CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND THE TREATMENT OF PAKISTAN’S RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Although Pakistan was created as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims, religious freedom was one of its founding principles. Seventy years later, Pakistan is better known for religious extremism and the persecution of Muslim and non-Muslim religious minorities. Pakistan's blasphemy law is a state-sanctioned tool of religious oppression used to target members of minority faith communities whether Ahmadiya, Christian, Hindu, or Shiite, as well as Sunnis who criticize the law. This paper discusses the blasphemy law and other laws that have led to the state of religious oppression in Pakistan.     

IDENTITIES AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN: A STUDY OF MENTALITY

This paper examines Pakistan's identity as a state, a religious community, a developmental enterprise, and a primordial society. It argues that over time Pakistan's state and developmental identities have weakened while its religious and primordial identities have gained in strength. This change in the balance has grave implications for Pakistan in terms of the working of the state and its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. There is therefore a need to rehabilitate the state and developmental identities at a functional level, which means investing in improving the quality of governance and policy planning in Pakistan over the long-term.     

The conflict in China

The Kashmir question is felt by many to be beyond resolution. As many again regard it as a situation wherein the status quo of on-going violence is now a ‘conflict industry’ with too much vested interest in play for any genuine avenues of negotiation to be pursued. The Kashmir Valley seems to have joined the long list of often forgotten Balkanised stories about unresolved hostilities written around the themes of geopolitics and jingoistic nationalism. The psychotherapist Justine Hardy looks at the question from another point of view, that of the psychological state of the people of Kashmir, the real stakeholders in any possible agreement between Pakistan and India over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. She presents the case for adding another approach to those that appear to have stalled along the way.     

MYANMAR: RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

This article examines the experience of religious minorities in Myanmar between 2011 and 2017 in the context of the 2008 constitution and a new system of governance. It highlights the precarity of religious minorities and argues that neither the constitution nor the state were reliable sources of protection or redress during this period. The first section considers the multiple identities of religious minorities with regard to citizenship and national belonging. The second section elucidates how an enabling environment for Buddhist nationalism emerged and what types of actions state and non-state actors have taken with regard to religious minorities. The final section addresses the 2008 constitution and rule of law in Myanmar in order to understand the challenges for religious minorities in securing justice and protection.     

UNPACKING THE BLASPHEMY LAWS OF PAKISTAN

Over the years, Pakistan's notorious blasphemy laws have been a central instrument for the persecution of religious minorities. While these laws are colonial in origin, they exist today within the context of a general Islamisation of laws, which combined with the state's inability to hold a monopoly over violence have contributed to growing anarchy in the country. This paper traces the evolution of Pakistan's religious nationalism, presents debates around the blasphemy laws and their implementation, and considers the possibilities for reform.     

MEDIA,IDENTITY, AND STRUGGLE IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHINA

The experience of international migration is generally found to turn migrants into culturally hybrid communities. Yet, migrant communities often hold on to their religious moorings even as they relocate. From the 1970s onwards, the emerging leadership of Hindu settlers in Denmark consciously tried to transfer with them what they saw to be key aspects of Hinduism as they migrated to Denmark. In 1985, Hindus organized a major conference to position the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) as the umbrella organization for Hinduism in Denmark. Later on they established a Temple of Indians called Bharatiya Mandir to provide a place of worship for local Hindus. The philosophy behind the temple conformed to the nondenominational Hindu nationalist vision of Hindus as a unified community. This article, which contrasts the aim of Hindu nationalism with the on-the-ground realities of Hindu mobilization in Denmark, reveals that two major factions spearheaded Hindu nationalist endeavors in Denmark from the 1980s until 2006. The two factions successfully launched several projects, and even collaborated in their execution, but the initiatives were beset with rivalries that hampered the communal unity they had set out to achieve. The authors analyze this factional rivalry as an expression of Indian political culture, arguing that tensions among Hindu activists in Denmark is an instance of the political factionalism prevalent in the Indian subcontinent. The unintended emergence of such factionalism represents the successful transfer of a core element of Indian political culture to a new locale through Hindu nationalist politics. The authors base their argument on field observations since the 1980s, recent interviews with key religious players, and more than two hundred pages of written materials that offer a rare entry point to the study of Hindu nationalism ex situ.     

