‘Playing the Judicial Card’: Litigation Strategies during the Process of Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

During the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of constitutional jurisdictions were activated by political actors. In playing ‘the judicial card’, opponents of ratification decided to seek political goals through judicial means, and thus they were obliged to develop litigation strategies. This article explores such strategies and the responses that courts gave them. It shows that constitutional proceedings with regards to the Lisbon Treaty became a political battleground governed by legal logics, in which the interpretation of European clauses, the democratic deficit of the Union and the tensions underlying the European judicial dialogue were privileged objects of discussion between claimants and courts in which law and politics intertwined.     

The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance

The European Union offers crucial insights into the gradual shift from a Weberian form of modern 'government' towards the institutionalisation of post-Weberian 'governance'. The article argues that the emerging 'polity of polities' context, not only threatens the constitutional basis of democratic rule but also raises the questions of what exactly the new institutions of governance beyond the nation-state are, and what they imply for the functioning (rules of the game) and legitimacy (democratic processes) of the political order. In an effort to elaborate on these questions, the article develops two themes. First, it raises critical questions about the conceptual boundedness of 'governance' in the discussion of constitutional and policy studies within the field of European integration. Secondly, it advances a methodological access point for the study of the institutionalisation of governance in the Euro-polity. It suggests situating the legal concept of acquis communautaire at the boundary of legal studies and politics. The concept is then applied to a case study of citizenship policy in the EU to demonstrate how the acquis communautaire–more precisely, the 'embedded acquis communautaire'–facilitates methodological access to the study of the institutionalisation of governance beyond the state and despite states.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Democratic Legitimacy in the Bund or ‘Federation of States’: the Cases of Belgium and the EU

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.     

The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case

There is little doubt that the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit. However, the causes of this deficit and, as a consequence, the remedies are contested. This article wants to show that an important, but often overlooked, cause for the legitimacy deficit lies in the overconstitutionalization of the EU. The European Treaties have been constitutionalized by the ECJ, but are full of provisions that would be ordinary law in states. Constitutionalization means de‐politicization. What has been regulated on the constitutional level is no longer open for political decision‐making. Thus, in the EU political decisions of high salience are not only withdrawn from the democratically legitimized institutions, but also immunized against political correction. Therefore, the consequences from the constitutionalization have to be drawn: The Treaties should be reduced to those norms that reflect the functions of a constitution, whereas all the other parts have to be downgraded to the level of secondary law.     

Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights

This article takes as its starting-point the relationship between Article 30 of 30 of the EC Treaty (general rule on the free movement of goods) and the European Constitution. On the one hand, it examines Article 30 in the context of the constitutional dilemmas facing the European Union, particularly the balance of powers to be defined between Member States and the Union, between public power and the market, and between the legitimacy of Community law vis à vis that of national law. On the other hand, it reviews different conceptions of the European Economic Constitution by analysing the role of Article 30 in the review of market regulation.     

Prospects and Limits of Democratic Governance in the EU

The EU Treaty contains for the first time a title on democratic principles. These provisions emphasise the importance of national parliaments and the EU parliament for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The new chapter on democratic principles does not address the central challenge of the EU polity to the traditional understanding of democratic legitimacy, the disjunction of political and economic governance as expressed by the important role of independent institutions like the Commission, the European Central Bank and agencies in EU governance . This is a consequence of the fact that the status of independent regulatory institutions in a democratic polity has not been clarified—neither in the EU nor in the Member States. However, such independent institutions exist in diverse forms in several Member States and could hence be understood as a principle of democratic governance common to the Member States. Such an understanding has not yet evolved. The central theoretical problem is that regulatory theories which explain the legitimacy of independent institutions as an alternative to traditional representation remain outside the methodology of traditional democratic theory. Economic constitutional theory, based on social contract theory and widely neglected in the legal constitutional debate, offers a methodological approach to understanding independent regulatory institutions as part of representative democratic governance.     

Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards

Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe's 'democratic deficit' is democratically justified.
The expression 'democratic deficit,' however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the 'regulatory model' of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.     

