The Pinochet Case: 'Forced to be Free' Abroad and at Home

In part one of this article it was posited that the Pinochet case was best understood not as a harbinger of a borderless world of eroded state sovereignty and universal rights, but rather as an indication that those distanced from popular sovereignty and citizenship by the deals struck in a pacted democratic transition may have found their most potent means of forcing a reopening of the particularist national debate on who belongs to, and in, 'the nation'. Here, two phases of the Pinochet case are examined through this prism. The extradition attempt saw Pinochet's victims 'escape' the legalized confines of domestic space only to shape the understanding of national citizenship from afar. The case's surprising development after repatriation revealed the potential coercive power of the cosmopolitan liberal consensus on 'deserving sovereignty' similar to the conditionality associated with the neo-liberal 'Washington consensus' on economic reform. Three primary lessons are drawn: cosmopolitanism may have to be coerced; pacts are not forever; and place and belonging still matter even as justice is 'globalized'.     

Is Belarus a demagogical democracy?

The article analyses the meaning and the forms that contemporary democracy may take, especially in application to the new regimes in Eastern Europe. The evaluation of developing polities always poses a difficulty, as one never knows whether an existent form of government is the final one that a state aims to achieve, or whether it is simply an interim effort to survive transition. Furthermore, there may be as many forms of democracy as there are different states, and the currently prevailing liberal form of democracy may not necessarily be the only or the best means to form a sustainable government. From this perspective, contemporary Belarus provides an insightful study of a regime that may be labelled as 'authoritarian', but in this article is arguably viewed as a 'demagogical democracy' following Aristotle's conceptualisation of a democratic state. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable support of INTAS (99-00245) and the British Academy (SG-31102 and PDF/2001/174), without which the project on which my quotations are based would not have been possible.     

Economic development and democracy revisited: Why dependency theory is not yet dead

It is generally accepted that there is a relationship between economic development and democracy which can be demonstrated by quantitative empirical evidence. The difficulties of validating the empirical claims derive not so much from the measures of economic development as from the measures of democracy itself. Our inquiry deepens the investigation of the relationship by 'unpacking' the dependent variable into separate measures of eight core values of liberal democratic government for 40 countries over the period 1970-1998. Our model assumes that the quality of liberal democratic government is not one-dimensional but can be measured across this range of values, so creating 'performance profiles' and demonstrating the likely trade-offs across distinct democratic values. The results of the analysis confirm that economic development has positive effects on democratic performance, but these effects vary across diverse aspects of performance and also across regions.     

Woodrow Wilson and The Birth of a Nation: American Democracy and International Relations

President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War One, promising to make the world safe for democracy. Advocating liberal internationalism, he called for collective security and national self-determination. He wanted democratic states to create the League of Nations as a partnership for peace in a new world order. But in his thinking and statecraft, the text of modern liberalism was intertwined with the subtext of White racism. His friendship with Thomas Dixon, Jr., and his contributions to David W. Griffith's 1915 film The Birth of a Nation revealed this nexus between liberalism and racism. His liberal civic ideals appeared quite different from the ultra racism of the film, which was based on Dixon's novels. He seemed to advocate inclusive nationalism, in contrast to its exclusive Americanism. The president's apparently universal principles, however, were still influenced by the White South's Lost Cause. His diplomacy and his legacy of Wilsonianism combined racism with liberalism. He adhered to the color line at home by promoting Jim Crow segregation in the federal government and abroad by limiting his liberal internationalism in practice. Historians and political scientists have typically identified Wilsonian diplomacy only with liberalism. To see him and his legacy in international history from a different perspective, which brings into focus the experience of people of color, it is necessary to recognize the subtext of racism in the text of Wilson's liberalism. Racism shaped his understanding of America's national identity and global mission, and thus his vision of liberal democracy and peace.     

Mauritania: Political Parties,Neo-patrimonialism and Democracy

This article takes issue with those analyses of ‘developmental democracy’ which treat popular participation as a clamorous inconvenience to be managed in the interests of economic efficiency. Instead it asks what follows from prioritizing participation both as a defining feature of democracy, and as an integral part of what is meant by development.

