Les populaires et le parlement italien (1919–24)

ABSTRACT

On 18 January 1919, Luigi Sturzo (Caltagirone 1871–Rome 1959), the Italian priest and politician, a Fascist dissident and fervent Europeanist, founded the Italian Popular Party (PPI) by pronouncing his Appello ai liberi e forti. The new PPI marked the entrance of Catholics to the political life of the country. Indeed, after the unification of Italy, Catholics had not been able to vote in political elections due to a provision issued by Pope Pius IX in 1874, the so-called non expedit, which had forbidden them from participating in the political elections of the kingdom of Italy. In the elections of 16 November 1919 – after the reform that led to the transition from the uninominal electoral system to the proportional electoral system and the extension of the right to vote to all 21-year old male citizens – the PPI secured 20.5 per cent of the votes. One hundred PPI candidates were elected, proving to be an indispensable force for the institution of any new government. The serious economic difficulties and the social contrasts, caused in large part by the First World War and by an institutional system unable to cope with the crisis, would have subsequently led to the establishment of the fascist regime. PPI members elected in 1919 were active in implementing institutional reforms that attempted to bring parliamentary representation to the real life of the country. This was to be achieved in the following ways: by renewing the apparatus of political representation, that is safeguarding the role of parliament as the central organ of a democratic system; by transforming the old constitutional model of cabinet government, with prime ministers appointed by the crown and chosen by parliamentary hybrid majorities, into a new parliamentary government based on the trust of majorities formed by parties with common programmes.     

Electoral Reform as an Engine of Party System Change in Italy

Abstract

After more than forty years of proportional representation, in 1991 Italy embarked on a period of electoral law revision. The ongoing debate about how to engineer an electoral system capable of producing the preferred political outcomes stands out against the stasis in constitutional reform, most recently demonstrated in the rejection by popular referendum of Matteo Renzi’s package of reforms. The extent to which the different electoral reforms have had an impact on Italian politics, especially following the 2005 electoral legislation, can be evaluated by analysing the changing Italian party system over the past decade and beyond in terms of its morphology, dynamics, and party/parliamentary group switching. The 2005 electoral reform has had a clear effect on Italian politics and on the party system, but that effect is unlikely to endure given the highly controversial new electoral law that came into force in 2017.     

L'affaiblissement du Parlement français dans la dernière législature de la Troisième République (1936–1940)

SUMMARY

In this article, Simone Lassig examines franchise reforms in the federal states of the German Empire before 1914. She is critical of restricting the history of the German Empire to the history of Prussia. From this viewpoint, electoral reforms in several of the German federal states are used to indicate the capacity of the political elites to resolve problems related to the system. When we observe southern and central Germany, it can be shown that the old elites were capable of learning. Although the non-socialist parties opposed every form of mass politics until the turn of the century, by limiting the right to vote, after that they opened up to the increasing demands for participation from the lower levels of society. Tendencies towards democrati;tation appeared not only in many new electoral laws, but also in the political culture, expecially in the development of new methods of parliamentary conflict. Legitimation of authoriry gained a new status: the parliamentary resolution of conflicts was revalued as against legal restrictions, and facilitated the partial integration of the formerly excluded workers' party. The concept, scarcely challenged in research, that there was only a primitive level of democratization in Wilhelmine Germany should be reconsidered at least, as a result of this analysis.     

Influencing votes,winning elections: clientelist practices and private funding of electoral campaigns in Albania

ABSTRACT

The present article is part of a broader effort to understand and analyse the relationship between formal and informal norms and institutions in the Balkans. Free and fair elections are a central component of any functioning democracy and, in the case of Albania, an essential element of its EU accession process. Elections can also be affected by political clientelism, which puts their outcomes’ credibility into question. Political clientelism is a principal sector of informal relations and practices and informal and/or illegal funding of electoral campaigns are identified as its key mechanisms. This article addresses a number of issues related to clientelist practices and private funding of electoral campaigns, focusing on the general parliamentary elections of June 2017. The main research question investigates the ways in which private funding of electoral campaigns works in practice. Based on data gathered through ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, reports on the electoral process, and other secondary sources, we argue that informal clientelist practices permeating private funding of electoral campaigns enable political parties to further and strengthen clientelist relations and to influence the electoral result.     

