The use of intergovernmental grants to municipalities for electoral purposes by subnational governments

Subnational governments devote a significant share of their financial resources to help municipalities provide local public services to their citizens. Compared to the large number of studies on national governments, little effort has been devoted to the influence of distributive politics on the use of intergovernmental grants by subnational governments. To fill this gap, this study uses a data set covering the period 2001–2011 to verify to what extent the Québec government used conditional grants to municipalities for electoral purposes. The results of this study show that the allocation of grants to municipalities is not exempt from electoral politics as municipalities located in districts held by governing parties or in high electoral competition districts receive more grants than other municipalities. However, the influence of electoral politics decreases substantially when the management of intergovernmental grants is under tight scrutiny by the opposition parties, mass media and the population. These findings suggest that distributive politics can be conceptualised as a political agency problem whose prevalence is seriously constrained by the improvement of the transparency of public policies management.     

Realising the Public Person

In response to a crisis of representative democracy in many Western countries, (local) governments have introduced instruments to circumvent political parties in order to establish more direct links between citizens and governments. One of these instruments is rendering electoral systems more personal, that is by giving more weight to preferential voting. Preferential voting is important since it constitutes a major element of the personal vote and it determines whether parties or voters are the main decision-makers in designating representatives. We have investigated, in relation to the local elections in Flanders (Belgium), in what kind of municipalities voters are most likely to cast a preferential vote, whether the electoral reform granting voters more power has had an effect, and if it has had an effect, in what kind of municipalities. We have put forward five groups of explanatory variables: socio-demographic, political, social capital, geographic and ballot form variables. Our analysis shows that variables from each group correlate significantly with the percentage of preferential votes, with population density and electronic voting as most important variables. A comparison between the 1994 and 2006 elections often yields the reverse picture: characteristics of municipalities that have a positive effect on the percentage of preferential votes cast have a negative impact on the evolution of preferential voting and vice versa (electronic voting being an exception). This results in the only obvious effects of the electoral reform being seen in urban municipalities, because elsewhere local politics was already to a large extent personalised by politicians being locally known. We could conclude that in these rural municipalities the electoral reform was superfluous.     

The attractiveness of local and national list labels: the role of socio-economic inequalities on the success of electoral lists

ABSTRACT

According to the nationalisation hypothesis, it is sometimes argued that electoral lists competing at local elections under a national party label are more likely to win. Yet, in many countries, local lists are still much present. This article seeks to assess the attractiveness of local and national list labels at local elections. Following Rokkan’s hypothesis of the nationalisation of local politics, we test the role of socio-economic inequality on the success of electoral lists across local polities. Based on an original dataset distinguishing the labels of 1.012 electoral lists – be they local, mixed or national – in the 262 Walloon municipalities in Belgium, the multilevel regression demonstrates that local and mixed labels present a significant electoral advantage vis-à-vis national party labels. However, the article shows that this electoral gain decreases as economic inequalities increase: national labels, especially left-wing parties, attract more voters as inequalities rise.     

What are the Local Political Costs of Centrally Determined Reforms of Local Government?

Taking advantage of a quasi-experimental setting and drawing upon analysis of electoral results and a survey of voters, this article explores the political costs of reform through the example of the 2009 local elections in Denmark. The article finds that the local parties of mayors were punished at the polls for implementing municipal amalgamations decided by the central government. However, the effect on the mayoral parties’ electoral result is more indirect than direct. Analyses of the electoral results demonstrates that the political parties holding the mayoralty in times of amalgamations tend to nominate very tenured mayors as candidates, thereby missing the positive first-term incumbency effect, which a new mayor could have acquired. And analyses of a survey of voters demonstrates higher levels of dissatisfaction with the municipal service in amalgamated municipalities, leading to a higher cost of ruling for mayoral parties which have led the implementation of an amalgamation.     

A Spatial Analysis of Czech Parliamentary Elections, 2006–2013

This article presents a spatial analysis of the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2013. Among most political parties with long-term parliamentary representation, right-wing parties had higher support in areas with a high development potential and left-wing parties in areas with a low development potential. However, similar congruence between electoral support and development potential was not found in the case of most new parties. Spatial regression analyses then show that class conflict has ceased to be the unambiguous primary factor of political competition in the Czech Republic. This finding is further supported by the often inconclusive estimates for most new parties, which showed their ability to mobilise voters from different social classes.     