The analysis is developed in two parts. The first contrasts the narratives of popular and of liberal democracy, showing how they come to different conclusions about participation and its role in development. But it also argues there are potential complementarities. These were obscured when socialist ‘people's democracies’ were (misleadingly) seen as popular alternatives to liberal democracy. Since the end of the cold war, however, the focus has been on democratizing liberal democracy, to ensure it is responsive to the needs of citizens, as active participants in development and not just targets of state policy, rather than on whole system alternatives.

The second part reviews the experience of popular democratic experiments in Tanzania and Nicaragua, which sought to extend participation beyond the confines of representative democracy, and to link it to participatory development. It might be read as a requiem for their apparent failure. But their vicissitudes also raise broader questions: about the contradictions between popular participation and ‘people's democracy'as a system of rule; concerning the structures and procedures (elections, political parties, civil society bodies, mass organizations and so on) through which participation is organised; and about the problems of harmonizing participatory development with the management of complex national economies.     

The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy,Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950–1999

We test a model of the liberal peace by examining the initiation of militarized interstate disputes at the monadic level of analysis from 1950–1999. Liberal peace theory contends that both economic dependence and democratic political systems reduce conflict propensities. Extant empirical analyses of the monadic liberal peace, however, are under-specified. First, the concept of economic dependence not only includes trade, but also foreign investment. Second, existing models do not control for the influence of economic development. Previous research on the monadic liberal peace has also failed to distinguish between the initiation of conflict and participation in conflict. We find evidence for a liberal peace: trade dependence, foreign investment, and democracy reduce a state’s propensity to initiate militarized disputes.     

‘Peace-building as state-building’? Rethinking liberal interventionism in contexts of emerging states

Contemporary policy-making guided by the ‘liberal peace’ holds that peace is necessary for states to emerge, and that peace-building and state-building do not only go in tandem, but are mutually reinforcing. Yet, in view of both the historical record of state-making and empirical evidence provided by liberal interventionism, this proposition appears questionable. While scholars have shown that state-making has, historically, been as much associated with war than with peace, cases from Afghanistan to Somalia suggest that state-making is inherently conflictive, frequently upsetting nascent peace. In order to shed light on the reasons underpinning the relationship between prevailing peace-building practices and the fundamental exigencies of state-making, this article pursues a theoretical argument. It proposes that while peace-building is principally about creating a situation of non-violent co-existence despite prevailing differences and, thus, essentially geared at accepting and enshrining institutional and identity pluralism, state-making is vitally aimed at replacing institutional and identity multiplicity with greater degrees of rule hegemony and standardisation. Applying the prism of ‘rule standardisation’ to the nexus of peace-building and state-making, this paper seeks to advance existing debates on this delicate relationship.     

The Limits of Populist Diplomacy: Fidel Castro's April 1959 Trip to North America

This article asks what lessons about diplomacy can be drawn from Fidel Castro's April 1959 trip to the United States and Canada, a trip long neglected by historians as an aberration in US–Cuban relations because of its apparent public relations success. The trip's meaning, rather, lies in the populist style Castro practiced to circumvent normal protocol, and more importantly in the failure of that populism to sway not only US foreign policy makers but also the US public. Based on comprehensive media and archival research and of interviews in Cuba and the United States, this is the first ever article-length treatment of this diplomatic visit. It helps to understand not only the US–Cuba divide that soon followed Castro's trip but also the limited potential of a populist diplomacy.     

American diplomatic realism: A tradition practised and preached by George F. Kennan

George F. Kennan's work remains pertinent to the contemporary debate over American foreign policy in which voices calling for a realistic conduct of American diplomacy have been faint. Kennan's thought contains a framework that can be used to examine critically the drift in American diplomacy from the realist assumptions held by the American Founding Fathers towards the liberal or Wilsonian school of international relations. Wilsonianism has seized the world view of contemporary American diplomats and statesmen, particularly during the Clinton administration. Kennan's analysis provides a salutary word in the debate over the course of post‐Cold War American foreign policy that takes Wilsonian assumptions for granted.     

The EU in Somalia: Furthering Peacemaking and Reconciliation

Since the Transitional Federal Institutions were established after the 2002 Nairobi Conference, the situation in Somalia has seen two drastic about-turns – in opposite directions. In June 2006, starting out from Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts rapidly extended their control over most of south-central Somalia. Now, after the Ethiopean military intervention, the Transitional Government is trying to establish itself in the capital and to effectively exercise its formal authority for the first time. But the military defeat of the Courts has not solved the problems that initially made their success possible. Only reconciliation can create real stability and the European Union can contribute to achieving this. A peaceful and stable Horn of Africa is in the EU's interest, given the risks of it becoming a breeding ground for Al Qaeda-like organisations and a source of immigration. Somalia could also become a test case for solving the problems of a failed state by peaceful means, and an example of the EU's willingness and ability to have an effective dialogue with the Islamic world. Success in Somalia would strengthen the EU as a regional player with Arab and Muslim countries.     