Parliamentary oversight and corruption in the Caribbean: comparing Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada

Parliamentary oversight is a key determinant of corruption levels. This article presents research findings on parliamentary oversight in two Caribbean countries: Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada. Our results cast doubt on the results of previous research and also indicate that certain facets of ‘the Westminster’ system need to be relaxed, to reflect contextual reality in smaller island economies. Political will to adopt our recommended reforms is critical, but, as in other countries, inertia often dominates the political environment. Until citizens demand that their elected representatives establish various oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms and ensure these mechanisms are free of political influence, the institutions will be ‘window dressing’ and corrupt actions will go undeterred and unpunished.     

Du système des bureaux au système des groupes et des commissions. Le règlement parlementaire italien de 1920 et la doctrine constitutionnelle*

An attempt to explore the scope of Italian parliamentary reforms in 1920 in the context of the transition from a traditional constitutional culture to a new model of political representation is presented. The workings of Parliament were ‘temporarily’ established in 1848, when a system of ‘bureaux’ was adopted which was to last until 1920. They were distributed among members by lot. Preliminary discussions took place in these ‘bureaux’, which then nominated a commission with the responsibility to present its work to the Assembly. This system related to the concept of representation according to which each deputy freely represented the entire nation. By contrast, the 1920 reforms proposed to organise this by means of commissions whose membership mirrored the proportional weighting of political groupings to which all deputies had to belong. This regulation complemented earlier electoral reforms which, following the introduction of male mass suffrage, favoured the presence on the political scene of modern parties. As a result of this new parliamentary regulation and in spite of resistance based on constitutional tradition, the political parties, now part of political life, moved to the heart of the institutional life of the state.     

How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General Election

Abstract

Allegations of electoral irregularities loomed large prior to and following Malaysia’s 13th general election in May 2013. Yet while these irregularities elicited strong reactions domestically and internationally, they are unlikely to have played a significant role in shaping the election’s outcome. Rather than how the game was played, it was the very rules of the game itself that were responsible for returning the United Malays National Organization and its Barisan Nasional coalition to power for the 13th consecutive time, as Malaysia’s electoral institutions quietly transformed the incumbent coalition’s 4% deficit in the popular vote into a 20% winning margin of parliamentary seats. This is largely the result of substantial variation in the size of electoral districts, which had the effect of delivering parliamentary seats to Barisan Nasional with significantly fewer votes than were required by the opposition to secure its seats. This article has two primary aims. First, it seeks to understand better malapportionment in Malaysia by examining the degree of distortions at multiple institutional levels. It demonstrates these distortions to be exceptionally high from a comparative perspective. Second, it seeks to understand better the factors responsible for the size variation of electoral districts, specifically the extent to which the non-partisan factors stipulated in the constitution can explain the variation. Several tests are conducted using new data on the density of voters in electoral districts. The results strongly indicate a partisan element to malapportionment. This creates an institutionalized bias against the opposition and risks increasing polarization in the Malaysian polity.     

Crown and Cortes in Castile, 1590–1665

Summary

Preparations for the Estates General of 1789 constituted one of the last acts of the anclen régime in France. The accompanying elections have received relatively little attention, yet they bequeathed much more to the electoral practices and political mentalités of the Revolution than most historians have realised. Though separate orders were preserved at the final meeting of the Estates General, with disastrous consequences for the monarchy, custom was breached by the uniform fashion and broad franchise with which deputies were elected. When the National Assembly was created the orders were dissolved, but much of this semi‐traditional electoral system survived. Assemblies of voters, an indirect, two‐tier process of election and exhaustive balloting were all retained from the past. A pronounced aversion to declared candidatures and electoral canvassing remained equally entrenched. Moreover, radicals drew upon the old‐régime heritage, rather than upon Rousseau, in their use of mandates, oral voting and the pursuit of unanimity at the polls. The revolutionary experiment with elections ultimately faltered in face of apathy and cynicism among voters. This article concludes by suggesting how the electoral legacy of the anden regime inhibited the emergence of a ‘modern political culture’, which is currently hailed as the major achievement of the French Revolution.     

