatures about voting behavior.

     

Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Government Officials

The questions posed in the current study are (1) whether, and (2) how, participation within Commission expert committees and Council working parties of the European Union (EU) affects the coordination behaviour of the participants. Based on organizational theory arguments, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arguably weakened by institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees. The opposite is argued to be the case within Council working parties. Empirically, this study is based on 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish domestic government officials attending EU committees. Secondly, this study also includes answers from 49 officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. Being excluded from attending Council working parties, Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees are shown to coordinate considerably less with the foreign ministry than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Notwithstanding these observations, this study also reveals how the coordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants reflects their domestic institutional affiliations. In addition to showing how EU committees affect coordination behaviour among the participants, the current analysis also shows how responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs at the domestic level of governance.     

Polanyi in Brussels or Luxembourg? Social rights and market regulation in European insurance

The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union to ban sex discrimination in insurance has shown the potential reach of the principle of non‐discrimination. This paper discusses the different positions taken by participants in the policy process leading up to the decision, in order to reveal the potential and limitations of non‐discrimination as the basis for market‐regulatory social policy. It is shown that the European Commission's initial support for prohibiting insurance discrimination faltered with the realization that the measure would have little efficacy as a distributive social policy. It was left to the Court to assert that non‐discrimination rights are constitutive for European markets, regardless of their functional and instrumental limitations. The Court's focus was on the market‐integrative potential of rights as sources of norms for the conduct of insurance relationships. It is argued that this form of constitutive regulation is distinct from distributive social policy as it does not require that outcomes are egalitarian, but, rather, that the processes governing market relations should respect fundamental rights.     

Rating and Evaluating Health Systems: The Value of the Life Expectancy Approach

ABSTRACT

Cross-national ranking and rating of public services does not always provide the conditions for effective cross-national learning, because such learning requires causal understanding of the mechanisms underlying ranking scores. That causal understanding means grappling with the production functions involved in public services, and it is particularly difficult for organizations or policy domains where processes are more readily measurable than outcomes relative to goals. Health is to a large extent a policy domain of that type, which makes effective ranking and comparison difficult and also presents a particular challenge for cross-national learning. Numerous attempts have been made to compare the efficiency of different health care systems, and though there is a certain logic about such approaches to ranking and rating, this paper argues that much can be learnt for health policy using life expectancy as the basis for ranking and comparison.     

Welfare Reform and Models of Public Policy: Why Policy Sciences Are Required

Policy could be studied on the basis of three different models: ideological, social science, and policy sciences. Policy in accordance with ideology may not necessarily rely on solid rigorous research to back it up. Policy made solely in accordance with a rigorous social science model might be able to demonstrate a causal relationship between a given policy and desired outcomes, and in the process establish a clear role for good research in the policy process. But it often fails to account for the larger social and political context in which policy is formulated. Good policy should be based on rigorous social science research, while also factoring in the values of the broader society, that is, ideology. This would imply that in order to bridge the gap, that good policy should be formulated in accordance with the policy sciences model because it connects the rigorous methodology of the social sciences with the larger social policy context, that is, the broader policy process. When analyzing the reform of 1996 within the framework of these models, it becomes clear that while the legislation is highly ideological, it is not based on any serious research that would satisfy the criteria of the social science model. It fails the policy sciences model, in part, because its absence of clearly defined objectives, or a single objective, makes the task of measurement difficult. On the contrary, this legislation is a good example of why the policy community would do better to rely more on the policy sciences.