Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace

The extent to which democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive is tested empirically with implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic peace. Three measures of democracy are used: a political rights index, an index of liberal democracy, and a measure based on institutionalization. Environmental variables such as sea borders and rainfall that minimize external threat to democratic systems are found to predict better to the more rudimentary political rights index, while cultural variables, including Islam in a negative direction, are more clearly associated with liberal democracy. The measure of democratic institutionalization behaves in a manner intermediate between the two. Divergence of the structures of explanation for these measures suggests that conclusions concerning the likelihood of war between democracies can depend on the specific index of democracy employed. The absence of a significant negative association between Islam and the political rights index under controlled conditions suggests that the probability of civilizational conflict is low.     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.     

A Quality of Government Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1985–2001

That democracies do not wage wars against each other is one of the most widely accepted claims within the study of international relations, although challenged lately by the capitalist peace argument. In addition to confirming both the democratic and capitalist peace effects, this article finds that the impact of quality of government—that is, having an impartial, nonpoliticized, and noncorrupt bureaucracy—on the risk of interstate conflict is at least on par with the influence of democracy. This result draws on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data in 1985–2001 and holds even under control for incomplete democratization and economic development, as well as for fatal MIDs, the Cold War era, and within politically relevant dyads. I argue that the causal mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government reduces information uncertainty among potentially warring parties and improves their ability to credibly commit to keeping their promises. Both democratic and capitalist peace theory needs to be complemented by theories “bringing the state back in” to the study of interstate armed conflict.     

Preferences and the Democratic Peace

A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes ( affinity ) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type—that democracy 'causes' affinity . Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing affinity on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of affinity remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure.     

Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the ‘democratic peace’ and the ‘failed democratization’ approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states.     

War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization

Democratization reduces the risk of war, but uneven transitions toward democracy can increase the probability of war. Using country-level data on democratization and international war from the period 1875–1996, we develop a general additive statistical model reassessing this claim in light of temporal and spatial dependence. We also develop a new geopolitical database of contiguities and demonstrate new statistical techniques for probing the extent of spatial clustering and its impact on the relationship between democratization and war. Our findings reaffirm that democratization generally does reduce the risk of war, but that large swings back and forth between democracy and autocracy can increase war proneness. We show that the historical context of peace diminishes the risk of war, while a regional context plagued by conflict greatly magnifies it.     

Conflict Resolution through Democracy Promotion? The Role of the OSCE in Georgia

This article qualitatively and empirically analyses the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy after intra-state war in Georgia. This regional organization is rooted in a comprehensive approach to security that directly links security to democratic values. Therefore, the OSCE is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the issue of democracy promotion in the context of conflict-resolution processes. Georgia provides a difficult environment for such a goal. Given that its two secession conflicts are ‘frozen’, democracy can, especially in this context, be considered a well-suited means to indirectly contribute to conflict resolution. By contrasting the democratic development in Georgia with OSCE activities since 1992, this article will assess OSCE democracy promotion efforts. When these efforts are measured with regard to progress in peace and democratic quality, the effectiveness of external democracy promotion by the OSCE has to be called into question. However, the article argues that democratization is a long-term process in which internal factors play a decisive role. The OSCE, like other international organizations, can only reach its normative goals to the degree of the reform orientation and political will of the target state's government. The potential for impact is limited, but can be increased by commitment and context sensitivity.     

Toward a Multiprocess Model of Rivalry and the Democratic Peace

In this paper we examine recent efforts to combine quantitative research on the democratic peace with research on interstate rivalry. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we highlight problems with separately analyzing the processes associated with rivalry and the democratic peace. Specifically, we specify a multiprocess model and demonstrate that previous research on this topic may overestimate the pacifying effect of democracy on enduring rivalries. Since pairs of democracies are unlikely to experience interstate rivalry in the first place, the true effect of joint democracy is difficult to ascertain in a censored sample of interstate rivals. Our simulation results are consistent with historical data analysis that suggests that the pacifying effect of democracy is most pronounced in the enhanced probability of jointly democratic dyads averting the onset of rivalry. More generally, this article fits into a larger body of research that examines the confounding effect of selection bias on world politics research.     

Assessing the statistical rarity of wars between democracies

The ‘small numbers objection’ to the democratic peace claims that the relative rarity of militarized conflict between democracies is due to their small numbers coupled with the infrequency of violent interstate conflict, not to an alleged pacifying effect of democracy. This study assesses this objection directly by treating the number of militarized disputes between democracies as a random variable. Since the historical record provides only one observation for this variable, full estimation of its distributional characteristics requires repeated simulation of the process by which dyads are ‘selected’ for conflict We employ Monte Cario techniques to carry out this process. The simulation results indicate no support for the small numbers objection. The results remain stable when important control variables are introduced and when the analysis employs a weaker definition of democracy. Finally, the simulation enables a precise identification of the point within the 1816–1992 temporal domain when the democratic peace moved from an apparent statistical artifact to significant phenomenon.     

Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainable peace in post-civil war states. Yet studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitality may be due to the fact that post-civil war environments are contentious. After a civil war, the former protagonists fear for their security and also want to protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of this study is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebel groups; a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma that would encourage one or both parties to resume armed conflict. Such a balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources. This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of a balance of power between former protagonists and factors that affect its stability. The presence of these factors should affect the decision of former protagonists on whether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if they agree to a transition toward democracy once the civil war ends. Based on this theoretical argument, I have derived empirically testable hypotheses. In the survival analysis performed, I find support for the theoretical arguments. The findings of this study have some policy implications.     

