The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: judicial standards of wrongfulness since M'Naghten

In insanity defense litigation, the precise legal definition of wrongfulness is often critically important. References in the M'Naghten Rules to the appropriate standard of wrongfulness were ambiguous, resulting in a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether wrongfulness means legal wrong, subjective moral wrong, or objective moral wrong. This article reviews and analyzes these three judicial standards of wrongfulness in the context of case law from jurisdictions that follow each of the respective standards. The evolution of knowledge of right and wrong tests of criminal responsibility is traced back to its philosophical roots. Most psychiatrists claim no expertise in matters of morality or law. The American Psychiatric Association would bar psychiatric expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, on the grounds that there are "impermissible leaps in logic" when psychiatrists opine on the probable relationship between medical concepts and moral-legal constructs. Whether or not they testify on the ultimate issue, psychiatrists should ascertain the applicable standard of wrongfulness in order to properly relate their findings to the relevant legal criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of their testimony.     

The impact of general versus specific expert testimonyand eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgment

Subjects (n=128) initially viewed an eyewitness of high or low confidence. Subsequently, participants viewed a psychologist who gave either espert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, specific expert testimony, or no expert (control) testimony. Subjects viewing expert testimony believed the eyewitness identified the gunman significantly less often, gave the defendant lower guilt ratings, estimated a lower general percentage of correct identifications under similar circumstances, estimated a lower percentage of general accurate eyewitness testimony, and gave significantly lower ratings to the belief that one can generally tell from eyewitness confidence whether an eyewitness is accurate than subjects in control conditions. Significant differences were also obtained between general and specific expert testimony. Participants viewing specific expert testimony estimated lower general percentages of correct identifications under the circumstances of the crime and reported relying more upon the psychologist's testimony than subjects viewing general expert testimony. Additionally, subjects viewing general expert testimony had significantly less confidence in their gunman vs. innocent person decision than subjects in specific testimony or control conditions. Subjects who viewed the high confidence eyewitness decided that the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman more often, gave the defendant higher guilt ratings, and estimated the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony to be significantly higher than jurors in low eyewitness confidence groups. The finding that jurors may continue to rely on eyewitness confidence to gauge the accuracy of the witness even after viewing expert testimony is discussed.     

失范鉴定人将面临的三份监管“黑名单”

鉴定意见是重要的诉讼证据,是法官发现事实真相的得力助手,但失范鉴定意见则起着相反的作用。近期全国人大常委会、最高人民法院、国家市场监督管理总局分别发文,对鉴定主体展开信用管理,对于存在失信失范行为的鉴定主体,纳入黑名单进行管理,需引起鉴定机构和鉴定人的重视。     

论翻供问题

翻供是涉案当事人推翻原来口供的行为。口供本身具有复杂性。翻供具有两重性,一方面其增加了诉讼成本,是消极的;另一方面,翻供可能接近案件事实,避免冤假错案,又具有积极性。翻供的一般原因,有侦讯双方的“失误”;非法取供,导致乱供;侦办程序有缺陷,证据材料有漏洞;监管不力,引发翻供等。对翻供材料的审查,应从内外因素进行,审查是先有供还是先有证,最后确定其真伪。减少翻供的对策,首先,要保持平和心态,正确对待翻供;其次,用律师在场、全程录音录像等遏制非法取供;再者,要问清细节,锁死口供;最后,要强化证据体系,使人证物证相互印证。翻供是疑犯辩解权的一部分,可用以阻断错案,化消极因素为积极因素。     

Expert psychological testimony

Experimental psychologists increasingly are asked to give expert testimony in court, especially with regard to issues of eyewitness reliability. Whether or not experimental psychologists should give expert testimony on these matters is a controversial issue. The empirical literature suggests that potential jurors do not have a good understanding of the variables influencing eyewitness accuracy and that they cannot discriminate adequately between accurate and false eyewitness identification testimony. Experiments using expert testimony as a treatment variable, however, have not made a definitive case that expert testimony can benefit trial outcomes. The question of whether or not to give expert testimony must be broadened to consider not only the effects on verdicts but also the effects of expert testimony on the process by which verdicts are reached, the practices of police in subsequent investigations, the public's view of psychology, the practices of judges in subsequent cases, and the interaction between expert testimony and research activities.     

Considering forensic science: individual differences,opposing expert testimony and juror decision making

Two experimental studies examined the effect of opposing expert testimony on perceptions of the reliability of unvalidated forensic evidence (anthropometric facial comparison). In the first study argument skill and epistemological sophistication were included as measures of individual differences, whereas study two included scores on the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale. In both studies participants were assigned to groups who heard: (1) no expert testimony, (2) prosecution expert testimony, or (3) prosecution and opposing expert testimony. Opposing expert testimony affected verdict choice, but this effect was mediated by perceptions of reliability of the initial forensic expert's method. There was no evidence for an effect on verdict or reliability ratings by argument skill or epistemology. In the second experiment, the same mediation effect was found, however scores on one subscale from the FEEBS and age also affected both verdict and methodological reliability. It was concluded that opposing expert testimony may inform jurors, but perceptions of the reliability of forensic evidence affect verdict, and age and bias towards forensic science influence perceptions of forensic evidence. Future research should investigate individual differences that may affect perception or bias towards forensic sciences under varying conditions of scientific reliability.     

Educating Jurors about Forensic Evidence: Using an Expert Witness and Judicial Instructions to Mitigate the Impact of Invalid Forensic Science Testimony

Invalid expert witness testimony that overstated the precision and accuracy of forensic science procedures has been highlighted as a common factor in many wrongful conviction cases. This study assessed the ability of an opposing expert witness and judicial instructions to mitigate the impact of invalid forensic science testimony. Participants (N = 155) acted as mock jurors in a sexual assault trial that contained both invalid forensic testimony regarding hair comparison evidence, and countering testimony from either a defense expert witness or judicial instructions. Results showed that the defense expert witness was successful in educating jurors regarding limitations in the initial expert's conclusions, leading to a greater number of not-guilty verdicts. The judicial instructions were shown to have no impact on verdict decisions. These findings suggest that providing opposing expert witnesses may be an effective safeguard against invalid forensic testimony in criminal trials.     

Two conjectures about the issue of expert testimony

This article responds to concerns about expert testimony in experimental psychology by conjectur that disagreements about the propriety of the testimony are camouflaged arguments about the strength of psychological knowledge. Differences between proponents and opponents of expert testimony are about the state of psychological knowledge and certainty, rather than about the proper standard for psychologists to use when deciding whether to testify. A second conjecture is stimulated by the assumption that laypersons generally overvalue eyewitness testimony and that expert psychological testimony is a required corrective. The truth of this assumption rests on the debatable assertions that eyewitness identifications, without more, are potent sole determinants of trial outcome, and that lay juries need instruction from experimental psychologists about aspects of human behavior of which the jurors are definitive producers and consumers. One need not resolve these debates in order to understand that psychologists should not rely on the legal community to set the psychologists' standards for expert testimony. And psychologists, in considering their role as courtroom experts, should guard against a self-serving critique of the acumen of lay juries.     

The effects of complainant age and expert psychological testimony in a simulated child sexual abuse trial

Mock jurors viewed a videotape of a simulated child sexual abuse trial and then deliberated to a unanimous verdict. The complainant was described as either a 13- or 17-year-old female child. Jurors voted to convict more often when the younger complainant was seen, and the younger complainant was rated as more credible than the older complainant. Female jurors voted the defendant guilty more often and rated the complainant as being more credible than male jurors. Jurors voted to convict more often and rated the defendant as less credible when expert psychological testimony was specific to the case than when they were presented with either general expert testimony or no expert testimony. Jurors who saw a psychological expert testify became less accepting of child sexual abuse misconceptions than those in the no expert control condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.Millbrook Correctional Centre     

Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy on jury decisions

To determine the influence of expert testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitnesses, a two-phase study was conducted. In the first phase, 24 community residents served as jurors on four six-person juries. A burglary case was tried in 120 District Court. El Paso, Texas. Two juries heard all the evidence including the expert testimony of a psychologist and the other two heard all of the testimony except that of the psychologist. During the second phase, 24 student jurors constituting four six-person juries viewed a videotape of the trial. Two of these juries saw the entire proceeding from the first phase including the expert testimony and the remaining two saw all but the expert testimony. All juries acquitted the defendant; however, those who heard the expert testimony significantly lowered their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification as well as its overall importance to the trial. Further, those juries that heard the expert testimony spent a significantly longer time discussing eyewitness identification as well as other relevant evidence. No differences between community residents and college student juries were obtained.The authors wish to thank Judge Brunson Moore, Mr. David Jeans, Mr. Ricky Glenn Smith, Detective James Christianson, D. Steven Cooper, Rachel Hanna, Daniel Torres, and Patricia Tetreault. All of these people participated in the trial and without them this research could not have been conducted. This research was supported by Gift Funds of the Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso.     