Class,nation and religion: changing nature of Akali Dal politics in Punjab,India

The Akali Dal is the best organised political party in Punjab and has ruled over Punjab for a longer period than any other political party since the creation of the Punjabi-speaking state in 1966. It articulates aspirations of Punjabi regional nationalism along with trying to protect the interests of the Sikhs as a religious minority in India and abroad. As a part of shaping Punjab's economic future, it deals with the pressures of Indian and global capitalism. This paper is an attempt to track the multi-faceted pressures of class, religion and nationalism in the way Akali Dal negotiates its politics in Indian federalism.     

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Abstract

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990.

Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. ¹ 1. See, e.g., Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–110; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 133–170; Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 109–124; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in D. R. SarDesai and G. C. Raju Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 63–84, at pp. 82–83; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 197–198. A considerable literature exists regarding nuclear weapons’ general effects on the South Asian security environment. Scholars optimistic that nuclear weapons will help to pacify South Asia include Waltz, “For Better”; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order”; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002). Scholars pessimistic as to nuclear weapons’ likely effects on the regional security environment include Scott D. Sagan, “For the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2001), pp. 15–36; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 781–793; S. R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (United States: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 263–273. This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world.

This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war.

Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.     

Discourse and Mediation in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958

The Lebanese constitutional crisis and civil war of 1958 were caused by a combination of domestic and international factors such as Arab nationalism, Cold War strategic thinking, and the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun's unpopular intention to amend the constitution to enable him to stand for re-election. This article argues that the crisis was resolved primarily thanks to the efforts of moderate Lebanese politicians and religious leaders. American mediators were involved in mediation attempts, but their contribution to the resolution of the conflict was made possible by the continuous efforts of the Lebanese themselves.     

Challenging Bipolarity: The Socialist International and the ‘Chilean Democratic Cause’ during the Cold War

This article analyses, the Socialist International's (SI) new international positioning strategies from a transnational perspective, through its relationship with the Chilean cause in the context of the Cold War détente. Focus will be placed on the SI's strong commitment to the Chilean democratic cause after the coup and its sustained activism during the military regime. Drawing from primary sources in various international archives, this article's main goal is to shed light on the SI's positioning regarding Latin America as a way to challenge the bipolar order.     

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEATH CULT IN 1930s JAPAN AND THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOM BOMB

In the 1930s Japan developed a death cult which had a profound effect on the conduct of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific War, 1941–1945. As a result of government directed propaganda campaign after the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the ruling military cliques restored an Imperial system of government which placed Emperor Meiji as the Godhead central to the constitution and spiritual life of the Japanese nation. A bastardised Bushido cult emerged. It combined with a Social-Darwinist belief in Japan's manifest destiny to dominate Asia. The result was a murderous brutality that became synonymous with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and conquered civilians. Japan's death cult was equally driven by a belief in self-sacrifice characterised by suicidal Banzai charges and kamikaze attacks. The result was kill ratios of Japanese troops in the Pacific War that were unique in the history of warfare. Even Japanese civilians were expected to sacrifice their lives in equal measure in the defence of the homeland. It was for this reason that American war planners came to the shocking estimate that as many as 900,000 Allied troops could die in the conquest of mainland Japan – Operation DOWNFALL. Contrary to the view of numbers of revisionist historians in the post-war period, who have variously argued that the atom bombs were used to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Francis Pike, author of Hirohito's War, The Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 [Bloomsbury 2015] reaffirms that the nuclear weapon was used for one purpose alone – to bring the war to a speedy end and to save the lives of American troops.     

Establishment of state religion and requirements for public office

SUMMARY

There is a significant body of work on the broad question of the relationship between a positive affirmation of religion and the state. Scholars largely agree that a close relationship between religion and the state influences both political processes and state structures although the nature and extent of the impact and its direction remains an open question. While engaging this topic, the article deviates from the standard approach by looking not to the religious makeup of a country's citizens but to a country's constitution. The result is that countries fall into one of three categories based on a state's orientation toward state-established religion: first, countries that affirm establishment; second, countries that forbid establishment; and lastly, countries that are silent on the issue. Utilizing a dataset of all 186 of the world's written constitutions to analyze the variation in the requirements for office of each of these three groups, the following hypotheses are posed: First, constitutional requirements affirm political culture and as such, one can expect similar types of requirement use within each of the three populations above. Second, there should be variance in requirement use across the three populations. Lastly, the greater the difference between political cultures, the greater the difference between requirements used. Our findings largely affirm the hypotheses with some interesting nuances. For example, countries with state-established religions tend to require adherence to religious standards but have few additional requirements. Countries that forbid establishment use a set of requirements that serve to frustrate a government official's effort to consolidate political power. Tentatively, this suggests a relationship between the nature of requirements used for public office and authoritarian tendencies. This finding warrants further research.     

SHAIKH HASINA'S VISIT TO INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Shaikh Hasina's crushing victory in the December 2008 Bangladesh elections opened a new chapter in her country's relations with Delhi. India had long wanted improvements in cooperation against terrorism and better access to the states of North East India, Bangladesh needed better cooperation over water resources and the trade imbalance. Shaikh Hasina's swift action against insurgent groups trying to operate against India from Bangladesh territory laid the foundations for her very successful visit to India in early 2010 which in turn set the framework for a better future relationship. But in the light of the hostility of many in Bangladesh to improved relations with India, the author examines the options for Indian policy makers. He concludes that the emphasis should be on achieving progress in areas outside security, where progress would be irreversible, while recognising that a real transformation of the relationship would be possible if Shaikh Hasina was able to win the next elections and secure a further term in office.     

Notes on South Asia in Crisis

Abstract

Louis Dumont has argued persuasively that the concept of caste is not simply a form of social stratification, but a way of looking at society as a whole. Dumont argues that the “Western mind” sees society as the relationship between individuals and the mass, but that the “Indian mind” sees relationships between groups (castes) and social unity. This holistic concept of Indian society is essentially religious, for it is based on beliefs and values which reflect a sacred order, undergird religious institutions, and are the subjects of religious texts. At the heart of these beliefs and values are the Hindu concepts of purity/pollution, and the karmic cycle of birth and rebirth. Both of these concepts are intimately related to the notion of Untouchability; and without them, the caste system would lose its religious legitimacy. The question, then, is whether the Untouchables accept this logic, or whether it is forced upon them.     

Sudhir Kakar and the Socio‐Psychological Explanation of Hindu‐Muslim Communal Riots in India

Concentrated principally in four of twenty‐eight Indian states, there have been more than 33,000 Hindu‐Muslim riots since 1947. Scholars have differently explained communal violence. Some have argued that there are innate qualities in Indian society which encourage what Donald Horowitz calls “deadly ethnic riot”. Psychoanalysts have wondered if proneness to violence is ingrained in India's religion‐based culture. After assessing several existing explanatory paradigms, I examine the legitimacy of psychoanalysis and some selected aspects of other explanations, arguing that both the rational and psychological theories help explain Hindu‐Muslim conflict. I submit that Sudhir Kakar, who worked with Erik Erikson at Harvard and trained at the Sigmund Freud Institute in Frankfurt, unduly follows the elitist French social psychologist, Gustave Le Bon (1895), to present violent communities as undifferentiated masses. Specifically, Kakar's contention that Hindu males are psychologically socialized by confrontational religious values deserves close scrutiny. Methodologically, drawing on the postmodern thesis of the de‐centered subject and minimizing the significance of the master narrative, I conclude that primordial ancient hatred is not programmed in India, arguing that Kakar's insights do not speak to religion's truth, but do help us understand its manifestation and political psychology.     

COW PROTECTION AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN INDIA: REASSESSING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Recent efforts to prevent cow-slaughter in India have prompted U.S. concern about violations of religious freedom. But although the politics of cow protection poses a significant threat to disadvantaged groups in India, efforts to ameliorate that threat through an international policy of religious freedom also carry serious risks. This paper reviews reports issued by the U.S. Department of State's Office of International Religious Freedom and by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. It argues that by unnecessarily portraying the politics of cow protection in terms of a stark conflict between Hindus and Muslims, they threaten to undermine the goal of reducing anti-minority discrimination and violence in India.     

Operation Lal Dora: India's Aborted Military Intervention in Mauritius

Abstract

As India expands its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, it will need friends that it can count on. The island state of Mauritius has long been one of India's closest allies in the region. This article discusses India's plans for a military intervention in Mauritius in 1983 to prevent a feared coup that may have threatened India's interests. A naval task force was readied, but the intervention did not proceed because of disagreements in India's leadership. Instead New Delhi facilitated a political solution to the crisis that firmly consolidated its special role. This previously undisclosed episode sheds light on India's thinking about the Indian Ocean, the alignment of India's interests with the United States, and India's military capabilities.