Disposition of insanity acquittees in the United States Military

Recent amendments to the United States Code of Military Justice have essentially adopted the federal mental nonresponsibility rule or insanity defense. The prior standard, as outlined in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, has been abandoned. Notably absent is a system to address the disposition of the military insanity acquittee. This raises concerns regarding recidivism and the military's role in mitigating potential dangerousness. Relevant civilian and military law is reviewed, two cases described, and possible remedies proposed.     

Criminal defense counsels,district attorneys,and the insanity plea: A modest difference of opinion

This research examines differences between samples of 166 city and county prosecutors and 118 defense attorneys from Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky concerning their views toward the insanity plea in felony cases. Currently, tests for insanity used by the states are the M’Naghten rule, the ALI Model Penal Code test, and the Smith “irresistible impulse” test or combinations thereof. Defense counsels greatly favor the prosecution bearing the burden of proving a defendant’s sanity, while a majority of prosecutors believe that this is the defense counsel’s responsibility. Twenty-five percent of the prosecutors surveyed believed that it is the prosecutor’s responsibility to show by clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants are sane and capable of bearing the responsibility for their crimes alleged. Philosophical and practical arguments about the burden of proof issue are examined. Preferences of defense counsels and prosecutors for different insanity tests are explored, finding that a majority of attorneys favor the more recent ALI test.     

Alleged brain damage, diminished capacity, mens rea, and misuse of medical concepts.

As focus on the insanity defense diminishes, defendants may place emphasis on a lack of knowing or purposeful behavior in order to negate a criminal charge. This use of a mens rea defense in accord with Model Penal Code principles is exemplified by the current New Jersey statute. Such a defense may result in a lesser charge or a finding of not guilty. In addition to reviewing applicable law, this report presents a sex offense case in which remote brain damage was invoked as a purported basis for incapacity to formulate the required intent; the study also raises the issue of the inappropriate or questionable use of medical principles, a practice that diminishes professional credibility in the courts and in the community.     

精神病辩护制度研究——基于美国精神病辩护制度的思考

由于刑事责任的承担要求行为人对自己行为的社会危害性有认识和控制能力,某些精神病人对自己行为的社会危害性没有认识或无法控制,因而无法对自己的行为承担刑事责任,精神病也就成了刑事辩护的重要事由。在美国刑事审判中,精神病是无罪辩护的重要理由,判例法与刑事立法共同形成了一套较为完善的精神病辩护制度。在美国,精神病辩护制度的存废问题一直备受争议;精神病法律标准处于变化之中,各法域标准不一;精神病辩护的提出、审理程序、证明责任分配与证明标准、裁定及专家证人的作用有其特点;因精神病而判无罪者的关押与释放形成了特定规则。我们可以借鉴其制度的某些合理因素,健全和完善我国的精神病辩护制度。     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: judicial standards of wrongfulness since M'Naghten

In insanity defense litigation, the precise legal definition of wrongfulness is often critically important. References in the M'Naghten Rules to the appropriate standard of wrongfulness were ambiguous, resulting in a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether wrongfulness means legal wrong, subjective moral wrong, or objective moral wrong. This article reviews and analyzes these three judicial standards of wrongfulness in the context of case law from jurisdictions that follow each of the respective standards. The evolution of knowledge of right and wrong tests of criminal responsibility is traced back to its philosophical roots. Most psychiatrists claim no expertise in matters of morality or law. The American Psychiatric Association would bar psychiatric expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, on the grounds that there are "impermissible leaps in logic" when psychiatrists opine on the probable relationship between medical concepts and moral-legal constructs. Whether or not they testify on the ultimate issue, psychiatrists should ascertain the applicable standard of wrongfulness in order to properly relate their findings to the relevant legal criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of their testimony.     

The death penalty loses its mind: an interview with Professor James Acker

In April 2009 the American Law Institute (ALI) made the decision to withdraw its support for the a section of the Model Penal Code that had been instrumental in shaping contemporary death penalty legislation. The Institute had created the modern legal and criminal justice administration framework for capital punishment as part of its Model Penal Code in 1962. Professor James Acker, one of the leading scholars on the death penalty in the United States, speaks to the import of this decision while providing some historical context for ALI’s involvement in the matter initially.     