We do negotiate with terrorists: navigating liberal and illiberal norms in peace mediation

The normative framework in mediation processes is growing. Mediators are increasingly expected by their mandate-givers to incorporate liberal norms such as inclusivity into their overall strategy. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001, and the policy shifts that accompanied the “Global War on Terror”, mediators find themselves simultaneously pressured to design mediation processes actively excluding armed groups proscribed as terrorists and consequently incorporating this illiberal norm of “exclusivity”, barring proscribed groups’ access to negotiations. This article asks what consequences this development has on the normative agency of mediators, based on if and how they incorporate proscribed armed groups into their mediation strategies. It argues that the dichotomy between liberal and illiberal norms has important consequences on a mediator’s normative agency. First, the dichotomy constrains mediators to a single normative standard, rendering only liberal and illiberal views possible. Second, the assumption that liberal norms are “good” and illiberal norms are “bad” engenders a double dichotomy that greatly constrains a mediator’s normative agency. Third, these constraints on a mediator engender new mediation practices such as outsourcing and risk-sharing in an attempt to salvage normative agency. The article contributes to scholarship on norms, terrorism and mediation through providing a more nuanced view of normative parameters in mediation practice.     

Thinking about terrorism and just war

Since 2001 a new urge to moralize the use of violence as an instrument of state policy has appeared in liberal democracies. The American idea of a War against Terror, and the European notion of confronting a global terrorist threat, have together merged with a discourse on humanitarian military action: the political/moral ‘responsibility to protect’ is no longer to be confined to one's own citizens. Renewed interest among academics in ‘just war’ theory, the tradition that seeks to humanize war through law, reflects this development. This article questions the assumption that there is an essential difference between war (civilized violence) and terrorism (barbaric violence). It argues that their similarity appears more clearly if we set intentions aside—such as the deliberate or accidental killing of ‘innocents’—and focus instead on three main facts: (a) modern war strategies and technologies are uniquely destructive, (b) armed hostilities increasingly occupy a single space of violence in which war and peace are not clearly demarcated, and (c) the law of war does not provide a set of ‘civilizing’ rules but a language for legal/moral argument in which the use of punitive violence is itself a central semantic element.     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

Public Diplomacy and the International Paralympic Committee: Reconciling the Roles of Disability Advocate and Sports Regulator

Abstract

Whilst the link between international diplomacy and the Olympic movement has been the subject of extensive academic and journalistic enquiry, the experience of diplomatic discourse relating to the relatively youthful Paralympic movement has received little attention. It occurs not just in the context of state diplomacy, where for example the Paralympic Games may provide a conduit for the pursuit of specific policy objectives, but also in relation to the engagement of the International Paralympic Committee [IPC] as an evolving non-state actor in the diplomatic process. The idea of the IPC as an advocacy body engaged through public diplomacy in promoting disability rights needs exploration as an element of the contemporary politics of disability. This analysis considers the relationship between the activities of the IPC and wider lobbying by disabled people’s organisations as a means of leveraging change in domestic and international policy toward disability. In relation to the global development agenda, it also assesses IPC responses to the gulf in resourcing for para-sport as well as related health and education provision between high- and low-resource regions. It considers the response of the organisation from the perspective of public diplomacy and locates that response within the wider diplomacy of development.     

Waiting for the wolf to bite: Civil society's view of the new World Bank presidency

The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, the EU’s mission to contribute to the training of the Somali Security Forces, was deployed in April 2010 and extended for another 12-month period in July 2011. Despite the positive assessment of the outcome of the first training period, the overall feebleness of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government puts the political feasibility of the mission into question. EUTM Somalia can be subjected to many of the same criticisms as the liberal peacebuilding agenda in general for trying to contain rather than resolve conflict and maintaining a top-down perspective which ignores organic, indigenous local structures.     

