The Role of the Peruvian Guerrilla in Che Guevara's Continental Guerrilla Project

The Peruvian guerrillas of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) played a key role in Che Guevara's continental guerrilla project. When Guevara left from Africa, his idea was to strengthen this organisation that was supposedly fighting in the department of Ayacucho. After the defeat of this guerrilla in 1965 he turned his eye on Bolivia. The Peruvian guerrillas of the ELN maintained their importance in Guevara's project as evidenced by their attempts to build a guerrilla force nearby the border of Bolivia. This article sheds light on the role of the Peruvian ELN in Che Guevara's continental guerrilla project.     

The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade Revisited: The Teaching of Literacy as a Nation–Building Project

This article draws on the ideas of Anderson (1991) in discussing the role played by the National Literacy Crusade of 1980 in imagining the Nicaraguan nation. As the article demonstrates, the National Literacy Crusade had the potential to create a sense of communion with a mass of anonymous others that is, according to Anderson, the hallmark of modern nations. At the same time, it was also a project that sought to foster a particular national identity centred around the anti–imperialist and socialist nationalism of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.     

Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?

The World Islamic Conference, held in Jerusalem in 1931 under the auspices of Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim Council, marked a turning point in the Palestinian nationalist struggle as well as in the struggle between the two main factions—the more extremist one led by Hajj Amin and the more moderate Opposition—for control of the Palestinian leadership. The Conference, though co-sponsored by Shawkat ‘Ali and the Muslim Indian Congress, and ostensibly representative of the worldwide community of Muslims, was effectively dominated by Hajj Amin and his Palestinian supporters. Through his control of its proceedings, Hajj Amin was able to redefine the Palestinian nationalist cause as essentially a pan-Islamic one, in connection with the perceived need to defend the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem against Zionist encroachment. Contrasted here with the World Islamic Conference (and held concurrently with it) is the Second Arab Orthodox Congress. Whereas the World Islamic Conference sought to redefine an issue arguably specific to Palestine as pan-Islamic, the local Christian Orthodox community, in keeping with its desire to Arabise Palestine's Greek Orthodox Church (hence their self-designation as the Arab Orthodox Church in Palestine), sought to redefine what was essentially a religious matter—concerning the succession of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem—in nationalist terms. It was not simply a matter of differing ideological perspectives; defining the cause of the Haram al-Sharif as a pan-Islamic one also served a political objective, namely the enhancement of Hajj Amin's position vis-à-vis his political rivals. Nonetheless, whatever the motivations involved, this development was a factor in the marginalisation of the Christian Arab component of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Whereas at the start of the British Mandate they had played a role disproportionately large relative to their actual numbers, by its end, their role in the nationalist movement had diminished almost to the point of near inconsequence, as evidenced, for instance, by their marginal involvement in the Arab Revolt (1936–1939).     

The weaknesses of Vietnamization

Abstract

Much stress has been put on the fact that the United States has been able to increase Saigon’s various armed forces to over 5 million men, armed with the most modern and destructive weapons. From such statistics, most Vietnam-watchers assume that the United States and the Thieu regime have been able to “extend” their control into the country-side simply through the sheer numbers of their forces and that the National Liberation Front’s “base” has naturally contracted as a result.     

A Footnote to East African History

This article is by a District Officer in Uganda, seconded duringthe War to administration in Somalia. He regards the entry asinteresting because it does not appear in Sir Reginald Coupland'sstandard East Africa and its Invaders.     

SPLM–NCP asymmetrical power relations jeopardise the implementation of the CPA and the future of the Sudan

ABSTRACT

The political instability that has characterised Sudanese politics since independence is attributable to political exclusion, economic neglect and marginalisation. Discrimination based on religion, language and culture has constituted the main contradictions between the masses of the Sudanese people (periphery) and the politically dominant Arabised Nubians (centre) in all the different politico-ideological hues experienced by the nation. Attempts to resolve this contradiction have left the structural imbalances inherited from the colonial administration of the Sudan intact. This explains the resurgence of war, particularly in Southern Sudan. The recent peace agreements between the National Congress Party (NCP), namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) (Minawi); the Cairo Agreement with the National Democratic Alliance and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement with the Eastern Sudan Front, have left the NCP still in firm control of the oppressive state machinery. The CPA power-sharing protocol awarded the NCP a majority which institutionalises a power asymmetry that the NCP utilises to obstruct implementation of the CPA and delay the process of democratic transformation.

This article analyses the asymmetry in the NCP–SPLM partnership and power relationship. It assumes that the tragic death of Dr. John Garang de Mabior is a major cause of the political weakness demonstrated by the SPLM since 2005. This power imbalance jeopardises the CPA implementation and the future of the Sudan as a state.     

The regional outcome of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement five years down the road: Are external forces playing a progressive role?