Expert psychiatric evidence in sexual misconduct cases before state medical boards.

The growing problem of physician sexual misconduct has captured the attention not only of the medical and legal communities, but of the public as well. State medical boards, administrative agencies with generous rules of evidence and varying levels of expertise, face the difficult task of responding to patients' allegations of physician sexual abuse. This Article, based in large part on the author's survey of current state medical board practice, reveals an increasing reliance on expert psychiatric testimony to explain the behavior of complainants and accused physicians. Drawing analogies from the use of psychiatric evidence in child sexual abuse cases, the author examines the factors that boards must consider in determining the admissibility of expert testimony in physician sexual misconduct cases, and calls upon states to establish clear evidentiary rules to govern the use of such testimony in administrative hearings.     

Dueling experts and imperfect verification

In the Dueling Experts Game, adversarial experts strategically produce “good” or “bad” evidence to support their partisan testimony. Good evidence is probative while bad evidence has no evidentiary value. The new feature of this Game is that Judge sometimes erroneously identifies good evidence as bad evidence and vice versa. Along the Game’s equilibrium path, each partisan expert produces only good evidence if it supports his side. When favorable good evidence is unavailable, an expert produces bad evidence to support his testimony. Hence, dueling experts always contradict one another. Despite their conflicting testimony, one of the experts invariably produces the available good evidence for Judge. Therefore, Judge always receives the available good evidence. A central result is that the quality of experts, including their ability to persuade judges using available good evidence, and the quality of judges – their ability to distinguish good from bad evidence – determine the accuracy of verdicts. Remarkably, the likelihood that experts are endowed with good evidence does not matter provided that this likelihood is not identically zero or one.     

Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts on Juror Judgments

Previous research shows that expert testimony on eyewitness memory influences mock-juror judgments. We examined the extent to which opposing expert testimony mitigates the impact of defense-only expert testimony. Participants (N = 497) viewed a video-taped trial involving an eyewitness identification and individually rendered verdicts and evaluated the evidence and the experts. We manipulated the Foils (unbiased vs. biased) and Instructions (unbiased vs. biased) of the lineup and Expert Testimony (no expert vs. defense-only expert vs. opposing experts). Expert testimony did not significantly influence juror judgments, but the opposing expert testimony diminished the credibility of the defense expert in the eyes of the jurors. Results point to the need for further research on conditions that qualify the impact of expert testimony.     

The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert Witness Statements on Juror Verdicts and Information Processing

Mock jurors recruited from jury rolls were either not given written statements of expert witnesses' direct testimony or were provided with such statements before or after the presentation of that testimony. Presentation of the statements before the testimony and cross-examination provided jurors with a schema that allowed them to distinguish more effectively among the claims of four differentially worthy plaintiffs because they processed more probative evidence than other jurors. Jurors in receipt of written statements before the testimony found the evidence to be more comprehensible than other jurors. Jurors provided with written statements following testimony and cross-examination were able to differentiate between the most and least severely injured plaintiffs, whereas jurors not in receipt of any written statements were unable to differentiate among any of the differentially worthy claimants. The limitations of this case management technique and of the study are discussed.     

The Impact of Negative Forensic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of a Trial of Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assault

Legal concerns with regard to the adverse impact of a negative toxicological screening for date-rape drugs in a case of drug-facilitated sexual assault (DFSA) were the focus of a recent Canadian case (R. v. Alouache, 2003). To assess the impact of a negative forensic report, as well as the impact of expert testimony explaining the many factors that may contribute to a negative outcome, participants (N=171) received a written trial stimulus in which the forensic evidence (negative report, negative report plus expert testimony, no negative report and no expert testimony control) and the complainant's beverage consumption (alcohol, cola) were systematically varied. Results indicate that a negative finding in the absence of expert testimony produced greater verdict leniency and more favourable evaluations of the defendant's case. In contrast, no differences were found between the case in which the expert testified and a case in which the negative report and expert testimony were omitted.

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Defending the Right To Do Wrong

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.