"Insanity" in civil law

The issue of "insanity" is rarely alluded to in the area of civil law. As a consequence, the legal standard for insanity is not clearly understood by many psychiatrists. The standard derives from case law and is based upon statutory law in the criminal sector. A civil case will be presented where the question of "insanity" was raised. In this case an individual committed suicide and his insurance company refused to pay the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy based upon a provision in his policy that excluded payment in situations of suicide. His beneficiaries sued, claiming that the deceased was insane at the time of his suicide and therefore not responsible for his actions. The standard for insanity in New Jersey and the reasoning of the psychiatrists will be presented.     

Causing the Conditions of One’s Defense: A Theoretical Non-problem

My contribution to this symposium is short and negative: There are no theoretical problems that attach to one’s causing the conditions that permit him to claim a defense to some otherwise criminal act. If one assesses the culpability of an actor at each of the various times he acts in a course of conduct, then it is obvious that he can be nonculpable at T₂ but culpable at T₁, and that a nonculpable act at T₂ has no bearing on whether an actor was culpable at T₁ when he caused the circumstances that are exculpatory with respect to his act (or conduct) at T₂. Moreover, as I interpret the Model Penal Code, it gets matters close to right on this point.     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

Frontloading Mitigation: The "Legal" and the "Human" in Death Penalty Defense

The bifurcation of capital trials into determinations of guilt and sentencing presents defense advocates with what seem to be two distinct domains of knowledge—one apparently "legal" in character, the other "human." But this epistemological division is actually not so clear in practice. This article dissects the procedural and strategic mechanisms through which these two domains unsettle and reconstitute the other. I provide a historical, empirically grounded account that explicitly articulates the connections between developments in legal procedure, prevailing standards of care concerning the need to conduct humanistic investigations of mitigating factors, and the on-the-ground trial practice of "frontloading" as a defense strategy. Drawing from documentary research, interview data with leading capital defense practitioners, and analytical observations based on my own experience as a mitigation specialist, this article presents itself as a case study of the processes of mutually constitutive rupturing that reconfigure the categories of the legal and the human.     

Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful insanity pleas

Thirty men acquitted not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were matched on type of violent crime and compared to 30 men who unsuccessfully raised the insanity defense. Demographic, legal process, and psychological variables were compared. Eighty percent of successful acquittees previously had been found incompetent to stand trial, compared to only 33% of those found guilty and sentenced to prison. Ninety-six percent of NGRI acquittees opted for trial before a judge rather than a jury; 76% of cases raising an unsuccessful defense were heard in front of a jury. Unsuccessful attemptees also had significantly higher IQ scores and personality profiles characterized by acting-out potential and intact reality testing compared to profiles of NGRIs. The ability of the legal system to identify those meeting criteria for the insanity defense is discussed.     

Impulse control and criminal responsibility: lessons from neuroscience

Almost all of the world's legal systems recognize the "M'Naghten" exception to criminal responsibility: the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of action. This exception rests on the assumption that punishment is morally justified only if the defendant was able to choose whether to do wrong. Jurists and jurisdictions differ, however, on whether to extend M'Naghten's logic to cases where the defendant understood the wrongfulness of an act but was incapable of resisting an impulse to commit it. In this article I ask whether contemporary neuroscience can help lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain this defense, known variously as the "irresistible impulse" defense or the "control" or "volitional" test for insanity. More specifically, I ask firstly, whether it is empirically true that a person can understand the wrongfulness of an act yet be powerless to refrain from committing it; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first), whether the law of criminal responsibility can practically accommodate this phenomenon? After canvassing the relevant neuroscientific literature, I conclude that the answer to the first question is "yes." After examining the varied treatment of the defense in the United States and other nations, I also give an affirmative answer to the second question, but only in limited circumstances. In short, the defense of irresistible impulse should be recognized, but only when it can be shown that the defendant experienced a total incapacity to control his or her conduct in the circumstances.     

Improving health care safety and quality: reluctant regulators

The Penal Code is the main of source of criminal law and criminal offences in Malawi. Unfortunately, as the results of a survey show, many people in Malawi do not understand the provisions of the Penal Code. This article examines aspects of the language of the Penal Code which impede people’s understanding of the provisions. The article recommends that the Penal Code be amended and redrafted in a language which the audience can understand.     