Anti-Immigrant Parties,Local Presence and Electoral Success

Abstract

Does the local organisational presence of anti-immigrant parties affect their chances for electoral success? In order to answer this question, the article explores the potential of a supply-oriented explanation to anti-immigrant party success by examining the electoral advancements the Sweden Democrats (SD) made in the 2006 and 2010 elections. Our results indicate that traditional demand-side explanations to anti-immigrant party success can be successfully complemented by an ‘internal supply-side argument’ to make the electoral fates of these parties more intelligible. Whether the SD had a local organisational presence had a substantial effect on its results in the national election and on the probability of gaining representation in local councils. Thus, the party’s fate in the national as well as local elections was largely determined by whether or not it had a local organisational presence in Swedish municipalities.     

Do Electoral Risks Moderate the Effect of Partisan and Electoral Cycles on Debt-Financed Local Spending?

Governments’ use of debt as a political instrument has been widely studied from the perspective of partisan and electoral cycles, mainly concerning central government. On the whole, previous studies have attempted to determine the effects of political ideology and the proximity of elections on the opportunistic use of public spending. The current study aims to broaden the scope of attention to the effect of partisan and electoral cycles on debt, by means of a broader consideration of the motives that lead politicians to take on a deficit and that are usually linked to the associated electoral risk. More particularly, we examine whether, during the electoral period, greater confidence in re-election can modify party behaviour concerning the use of public spending, and if so, whether the change is greater or smaller depending on the ruling party’s ideology. The results obtained show that local administrations need to incur debt, although politicians take on more liability than is appropriate to their demographic and economic characteristics, especially in an election year. It was also found that political stability favours a reduction in the public deficit, a pattern that is maintained in electoral periods. This effect was found to be independent of the partisan cycle.     

Economic Crisis and Sub-national Elections in Selected European Countries. Three Types of Possible Relationships

During the past two decades, decentralisation issues have generated a keen interest in a large number of countries. However, this notion is very difficult to define as it refers to a wide range of institutional arrangements on the political, economic and social levels. There are many good reasons why the allocation of fiscal resources and budget transfers among levels of government must come after a strict assignment of spending powers. Hence, decentralisation as a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe and has reemerged as a valued political and economic goal in most countries, significantly varying from country to country. The purpose of this article is to show the impact of financial and economic crisis on sub-national government and sub-national elections in chosen European countries such as Poland, Ireland, Denmark and Greece. In some of the countries mentioned the sub-national run-offs were conducted with national parliamentary elections, but not in other countries, including Poland. Because of its uniqueness, however, the explanation of which constitutes an essential part of the article, Poland can be ‘a matiere a penser’ and a starting point for interesting analysis. As can be seen, the economic situation can not only change the election results, but also stabilise the political system, which is a good example of how the government party can manipulate public opinion, or even make elections a referendum on economic policy. The main determinant is the financial situation of sub-national government units and the country concerned.     

Dealing with Austerity: a case of local resilience in Southern Europe

Southern countries are undergoing a severe economic crisis that has renewed debates about the available strategies to economise their public resources. Political leaders have launched a wide range of different strategies aimed at reducing spending. According to generally accepted political discourse, drastic actions should be taken to guarantee economic and financial sustainability in times of austerity. We explore the main measures adopted by Spanish municipalities in order to examine their impact in budgetary terms. First of all, we identify the most frequently implemented mechanisms including organisational structure, public services and operational economic restructuration. After their quantification, we monitor the presence and impact of each set of policies to analyse the relationship between concrete measures and effective economic impact. The effective reduction of budgets is being implemented but data show that local governments are resilient to non-compulsory changes. The ‘government at a distance’ policy pursued by the central state administration has effectively reduced budgets but has not affected the institutional core of Spanish local governments.     