Economic Conditions and the Vote for Incumbent Parties in Russia,Poland, Hungary,Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990 to 1996

An American political scientist employs regional electoral, economic, and demographic data across several transition countries—Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Russia—to examine the effects of economic conditions on the electoral fortunes of thirty-two incumbent political parties in ten parliamentary elections. “Primary Incumbents” and “Other Incumbents” are distinguished in order to analyze how the “Degree of Incumbency” affects the relationship between economic conditions and election results for these two different types of incumbents in post-communist countries. The article points to new questions and methods for examining multiparty elections as well as for the relationship between economic conditions and voting outcomes.     

Social media,civil unrest and government responses: the Zimbabwean experience

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the discontent that increased against the Robert Mugabe led government as a result of grave socio-economic and political grievances, and in the context of accessible social media platforms which mobilised and empowered disenfranchised Zimbabweans to challenge the regime after the 2013 elections. Among other factors, the mounting discontent was caused by the belated payment of civil servants’ salaries, inability to create employment opportunities, refusal to enact electoral reforms, rampant corruption and the introduction of import ban restrictions. This led to the formation of civic organisations which demanded the resignation of Mugabe and these included, but were not limited to, #Tajamuka and #ThisFlag. In response, the Mugabe led government used rigid and repressive measures targeting the protesters, as well as traditional and social media platforms to safeguard itself.     

Election through complaint and controversy for political power in Chile, 1874–1925

SUMMARY

This article offers reflections on the power relations between the executive and legislative branches of the Chilean state by examining the way political parties leveraged the electoral system to balance the weight of each branch in the configuration of government. The period from 1874 to 1924 is framed by a cycle of reforms to Chile’s 1833 constitution that were pushed through by liberal sectors to limit the power of the executive under the country’s presidential regime, efforts that contributed to a final breakdown of the presidential regime following civil war in 1891. That year the victorious revolutionary forces implemented a parliamentarian system that remained in place until it was overthrown by a military coup. The literature on this process has studied the use of legislative manoeuvres such as obstruction, accusation and filibuster by political parties to weaken the executive power. Little has been written, however, about the way parties exploited the rules and procedures of the electoral system and, specifically, the use of official complaints and the process known as calificación (qualification) by which congress audited final election results. This article will help fill that void, focusing on understanding how both practices worked and the effects that the election reforms of 1874, 1884 and 1890 had on them.     

Members of Parliament representing Barcelona during the rise of the Spanish parliamentary system (1834–54)

SUMMARY

The province of Barcelona became one of the major industrial regions at the outset of the first industrial revolution in Spain. The province of Barcelona had a distinctive place in the Spanish monarchy and it was an area where agriculture was the most important economic activity. This situation coincided with the beginning of liberal parliamentarism in Spain and it determined the profile of the Catalan MPs. For this reason, this article explores the profiles of the 85 deputies elected by the province of Barcelona during the period of liberal parliamentarianism (1834–54). The date and place of birth, profession, parliamentary experience and political militancy are examined, as is the development of cursus honorum, the ladder of political career advancement, based on the ‘course of honours/offices’ that operated in ancient Rome for men of senatorial rank and comprised a mixture of administrative and political posts. A quantitative analysis indicates a characteristic profile that is also aligned to a general European pattern. For instance, liberal professionals and public officials were significant in the professional status of the MPs. Besides, this study also considers the issues and questions which attracted the attention of the Catalan MPs and which were also willingly used by the MPs to mobilize public opinion. Furthermore, the MPs chosen by the province of Barcelona during the rise of the parliamentary system acted in an autonomous manner. Important examples of this autonomous political behaviour include the defence of a unitary position concerning industrial issues, military intervention in the province of Barcelona, and with tax policies.     