ABSTRACT

The Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 is the outcome of regional and international mediation led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)1 and the IGAD Partners’ Forum broadened to include the United States of America, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and the United Nations. Five years into its implementation the peace agreement appears to have transformed the war between North and South Sudan into a series of engagements of conflicting nature. Numerous contradictory actions by both the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) (the main political forces behind the CPA) have been noted during the ongoing implementation process (Grawert forthcoming 2010; Grawert and El-Battahani 2005; Wassara 2008). Although internal Sudanese forces are the key actors in implementing the CPA, external forces are critical in providing the support and pressure needed for a complete realisation of the peace deal. The New Regionalism Approach (NRA), as advanced by Grant and Soderbäum (2003), is instrumental in understanding this dynamic. This article is based on the result of a study that seeks to examine why positive engagements of external forces are needed for a timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.     

Correction

A thorough-going protest has been made to the Uganda referencesin April (pp. 101–2) but on inquiry they boil down toan inadequate summary of the Kingdon report, which is acknowledgedwith regret. In the July number, the same correspondent pointsout that it is not the Police that has been expanded but thePolice Service Unit; while the special restriction on assemblyis limited to certain gazetted areas, at present 4 gombololasin Kyadondo County. Another mistake, pointed out by H. B. Thomas,is a reference on p. 283 to 5000 square miles being alienated,instead of 500. I have also been asked to say that the Rev.Michael Scott's passport has not been cancelled; the referencehere (p. 200) was based on a report of Dr. DQnges statementon the 27th April: "The question arose as to how the Governmentcould prevent the abuse of a cancelled passport as in the caseof the Rev. Michael Scott, who, when asked to hand in his passport,slipped over the border and took a plane from Rhodesia". Forhis part, Mr. E. B. Kirkman has complained of a reference toa transit welfare centre for miners in the Northern Gold Coast(p. 189). Although this was based on a statement by the Chairmanof a Mining Company, the opportunity is gladly taken of imputingno Macchiavellian intentions to the men who planned and builtthe centre.      

Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area

Recent decades have seen an escalation in interethnic resourceconflicts and banditry among pastoralists in the Kenya-Ugandaborder region, fuelled by a growing number of small arms. Statemanagement has been largely unsuccessful and often counterproductivein reducing numbers of small arms. The creation of paramilitaryinstitutions in rural Kenya and Uganda are an example of howlegal arms are entering communities and intensifying the conflictsfurther. Understanding the sources and mechanisms of arms acquisitionis a significant step in curbing the violence. The main sourcesand routes, and the current costs of arms and ammunition areprovided. More important however is to appreciate the complexreasons behind the demand for small arms. Relationships withstates, alienation of pastoral land, cultural issues and questionsof livelihood are all examined, using empirical evidence collectedby the author between 2001 and 2005. ^1. Interview with Rev. John Lodinyo, pastor of Baptist Church,Kiwawa, 31 May 2001. The officer-in-charge of the police notedthat the number of Pokot looking for pasture had increased becauseof the dry spell in the district at the time. ^2. Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, ‘Pastoral politicsin the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK47 as change agent’,Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3 (2000), pp. 407–30;Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL), ‘TheKarimojong response to disarmament: six months later’,(Unpublished report, ADOL/Pax Christi, Netherlands and Kampala,2002); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and SmallArms: The Kenya–Uganda border region’ (Consultancyfor Saferworld, London, 2003). ^3. Interview with former resident district commissioner in Kotido,2 February 2003. ^4. Interviews with victims of small arms injuries including a 15-year-oldvictim in Kanwata, Karamoja, 2001–4. ^5. How the figure is arrived at is unclear: see ‘Disarm them’East African Standard <http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news_s.php?articleid=28071>(30 August 2005). ^6. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBO), ‘National Populationand Housing Census’, (Government report, Kampala, 2003). ^7. For details, see David Anderson, ‘Stock theft and moraleconomy in colonial Kenya’, Africa 56, 4 (1986), pp. 399–416;Richard Hogg ‘The new pastoralism: poverty and dependencein northern Kenya’, Africa 56, 3 (1986), pp. 319–32;Kennedy Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Armsin the North Rift, Northeast Africa (University of Bradford,Unpublished PhD thesis, 2005); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘PastoralistConflict in the Horn of Africa’ [Consultancy for AfricanPeace Forum (APFO)/Saferworld/University of Bradford, 2001];Derrick Belshaw and Joshua Malinga, ‘The Kalashnikov economiesof the Eastern Sahel: cumulative or cyclical differentiationbetween nomadic pastoralists’ (Unpublished report, DevelopmentStudies Association, South Bank University of East Anglia, 1999);Suzette Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable: cattle raidingamong the Kuria’ in G. Aijmer and J. Abbink (eds), Meaningsof Violence: A cross-cultural perspective (Berg, Oxford, 2000),pp. 101–21. Bruno Novelli, ‘Karimojong TraditionalReligion’ (Comboni Missionaries, Kampala, 1999); AugustoPazzaglia, The Karimojong: Some aspects (Camboni Missionaries,Bologna, 1982). ^8. Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Armed Pastoralist Conflicts and PeaceBuilding in Karamoja: The Role of Gender’ [Consultancyfor Netherlands Development Agency (SNV), Kampala, 2005]. ^9. Interviews in Karamoja, various sources, 2001–4. ^10. ‘50,000 guns in wrong hands, says Michuki’ DailyNation <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category-id=1&newsid=56059>(29 August 2005). ^11. Belshaw and Malinga ‘The Kalashnikov economies’. ^12. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Anderson,‘Stock theft’; Natalie Gomez and Kennedy Mkutu,‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building capacity fordevelopment in Karamoja, Uganda’ (Consultancy for SNV/PaxChristi, Kampala, 2004); Mkutu, Armed Pastoralist Conflict .. . the Role of Gender; Ton Dietz, Pastoralists in dire straits:survival strategies and external interventions in a semi aridregion at the Kenya/Uganda border: Western Pokot, 1900–1986(Instituut Voor Sociale Geografie, University of Amsterdam,Amsterdam, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1987); National Council ofChurches of Kenya/SNV/Semi-arid Rural Development Project (SARDEP)‘Pacifying the valley: an analysis of the Kerio valleyconflict’, (Report NCCK/SNV/SARDEP, Nairobi, 2001). ^13. Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable’; Michael Fleisher,‘Cattle raiding and household demography among the Kuriaof Tanzania’ Africa 69, 2 (1999), pp. 238–55. ^14. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms. ^15. John Sislin, John Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka, and Jeffrey Weigand,‘Patterns in arms acquisitions by ethnic groups in conflict’,Security Dialogue, 29, 4 (1998), pp. 393–408. ^16. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Mkutu,‘Armed Pastoralist Conflict’. ^17. For example, the first time I interviewed the Honorable DavidPulkol, the former external security officer for Uganda in 2001,he was on a campaign trail. ^18. Kotido, Panyangara, Nakapelimoru, Kachire, Moroto, Loputuku,Lokitelekapes, Lokitelebu, Kalapata, Losilang, Kanwat Iriri,Namalu, Kangole, Nakiloro, Amudat, Karita, Kotido, Rupa, Musasiaand Kampala in Uganda and Kapenguria, Kachiliba, Alale, Nauypong,Kiwawa and Kunyao in Kenya. ^19. KIA is the senior institution for training upper level policymakers in Kenya. I worked there from 1997 to 2005 (colleaguesadministered the questionnaire whilst I was on sabbatical). ^20. This consisted of officers based in finance, home affairs, transport,the judiciary and foreign affairs. ^21. Communications with Philip Gulliver, Ton Dietz, Michael Bollig,Ben Knighton and John Lamphear. ^22. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^23. Kenya National Archive, Turkana history, Turkana political records,miscellaneous, 1921–45 TURK 159, DC/TURK3/1, p. 90. ^24. Awoundo Odegi, Life in the Balance: Ecological sociology ofTurkana nomads (ACTS, Nairobi, 1990); James Barber, ImperialFrontier (East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968), pp.91–106; Augusto Pazzaglia, The Karimojong. ^25. Barber, Imperial Frontier. ^26. Interview with Ael Ark Lodou, Member of Parliament for Dodothin Moroto, Uganda, 12 November 2004. ^27. Interview with James Chere, former raider and Chief of Rupain Moroto, 3 January 2003 and October 2004. ^28. Samuel Makinda, ‘Conflict and superpower in the Horn ofAfrica’, Third World Quarterly, 4, 1 (1982), pp. 93–103;For analysis of countries supplying arms to the Horn of Africaduring the cold war, see also Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for theHorn: U.S. security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953–1991(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991). ^29. Interviews with eyewitnesses and others in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^30. Interviews in Panyangara, Kotido, Moroto and Namalu, 2001–4. ^31. Charles Ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in Northern Uganda: thechanging significance of cattle raids’, (Report, Centrefor Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^32. Interviews 2001–4. I did meet some young men who had foughtin DRC but were now jobless and originated from the Karimojongarea. ^33. Ibid. ^34. Jan Cappon, ‘Why do communities want arms? Controllingthe demand for small arms, the search for strategies in theHorn of Africa and in the Balkans’, (Report, The Hague/PaxChristi, Netherlands, 2003). There is increasing evidence ofracketeers, but more work needs to be done on this secretivearea. Some evidence exists in Kennedy Mkutu, Guns and Governance:Pastoralist conflict and small arms in the North Rift (JamesCurrey, Oxford, forthcoming). ^35. National Assembly of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary SelectCommittee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and OtherParts of Kenya, (National Assembly, Nairobi, Government Press,1992). ^36. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. ^37. The term vigilante here refers to a self-appointed body of citizensorganized to maintain order in their local community. For moreon vigilantes, see Les Johnston, ‘What is vigilantism?’British Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (1996), pp. 220–36.For the metamorphosis of vigilante in Karamoja region and itscurrent status, see Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance andSmall Arms. ^38. Interviews with Father John Bosco in Amudat, and others, 2001–4. ^39. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^40. Interviews in Karamoja, November 2004. By the end of 1995, theUgandan government was spending over 60 million UgSh per monthto pay vigilante in Karamoja alone. See ‘Government spendsSh.60m on Karamoja vigilantes’, Daily Monitor, 9 October1995. ^41. Gomes and Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’. ^42. Interview, name withheld, in Kampala, 17 May 2003. ^43. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^44. Interview with resident district commissioner, name withheld,in Karamoja, 2004. ^45. Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms (chapter4). ^46. The Monitor, 22 March 2000. ^47. Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) and Organisationof African Unity (OAU) pastoral community harmonization meetingheld at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale, Uganda, May 2001. ^48. These were recognized by their language especially in Bokora:interviews in Lotome, November 2004. ^49. For more on the disarmaments, see Mkutu, ‘Guns and Governance’;Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist conflict and small arms: thechallenges of small arms and insecurity and attempts at managementin Karamoja, Uganda’ (Paper presented at the NortheastAfrica Seminar, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology,University of Oxford, 30 January 2004); From 2004 to January2006, 1,068 arms have been recovered forcibly and voluntarilyin the four districts of Karamoja. See Daily Monitor, 9 January2006. ^50. Confirmed by interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^51. Interviews in kraals in Karamoja, 2003–4. ^52. ‘Protests as state disarms homeguards over clashes’,Daily Nation, 29 November 2004; ‘Police reserves werea threat to security’, Kenya Times, 21 April 2004; ‘KenyaPolice reserve force is disbanded,’ Daily Nation, 10 April2004. ^53. Interview with UPDF soldier in Namalu, 28 January 2003. ^54. Interviews in Namalu, January 2004. The author personally visitedthe kraal where the animals were raided and witnessed the gravesof the children who had been killed in the crossfire. ^55. Interview with Amudat hospital personnel, January 2003; interviewswith several members of the Karimojong and Upe Pokot communityconcurred in 2004. ^56. Interview with Roman Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld,Karamoja 2004. ^57. Interviews with elders in Alale, Kenya, August 2002, and visitto the scene. This was not reported in any press. ^58. Interview with karachunas in Kangole, July 2001; interviewsin Musasia, Nakaplimoru and Pangayangara in September–November,2004, confirmed this. ^59. Interview with elder Koritantoyo in Nakiliro, 2 February 2003. ^60. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^61. Interviews in Karamoja, Uganda and in West Pokot, Kenya, 2001–4,and phone and e-mail communications, 2005. In Namalu and Kangolein Karamoja, warriors could be seen chewing miraa (Khat). ^62. Interview with a SPLA soldier, name withheld, Moroto, 20 June2001. ^63. Ibid. ^64. Interview with James Chere, former raider and now chief of Rupain Rupa, 2003 and 2004. ^65. ADOL ‘Arms trafficking in the border regions of Sudan,Uganda and Kenya’ (Unpublished report ADOL, Kampala, 2001),pp. 202–10. ^66. Interview with elder in Moroto, 20 June 2001. ^67. In the field in October 2004, reliable sources in Karamoja indicatedthat Kony was spotted in Lira. Interviews in Kotido with variouspeople, including Local Council Fives, and in Kanawat, February2003, also confirmed Kony as a source of weapons to pastoralists. ^68. Interviews in Losilang and Kachile, Jie, October–November2004. ^69. Interviews with Somali businessmen who own mines in Karamoja,2003–4; interviews in Moroto, Nikloro and Namalu and visitsto mining areas. ^70. Interviews in Namalu and Mbale, name withheld, 20 June 2001. ^71. Observed in Namalu and Kangole in Uganda and in Alale in Kenya. ^72. Sandra Gray, ‘A memory of loss: ecological politics, localhistory, and the evolution of Karimojong violence’, HumanOrganization 59, 4 (2000), pp. 401–18. ^73. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, p.11. ^74. Father Joachim Omolo Ouko, ‘Clearly famine caught govtnapping’, Kenya Times, 5 January 2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/05jan06/editorials/comm1.html>(5 January 2006). ^75. Interviews in Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Nikoloro and observation,2003. ^76. Riamiriam, ‘The policy advocacy role of Civil SocietyOrganizations (CSOs) in Karamoja: The challenges and successes’(Unpublished report, Riamiriam, Moroto, 2005). ^77. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, pp.17–18; for numbers of cows paid for brides, see Mkutu,‘Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms’,p. 167; ADOL, ‘Karamoja response to disarmament’. ^78. Interview with Peter Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja, in Kampala,January 2003. ^79. Interview with Father John Bosco who is a victim of a gunshotin the knee, St Joseph’s Mission, Amudat, 28 January 2004. ^80. Interviews in Karamoja and West Pokot in Kenya, 2001–4. ^81. Interviews, visits and observations. ^82. West Pokot was formerly known as West Suk. ^83. KNA, District Commissioner West Suk, Annual Report, 1945, pp.2–3. ^84. Interviews and observations, 2001–4. ^85. Ben Knighton, ‘The state as raider among the Karimojong:where there are no guns they use the threat of guns’,Africa 73, 203 (2003), pp. 427–55. ^86. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 443–46;‘Residents plead for army bases at border’, DailyNation, 7 June 2002 <http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/today/News/News11.html>(7 June 2002); the government of Kenya was accused of killingresidents under the guise of ‘security operations’.Other examples include the Wagalla, Malkamari and Garissa massacres,where thousands of people were killed and property worth millionsdestroyed. ^87. See ‘Leaders foiling guns surrender plan, says DC’,Daily Nation, 19 September 2004 <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=57473>(20 September 2004). The DC noted that, of the 2,600 arms surrendered,the majority were defective, and some residents were still withholdingthose in good condition. ^88. Ben Okudi, ‘Causes and effects of the 1980 famine in Karamoja’(Report, Center for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^89. Interviews and phone communications Karimojong, NGOs and governmentofficials in Karamoja, 2004–6; Office of the Prime Minister(OPM), ‘Karamoja integrated disarmament and developmentprogrammes: creating conditions for promoting human securityand recovery in Karamoja, 2005–2008’ (Governmentreport, Kampala, June 2005). ^90. Interviews with warriors in Panyangara, Kanawat and Kotido inKaramoja, February 2003 and November 2004. ^91. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 426–55. ^92. Not all the UPDF are raiders, in my experience in the fieldsince 2000, I found a lot of them to be very helpful; the conditionsin which they operate need to be considered. ^93. Interviews in Panyangara, Kacheri, Kotido, Musisia, Loputukand Moroto, November 2004. ^94. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^95. Interviews with warriors and others, Nakapelimoru and Panyangara,August 2005. ^96. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^97. Interview with warriors in Panyangara airstrip, 7 October 2004;interviews with Lotirir mothers’ group and women in Rupanear Moroto, September 2004. ^98. Interviews in Karamoja, September–November 2004. ^99. Interviews with young Ekwete brew sellers in Jie County andLoputuk, September–October 2004. ^100. Interviews in Kanawat and Kotido, February 2003, and in Losilangand Kachire, November 2004. In some places, there is no governmentadministration. ^101. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^102. Interview with Pastor Samuel Kotiyot, Amudat, 31 May 2001. ^103. Interviews in Kachire, Panyangara and Kanawat, November 2004.Kotido also came up with the same figures. ^104. Interview with reformed raider in Kanawat, 2004. ^105. Interview with Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld, 19June 2001 and January 2003. ^106. Interviews in Kotido town, November 2004. ^107. Interview, name withheld, in Alale, 2006. ^108. See Standard Team, ‘Minister: Sh28b needed to fight famine’,Sunday Standard, 8 January 2006; See also John Korir, ‘60billion livestock threatened’, Kenya Times, 4 January2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/04jan06/business/buns7.html>(4 January 2006).     

