话语的批判与超越:马克思主义视阈下的全球正义及其可能

自罗尔斯开启西方自由主义关于正义话题的讨论以来,以博格、贝茨为代表的世界主义者试图将奠基于西方文明背景下的正义原则广泛地应用于国际社会,推行以西方价值为中心的全球正义理论。在理论与现实的政治影响下,我们有义务立足于马克思主义立场来反思和批判当代全球正义理论中的西方话语霸权倾向。因为马克思关于社会正义的论述,不仅是构建社会主义政治生态文明的重要价值依据,同时也是社会主义国家参与全球政治正义话语建构的重要理论来源。对于中国而言,应当坚持以马克思主义正义理论为指导,吸纳与改造传统政治思想中的良善价值,打破西方理论独断局面,成为建构全球正义理论体系的重要力量。     

规范与道德之争——基于《拯救正义与平等》谈柯亨对罗尔斯建构主义的批判

建构主义作为一种政治观念和方法,被罗尔斯在其《政治自由主义》中称之为"政治建构主义",用作解释他的正义理论。而柯亨则在《拯救正义与平等》中,集中批判了这种社会正义的建构主义。社会正义的建构主义试图在原初状态下建构出正义原则,柯亨认为无论是建构的方法还是关于正义原则的解释,都存在着许多问题。柯亨对罗尔斯为代表的社会正义的建构主义的批判主要从正义的特殊性、首要性以及受环境的影响等几个层面展开。这种批判实际上也是规范与道德之间的权衡和论战。     

女性主义与罗尔斯家庭正义之辩——政治哲学的一种独特论域

通过将论域聚焦于公共领域来阐发和论证政治价值和政治原则的正当合法性几乎是自由主义政治哲学的主要范式,而女性主义作为政治哲学中的一支新生力量,在正义的适用领域问题上,一直是罗尔斯理论的主要批评者。就正义是否适用于家庭领域而言,女性主义在对罗尔斯有关正义的几部论著进行文本解读的基础上,批判其模糊的家庭正义观致使在正义原则的正当合法性中家庭的缺场。罗尔斯在后期著作中,以强调正义对家庭采取的是外部关照形式来为自己辩护。二者的歧见在展现政治哲学的一种独特论域的同时,引发了我们对社会正义与家庭正义的关系,家庭与公私领域的关系以及正义如何关照家庭等一系列问题的深思。     

唯一的分配正义原则存在吗?——沃尔泽对罗尔斯公平正义理论的批判

在罗尔斯整个公平正义理论体系中,核心是他提出的两个正义原则及其优先性,但沃尔泽在其《正义诸领域》中,对此进行了批判,他通过与自由主义不同的方式,对正义的分配做了平等主义的、广泛的与多元主义的阐述。沃尔泽提出的多元分配正义理论是为了消除局部领域的简单平等,来达到整个领域的复合平等。他与罗尔斯正义论分歧的实质是社群主义和自由主义之争,但沃尔泽的多元正义理论却带有浓厚的相对主义色彩。     

全球正义与资源平等——浅论斯戴纳的资源平等观

当前对全球正义的讨论主要分为民族主义和世界主义两大阵营,民族主义者反对无上限的全球援助,世界主义者出于不同的立场对他们进行了批评。斯戴纳(Hillel Steiner)作为世界主义者,从资源的角度出发,认为富人有义务援助穷人。在他看来,民族主义者声称对领土内的自然资源有所有权是不成立的。自然资源作为一种运气并且作为一项基本人权,每个人对此都应有平等的份额。因而,资源占有超过平等份额的人应当对资源占有不足平等份额的人进行补偿,这是一种正义的义务。     

实践性正义观与立法实践——阿马蒂亚·森对约翰·罗尔斯理论的重构与启迪

社会正义问题与社会科学各个学科都具有紧密关联。阿马蒂亚·森(Amartya Sen)在2009年出版了《正义的理念》(The Idea of Justice)一书。在这本著作中,森对罗尔斯的正义理论展开了批判,并利用相关的理论资源建立了实践面向的正义观。森认为罗尔斯的理论存在理论面向、理论工具、衡量尺度、实现路径四个基础层面的错误。首先,应该将对完美正义制度的构建转向对非正义现象的消除;其次,应使用社会选择理论代替契约理论作为研究正义问题的工具;再次,可以使用基于可行能力的能力观,取代单一的基本品作为衡量福利和正义的尺度,以体现正义的实质;最后,社会正义的实现路径应该是通过协商对话与投票选举的民主方式完成的。     