A Structural Analysis of International Conflict: From a Communication Perspective

The study describes the structure of international conflict with the tools of network analysis to enhance the understanding of multilateral conflict-communication relations and to predict the conflict structure with existing international relations theories (liberal and realist) plus global communication variables. Using data obtained from the Correlates of War Project (http://cow2.la.psu.edu/), the structure of international conflict is described for the period 1993–2001 for 145 nations. The results indicate that this network is very sparse; 42 nations had no conflict, and 36 only one bilateral disagreement. The network is centered about former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, the United States, Iraq, and China. Most conflicts are regional. The paper also evaluates both the liberal, expanded liberal (with communication variables included), and realist (including Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory) perspectives as predictors of conflict. The results indicate that communication variables substantially enhance explanatory power of a predictive model, but the effects of the communication variables are inconsistent. A multiple regression model including history of colonialism and prior conflict, physical proximity and contiguity, whether or not a nation is a democracy, and the communication variables—international telecommunication, freight, and exports—accounted for 30.0% of the variance in the structure of international conflict and each variable was significantly related to conflict. The need for further research is discussed.     

Refocusing Public Diplomacy: The Need for Strategic Discursive Public Diplomacy

This article concerns itself with the agenda, the instruments, and the goals of public diplomacy (PD). Taking into account the current state of PD that concentrates predominantly on forging cultural and educational links and promoting values, but not policies, it refocuses PD in two substantial ways: driving it, first, to focus on the most significant global issues and, second, to employ profound discursive processes. The emphasis then shifts to how PD can strengthen the global public sphere with regard to the profoundly political and critical issues of the present era. It argues in favour of strategic discursive PD and suggests ways to enhance both the legitimacy and efficiency of states' foreign policies on the handling of the Greek economic crisis and the issue of economic governance.     

Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The European Union has since 2003 developed both a security and a Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy, and it has become the primary interlocutor of Iran in the dispute related to Iran's nuclear development. These are signs of significant policy progress. However, the fact that four years of nuclear diplomacy have brought few results invites a critical appraisal of EU strategy. This essay undertakes this appraisal, arguing that the EU is notably ambivalent regarding its underlying conception of international order. The EU wishes to be pluralist (in the tradition of sovereign equality), but is also anti-pluralist (in the liberal–democratic tradition). The essay lays out how the EU has coped with pressures for reform—arising notably from the United States—within the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this has made the EU problem apparent. The essay finally suggests that to salvage its policy of effective multilateralism the EU must acknowledge its anti-pluralist bias and promote a common transatlantic approach to nuclear non-proliferation.     

Disputing the geopolitics of the states system and global capitalism

Alex Callinicos's intervention in the debate on the geopolitics of the states system and capitalist modernity provides a crucial wake-up call to International Relations theory and practice. Yet, within the contending positions he outlines disputing the political economy of geopolitical conflict, inter-state rivalry and capitalist imperialism, the insights of Antonio Gramsci are notably absent. This article contributes to the debate by elaborating how the theory of passive revolution reveals the political rule of capital, thereby internally relating the states system to capitalist modernity within a focus on uneven development. This concern is evident in Gramsci's analysis of the labour process of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and the geopolitics of the states system contained within his survey of 'Americanism and Fordism'. Theorization on the passive revolution of capital might then provide a fruitful basis from which an empirical research agenda on social development could be advanced with reference to post-colonial state formation processes.

The Italian bourgeoisie succeeded in organizing its state not so much through its own intrinsic strength, as through being favoured in its victory over the feudal and semi-feudal classes by a whole series of circumstances of an international character (Napoleon III's policy in 1852-60; the Austro-Prussian War of 1866; France's defeat at Sedan and the development of the German Empire after this event). – Antonio Gramsci, `Origins of the Mussolini Cabinet', Letter to the Fourth World Congress of the IIIrd International (20 November 1922).     

Legacy Problems: China's Taiwan Dilemma

The particular difficulties that Taiwan's new administration faces are paradoxical, for their origin no longer has to do with ensuring the continuing existence of the state. That seems assured. Rather, the challenges arise because U.S. and China's diplomacy in the 1970s assumed that Taiwan was going to disappear, but it failed to do so. This fact created an embarrassing—and probably insoluble—long-term problem for China. To be sure, much commentary still suggests that if not on the verge, Taiwan and China are at least on a one-way road to unification, shadowed by the concern that China will not wait forever, ready to “impose” unity when it is finally fed up.