Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What thePhilosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’,I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived hisinterpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theoryof meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’.In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that hecommitted the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact thathe considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’,‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—inLaw's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each,he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning,which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal conceptof law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I arguethat Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacyis itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacypervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.     

Dutch Courts' Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes

On 14 October 2005, The Hague District Court sentenced two Afghanasylum seekers for their role and participation in the tortureof civilians during the Afghan War of 1978–1992. The Courtheld in both cases that it had ‘universal jurisdiction’over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventionsand that the accused were guilty of ‘torment’ (‘foltering’)and torture as a war crime (‘marteling’). The jurisdictionalbasis relied upon by the Court and the Court's legal reasoningin both cases is open to criticism.     

International Law and Detention of US Asylum Seekers: Contrasting Matter of D-J- with the United Nations Refugee Convention

US refugee law reflects an ever-increasing conception that theapplication of international standards would constitute an unacceptablerisk to national security. CSR Article 31(2)’s requirementthat refugees ‘shall not’ be detained unless ‘necessary’appears among the chief casualties of such suspicions. US jurisprudenceremains strikingly devoid of reference to Article 31, and 2003’sMatter of D-J- is a prime example. D-J- was an administrativedecision in which the US Attorney General held that nationalsecurity required all US asylum seekers who successfully arrivevia boat must be subject to mandatory detention throughout thecourse of removal proceedings. Despite US accession to the Protocol,Article 31(2) was not mentioned. This article explores what might have happened to D-J- if theRefugee Convention had indeed been applied to his case. Utilizingthe international methodology for treaty interpretation, itapplies Article 31(2) to various aspects of the Attorney General'sdecision. Part 2 argues that under the Supreme Court's CharmingBetsy rule, statutory discretion to detain must be interpretedconsistently with US international obligations. Part 3 concludesthat Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention grants asylum seekersa right to release whenever their detention is not ‘necessary’.Part 4 proposes a three-part ‘pyramid’ approachto explain the elemental phases of the decision to detain anasylum seeker and examines necessity at each stage. Finally,Part 5 discusses Article 31(2)’s implications regardingevidence and proportion. The premise throughout is that, hadit been applied, the Refugee Convention could have protectedthe interests of both D-J- and ‘national security’.     

Shadows in Paradise - Exploring Non-Refoulement as an Open Concept

The principle of non-refoulement contains a paradox. While stateshave committed to respecting the principle by joining the 1951Refugee Convention and key human rights conventions, its contentis not established in international law. In other words, stateshave committed to a principle the content of which is indeterminate.Since no common definition exists, in practice, national andinternational bodies have extensive powers of discretion togive content to the terms ‘persecution’, ‘torture’,‘degrading’ or ‘cruel’ treatment. Thepurpose of this article is to explore non-refoulement as anopen and ambiguous concept. Acknowledgement of the indeterminacyis important, as open concepts never remain such in practicebut are always issued with content or interpreted. This approachcalls for a further question: how do interpretations come aboutand what kind of factors influence them? The conclusion of thearticle is that different national and international actorspromote their own ‘correct’ interpretations of thiskeystone of refugee protection.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

All the best things come to those who wait

‘A book may be good for nothing; or there may be onlyone thing in it worth knowing; are we to read it all through?’(Samuel Johnson) This section is dedicated to the review of ideas, articles,books, films and other media. It will include replies (and rejoinders)to articles, the evaluation of new ideas or proposals, and reviewsof books and articles both directly and indirectly related tointellectual property law. In 1966, Professor Benjamin Kaplan gave the Carpentier Lecturesat Columbia University. His subject was copyright law and eachof his three lectures examined a different aspect of that subject.The first looked at the ‘First Three Hundred and FiftyYears’, the second at ‘Plagiarism Reexamined’,and the final at ‘Proposals and Prospects’. Theselectures were     

WTO for Trade and Development Post-Doha

The WTO Members’ negotiations under the Doha mandate onspecial and differential treatment (‘SDT’) and developmentissues have made little progress. The gap between developedcountries and developing countries in this regard seems toowide to be bridged. This gap originates from a fundamental differencein their basic stances on cross-cutting issues. In principle,without prejudice to currently available SDT under individualWTO Agreements, developing countries should be given flexibilitiesin implementing WTO rules, which may result in the rebalancingof rights and obligations of WTO Members but only when policymeasures at issue can contribute to particular developing countries’development needs and no alternative less-trade restrictivemeasures are reasonably available. After reviewing WTO Members’discussions since the adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,this article suggests a ‘measure-specific ex ante approach’for a workable solution to bridging the gap between developedcountries and developing countries on SDT and development issues.     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

Trustees beware: submit with care

The Royal Court of Jersey has recently heard an interestingapplication reported in Jersey as In the Matter of CI Law TrusteesLimited and Folio Trust Company Limited as Trustees of the FountainTrust [2005 JRC099]. The case concerned an application for directions by CI Law TrusteesLimited (the ‘Trustee’) seeking directions as tohow to respond to a judgement of the Family Division of theHigh Court of Justice in England and Wales setting aside a Jerseylaw trust (the ‘Trust’) as a sham, and orderingthe Trustee to transfer the Trust assets to the petitioner inthe English matrimonial proceedings (the ‘Wife’).     

Does the 'Personal Employment Contract' Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment Law?

This article considers Mark Freedland's idea, at the core ofThe Personal Employment Contract, that a unified body of employmentlaw for ‘employees’ and ‘workers’ isboth feasible and desirable. It discusses the origins of thedivision between employees and the self-employed, and considerswhether the rediscovery of the worker concept in the 1990s hasprovided the hoped-for solution to problems concerning the coverageof employment legislation. More generally, it seeks to takeup Freedland's challenge to reconceptualise the employment relationshipas a ‘personal employment contract’ covering bothemployees and the dependent self-employed.     

The Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998: is it still afloat?

Legal context. The Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (‘VHDPA’or ‘Act’) is a unique form of industrial designprotection under US law, part of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct 1998. Congress provided this sui generis form of protectionin response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boatsv Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. This statute has been underutilizeddue to the difficulty in proving infringement, as unintendedconsequences were caused by the way ‘hull’ was originallydefined under the Act. A bill is pending in Congress that addresseshow a ‘hull’ is defined, eliminating any inclusionof ‘deck’ features, when passed, registrants shouldbe able to pursue infringers with greater success. Key points. The recreational boat manufacturing industry hasbeen plagued by low-cost boat makers who think nothing of takinga competitor's boat hull design, and using it as a ‘plug’to make a casting for their own unauthorized manufacturing use,a counterfeiting technique known in the trade as ‘splashing’a hull. In the eight years since enactment, the boating industryhas generally overlooked this form of intellectual propertyprotection due to the difficulty in proving infringement—thatis likely to change soon. Practical significance. The Act includes the right to excludeothers from making, having made, importing, offering for sale,or using in any trade, any boat hull embodying the protectedhull design. The Act provides compensatory recovery for damagesas well as injunctive relief. The newly revised Act has thepotential to provide a low-cost and effective form of intellectualproperty protection for recreational boat manufacturers whobuild hulls from moulded fibreglass or similar materials.     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.     

The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law

The question of how the ‘border’ is conceived ininternational law, and how it shapes identity and peoples’lives, remains largely unexplored in the international legalliterature. This article seeks to contribute to our understandingof the meaning of the border in international law, and in thecontemporary context, by drawing on the work of the philosopherand political theorist, Étienne Balibar, and by reflecting,in the light of his work, on the recent decision of the Houseof Lords in R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. It isshown that international law's focus on the territorial bordermay render invisible other borders which are significant forsubaltern groups, and thereby fail to address the manner inwhich borders affect lives and determine outcomes. Borders arenot stable and ‘univocal’, but instead, ‘multiple’,shifting in meaning and function from group to group. They arealso being ‘exported’ such that a person may experiencea foreign border while still within the territory of their owncountry. In highlighting the multiplicity of borders, the articleseeks to prompt further reflection on the articulation and applicationof norms of international law in a way that addresses the realitiesof the contemporary context.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