A note on Beheiren

Abstract

It might be useful for Concerned Asian Scholars to be aware of what is probably the most active independent peace group in Japan — a country of peace groups. Like National Mobilization in this country, which it resembles in style and outlook, Beheiren (Japan “Peace for Vietnam!” Committee) emerged as a direct response to the American bombing of North Vietnam. Since its foundation on April 24, 1965, it has remained the only major group in Japan to focus its main energies on opposing the Vietnam War. This has meant publications (books, articles, newsletters — mostly in Japanese, but two fine booklets of translations of an Asahi series: Vietnam — A Voice from the Villages and The National Liberation Front by Honda Katsuichi), demonstrations, teachins, emissaries to Vietnam, international gatherings in Japan (among its guests have been David Dellinger, Ralph Featherstone, Jean-Paul Sartre, Howard Zinn, Joan Baez), anti-war ads in American newspapers, medicine to Hanoi, and, attracting the most international attention, assistance to American military men in Japan desiring to desert.     

Unity and Disunity in the FMLN

Problems of unity can affect an armed opposition group at many stages of its existence—during the war, in peace negotiations, and in its transition to political party. This article assesses how internal divisions affected the performance of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. It finds that while the FMLN suffered significant internal divisions in the early years of the war, it remained remarkably unified from 1983 on. Significant divisions began to appear during the later war years but were not exacerbated until after the war's conclusion, when repeated fracturing occurred. The FMLN began to present itself as a programmatically coherent party only in 2005, and this ideological homogeneity allowed it to establish a series of partnerships with moderate, non‐revolutionary sectors of Salvadoran society and to achieve victory in the 2009 presidential elections.     

Justice for survivors of sexual violence in Kitgum,Uganda

Based on fieldwork in the Kitgum district of northern Uganda, this paper investigates the experience of justice for the large number of survivors, female and male, of sexual violence as a result of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency and its aftermath. It asks: what justice do survivors of sexual violence want; what access to justice do survivors of LRA sexual violence have; what access to justice do the survivors of current sexual violence have; and what are the problems faced with delivering justice. It finds that the response has been minimal, ineffective and inappropriate. It concludes that the neglect of justice has serious implications for the attitudes on Acholi people towards the current Uganda government, for it perpetuates the perceived sense of marginalisation felt by many Acholi and which was a contributor to the LRA rebellion.     

The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America

After the third wave of democratization swept much of the world during the late twentieth century, many armed opposition groups disarmed and transformed themselves into political parties. This paper explores the electoral performance of four Central American parties that have roots in armed opposition movements. It finds that the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, which achieved the greatest success during their revolutionary periods, have also had the most success in electoral competition. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit and the Democratic Unification Party of Honduras, which trace their roots to relatively less successful armed opposition groups, have struggled in elections. Organizational factors, especially the number of combatants and popular support during the conflict, tend to provide a better explanation than institutional factors for the initial success of these groups as political parties.     

Correction

A number of errors from the last number have come to light.On p. 280, 1. Io, the site of the new Uganda land project cannotbe North-west of Lake Albert if it is to be in Bunyoro. theSources on p. 329 require a certain modification. For AfricanMorning Post, one should read Gold Coast Observer. For Bulletinde l'nstitud Centrafricain, Bulletin de l'Institut des ÉtudesAfricaines, for Congo Ocersee, Kongo Oversee. One should alsoadd the useful Books for Africa to the list for Britain andl'Egypte Contemporain for Egypt. It is also necessary to pointout thatmanysources found useful in the past have for one reasonor another, ceased to flow and cannot always be recalled evenby an act of memory. On p. 341, on the last line of the reviewby J. A. Barnes, external should read eternal. The principalcovey of errors comes however in a paragraph on the top of p.347. The title of the German book is Mythe, Mensch und Umwelt,it is published in Bamberg, one writer is Harald von Sicard,the Nyama beliefs are West African, nor can they be strictlycalled a cult. On p. 384, the reference to the Belgian guiderather misses the point when spelt with two l's. It should readTracelers, as it does in American English.      

The National Liberation Front and the transformation of Vietnamese society

Abstract

Like vultures swarming over a dying carcass, American establishment intellectuals have been swift to dissect the agonizing war in Vietnam. Yet poring through the massive scholarly, journalistic and official works heralding American attempts to crush the Vietnamese resistance, one is struck by the void of information concerning the National Liberation Front. The enemy remains almost as elusive in the literature as in the swamps of Vietnam. After more than a decade of fighting, the NLF is virtually as ‘faceless,’ unknown, unfathomable as ever to the American people. Indeed a careful search reveals not a single significant scholarly work on the subject. In the absence of independent scholarship, the officially sanctioned work of Douglas Pike, an officer of the United States Information Service with long tenure in Vietnam, has gone virtually unchallenged. Consider Pike's conclusions about the NFL:     

THE CENTRALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM

South Africa's first democratic election of 1994 provided thebasis for the African National Congress (ANC) to replace theformerly ruling National Party (NP) as the country's dominantparty. The new dominance was initially established by the ANC'smajority position within the postelection coalition Governmentof National Unity. Since the election, however, the ANC's dominancehas begun to be extended by a centralization of control exercisedthrough the machinery of state, notably through four processes:the rewriting of the transitional interim constitution and thepromulgation of a new constitution which, inter alia, abolishesthe necessity for coalition government after the next election;the attempted containment of autonomy of the ANC's structureswhich have been established at the level of the new provinces;the exercise of party discipline within parliament and somecurtailment of the government's accountability to parliament;and, fourthly, the imposition of administrative and financialdiscipline upon the provinces. These processes have taken placewithin a context of a fragmentation and fissure of Oppositionparty forces, which in the immediate future will only furtherenhance the ANC's dominance, despite some indication that thatparty is itself faced by a declining level of popular support.     

From rebels to politicians: Explaining the transformation of the RCD-Goma and the MLC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

This article analyses the transformation of two former Congolese rebel groups, namely the Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (RCD-Goma) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), into political parties following the conclusion of the Second Congo War (1998–2003) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is argued that three sets of factors influenced the process of the political transformation of the RCD-Goma and the MLC. These factors related to the stabilisation process that unfolded in the country starting with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the make-up and the behaviour of the rebel groups involved as well as changes in international politics, especially the advent of the Bush administration to power in the United States in January 2001, which led to increased international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to desist from interfering in Congolese internal affairs and the strengthening of the United Nations' peace efforts in the DRC.     

From rural rebellions to urban riots: political competition and changing patterns of violent political revolt in Uganda

Violent political revolt has been common in independent Uganda. For a long time, such revolts were exclusively expressed as rural-based rebel groups fighting the government. Since the mid-2000s, however, this seems to have come to an end. Instead, urban riots, very rare in the past, have become much more common. This article analyses these changing patterns of types and location of violent political revolt in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement government. It argues that the earlier prevalence of rural rebellions can be explained by the combination of a coercive and militarised state, and weak and ethnically factionalised political forces who took their violent resistance to rural regional bases. Over time, however, government counter-insurgency became more effective and the conditions for insurgency were undermined by withdrawal of external support. Furthermore, the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 2005 opened up new avenues for political expression. The changes to the political system were, however, more nominal than real in many respects. While the rebel option had become less attractive and feasible, a series of social, economic and political grievances remained which were only partly channelled through party politics. They also found expression through sporadic urban violent revolt.     

Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi

International migration from Malawi has changed profoundly sincecentrally organized mine migration to South Africa ended inthe 1980s. Contemporary movements are more diverse and lesstied to labour, as informal trade has developed alongside. Thisarticle replaces a common ‘productivist’ perspectiveon migration with a decentralized approach, using ethnographicobservation and anthropological case studies to understand interrelatedflows of people and goods. It shows how in an emergent informalmarket for South African goods in Mzimba, Malawi, price informationdoes not structure trade practices. Historical continuitiesin the socio-cultural organization of illegal migration, ratherthan liberalized market forces, shape this economic configuration,including price formation. The research for this article was financed by the NetherlandsFoundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).Data were collected in Mzimba district, Lilongwe, Blantyre (Malawi),and Johannesburg (South Africa) in the period from April 2004to March 2005. ^1. Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and dependence in BlackAfrica: historical origin’, Journal of Peace Research9, 2 (1972), pp. 106, 115. ^2. David A. McDonald, Lephophotho Mashike, and Celia Golden, ‘Thelives and times of African migrants and immigrants in post-apartheidSouth Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.), On Borders:Perspectives on international migration in southern Africa (St.Martin’s Press, New York, 2000), pp. 168–95. ^3. In the 1990s, migration to South Africa has expanded enormously,and alongside it, regional trade. See Jonathan Crush and DavidA. McDonald, ‘Transnationalism, African immigration, andnew migrant spaces in South Africa: an introduction’,Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, 1 (2000), p. 2. Theincrease in regional trade is difficult to quantify as muchof this trade is informal in nature and does not appear in officialfigures. ^4. See, among others, Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman,South Africa’s Labor Empire: A history of black migrancyto the gold mines (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991). ^5. Dunbar Moodie, Going for Gold: Men, mines, and migration (Universityof California Press, Berkeley, 1994). ^6. Harold Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in SouthAfrica: from segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society1, 4 (1972), p. 433. ^7. For an example of this phenomenon in another context, see JensA. Andersson, ‘Administrators’ knowledge and statecontrol in colonial Zimbabwe: the invention of the rural–urbandivide in Buhera district, 1912–80’, Journal ofAfrican History 43, 1 (2002), pp. 119–43. ^8. See the numerous interesting studies published by the SouthernAfrican Migration Project (URL: http://www.queensu.ca/samp). ^9. Hopes for a re-opening of TEBA remained alive, though, and werefed by election promises in Malawi’s first multipartyelections in 1994. See among others ‘More light on TEBA;not in UDF manifesto’, Malawi News, 5–11 November1994, p. 4. See also Wiseman C. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi governmentand South African labour recruiters, 1974–92’, Journalof Modern African Studies 34, 4 (1996) pp. 623–42; WisemanC. Chirwa, ‘ "No TEBA. . . forget TEBA": the plight ofMalawian ex-migrant workers to South Africa, 1988–1994’,International Migration Review 31, 3 (1997), pp. 628–54. ^10. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi government’, p. 627; JonathanCrush, ‘Migrations past: an historical overview of cross-bordermovement in southern Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.),On Borders, p. 15. Labour recruiting agencies competing forlabour in (colonial) Malawi were the Witwatersrand Native LabourAssociation (WNLA), and the (Southern) Rhodesian Native LabourBureau (RNLB). The agencies were later renamed as The EmploymentBureau of Africa (TEBA) and the Rhodesian Native Labour SupplyCommission, respectively. ^11. F.E. Sanderson, ‘The development of labour migration fromNyasaland, 1891–1914’, Journal of African History2, 2 (1961), pp. 259–71; G. Coleman, ‘Internationallabour migration from Malawi, 1875–1966’, Journalof Social Science (University of Malawi) 2 (1972), pp. 31–46;Robert B. Boeder, Malawians abroad: The history of labor emigrationfrom Malawi to its neighbors 1890 to the present (PhD thesis,Michigan State University, Ann Arbor, 1974). ^12. Robert E. Christiansen and Jonathan G. Kydd, ‘The returnof Malawian labour from South Africa and Zimbabwe’, Journalof Modern African Studies 21, 2 (1983), p. 311. ^13. Ibid, p. 324. ^14. J.K. van Donge, ‘Disordering the market: the liberalisationof burley tobacco in Malawi in the 1990s’, Journal ofSouthern African Studies 28, 1 (2002), p. 105. This is not tosay that tobacco production solely relies on migrant labour. ^15. In the period 1977–1998, average annual intercensal growthrates in rural areas were highest in tobacco-producing areassuch as Kasungu District (4.4 percent) in the Central Region,and Traditional Authority (TA) Mpherembe (5.3 percent) in MzimbaDistrict in the Northern Region. Lowest growth rates were concentratedin the poor and densely populated southern districts, such asChiradzulu (1.4), Mulanje (1.6), Phalombe (1.5), and Thyolo(1.7). See Figure 2. ^16. In western Mzimba, and possibly elsewhere in the Northern regionwhere average education levels are higher than in the rest ofMalawi, people look down upon labouring in the low-paid tobaccosector. For figures on education levels, see T. Benson, J. Kaphuka,S. Kanyanda, and R. Chinula, Malawi: An atlas of social statistics(National Statistical Office of Malawi/IFPRI, Zomba/Washington,2002), p. 51. ^17. Bridget O’Laughlin, ‘Missing men? The debate overrural poverty and woman-headed households in Southern Africa’,Journal of Peasant Studies 25, 2 (1998), p. 10. ^18. ‘91 Malawians deported’, The