普遍主义正义理论的困境——唯物史观视野下的社群主义对新自由主义正义理论的批判

基于一种普遍主义的思维模式,以罗尔斯为代表的新自由主义者认为其构建的正义理论是普遍适用,能够超越一切地域、历史、文化和传统的,因而必将面临不可实现的困境.在当代,社群主义对新自由主义的这种普遍主义正义理论进行了釜底抽薪的批判,在社群主义看来,正义是存在于历史之中的,普遍的正义是不存在的.唯物史观认为,正义都是具体的、历史的、具有阶级性;抽象的、超越时空、普遍适用的正义只是理论上的幻象,实践上的乌托邦;社群主义对新自由主义的批判虽然具有一定的合理之处,但其同样有其自身不可避免的理论局限性.     

进退之间:罗尔斯政治正义观念的证成与反思

从《正义论》到《政治自由主义》,罗尔斯的正义理论经历了一次逻辑转换,即用"政治正义"替代了先前的"伦理正义"。这种逻辑转换到底是理论发展还是理论退却,曾在政治哲学界引起较大的争议。本文通过对罗尔斯正义理论若干核心理念的解读,探析了政治正义观念的道德基础和政治意蕴,试图证明罗尔斯伦理正义观念与政治正义观念之间的逻辑连续性与价值合理性。     

罗尔斯和哈贝马斯正义与合法性之争的深层解读

罗尔斯和哈贝马斯是当代西方社会政治哲学的两位大师级人物,他们关于正义问题的争论格外引人注目。罗尔斯的正义观是实质正义,这种政治正义观独立于任何完备性学说,支配着整个社会的基本结构;而哈贝马斯的正义观是程序正义,他认为正义是由某种民主程序决定的,是通过公民之间的对话、交流、协商之后所达成的共识决定的。罗尔斯认为,正义与合法性不是一回事,正义本质上是一个道德概念,合法性是一个法律概念;而哈贝马斯认为,合法性是某种社会政治被认可的价值,追问一个社会是否合法,就是对它进行道德批判,因此,在这种意义上,合法的就是正义的。     

马克思的正义观

在马克思的著作中,多次提到了有关正义的观点,在国内外的学者中也存在着对于马克思正义思想的诸多争议,马克思是否赞同正义、马克思是否在正义的维度下批判资本主义为非正义、共产主义是否是一个正义的社会、马克思缘何批判资本主义,这些都成为了争论的焦点,也由此形成了几种主要观点,试图在对各种观点的简单阐述与评析下,重点阐发马克思的正义观,在对马克思正义思想的深入剖析中,进一步了解马克思对于资本主义批判的深刻内涵。     

Reconciliation Arguments in John Rawls’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof.     

Ideals of justice: goals vs. constraints

Amartya Sen describes John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ as ‘transcendental institutionalism’ and develops his realization-focused approach in contrast. But Rawls is no transcendental institutionalist, and Sen’s construal of their opposition occludes a third, relation-based position and a valuable and practical form of ideal theory. What Sen calls transcendental institutionalism and realization-focused comparative theory each treat justice as something to bring about, a problem for experts. A third position treats justice in terms of how we relate to one another rather than of achievement. This position, called ‘justice as reciprocity,’ is consistent with Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ and Sen’s normative aspirations, and might form the basis of new and fruitful dialogue between them. By treating justice as a question of how we relate to one another, and treating relation-based ideals as the basis of respectful behavioral constraints (rather than of ends to pursue), ‘justice as reciprocity’ grounds an everyday form of just democratic citizenship.     

Cohen vs. Rawls on justice and equality

G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls’s account of justice because his difference principle permits inequalities that reflect the relative scarcity of different skills and natural abilities. Instead of viewing the ‘basic structure’ as the primary subject of justice, Cohen argues that individual citizens should cultivate an egalitarian ethos, which would enable a just society to dispense with the use of incentive payments to induce individuals to use their talents in socially ideal ways. This study examines Cohen’s critique, including his rejection of ‘incentives,’ and vindicates Rawls’s approach. Ultimately, Cohen’s argument fails to grapple with the moral pluralism that characterizes modern, democratic societies, whereas Rawls’s theory is constructed to accommodate such pluralism.     

In defense of the duty to assist: a response to critics on the viability of a Rawlsian approach to climate change

One test of the practical relevance of any theory of international justice will be to apply it to the case of global climate change. Several thinkers have already dismissed John Rawls’s Law of Peoples as a possible candidate for helping to manage this problem, arguing, among other things, that it demands too little, too late. This paper revisits and defends the Rawlsian framework as a viable approach to managing climate change. In particular, it argues that the duty to assist (the eighth principle of the Law of Peoples) may actually be an invaluable resource for dealing with the now inevitable consequences of global climate change.     