‘Municipal entrepreneurs’: local politicians and the delivery of urban sanitation in Kumasi,Ghana

ABSTRACT

The municipal government in Kumasi has been the focus of numerous reforms to improve local policymaking and delivery of public goods to the city’s dwellers. Yet, the reforms have spurred strategic reactions from local actors who exploit institutional ambiguities to pursue their interests. This paper draws on empirical data on the city’s sanitation franchising to show how ordinary local politicians exploit reform ambiguities; they establish themselves as local entrepreneurs to deliver urban sanitation services and also contest the municipal executive. The manipulations do not only undermine reforms proffered by the regime and external actors but the municipal government’s promise to deliver efficient public services also becomes problematic. Management of urban sanitation is a contested arena between bureaucrats and political actors all vying for their interests. The sanitation reforms are eventually subsumed under the ‘local politics as usual’ logic.     

Opposition Coordination in Singapore’s 2015 General Elections

Abstract

Recent political science scholarship suggests that when opposition political parties are able to coalesce into a united coalition against an authoritarian regime, they will perform better in authoritarian elections, and can more credibly bargain with the regime for liberalising reforms. Yet, most of this literature pays little attention to the variety of ways in which opposition parties cooperate with each other. Drawing on the literature on the bargaining model of war, the author sketches out a theoretical framework to explain how opposition parties coordinate to develop non-competition agreements. Such agreements entail opposition parties bargaining over which political party should contest or withdraw in which constituencies to ensure straight fights against the dominant authoritarian incumbent in each electoral district. The author then applies this framework to explain opposition coordination in Singapore’s 2015 general elections, focusing on the conflict between the Workers’ Party and the National Solidarity Party.     

Regionalism,personalism, ethnicity,and violence: parties and voter preference in the 2010 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan

On the basis of interviews, census data, and precinct-level electoral results from the October 2010 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan, this paper examines the influences on the party vote in Kyrgyzstan. Instead of traditional socioeconomic variables, this study finds that regionalism (North vs. South), ethnicity, personalism, and violence offered the most compelling explanations of party preference in Central Asia's most competitive election. The paper also examines the contextual factors that constructed and filtered voter demand, from Kyrgyzstan's political and economic conjuncture in 2010 to its unusual party system and electoral rules.     

A real electoral duel between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M.? Analysing constituency-level competitiveness in the 2016 Moroccan elections

ABSTRACT

This article examines electoral competitiveness between the two main contenders in Morocco’s 2016 legislative elections, i.e. the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (P.J.D.) and the pro-monarchy Party of Authenticity and Modernity (P.A.M.). In contrast with electoral results at the national level, which reflect a high parliamentary competitiveness between these two parties, the analysis of competitiveness at the local constituency level (92 electoral districts) leads to quite different conclusions. The degree of local standard competitiveness between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M. was generally very low and, in most of the districts, the Islamists held a large advantage over the P.A.M. Other third parties also played a significant role and became the voters’ first or second choice in some districts, with the effect of increasing parliamentary fragmentation and decreasing competitiveness between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M. Thus, the proportional system used in a large number of districts contributed to achieving the monarchy’s aim of avoiding a predominant party. Also, the central role played by the loyalist National Rally of Independents (R.N.I.) in blocking the coalition government talks after the elections questions the idea that the Moroccan party system is becoming polarized between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M.     

Die Lassersche Wahlrechtsreform. Der Kampf um die Einführung der Volkswahl des cisleithanischen Abgeordnetenhauses 1871–1873

SUMMARY

After the creation of the Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary in 1867, the 17 kingdoms and provinces with a population of over 20 million gathered in the (Cisleithanian) Austrian half comprised a multitude of nationalities. Since 1861 they had been represented in the imperial council (Reichsrat) consisting of an aristocratic upper house and a lower house of representatives from the 17 local diets. The local diets were a modified form of Estates, with a first house of large landlords, a second house elected by those entitled to vote in urban elections, in some cases a third house for trade and craft bodies, and another house for rural communities. Many of these elections were also indirect and based on a property qualification, and bishops and others sat by right in the local diets. Deputies from the local diets to the imperial council were chosen in a variety of ways. Despite previous demands for direct elections, this remained only to a limited extent a constitutional monarchy. The non-German nationalities had an overall majority in the population but were severely underrepresented in the House of Deputies (Abgeordnetenhaus) and divided among themselves. The self-imposed absence of several of them from its sessions gave force to the demands for electoral reform and put pressure on the Emperor to grant concessions. Complex negotiations with the parties and changes of government led to the ministry in 1871 of Adolph Fürst Auersperg, who appointed Joseph Freiherr Lasser von Zollheim as Interior Minister with the task of completing the electoral reform. Thomas Olechowski proposes in this article that the measures eventually introduced in 1873, hitherto ‘nameless’, be named the Lasser Electoral Reform, on the analogy of later reforms named in the literature after their progenitors. Lasser resisted pressure for a more open constitution from the liberals who held an effective majority in the newly elected House of Deputies, but not the required two-thirds for constitutional change. It also proved difficult to satisfy the national elements in the Empire, especially Czechs and Poles, and hard-fought local elections accompanied the stages in introducing reform. Among many detailed plans publicly aired was one by Eduard Herbst which would have reduced the electoral advantage of the richest elements, but Lasser was able to recruit Herbst to help formulate his own more conservative proposals. Lasser's concern was to take the election of deputies away from the local diets, not to broaden the franchise nor alter the existing balance of power between countries and classes, and the Emperor too wanted minimal reform. Where popular unrest broke out, military force soon suppressed it. The withdrawal of a large Galician contingent from the debate in the House of Deputies failed to stop the legislation. The end result was only a small change in the balance between the provinces and a modest reduction in the representation of large landlords. Only 6 per cent of the population received the vote, with that of a large landlord counting 140 times that of a member of a rural community. Even so, the now directly elected imperial council proved less compliant than its predecessor, and new electoral reforms were to broaden the franchise in 1882, 1895 and 1907.     

Reign-seeking and the Rise of the Unelected in Thailand

ABSTRACT

This article develops the concept of “reign-seeking” to capture the unprecedented collective action of the Thai professional and official elite prior to the 2014 military coup and the establishment of a military regime. It argues that this phenomenon reflects broad and deep political dynamics, for which the dominant scholarship on authoritarianism and Thai politics cannot adequately explain. The changing incentives of these supposedly non-partisan actors are interwoven with neo-liberal governance reform driven by a desire for depoliticisation and the minimisation of rent-seeking. This idea has been rationalised in Thailand since the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution resulting in the rise of technocratic and judicial bodies designed to discipline elected politicians and political parties. However, such institutional reconfigurations have consolidated the incentive for people considering themselves to be prospective candidates to “reign” in these organisations. As evident in the 2014 coup, these unconventional political actors – academics, doctors and civil society leaders – made collective efforts to topple the elected government in exchange for gaining selection into the wide range of unelected bodies. Governance reform in Thailand has hitherto reinforced the status quo, although the article further argues that reign-seekers should be seen as contingent, rather than consistent, authoritarians.     

Primaries vs. Quotas: Gender and Candidate Nominations in Mexico, 2003

Parties throughout Latin America have recently addressed two distinct kinds of electoral reforms: primary elections and national-level gender quota laws. This study examines how these reforms interact, their mutual compatibility, and their effect on the nomination of men compared to that of women. It develops a series of hypotheses about this relationship by analyzing the 2003 legislative elections in Mexico, a case in which the three main parties relied on both gender quotas and primaries to select their candidates. Although the percentage of women elected to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies rose, the Federal Electoral Institute interpreted the gender quota law in a way that weakened its effect on women and limited the degree of openness in the primaries that were held.