STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of ‘street‐level bureaucracy’ was coined by Michael Lipsky (1980) as the common denominator for what would become a scholarly theme. Since then his stress on the relative autonomy of professionals has been complemented by the insight that they are working in a micro‐network of relations, in varying contexts. The conception of ‘governance’ adds a particular aspect to this: the multi‐dimensional character of a policy system as a nested sequence of decisions. Combining these views casts a different perspective on the ways street‐level bureaucrats are held accountable. In this article some axiomatic assumptions are drawn from the existing literature on the theme of street‐level bureaucracy and on the conception of governance. Acknowledging variety, and arguing for contextualized research, this results in a rethinking of the issue of accountability at the street level.     

IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY OF PORTUGAL

The influence of the New Public Management (NPM) movement in Portuguese administrative reform has been one of the country's noticeable trends in recent decades ( Araújo 2001, 2002a ; Rocha 2001 ). Many governments have aimed to introduce a new managerial rationality in public services. The literature about administrative reform shows that institutional bureaucracies resist change, particularly when it challenges prevailing practices and procedures ( Bjur and Caiden 1978 ; Olsen 1991 ). Thus, the influence of NPM in administrative reform has found different expressions and, in several countries, the introduction of NPM ideas is a limited and superficial phenomenon ( Pollitt 2000 ). This paper contributes to these debates. It examines the influence of New Public Management ideas in Portuguese administrative reform and discusses improvements in the way public services are implementing change using new managerial tools in Portugal: the Activity Plan (AP) and the Activity Report (AR). The data collected from official reports and a questionnaire show that the juridical-administrative model persists and transforms both Activity Plan and Activity Report into little more than a formality, another routine to be followed.     

WEBER AND KAFKA: THE RATIONAL AND THE ENIGMATIC BUREAUCRACY

Max Weber's and Franz Kafka's respective understandings of bureaucracy are as different as night and day. Yet, Kafka's novel The Castle is best read with Max Weber at hand. In fact, Kafka relates systematically to all the dimensions in Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy and give us a much‐contemplated parody, almost a counter‐punctual ideal type, based on four key observations: bureaucratic excesses unfold in time and space; a ‘no error’ ideology generates inescapable dilemmas; inscrutability is a life condition in bureaucracy; civil servants end up walking on the spot, just like the figures in Escher's painting: Ascending and Descending. Nevertheless, Weber and Kafka can both be right. While Kafka looks at the bureaucratic phenomenon through persons who are marginalized, Weber's perspective is historic‐comparative and top‐down. Are the observations of the one more correct than the other? The question is meaningless. As two opposite poles, Weber and Kafka ‘magnetize’ each other.     

PETTY BUREAUCRACY AND WOOLLYMINDED LIBERALISM? THE CHANGING ETHOS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS

Most discussions of the public service ethos ( pse ) have offered polemical accounts of how recent reforms have eroded the distinguishing values of public servants without ever defining this ethos or considering its relationship to other aspects of the public sector. This article considers the deeper and more structural implications of the pse by characterizing it as a political institution that shares the features of'new institutionalism'. It concentrates upon the pse as it manifests itself in local government and uses case studies of four authorities to analyse the extent to which external changes are altering the fundamental values of the ethos. In using the'new institutionalist'perspective it argues that the pse , a vital institution of the UK polity, has been resistant to external pressures for change. Hence, to be successful, public sector reform must take into account the interdependent relationship between the pse and other political institutions.     

PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY: A PROBLEMATIC QUICK FIX

This paper investigates the proliferation of parallel structures – also known as project implementation units (PIUs) and technical offices (TOs) – within the Egyptian public administration system and the pressures since the 1990s that have led to their increasing numbers, including the current political turmoil. To determine whether these structures are a viable tool for the implementation of reform in Egypt, the paper examines international experience, analyses the literature, and assesses the results of a brief survey of staff working in the traditional bureaucracy and those in parallel structures. The paper concludes that while PIUs may sometimes be necessary for initiating reform in the short term, long term sustainable reform requires genuine commitment of both donor and recipient governments to improve governance, build capacity within the traditional national institutions, apply performance management with a focus on policy impacts, and adopt alternative mechanisms in implementing development projects such as general budget support.     

RESTRUCTURING WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY: COMPARING MANAGERIAL REFORMS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In much of the international public administration literature, New Public Management (NPM) already appears to be bogged down in a quagmire of critical revisions and assessments. Although some criticisms are well founded, there can be no doubt that NPM represents a trend which has considerably affected public‐sector decision‐making worldwide. This article takes the examples of the Southern European bureaucracies, where NPM‐inspired reforms were introduced later than in the English‐speaking world, but have nevertheless played a decisive role in the political agenda of both socialist and conservative governments. The paper presents the results of a comparative study of administrative reforms in five European countries as well as the USA during the 1980s and 1990s. The comparison is based on three specific dimensions (central bureaucracies’ formal structure; civil service organization; administrative processes), enabling us to systematically measure and compare the progress of the various countries subsequent to the cycle of managerial reforms.     