The Myth of 'Rebalancing' Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice

It is generally assumed that trade retaliation under the WTOperforms some kind of ‘rebalancing’ by allowingthe injured Member to suspend ‘concessions and obligations’vis-à-vis the violating Member of a level equivalentto the level of ‘nullification and impairment’ sufferedby the injured Member. This article argues that this perceptionis misguided. The article first questions if a sensible comparatorexists with which equivalence for purposes of ‘rebalancing’could be evaluated. It then argues that WTO arbitration decisionsdo not even succeed in their limited goal of providing for retaliationthat will affect trade in the same amount as the WTO-inconsistentmeasure at issue. One reason is the use of an asymmetric andunderspecified trade effects comparator. The other reason isvery significant miscalculation of the trade effects of theviolation, as shown by detailed legal-economic analysis of allrelevant arbitration decisions. The decisions concerning countermeasuresagainst prohibited export subsidies do not make any attemptat ‘rebalancing’ in the first place. The articleconsiders political explanations of arbitration decisions. Itconcludes with some suggestions for improvement.     

The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law

Recent work in both the theory of the firm and of corporatelaw has called into question the appropriateness of analysingcorporate law as ‘merely’ a set of standard formcontracts. This article develops these ideas by focusing onproperty law's role in underpinning corporate enterprise. Rightsto control assets are a significant mechanism of governancein the firm. However, their use in this way predicates somearrangement for stipulating which parties will have controlunder which circumstances. It is argued that ‘propertyrules’—a category whose scope is determined functionally—protectthe entitlements of parties to such sharing arrangements againsteach other's opportunistic attempts to grant conflicting entitlementsto third parties. At the same time, the legal system uses arange of strategies to minimize the costs such protection imposeson third parties. The choice of strategy significantly affectsco-owners’ freedom to customize their control-sharingarrangements. This theory is applied to give an account of the‘proprietary foundations’ of corporate law, whichhas significant implications for the way in which the subject'sfunctions are understood and evaluated.     

A good introduction to publishing

Hugh Jones and Christopher Benson's book entitled, simply, PublishingLaw seeks to provide a useful and straightforward guide to copyrightlaw in the field of publishing. The accolades on the back statethat it is ‘an excellent, accessible, one-stop legal reference’and that it is ‘an invaluable resource for those practisingor studying the business of publishing’. Such praise bodeswell. The great tomes on copyright present a standard that is difficultto achieve. Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria     

Part One of the Employment Act 2008: 'Better' Dispute Resolution?

This article will analyse Part One of the Employment Act 2008on employment dispute resolution and in particular the repealof the statutory workplace dispute resolution procedures onlyfour years after Regulations implemented them. It will beginby considering the background of increasing tribunal caseloadthat led to their introduction in the first place. Later sectionswill examine the replacement of these statutory procedures withwhat Ministers described as the triple package of a new AdvisoryConciliation and Arbitration Service (‘ACAS’) helpline,increased ACAS conciliation and a revised ACAS Code. The languageof repeal and the Act's reintroduction of the Polkey line ofcases might suggest that dismissal law is merely reverting backto its pre October 2004 position. This article will, however,conclude that Part One does not just ‘simplify’dismissal law, or ‘return’ the law to September2004 or indeed to any other time frame. Instead, it weakenskey procedural protections for employees potentially by conflatingthe 2002 Act's different tests of ‘automatically’unfair and ‘ordinarily’ unfair dismissals, for example.Lowering standards of procedural justice is significant in itselfbut this takes added importance for dismissed employees as tribunalsrarely investigate the substantive fairness of dismissals.     

The Contract for Intermittent Employment

This article further develops the concept of the ‘contractfor intermittent employment’ set out by Freedland in ThePersonal Employment Contract, and explores its potential toalleviate the plight of casual workers in today's labour market.