Capitalism,Democracy and the War in Iraq

Although Saddam Hussein was a bloody tyrant, and although deposing him served a noble purpose, one still may doubt the wisdom of the American war against Iraq. It is quite dubious whether the democratisation of Iraq can serve as a justification of the American war effort. Properly understood, the democratic peace proposition does not promise that poor, emerging, and illiberal democracies surrounded by autocracies are more peaceful than autocracies. By itself, the transition towards democracy is quite likely to imply some semi-democratic phase when the country is at risk of civil war. Moreover, the democratic peace proposition says nothing at all about the likelihood of success of democratisation in a poor, oil-rich, Arab and Muslim country where there is little common ground to unite the democracy-imposing occupier and the defeated country. Finally, defeating the insurgency in the Sunni triangle of Iraq might require means which a democracy cannot even wish to apply. Whereas the promotion of democracy by war looks like a dead end and is doomed to failure, the prospects of promoting peace by exporting capitalism, growth, and prosperity look much better. Such a strategy even serves the purpose of later democratisation of those countries that now accept only creeping capitalism.     

The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.     

Eyes wide shut: persistent conflict and liberal peace-building in Nepal and Sri Lanka

The decisive, albeit different, endings of armed conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal and subsequent post-war developments challenge key assumptions about conflict that have informed post-Cold War international efforts to produce peace in such conflict zones. International intervention—including in Sri Lanka and Nepal—characterises armed conflict as sustained by specific political economies that can only be stably resolved by establishing liberal democracy and market economics. This paper examines liberal peace engagement in Sri Lanka and Nepal to challenge a crucial assumption of the persistent conflict thesis, namely the separation between political contestation and armed conflict. It argues that the divergent post-conflict outcomes of continuing ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka and constitutional reform in Nepal reveal strong continuities in the dynamics of pre-war, war and post-war politics. This continuity challenges the presumed separation of politics and violence that drove international engagement to produce liberal peace and suggests that such engagement, far from encouraging reform, may have (inadvertently) sustained conflict in both cases.     

Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?

ABSTRACT

Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.     

Beyond Dyads: Regional Democratic Strength’s Influence on Dyadic Conflict

Over the history of modern international relations research, we have moved from systemic and regional studies to empirical explorations of dyadic interactions. However, our statistical models have put the details of dyadic interactions under a microscope at the expense of ignoring the relevant regional context that these dyads interact in. This development has been in part due to computational limitations, but do we really believe that decision makers interact with one another while ignoring the regional power balance and the wishes of regional powers? In this article, I take a look at the well-researched relationship between democracy and peace by using a multilevel approach to dyadic interactions and the regions they are embedded in. The findings suggest that when the regional power balance favors democracies, it influences conflict between dyads, especially mixed dyads, by increasing the costs of aggression by autocracies and establishing regional norms of cooperation and compromise.     

Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons

The viability of the thesis that liberalization and democracy foster peace, security and development is at stake. The main critique is that more liberties and elections lead to more conflict and abuses of power. There are three principal responses to this critique. The liberal argument calls for improving the democratic institutions; the institutions first thesis prioritizes strengthening the rule of law and state capacity over democracy; whilst the transformation argument proposes using fledgling democracy to foster gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards more substantial democracy. This article analyses the relevance of these theses to the remarkable dynamics of peace-building in Aceh, from the introduction of Indonesian democracy in 1998, the impact of the tsunami in 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 to the general elections in 2009. The study concludes that the liberal argument is congruous with the democratic opportunities for peace, while the institutions first and the transformation arguments give prominence to the dynamics that made peace-building possible but also difficult. While the institutions first argument responds to these difficulties by resorting to power sharing, the transformation thesis proposes more citizen participation coupled with interest and issue group representation.     

Editors' Note

Examining the relationship between regime type and defense effort provides evidence for reformulating theories of democratic peace. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has substantively and statistically significant effects. In times of peace, democracies bear lower defense burdens than other states and keep proportionately fewer soldiers under arms. During times of war, however, democracies try harder and exert greater defense effort than non-democracies. Contrary to the results of some recent studies, all other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy appears to out-gun its opponents when it counts. Examining three components of democracy separately indicates that a largely overlooked factor, political competition, tends to drive these outcomes. Executive constraints are also associated with increased defense effort during war. But there is little evidence that wide participation or large winning coalitions have the predicted effects on defense effort. The results point to the flexible quality of defense effort in democracies, which is theoretically and empirically accounted for by the competitive political environment rather than institutional factors favored by existing theories.     

“Democracy as Civilisation”

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy has come to embody the very idea of legitimate statehood in international politics. It has done so largely through defining a new standard of civilisation, in which “democraticness” determines the limits of international society and helps to construct relations with non-democracies “beyond the pale”. Like the “classical” standard, this new version again reflects a considerable interest in the socio-political organisation of states. Central in this shift back to a more “anti-pluralist” international society has been the democratic peace thesis, which emphasises how the internal (democratic) characteristics of states influence their external behaviour. Against more optimistic interpretations, it is argued that the democratic peace is a distinctly Janus-faced creature: promoting peace between democracies, while potentially encouraging war against non-democratic others. Within the democratic peace, non-democracies become not just behaviourally threatening but also ontologically threatening. Non-democracies are a danger because of what they are (or are not). In sum, the argument presented is that democracy, positioned as the most legitimate form of domestic governance in international society, has become caught up and used in global structures of domination, hierarchy and violence. Thus, the role of “democracy” in international politics is much more complicated, and, at least in its current guise, less progressive than often portrayed.     

State Capacity,Regime Type,and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War

About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure.