Expert network interaction in the European Medicines Agency

The need for supranational regulatory capacity and the drive for governmental control are two colliding forces in international governance. As a solution to this governance dilemma, European administrative networks need to simultaneously fulfill the demand for supranational institutions and maintain governmental control. The assessment of risks associated with medicines authorized on the European market is carried out by such a network of national regulators as part of the European Medicines Agency. To uncover how these double-hatted experts navigate the opportunity structures created by supranational and intergovernmental forces, this study employs social network analysis. Developing exponential random graph models, this study tests to what extent members can act as professional experts in service of the supranational administration and to what extent national features shape interaction. The results indicate that while PRAC members are socialized as professionals in service of supranational deliberation on pharmacovigilance, intergovernmental forces do structure their interactions.     

Runaway Bureaucracy? Exploring the Role of Nordic Regulatory Agencies in the European Union

This article reports a comparative study of the Environmental Regulatory Agencies in Norway, Denmark and Finland. Increasingly and relatively independently these agencies are taking part in transnational networks in the European Union involving the European Commission. An informal penetration, fuelled by faster electronic technology, is taking place between the European Commission and the regulatory agencies, largely outside the control of the domestic politico-administrative leadership. Changes in the character of the states' public administrations serve as an important background for these developments, a distinctive feature being the 'agencification' of the administrative apparatus during the last decades. Due to their relative autonomy, the national regulatory agencies are well placed to work 'double-hatted' in the sense that they interact directly with the European Commission at the same time as they perform traditional tasks as agents of national ministries. This development may challenge the image of integrated administrative apparatus and the notion of transparent and democratic governance.     

Gaining and seeking access: The European adaptation of domestic interest associations

Abstract. The multilevel governance literature on European politics argues that supranational governing arrangements have increased their autonomy vis–à–vis national governments. As private interests increasingly bypass national levels and become active in transnational Euro–level policy networks, national governments are no longer the sole interface between supranational and national levels. In contrast, the European Union might also be conceptualised as a two–level interstate negotiation system, an approach assuming that interests are formed and aggregated at the national level. Societal interests enter the fray of European negotiations via national executives, and private interests bypassing the national level are considered as a rather marginal, even irrelevant, phenomenon. In addition, both accounts expect different outcomes regarding which sorts of private interests – diffuse or specific – seek and gain access to both domestic and European public actors. By analysing the varying network strategies of domestic private actors, in particular interest associations, this article explores some propositions held by these two approaches. After a more comprehensive outline of some hypotheses, evidence collected among public and private actors at both the domestic (Belgian) and European levels will be analysed. In general, the results suggest that Euro–level networks of domestic interests are substantially related to their structural location within the domestic realm, that network strategies tend to be quite bureaucratic and that the sort of interest represented – diffuse or specific – has a considerable effect on gaining and seeking access.     

Mind the (Mobilization) Gap: Comparing Climate Activism in the United States and European Union

The barriers to concerted political action on climate change mitigation are steep, especially in multilevel systems where power is diffused and authority contested. This article seeks to explain how mobilization—galvanizing resources and people to participate actively—occurs in complex multilevel systems. It compares two different polities—the United States and the European Union—to tease out the key features of multilevel systems and how they affect climate activism and mobilization. To capture this dynamic, it proposes a three‐staged model of mobilization: awareness building, alliance building, and network creation. The latter stage features “mobilization networks”—stakeholder networks able to transcend levels and institutional inertia and steer polities toward particular climate goals. The article demonstrates how each stage of mobilization is highly contingent on stakeholders' ability to exploit—or at least navigate—multilevel institutional barriers.     

The Politics of Network Governance in Europe: The Case of Energy Regulation

Networks are considered increasingly important for policy-making. The literature on new modes of governance in Europe suggests that their horizontal coordination capacity and flexible and informal structures are particularly suitable for governing the multilevel architecture of the European polity. However, empirical evidence about the effects of networks on policy-making and public policies is still quite limited. This article uses the case of the European network of energy regulators to explore the determinants of the position of network members and, in turn, the domestic adoption of soft rules developed within this network. The empirical analysis, based on multivariate statistics and semi-directive interviews, supports the expectation that institutional complementarities increase actors’ centrality in networks, while arguments based on organisational resources and age are disproved. Furthermore, results show that the overall level of adoption is considerable and that centrality might have a small positive effect on domestic adoption.     

Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications

Organizational‐reputation literature has advanced our understanding about the U.S. regulatory state and its agencies. However, we lack contributions on what a reputational account can add to our knowledge about the European regulatory state, the strategic behavior of supranational agencies, and their endeavors to legitimize themselves in a multilevel political system. We know little of how reputation‐management strategies vary across EU agencies and why. The study offers the very first mapping of organizational‐reputation‐management patterns across all EU agencies, as well as the first empirical assessment on how reputational considerations guide supranational agencies' legitimation strategies. The results indicate that EU agencies facing higher reputational threats revert to their avowed raison d'être (i.e., technical conduct). We find that regulatory agencies utilize a more diverse set of reputational strategies by emphasizing the technical, procedural, and moral reputations more than nonregulatory agencies, whereas social‐policy agencies foster their technical reputation more than economic‐policy agencies.     

Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union

This article investigates the role of transgovernmental networks of national regulators in addressing collective action problems endemic to international cooperation. In contrast to recent work on transgovernmental actors, which emphasizes such networks as alternatives to more traditional international institutions, we examine the synergistic interaction between the two. Building on the broader premise that patterns of “dual delegation” above and below the nation‐state enhance the coordinating role of networks of national agencies in two‐level international governance, the article examines the formal incorporation of transgovernmental networks into European Union (EU) policymaking. The focus on authoritative rule‐making adds a crucial dimension to the landscape of EU governance innovations while connecting to the broader study of transgovernmental networks in international governance. The article develops an analytical framework that maps these incorporated networks across different sectors in terms of function, emergence, and effectiveness. Two case studies of data privacy and energy market regulation are presented to apply and illustrate the insights of this mapping.     

Reconceptualizing European Union regulatory networks: A response to Blauberger and Rittberger

This article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks,” published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger.     

Managing Risk and Regulation in European Food Safety Governance

This article focuses on the state of European food safety governance and offers a view on possible future courses of regulatory policymaking. We begin by examining the deficiencies of the current multilevel governance system in European Union (EU) food safety policy, with an empirical focus on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems. We then submit that a regulatory agency model (centralization) might perform better than multilevel governance or renationalization in terms of reducing business uncertainty, promoting food safety enhancing innovation, and improving consumer trust in the food supply. Hence it would make European food markets more resilient to recurrent food safety crises. We also argue that the EU's precautionary approach as applied to some areas of food safety risks is tied to legitimacy enhancing objectives of EU institutional actors. Assuming that supply‐side rents will change over time, we submit that emphasis of regulatory impact analysis (i.e., cost benefit considerations) is likely to increase.     

The Europeanisation of Research and Higher Educational Policies: Some Reflections

This paper poses the following question: To what extent do European Union (EU) policies affect national policies? In essence this paper studies the Europeanisation of policy in the field of research and higher education (R&E). The field of R&E is largely neglected in the literature on European integration and Europeanisation. I argue that processes of Europeanisation of R&E mirror two interrelated processes: both the emergence of supranational policies at the EU level and national convergence towards these policies. The empirical scope of the paper is the relationship between the EU’s R&E policies and the corresponding Norwegian policies. Our empirical observations based on documentary data and existing bodies of literature reveal that the emergence of creeping supranational policies of R&E at the EU level has accompanied moderate convergence of Norwegian R&E policies. This moderate level of convergence, I argue, reflects a mix of moderate institutionalised linkages between Norwegian ministries and agencies and the EU, moderate adaptational pressures towards Norwegian R&E policies from the EU, and institutional path dependencies in Norwegian R&E policies.     

Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance

Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.     

Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union

The article analyzes how business interests responded to European integration. It draws on survey data of eight hundred German, French, British, and European Union (EU) trade associations as well as thirty-four large firms. The argument is that the multilevel governance approach to European integration captures the realities of EU interest intermediation better than neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The article suggests that the strategies of interest organizations depend mainly on their location in the EU multilevel system and on their governance capacities. I distinguish two kinds of governance capacities: negotiation capacities and organizational resources. The analysis proceeds in the following steps: After outlining the three theories of European integration and presenting their implications for interest groups, a brief overview of the relative importance for interest organizations of EU and national institutions over time is provided. Then, cluster analysis techniques serve to identify types of interest groups according to their lobbying strategies in the multilevel system: niche organizations, occasional players, traditionalists, EU players, and multilevel players are distinguished. The composition of these clusters and the characteristics of their members support the multilevel governance approach and indicate that multilevel players have greater governance capacities than organizations in the other clusters.     

The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy

This article explores the politics behind the design of EU regulatory institutions. The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside of the Commission hierarchy, including over 30 European agencies and a number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The article examines the politics of institutional choice in the EU, explaining why EU policy-makers create agencies in some policy areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in others. It shows that the design of EU regulatory institutions – ‘the Eurocracy’ – is driven not by functional imperatives but by political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of supranational actors.     

Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: European Union, Member States, and the FCTC

The Westphalian idea of sovereignty in international relations has undergone recent transformation. "Shared sovereignty" through multilevel governance describes the responsibility of the European Union (EU) and its Member States in tobacco control policy. We examine how this has occurred on the EU level through directives and recommendations, accession rules for new members, tobacco control campaigns, and financial support for antitobacco nongovernmental organizations. In particular, the negotiation and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the participation in the FCTC Conference of the Parties illustrates shared sovereignty. The EU Commission was the lead negotiator for Member States on issues over which it had jurisdiction, while individual Member States, through the EU presidency, could negotiate on issues on which authority was divided or remained with them. Shared sovereignty through multilevel governance has become the norm in the tobacco control policy area for EU members, including having one international organization negotiate within the context of another.     

产品质量安全监管体制的国际比较与启示

产品质量问题关系到社会公众的人身与财产安全,对于企业、消费者乃至整个社会都是一个不容回避的问题,发达国家经过长期积淀形成了较为严格与稳定的产品质量安全监管体制,并呈现日渐完善趋势。美国、欧盟与日本等在产品质量安全监管的法律法规、机构设置、技术支撑等方面具有较为成熟的经验与措施,而我国存在产品质量安全法律法规体系不够系统、多部门监管、权责利分配不到位、认证标准体系缺失与滞后等问题。完善我国的产品质量监管,要树立一体化规范制定理念,确保法律体系系统化;整合梳理监管机构职能,促进监管资源的有效配置;引入成熟经验成果,鼓励监管措施多样化。     

From rule-taker to rule-promoting regulatory state: South Korea in the nearly-global competition regime

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.     

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision‐making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem‐solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance – that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten‐year period and semi‐structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.     

Orchestrating sustainability: The case of European Union biofuel governance

This article provides an empirical analysis of orchestration – that is, the initiation, support, and embracement of private governance arrangements through public regulators – in the field of European Union biofuel governance. It examines the emerging sustainability regime and shows that orchestration has been extensively practiced. Regulators in the European Union have used a range of directive and facilitative measures to initiate and support private biofuel certification schemes and to incorporate them in their regulatory frameworks. This has given rise to a hybrid regime in which public and private approaches are closely intertwined. Discussing the benefits and complications of engaging with private biofuel sustainability governance, the article's findings point to a partial failure of orchestration in this policy area.     

Information sharing,secrecy and trust among law enforcement and secret service institutions in the European Union

Abstract

Transnational information sharing among security agencies in the European Union and beyond has grown considerably more important over the past decades. Centralised databases and numerous formal and informal networks now facilitate cooperation and information sharing. However, sharing intelligence may not only conflict with the protection of fundamental rights (data protection/privacy; presumption of innocence), but also with the organisational culture of institutions that are built upon secrecy. Police agencies often keep knowledge about individual cases and their strategies secret as long as possible. Intelligence services build their work and strategies upon secrecy even more. This paper analyses the variations of secrecy that can be observed for police agencies and secret services, and the relationship between information sharing among security agencies, secrecy, trust, transparency and accountability. In a normative perspective, the paper explores answers to the questions of how secret the work of security agencies should be in democratic rule of law systems and how accountability can be improved without making these institutions work less effectively.     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.