The Role of Civil Wars and Elections in Inducing Political Assassinations

Political assassinations can dramatically impact political and social dynamics, especially in times of violent political conflicts or electoral competition. The current study explores if and how specific social and political events facilitate the occurrence of political assassinations. After an examination of the logic of political assassinations, a theoretical framework is presented, which explains the role of civil wars and electoral processes as facilitators of different types of political assassinations. The theory is tested via a dataset of political assassinations worldwide between the years 1946–2013. The findings confirm that different sets of structural and contextual factors facilitate assassinations against heads of state, legislators, and leaders of opposition movements/parties. In addition, the findings illustrate the tendency of elections, especially in nonliberal settings and in polarized societies, to facilitate political assassinations rather than to calm the political environment. In contrast, civil wars have a more limited impact on the probability of assassinations, and their intensity and endurance mainly enhance the risk of assassinations of legislators.     

Populism in Taiwan: The Rise of a Populist-Democratic Culture in a Democratising Society

Taiwan's democratic transition has emerged alongside a rise of populism. Based on an analysis of post-electoral survey data, it is shown that populist resentments – embodied in such emotion-laden campaign issues as ethnic identity, national identity and a party's image of interest representation and clean politics – have been the most efficient vote-getting appeals in Taiwan's post-authoritarian electoral competition between two major political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT). In Taiwan's democratic transition, mass demands for the ‘indigenisation’ of politics and the people's worry about an ever-increasing military threat from Mainland China have also popularised as well as polarised these populist appeals. As empirical data show, due to its position as the first Taiwanese party with a lion's share of populist advantages, the DPP was able to win the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. In sum, Taiwan's electoral politics in the past decade have given rise to a kind of ‘populist-democratic culture’, which inclines Taiwanese politicians to bring up populist issues rather than the rational policy debates of an electoral democracy.     

Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage

Patronage is important in developing countries, but its relationship to political competition has received little attention. Major literatures generate opposing predictions. In the good governance and democracy literatures, robust political competition is the antidote to patronage. But for scholars studying the process of democratization, competitive politics is associated with heightened social tensions and instability. Using data from an original survey covering 88% of local governments in Ghana, I show that political competition can increase patronage: where local elections are closely fought by the two main parties, local governments provide significantly more public sector jobs. I use qualitative data from 9 months of fieldwork to show the causal channel. I find a bottom-up phenomenon in which pressures for patronage come from parties’ own volunteers. Volunteers actively use their parties’ vulnerability in competitive elections to extract rewards. I locate the root of volunteers’ power in the nature of the party system, and I demonstrate that for 19 African countries, variation in party system strength is linked to certain forms of clientelism. These findings challenge assumptions that competitive politics will reduce patronage, as well as assumptions that a decline in one form of clientelism means a decline in all forms of clientelism.     

Federalism and low-maintenance constituencies: Territorial dimensions of economic reform in Argentina

How does the territorial distribution of political and economic resources within national polities influence politics and policy making? This article examines the electoral dynamics of market reform in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It provides insights into the way that the distribution of economic and institutional resources in federal systems shapes policy making and coalition building options for reformist governments. The electoral viability of the governing Peronist Party during the economic reform period was facilitated by the regional phasing of the costs of market reform. Structural reforms were concentrated primarily on economically developed regions of the country, while public spending and patronage in economically marginal but politically overrepresented regions sustained support for the governing party. Statistical analyses contrast patterns of spending and public sector employment in “metropolitan” and “peripheral” regions of the country during the reform period, as well as the social bases of electoral support in those regions. A conceptual distinction between “high-maintenance” and “low-maintenance” constituencies is also introduced to shed light on the dynamics of patronage spending in contexts of market reform.     

How do mayors get elected? The causal effects of pre-electoral coalitions on mayoral election outcomes in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

What determines the election of mayors? The extent to which pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) influence mayoral election outcomes has not yet been subject to empirical analysis, despite the question’s fundamental theoretical and practical relevance. This note uses regression discontinuity methods to identify the causal effects of PECs on mayoral election results in Indonesia. The study finds that candidates backed by PECs comprising political parties that control council seat shares exceeding first-round mayoral electoral vote thresholds are 14–18 percentage points more likely to win those elections than their counterparts supported by smaller-sized PECs. The analysis determines that PECs are especially helpful in getting non-incumbent candidates elected, although they have no apparent impact on incumbents’ electoral success. PECs can assist candidates in gaining office, therefore, but they are established under corrupt conditions. Ultimately, governance issues surrounding the formation and functioning of PECs impose significant constraints on the development of local democracy in Indonesia.     