Recognition as Redistribution

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and examine the implied commitment to the premises of recognition in Rawls’s account of redistributive justice. It attempts to find out whether or not recognition relations that produce humiliation and cultural injustice can be followed to their logical conclusion in his theory of redistribution. This paper makes two claims. Firstly, although Rawls does not disregard the harms of misrecognition as demonstrated in his notion of self-respect being the most important primary good, he cannot liberally accommodate the idea of humiliation as a case of injustice without compromising the basic premises of his theory. Secondly, while resource distribution produces indirect side effects that can impact upon cultural injustice, addressing recognition issues through the prism of redistribution can inadvertently result in further misrecognition. The paper concludes that in the final analysis Rawls wrongly takes redistribution as the overarching principle of justice to which recognition is but a subservient principle.     

Political legitimacy

These comments take issue with two aspects of the treatment of Rawls in On The People’s Terms. First, I criticize the characterization of Rawls as downplaying political liberties and focusing instead on social justice. Second, I take issue with the claim that Pettit provides a more robust conception of legitimacy than Rawls. The basis for this claim is that Rawls, along with others in the Kantian tradition, downplays the question of legitimacy by ‘going hypothetical’. Yet in common with Rawls, Pettit’s republican conception of legitimacy imposes a stringent test of legitimacy that many democratic regimes would not pass. This leads him to propose a weaker standard of ‘legitimizability’ that appears to involve the same kind of counterfactual judgment for which Rawls is criticized.     

Renaturalisierung sozialer Ungleichheiten? Zu Wolfgang Kerstings vergeblicher Hoffnung, auf dem Weg von John Rawls über Robert Nozick zu einer liberalen Sozialstaatsphilosophie zu gelangen

In 2000, Wolfgang Kersting gave a much acknowledged outline concerning a liberal welfare state-philosophy within the debate on libertarianism and egalitarianism. Kersting, who used to sympathize with John Rawls’ theory of justice, now bases his approach on a ‘naturalism of merits’, which he polemically distinguishes from all egalitarian forms of political liberalism. This article deals with Kersting’s way from John Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ (1971) via Robert Nozick’s ‘Anarchy, State, and Utopia’ (1974) to his present conception of a minimal welfare state; furthermore, the article points out that Kersting’s conception is appropriate neither to the complexity of modern societies nor to the basic normative standards of the classical political liberalism.     

Self-respect and public reason

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argues that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important’ primary good, and that its status as such gives crucial support to controversial ideas like the lexical priority of liberty. Given the importance of these ideas for Rawls, it should be no surprise that they have attracted much critical attention. In response to these critics I give a defense of self-respect that grounds its importance in Rawls’s moral conception of the person. I show that this understanding of self-respect goes well beyond giving support to the lexical priority of liberty, also supporting Rawls’s still more controversial view of public reason. On my account, taking self-respect seriously requires the coercive enforcement of public reason. This is a novel argument for public reason, in that it grounds the idea in justice as fairness and mandates its coercive enforcement.     

Incentives and the Natural Duties of Justice

In this paper I explore a possible response to G.A. Cohen's critique of the Rawlsian defence of inequality-generating incentives. Much of the debate on this topic has neglected the importance Rawls places on the principles that apply to individuals. I explore two possible strategies. First, to argue that self-seeking high-fliers fail to fulfil the natural duty to uphold justice; secondly, to argue that such individuals fail to fulfil the natural duty of mutual respect. These two strategies allow Rawlsians to argue that justice as fairness does require an ethos that is violated by the market behaviour of self-seeking high-fliers.     

From primary goods to capabilities to well-being

Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) mistakenly characterizes transcendental accounts of justice as being unable to compare non-ideal alternatives, and thus misfires as a criticism of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. In fact, Nozick’s disinterest in when rights may be overridden does not bespeak indifference to specific questions of comparative assessment, and Lockean rights do give determinate advice in everyday circumstances. Sen correctly reports that Rawls’s theory is defective at giving practical normative advice, but the basic problem is the over-rigidity of Rawls’s absolute priority relations, not transcendentalism. Sen’s search for a complete moral theory requires that he produce one. Act consequentialism is one promising complete theory of justice, having both transcendental grounding and clear methods for comparative assessment. I also propose moving from Sen’s capabilities standard of social justice to one based on functioning. The latter facilitates distinguishing between trivial and worthless capabilities and important and worthwhile ones, and focuses social justice more squarely on the end of well-being.