Alive and well: the good faith principle in Turkish contract law

Good faith is a principle prominent in civil law countries but less so in common law countries, and which allows courts to deviate from black letter law. It provides them with flexibility to change the outcome of a deductive legal decision if they regard it as absurd. The principle of good faith thus empowers the judiciary to deviate. It can be used for an indefinite number of cases and might lead to almost all conceivable legal consequences. For instance, the judge can invalidate the contract, change the price, suspend or change a clause in the contract, or grant injunctive relief, compensation of damages, the disgorgement of profits or a removal claim. We argue that if the principle of good faith is used to develop contract law into an instrument for redistributing wealth in favor of poor parties, this can destroy the concept of contract as a social mechanism for generating mutual gains for parties, which might lead to unwanted economic consequences in terms of efficiency losses. We argue that the principle of good faith must be carefully and reluctantly used to reconstruct the fully specified contract and that well-informed judges, who understand the factual environment of a contract well should ask how fair bur self-interested parties would have allocated the risk in a pre-contractual situation. If the courts restrict the application of the good faith principle to these functions, this provides elasticity that otherwise would not exist if courts would strictly use the rules laid down in black letter law. Moreover, it saves transactions costs and is therefore in line with economic reasoning. We look at the most important Turkish cases and find that the Turkish Supreme Court following Continental European doctrines of good faith actually uses this principle to curb opportunistic behavior of parties and not to achieve redistribution from the rich to the poor by way of interfering into contract law.     

The risks of contract law

The economic analysis of law may be able to provide some reason why it is efficient to enforce wholly executory contracts, but (I submit) it has not done so.     

Autonomy and private ordering in contract law

This essay reviews Michael J. Trebilcock's book,The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), examining crucial and controversial social issues within the rigorous framework of the law and economics of contract. The idea that private markets are the primary institutions for the allocation of limited resources is central to any private ordering model of contract law. Yet such a premise leaves a number of fundamental questions unanswered. Trebilcock is critical of the insufficiency and ambiguity of current contract theory in addressing fundamental legal issues relating to the limits of freedom of contract. Pushing the frontiers of current legal theory, Trebilcock revisits the slippery notion of freedom of contract and tests the actual reach of economic analysis in providing a coherent answer to compelling social questions. The author pursues his ambitious task by examining the conclusions reached by competing paradigms of analysis. In spite of his declared trust in the economic approach to law, Trebilcock pays close attention to alternative analytical traditions, comparing the conclusions of various intellectual perspectives with those suggested by an economic framework of private ordering. The book objectively examines strengths and weaknesses of competing views, affording the reader a balanced position from which to conclude for herself, by illustrating the practical implications of the various approaches. In a number of instances, Trebilcock shows how different theoretical premises may indeed be conducive to similar institutional outcomes.Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University. The support of the Sarah Scaife Foundation and of the John M. Olin Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of Jonathan C. Harris and Charles K. Rowley. Extensive remarks received from Michael J. Trebilcock prior to publication allowed me to remedy earlier omissions.     

房屋买卖合同中的陷阱及法律救济

开发商和购房人之间的权利义务关系规定在购房合同中。由开发商单方面提供的格式合同已提前确定了本应由双方协商的合同条款。本文以某房屋买卖合同为例，指出在房屋买卖合同中常见的不公平、不舍法条款，针对房屋买卖合同中的陷阱提出法律救济途径。     

Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics

We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court??s decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party??s interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the ??good faith?? or the ??Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus?? doctrine.     

论行政法上的比例原则

一、问题的提出 近日拜读苏力先生的<送法下乡--中国基层司法制度研究>一书,见其中介绍了一个警察使用枪支的案件,大概的案情是,王某(警察)与派出所其他干警按照上级统一"严打"部署,在午夜上路设卡检查摩托车情况.遇见三位即将毕业的大学生饮酒后驾驶一辆摩托车归来,拒绝停车检查,连闯两道检查线,直冲派出所所长把守的第三道检查线.     

The limits of contract law harmonization

Contract law harmonization in the European Union has met with some significant but limited success. This Essay explores some of the psychological and political forces that can complicate or even hinder law reform efforts. Even when there is a general institutional drive for law reform, as there is in the EU, scarce reform resources force attention to be focused on salient issues, while a status quo bias in individual member states by government officials can provide a braking inertia regarding nonsalient legal reforms. This braking influence can be seized upon and enhanced by interest groups that oppose reforms, especially where there is an alternative to proposed law reforms for private entities. In the case of contract law harmonization, contract doctrine that is not focused on providing consumer protections remain nonsalient, commercial entities can solve the confusion of diverse laws by choosing their own, and interest groups in nations whose laws and dispute resolution forums are commonly chosen will oppose harmonization. Thus, the current state of affairs may prove relatively difficult to alter.     

国家干预在我国劳动合同立法中的体现

劳动合同属于兼有当事人意思自治和国家干预性质的特殊合同.本文探讨了国家干预劳动合同立法的合理性和必要性,阐述了我国在劳动合同立法过程中,国家干预起到了积极的重要作用并具体地体现在了<劳动合同法>中.     

对下午法律保留原则的思考

法律保留是行政法的一个基本原则,是依法行政和建立“法治国家”的基本要求。但该原则在我国行政法领域还没有受到应有的重视,笔者在此对法律保留中“法律”的涵义、产生基础、界定标准、现状及改进的措施问题等作初步探析,以期引起理论界和实践界对该原则的重视。     

试论保险法的基本原则

保险法基本原则的功能在于指导保险法律制度的具体设计,它要与保险活动自身特点相适应.在这个意义上说,保险法的基本原则是保险活动特点的产物.本文意在通过考察保险活动的特点来分析保险法的基本原则.     

试论契约自由及其在我国合同法中的地位

毫无疑问,罗马法应该被视为研究契约自由的起点.正是在罗马法中,契约制度首次得到了全面规定并达到了相当的高度.而且,正是罗马法孕育了契约自由的观念和思想.契约自由从思想到原则的转变是在法国民法典中实现的,而人类进入20世纪之后,契约自由逐步受到限制.在我国合同法中,契约自由也得到了确立,它不仅是我国合同法的一项基本原则,而且也是我国合同法的最高原则.     

论民法的基本原理

我国即将制定民法典,在制定民法典时,应坚持什么样的立法指导思想?即以什么作为民法学体系 所体现的精神?这就要研究什么是民法的基本原理。关于这一点,学术界研究甚少,往往更多的关注具体的民法规范。笔者在此想谈一下自己对“民法的基本原理”这一宏观问题的认识。通过对民法的性质、总则及具体民事制度的分析,说明“意思自治”成为民法基本原理的必然。     

多元与融合:国际统一合同法的现代特性

合同法历来是国际统一立法最活跃的法域,在现行立法的架构中,已呈现出立法形式多元和立法内容融合两大特性.本文首先考察了国际统一合同法从一元化立法形态到多元化立法形态的历史演进过程,并分析了多元并存的价值,进而归纳了国际统一合同法的融合途径及统一法成果所涉领域.     

美国合同法中的精神损害赔偿探析

传统的英美合同法理论认为,侵权责任中的精神损害赔偿不能扩展到违约责任中。然而,随着经济的发展,为了更好地保护受害方的利益,美国法学界和法院在一定程度上打破了这一传统原则,允许受害方在某些情况下可以要求违约中的精神损害赔偿,如：合同具有个人因素,合同条款无法为受害方提供适当金钱赔偿,违约方在订约时已经或应该预见到其违约行为将导致的精神损害等。笔者在对此进行仔细研究的基础上,对我国在这方面的立法提出了建议。     

Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.