Juvenile Delinquency in the Netherlands: Trends and Perspectives

A comparison is made, on several levels, of the laws of various states in the United States and the State of Israel concerning the crime of rape as personally committed by a husband upon his wife, known as “marital rape.” Among the fifty states, there is a sharp division whether such an act is criminal at all. The majority of states have held the act not criminal based primarily upon the common law doctrine of marital immunity first enunciated in England by Lord Hale. Some of these states have followed the Model Penal Code and codified the immunity concept within their criminal law.

Those states which have rejected Hale's immunity concept include New York, New Jersey, Alabama, and others. Upon judicial review, New York invalidated its statutory immunity for husbands by declaring it unconstitutional and a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. New Jersey, as an example, statutorily eliminated the defense of marital immunity for rape, while other states simply rejected Hall's doctrine altogether. In 1980, Israel judicially rejected the defense of marital immunity insofar as a Jewish married couple was concerned by selectively utilizing Jewish religious law. It later enacted legislation eliminating the defense of marital immunity for rape for all persons regardless of religion.     

Predicting verdicts,adherence to judge's instructions,and assumptions about the disposition of the defendant in a case involving the insanity defense

Abstract

296 college students and jury eligible adults completed attitudinal measures and read a case summary of a murder trial involving the insanity defense. The case summary included opening and closing arguments, testimony from expert witnesses, and judge's instructions. Although broader legal attitudes (the PJAQ) predicted verdicts, the Insanity Defense Attitudes-Revised scale provided incremental predictive validity. Attitudes related to the insanity defense also predicted adherence to judge's instructions, whereas more general legal biases predicted a juror's willingness to change their verdict after being provided with accurate information about the defendant's disposition following the verdict. Importantly, misconceptions concerning the insanity defense impacted verdicts and many jurors made decisions that failed to adhere to the judge's instructions, though the nullification tendency does appear to vary as a function of pretrial juror attitudes. Implications for instructing jurors in insanity defense cases will be discussed.     

Assisted reproduction and artificial insemination and genetic manipulation in the Criminal Code of the Federal District, Mexico]

The article that one presents has for purpose outline and comment on the recent modifications to the Penal Code for the Federal District of México which establish, for the first time, crimes related to the artificial procreation and to the genetic manipulation. Also one refers to the interaction of the new legal texts with the sanitary legislation of the country. Since it will be stated in some cases they present confrontations between the penal and the sanitary reglamentation and some points related to the legality or unlawfulness of a conduct that stayed without the enough development. These lacks will complicate the application of the new rules of the Penal Code of the Federal District.     

Split-brain madness

With facts and metaphors regarding differential functioning of our two hemispheres proliferating faster than our understanding, the potential for a new insanity defense to emerge to fit certain Jekylland-Hyde-like defendants clearly exits. And with psychologists of varying stripes entering the courtroom with greater frequency and in newer capacities, the dangers of entanglement and error grow. This paper analyzes a split-brain insanity defense on the grounds of legal, logical, psychological, and current neuropsychological evidence. In addition, the likelihood, import, and place of this defense in the historical context of insanity defenses is examined. The concept of personal responsibility, which has been both asserted and denied by experts in split-brain or split-psyche cases, is tried; and a closing summary to the jury is offered.     

Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence

Twentieth-century reform of the American law of evidence was initially premised on the ideals of legal progressivism, ideals splintered by American legal realism. In preparing the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence from 1939 to 1942, Harvard Law School professor Edmund M. Morgan attempted to reconstitute the framework of reform in light of the challenge of legal realism. The Model Code was based on granting greater discretion to the trial judge and changing the goals of the trial from a search for truth to a "rational" resolution of disputes. In large part due to these apparently radical and "corrosive" changes, the Model Code failed to win professional support and was not adopted by any state. The structure of the Model Code was used for the two subsequent evidence codification efforts, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence. These codification efforts found greater academic favor in part because they fit within the post-World War II jurisprudence of reasoned elaboration. The Federal Rules also enjoyed extraordinary professional favor because the drafters explicitly affirmed truth as the goal of the rules. The irony is that the framework of the Federal Rules, since they are based on the Model Code, contradicts this message.