Party identity change in post-communist politics: the cases of the successor parties in Hungary, Poland and Russia

In recent years much has been written on the communist successor parties. Although much of the existent work focuses on the electoral performance of these parties or has described, in great detail, the development of single parties, this paper evaluates the utility of theories of party identity change in application to the successor parties. As an initial exploration we investigate the successor parties' programs before and after the initial competitive parliamentary elections in Hungary (in 1990), Poland (in 1991) and Russia (in 1993) to determine the extent to which poor electoral performance in initial competitive elections compelled the successor parties to alter their political identities.     

Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia

Authoritarian regimes often use fiscal policy to reward political supporters and to punish political opponents. In many authoritarian regimes with political institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections, elections become a focal point for budget expenditures and the distribution of government patronage. A time-series analysis of Malaysian fiscal expenditures from 1967 to 1997 shows that the ruling coalition systematically increases federal government spending before elections. In addition to marshalling private resources to distribute patronage, the Malaysian government manipulates the government’s official position. These findings have important implications for the growing literature on political institutions under autocratic regimes and the politics of patronage and redistribution in the developing world. They also suggest a new empirical domain for existing theories of political business cycles.     

Pushed by national politics or pulled by localism? Voting for independent local parties in the Netherlands

This study examines why citizens in the Netherlands vote for independent local parties. These are parties that run in municipal council elections, but do not run in elections at higher levels. This article examines a number of expectations: namely that voters vote for these parties out dissatisfaction with established parties, that they do so because they have a 'localist' political orientation or that they do so because their own national party is not running in the municipal elections. More support is found for the idea that voters vote for local parties because they are pushed away by national parties (either because they do not participate in some municipalities or because voters distrust them) than for the idea that voters vote for local parties for positive reasons, such as a localist political orientation. This article examines two surveys concerning voting behaviour in the 2014 Dutch municipal elections.     

Dynamic-opportunistic behaviour in local government contracting-out decisions during the electoral cycle

A major question for public managers is whether municipal services should be rendered in-house or contracted out. In view of the negative perceptions often aroused by contracting out, this political decision might be framed within a theoretical model that we term ‘dynamic-opportunistic behaviour’. According to this model, the probability of municipal services being contracted out is greater in the years immediately following elections; moreover, during this period the decision is taken more quickly. In this theoretical model, not all factors (budgetary, economic, political, service characteristics and socio-economic) have an equal impact on the contracting-out decision during each year of the electoral cycle. The model was applied to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities, with respect to a broad time horizon (2002–2014), and the results obtained confirm our hypotheses regarding dynamic-opportunistic behaviour in the contracting out of local public services.     

Party Reforms and the Unbalancing of the Cleavage Structure in Russian Regional Elections, 2012–2015

This study analyses the influence of the party reforms of 2012 and the ‘counter-reforms’ of 2013–2014 on the Russian party system, and the structure of political and electoral cleavages in Russian regions. The emergence of new political parties in 2012–2013 led to a temporary increase in electoral competition, an augmentation of the political space, and a rise in the number of electoral cleavages, but these developments did not weaken the domination of United Russia. The trend towards an ever greater tightening up of entry requirements for contestation in the elections led to a lowering of the number of political and, consequently, electoral cleavages, in addition to a reconfiguration of the political space. The study shows that there was an unbalancing of the political cleavage structure in 2012–2015: the socioeconomic political cleavage, whose primary place is a key determinant of equilibrium, ceded the top position to the authoritarian–democratic cleavage in 2012–2013, and to the ‘Ukrainian’ (systemic) cleavage in 2014–2015.     

Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians’ and Administrators’ Spending Preferences

The notion that appointed bureaucrats act as budget maximizers still stands strong within theories attempting to explain the growth in the size of the public sector. This paper reports the results of a case study that included local authority politicians and bureaucrats in 30 Norwegian municipalities and where differences in spending preferences was empirically investigated. Counter to the original theory, bureaucrats seem to be less expansive than their political counterparts. The most expansive were found to be members of political left‐wing parties, the more peripheral politicians and administrators, women, those with lower education and those working in the public sector. Nevertheless, there is some support given to a modified hypothesis that administrators have stronger preferences for ‘slack’ (that is, organizational slack in terms of spending more money on internal administration) than politicians. The data also strongly support the notion that within a specialized sector, both politicians and administrators have similar preferences for higher spending to their specific sector.