The Self-Referential European Polity, its Legal Context and Systemic Differentiation: Theoretical Reflections on the Emergence of the EU's Political and Legal Autopoiesis

Abstract:  This article starts by summarising major theoretical debates regarding European polity and governance. It highlights the role of statehood in those debates and suggests moving beyond the constraints of institutionalist and constructivist perspectives by adopting specific notions from the theory of autopoietic social systems. The following part describes the EU political system as self-referential, functionally differentiated from the system of European law, and internally differentiated between European institutions and Member State governments. Although the Union transgresses its nation-state segmentation, the notions of statehood and democratic legitimacy continue to inform legal and political semantics of the EU and specific responses to the Union's systemic tensions, such as the policy of differentiated integration legislated by the flexibility clauses. The democratic deficit of instrumental legitimation justified by outcomes, the most recent example of which is the Lisbon Treaty, subsequently reveals the level of EU functional differentiation and the impossibility of fostering the ultimate construction of a normatively integrated and culturally united European polity. It shows a much more profound social dynamics of differentiation at the level of emerging European society—dynamics which do not adopt the concept of the European polity as an encompassing metaphor of this society, but makes it part of self-referential and self-limiting semantics of the functionally differentiated European political system.     

Constitutional Review in the Mega‐Leviathan: A Democratic Foundation for the European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves, among other things, as a constitutional court for the EU. This means that it possesses the legal right to strike down both EU and national laws it deems irreconcilable with treaty provisions. In the present article, we shall draw on Hans Kelsen's theory of democracy to argue that the ECJ's competence to review and invalidate legislation is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the EU's legal system as a whole.     

Democratic Policy in Europe

Abstract: This article examines the implications of European integration for democratic self-determination. Distinguishing between the dimensions of 'autonomy' and 'effectiveness', it is argued that autonomous processes of democratic participation, public discourse and democratic accountability have not yet been established on the European level. On the other hand, the effectiveness of democratic self-determination at the national level is increasingly constrained by processes of economic globalisation and even more so by the completion of the European internal market. At the same time, however, conflicts of interest among the Member States of the European Union often stand in the way of effective European problem-solving in those areas where the nation-state is losing control. It is argued, therefore, that it would be desirable to allow greater legal scope to national policy choices by limiting the reach of 'negative integration' and European competition law in those areas where the Union itself, for political reasons, is incapable of effective action.     

The Waning of Legality in the Concept of Policy Implementation

The study of "implementation" has become a favorite subject of policy sciences in recent years. In part, this interest has been stimulated by the disappointments of the "great society program" in the United States in the sixties where goals formulated at the program level very often were not implemented. In the context of European constitutional thinking, the topic gains an ideological-critical emphasis. For those who believe in the reality of normative theories of separation of powers, it comes as a surprise that though political goals may be determined at the policy-formulation level, it is at the implementation stage where decisionmakers have a full range of possibilities to fulfill or to displace such goals. Concepts similar to "policy" and "implementation" (which are untranslatable in German legal language) have nevertheless been implicit in theories claiming a tendency to replace "conditional," compliance-oriented laws with goal-oriented legislation. To the degree that executive agencies become less strictly bound by precise legal rules and more by goal-oriented policy programs, they seem to lose legal legitimacy. This has to be replaced by increasing responsiveness at the implementation phase, which can be enhanced institutionally through participation, or what we might call the "democratic legitimacy of implementation."     

Pluralism and Integrity

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This paper argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The integrity and coherence of European law is best preserved by considering that both the national legal order and the international or European legal orders adopt sophisticated views of their own limits.     

The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy

The paper reviews key aspects of the new constitutional framework for the European Union, once the Treaty of Amsterdam has been ratified, in the light of the core challenges of managing flexible integration in an enlarged Union and securing adequate legitimacy for the integration project. Reviewing briefly the general debates on flexibility, and its relationship to different constitutional and political futures for the Union which are suggested by those involved in the debates, the paper examines the principal provisions governing what is termed 'closer cooperation' within the new Union treaties. The emphasis is placed on the framework provisions of the TEU, and those in the First Pillar. It is noticeable that the Treaty takes a 'non-ideological' approach to flexibility, eschewing direct support for those who interpret flexibility as meaning more or less integration in the future. It provides a framework for future cooperation which is likely to be too restrictive to be workable, except in very limited circumstances. However, particular instances of flexibility are provided in the Treaty, in the form of the opt-outs from the new free movement title and the communitarisation of Schengen for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and some might even describe these as 'pick-and-choose'. The paper concludes by reviewing the flexibility debate against the background of the ongoing legitimacy challenge for the Union, arguing that, as currently conceived, flexibility is more to do with balancing political interests than with securing or enhancing legitimacy.     

Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures

Abstract A remarkable feature of the Union's legal order is the absence of a genuine hierarchy of legal acts—a pre‐established ranking of different types of legal acts in accordance with the democratic legitimacy of their respective authors and adoption procedures, which is used as a means to resolve conflicts among these different types of legal acts. There is however a clear suggestion of such hierarchy in the sequence in which the newly created legal instruments are listed in Article I‐33(1) and in the organisation of the subsequent Articles I‐34 to I‐37 of the European Constitution. In this contribution, the (lost) logic behind the Union's current set of legal instruments is analysed, followed by an examination of the reform of the system of legal instruments carried out in the European Constitution. Lastly, an attempt is made to answer the question as to whether this reform amounts to the establishment of a genuine hierarchy of legal acts in the Union.     

‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation doctrine. Second, the European legislator has also insisted on political safeguards within delegated legislation. Under the Rome Treaty, ‘comitology’ was the defining characteristic of executive legislation. The Lisbon Treaty represents a revolutionary restructuring of the regulatory process. The (old) Community regime for delegated legislation is split into two halves. Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power.     

National parliaments and the European Union: part of the problem or part of the solution to the democratic deficit in the European constitutional settlement?

European integration is as much an opportunity as a threat to national parliaments. The view that national parliaments have been the main losers in the process is not substantiated by empirical evidence. National parliaments have adapted their structures and procedures to keep pace with the increasing scope of integration. This process has included strengthening the constitutional powers of parliaments in some of the member states. The recognition in the Nice and Laeken declarations that national parliaments have an important role in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union and the key provisions of the draft protocols on the role of national parliaments and subsidiarity adopted by the Convention on the Future of Europe will ensure that national parliaments have the opportunity and the means, if they so choose, to be closely involved in Union affairs. Constitutional change at the Union level is likely to trigger normative and procedural change in the member states.     

Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro‐Identity

Abstract:  There is a broad agreement on the fact that today there is a wide gap between the European Union (EU) and the citizens of the Member States. According to a common belief, this gap is the result of a deliberate decision made by the founding fathers and subsequent European officials to keep the integration dynamic distant from the people. Yet, if we look closely at their writings and actions that were initiated by the European Commission at an early stage in the integration process, we can only conclude that there is little evidence to support this common belief. On the contrary, it appears that the founding fathers were eager to inform the public on issues related to the communities and that they did not hesitate to support measures aimed at enhancing knowledge about Europe, its policies, and its institutions. It is essential to question these beliefs in order to improve our understanding of the democratic deficit in the EU and especially of the solutions proposed for remedying it. If we admit that the founding fathers never had the intention of keeping the people in ignorance and that some actions were rapidly taken to bring the EU closer to them then it becomes difficult to claim that a reduction of the democratic deficit will follow when decision-makers simply imagine and adopt programmes aimed at bridging the gap. The question then becomes why have this socialisation and this 'rapprochement' not occurred.     

The EU ‘Stress Tests’: The Basis for a New Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Safety

Among the constitutional tensions at the heart of the European integration process, the relationship between ‘mainstream’ EU Law (framed by the Treaty on European Union) and Euratom Law has often been overlooked. Nonetheless, the EU's response to the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima provides an opportunity to revisit this relationship. This article specifically aims to highlight the dysfunctions of the prevailing understanding of the Euratom's provisions on nuclear safety matters as well as to identify, under a joint interpretation of all EU Treaties, how to develop a European nuclear safety regime that reinforces the compensatory role of EU law and contributes to enhance the EU's legitimacy.