Daily Times, 9 December1994, p. 1. This is not to suggest that the South African governmentdid not deport Malawians before 1994. See Boeder, Malawiansabroad, p. 155, for an example from the 1930s. ^19. Information obtained by the author from the Malawian consulatein Johannesburg, South Africa, March 2005. ^20. Before 1994, transport in Malawi was highly problematic as government-controlledbus services were limited. With liberalization, matola (pick-upsand lorries) greatly improved rural transport, while minibusservices and foreign bus companies facilitated respectivelyrural–urban and international mobility. Exchanging foreigncurrency was equally problematic before liberalization; withouta passport and proof of recent travel, banks could refuse toexchange. ^21. Deanna Swaney, Mary Fitzpatrick, Paul Greenway, Andrew Stone,and Justin Vaisutis, Lonely Planet Southern Africa (Lonely Planetpublications, London, 2003), p. 222. ^22. Zimbabwe’s decreased popularity is also evidenced by thenumerous Zimbabwe-born youths of Malawian descent waiting forthe processing of a Malawian passport at the Department of Immigrationin Blantyre. ^23. The persistence of unequal sex distributions in the extremenorth of the country is a further indication of the popularityof Tanzania as a destination for, especially, male migrants(see Figure 2). ^24. Mzimba’s transport sector thus emerged before economicliberalization. In the 1980s, some South Africans started thebusiness by investing in vehicles and using Mzimba drivers.By the early 1990s, the South Africans had left the businessaltogether and Malawians took their place. ^25. R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire,Vol. II: East-Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 1949),pp. 564–68; Leroy Vail and Landeg White, ‘Tribalismin the political history of Malawi’, in Leroy Vail (ed.),The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (James Currey,London, 1989), pp. 151–92; Leroy Vail, ‘The makingof the "Dead North": a study of the Ngoni rule in northern Malawi,c. 1855–1907’, in J. B. Peires (ed.) Before andafter Shaka: Papers in Nguni history (Institute of Social andEconomic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978), pp.230–67. ^26. John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875–1940(CLAIM, Blantyre, 2000), p. 152. See also Sanderson, ‘Thedevelopment of labour migration’, p. 260. ^27. For instance, figures for the 1930s suggest that fewer Malawianswere working in mining related jobs (recruited through WNLA)than in other sectors of the South African economy, notablydomestic services and industry. See Boeder, Malawians abroad,p. 168. ^28. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004.For an earlier account of Malawian migrants’ travel problems,see E.P. Makambe, ‘The Nyasaland African labour "Ulendo"to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of the "highwaymen," 1903–1923’,African Affairs 79, 317 (1980), pp. 548–66. ^29. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004. ^30. Records of the Employment Service Division of the MGLR suggestthat entering into official labour contracts when already inSouth Africa was common in the early 1970s. The numerous ‘typical’Ngoni, Tumbuka, and Tonga names (such as Jere, Makamo, Kumwenda,Chirwa) appearing on these lists further suggest that, in particular,migrants from northern Malawi were familiar with this procedure.Malawi National Archives, file: 14 ESD/SU/34, Lists of Malawiansentering into contracts of employment, 1969–1975. ^31. The aim of anthropological case studies — also referredto as the ‘case-study method’ — is not topresent representative cases, but to illuminate wider socialpatterns and processes through the study of the particular.Here, the cases are used to illustrate the social processesat work in new social phenomena. See Max Gluckman, ‘Ethnographicdata in British social anthropology’, The SociologicalReview 9 (1961), pp. 5–17. ^32. Malawians advertise their services in daily newspapers or neighbourhoodweeklies, under categories such as ‘domestic workers’or ‘gardeners’. Often they explicitly state theirMalawian origin. ^33. This development seems to be confirmed by population figures(see Figure 2): TA M’Mbelwa in western Mzimba was Malawi’sonly TA where male absenteeism increased in the period 1987–98. ^34. In 2004, all booking-offices in Mzimba district have been closed.Stories of cheating transporters who suddenly disappear withthe money paid in advance have made people more cautious. ^35. The term is seen locally as a reference to the brand name —Caterpillar — of big ground-work machinery used for roadconstruction. ^36. Alongside the market for South African goods thus developedan informal money-transfer market, as illegal immigrants haveno access to South Africa’s banking system. Transporterscarry cash remittances of migrants, while migrant businessmenhave set up more sophisticated money transfer systems, operatingsimilarly to official agencies such as Western Union (whichdoes not operate in South Africa). ^37. Lindela is a repatriation centre near Johannesburg for illegalimmigrants awaiting deportation. See SAHRC, Lindela at the Crossroadsfor Detention and Repatriation: An assessment of the conditionsof detention (South African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg,2000). ^38. For example, an ongoing survey among international bus passengersleaving Lilongwe for Johannesburg indicates that 61 percentof the travellers originating from Mzimba district (n = 294),expects to be accommodated by a relative upon arrival. ^39. Due to lack of uniformity in the products traded, reliable pricecomparisons between the Johannesburg and Mzimba markets aredifficult to make. Common model mobile phones, such as the Nokia3310, are an exception. In 2005, a used Nokia 3310 fetched some300–400 rands in Johannesburg, which amounts to 5,700–7,600Malawian kwacha. In Mzimba, these phones are usually sold for5,000–6,000 kwacha.