MODELLING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL BUDGET SECTOR 1982-1992

A substantial literature exists on the economic analysis of bureaucracy, which includes formal models of bureaucratic behaviour by Niskanen (1971) and Dunleavy (1991). This article develops hypotheses from those models about changes in size of bureaux over time and tests them against data on the Australian federal budget sector in 1982–83 and 1991–92. The models predict that bureaucrats usually will be able to influence the size or structure of their bureaux in line with their personal preferences. However, the Australian data suggest that the extent of such influence may be less than is assumed in either model and that the preferences of politicians are more influential than the models allow. One conclusion is that, if bureaucracy is to be modelled, a principal-agent approach will have more to offer than the neo-classical maximizing framework adopted by Niskanen in particular. A further conclusion, at odds with those of Niskanen and weakening his case for wholesale privatization, is that bureaucratic dysfunctions may be amenable to reform of the political and bureaucratic rules and systems.     

DIVERSITY AND DOMINANCE IN THE ARCTIC. ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE GREENLANDIC BUREAUCRACY

Public bureaucracies are increasingly characterized by employee diversity in terms of ethnicity. Investigating relations between ethnic groups in bureaucracies is therefore important. This article focuses on the particularly interesting case of the Greenlandic administration. Being a former Danish colony, Greenland still recruits bureaucrats from mainland Denmark. These work alongside locally hired employees resulting in an administration with different ethnicities, cultures and languages. The analysis of ethnic relations is based on 28 interviews with bureaucrats of Danish and Greenlandic origin. Even though overall relations are found to be largely harmonious, ethnicity makes a difference. Interviewees describe differences in ethnic traits and behaviour and processes of social categorization. Particularly among Greenlanders, Danes are described as dominant and this dominance is reinforced by co‐variation between ethnicity, language skills and education. Finally, inter‐group relations are found to vary with the numerical balance of ethnic groups in different parts of the bureaucracy.     

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: EFFECTS OF ELECTED GOVERNMENT,PUBLIC AGENDAS AND EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE UK BUREAUCRACY

What determines the bureaucratic agenda? This article combines insights from models of bureaucratic behaviour with agenda‐setting models of government attention to test the effects of elected government, public, and EU agendas on the bureaucratic agenda. Using time series cross‐sectional analyses of subject and ministry coded data on UK statutory instruments from 1987 to 2008, I find strong effects for both the elected government and EU legislative agendas on UK statutory instruments. Furthermore, by breaking the data into different sets based on their relationship with the EU, several logical differences in these effects are found. These results include the EU agenda having exclusive influence on instruments implementing EU directives, and the UK agenda being the sole driver of bureaucratic attention on those instruments that mention the EU but do not implement EU legislation. This article opens a new avenue for research on bureaucracy by approaching it as a unique policy‐making institution.     

ON THE BUREAUCRACY OF BUREAUCRACIES: ANALYSING THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF OVERHEAD IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Governments across the globe try to rebalance their budgets by rationalizing overhead operations. When overhead‐reducing policies are adopted, it is important to understand why some central government organizations have a higher overhead than others, and why organizational models to produce overhead efficiencies are used to different degrees. This study focuses on the Flemish context to analyse differences between central government organizations in the size and organization of two overhead processes: human resources management (HRM) and finance and control (FIN). Significant effects are found for autonomy, organizational size, spatial dispersion and budgetary stress, yet effects vary according to whether HRM or FIN is considered and whether the focus is on the size or the organization of HRM or FIN. Our findings have practical implications to get a process‐sensitive understanding of the size and organization of overhead, and theoretical implications as they cast light on factors that shape decision‐making in public organizations.     

BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT OR DENIED? THE EXPANSION OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE, 1919–1939

The power of central government in Britain increased significantly in the inter-war period, but did Britain become bureaucratic? This article examines the expansion of the civil service as a whole through a detailed case study of one particular department (the Ministry of Labour) in the light of traditional critiques of bureaucracy. It concludes that previous over-concentration on the role of the Treasury has distorted analysis. The inter-war civil service became bureaucratic in terms not of rationality, inefficiency or power but only of size and increasing complexity. In this it reflected a general trend in British society, which also affected industry and the trade union movement.     

WHEN BUREAUCRACY MATTERS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: EXPLORING THE BENEFITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY IN BIG AND COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

Administrative intensity is arguably a major determinant of public service performance. Although a large administrative function might constitute a bureaucratic burden, it could also enable organizations to better coordinate key activities. In particular, administrative intensity may strengthen or weaken the performance effects of other key organizational characteristics, such as size and task complexity. To explore these ideas, we analyse the separate and combined effects of administrative intensity, organization size and task complexity on the research and educational performance of UK universities between 2005 and 2011. The statistical results suggest that administrative intensity has a performance pay‐off for big and complex organizations.     

UK LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: USING CONJECTURES TO EXPLAIN THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between local government and public participation is a problematic one. Taking the UK as an example, it is evident that, despite 40 years of experimentation with public participation initiatives, there has been little impact on local policy processes. While a range of plausible explanations can be found for this state of affairs, no overarching theoretical framework is available to organize them. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to offer just such a framework of analysis by utilizing and developing the conjectures approach originally used by Klijn and Skelcher (2007) . Four conjectures, developed from the UK experience, are presented. These are the transitional, incompatibility, instrumental and resistivity conjectures. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for research and for policy.