India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 ¹See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.     

Peter Gowan's “American grand strategy”

While this article broadly agrees with Peter Gowan's concern about the new militarism of the United States and the appalling consequences that have emerged as a result of U.S. preemption in Iraq, it questions the extent to which his portrait of U.S. hegemony addresses all the relevant issues as they affect the Asian region. Given the numerical dominance of Asia in world population and the rising power of China and India, how Gowan's “American Grand Strategy” applies to this part of the world is of fundamental importance to the relevance and sustainability of his argument. Part 1 on U.S. economic hegemony argues that U.S. capital has not been an unmitigated evil for India and where U.S. interests have been damaging they are not uniquely so: the European Union's economic policies have also been deeply damaging even though Europe is not a hegemon. Part 2 on U.S. political hegemony argues that bringing Pakistan and India into the U.S. alliance system has been beneficial for regional security and domestic political-ethnic stability. Part 3 considers responses to U.S. hegemony, arguing that this supremacy is more fragile than Gowan assumes because new powers, such as China and India, have long-term strategies to reduce their dependency. The conclusion suggests that despite widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the nature of U.S. engagement in Asia, the dominant view in the region is one that sees the United States as a useful wedge between the emerging interests of China, India, and Japan. In short, the “American Grand Strategy” is not as negative, overwhelming, or as unpopular as Gowan suggests.     

“印太”视域下印日“特殊全球战略伙伴关系”:动力、影响及前景

近年来,随着美国"印太"战略的提出和印度洋战略地位的进一步凸显,印度洋—太平洋地区已经成为世界各大国战略竞争与博弈的重点区域。印度与日本作为影响印太秩序的两支重要力量,两国均提出了自己的"印太"战略构想,并不断加强在印太地区的战略互动。在"印太"地缘框架下,印日战略伙伴关系的内涵得到全面发展,已经升级为"特殊全球战略伙伴关系"。印日战略伙伴关系以共同的"民主价值观"为纽带,在政治、经贸、安全、军事等各领域的合作全面深化,并具有浓厚的制衡中国色彩。在当前国际政治、经济重心向印太地区转移的大背景下,印日战略伙伴关系的强化既是两国各自利益的需求使然,也是对印太地缘政治格局新变化的反应,必将对当前的印太地区秩序产生深远而复杂的影响。面对"印太时代"的到来,中国应与印日共同建立有关印太地区秩序的对话沟通机制,扩大中印日三国在印太地区基于共同利益的战略合作,推进印太命运共同体建设。在当前印太地缘政治兴起与日印战略伙伴关系不断升温的情势下,中国既要密切关注日印战略伙伴关系的发展态势,客观地看待印日在印太地区的战略互动给中国周边外交环境带来的各种风险和挑战。同时也要积极构建中国的"印太"战略,运筹好中日、中印双边关系,以便塑造有利于中国和平崛起的周边安全环境。     

An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is now 28 years old, yet its success is nominal. That more important bilateral issues are discussed on the sidelines of SAARC Summits proves the point. Intra-regional trade is still miniscule compared to the region's overall share in the world trade. The biggest defaulter is India, the most prominent member of the group. The purpose of this paper is first to raise the question whether South Asia qualifies to be called a region, and second to argue that, given the problems it faces with most of its neighbours, India is forced to conclude that SAARC matters the least for it. For economic and strategic reasons, India's interests lie in global networking and in a balanced relationship with China. Since Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic presence in South Asia poaches into India's perceived sphere of influence, India's interest in SAARC is limited to that context for otherwise it neither provides large markets for India nor does it contribute to India's strategic policy. Inversely, such a situation justifies India's neighbours playing the China card to bargain with India though that card its losing its value. To buttress our arguments we have drawn from the region's historical experiences as well as from recent developments in international and South Asian politics, including domestic politics.     

The Iraq treaty, 1930

India's relations with the Gulf countries started to flourish in the 1990s after India succeeded in de-hyphenating Pakistan from its policy toward the Gulf. Though Pakistan remained a factor as it continued to raise Kashmir and internal situation in India at multilateral forums such as OIC to evoke anti-India sentiments, it did not remain an underlying factor in as was the case during the Cold War era. In the contemporary dynamics, when India-Gulf relations are progressing toward strategic partnerships, Pakistan has re-emerged as a factor but its nature has changed. As highlighted in the joint statements issued during the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to the Gulf countries since May 2014, India can now put pressure on Pakistan by highlighting its policy of sponsoring terrorism. This was evident when the Arab Gulf countries condemned the Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) terrorist attacks. India's relations with the Arab Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries are independent of their engagements with Pakistan and India-Pakistan tension, but New Delhi has stepped up efforts to raise the issue of cross-border terrorism and use of religion to incite terror activities against India during its engagements with these countries. It underlines the growing convergence between India and Arab Gulf countries over regional issues and the ability of India to isolate Pakistan over issues related to terrorism.     

India's “Look East” Policy

A combination of economic, strategic, and domestic considerations has led India to pay greater attention to its eastern neighbours since the 1990s. India's steadily growing ties with East and Southeast Asian countries have become an increasingly important element of India's foreign policy. India is working with these countries bilaterally as well as through regional frameworks like the EAS, ASEM, and ASEAN, and sub-regional organizations like BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. The main driver remains economic, and India has many ongoing and planned FTAs with the countries of this region. Of late, defence and security ties too have grown. However, India's relations with China remain tense and troubled, with persisting differences over the border, Tibet, and China's patronage of India's South Asian neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Asia's major players will have to overcome internal rivalries and consciously evolve a cooperative paradigm for Asian security and cooperation to enable Asia to play a leading global role.     

印度历史教科书中的中国形象

历史教科书是建构民族成员历史记忆乃至民族认同的重要媒介之一。在印度民族认同建构中,历史教科书如何认识中国这一历史悠久的邻国和定位中印关系,无疑具有重要意义。通过研究印度中央和六个邦现行的高小(6~8年级)、初中(9~10年级)阶段历史教科书,可将印度历史教科书中的中国形象按印度史的分期大致分为近代前、近代、独立后三个时期。近代前,中国是印度在世界范围内的主要贸易伙伴、友好邻国、物质文明大国,而在精神文明领域,中印是"学生-精神导师"关系。其中,西藏被塑造为印度文化圈的成员,而非中国的一部分。步入近代后,中印同样在帝国主义殖民浪潮冲击下,经历了衰弱和被剥削的文明古国,印度的教科书将中国视为"难兄难弟"。独立后,中国仍然被书写为国际格局中重要的一极,但中印之间围绕边界、涉核、涉巴等问题,形成了一定程度的对立,中国也开始在教科书中被视为对手和威胁。此外,印度的世俗民族主义、印度教民族主义和地方视角也导致了教科书中中国形象的差异性建构。     

Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century

Abstract

This article considers various security predicaments affecting relations between India and China. These Sino-Indian security predicaments include their territorial dispute, their nuclear arms race, their encirclement and alignment scenarios, their trade and energy issues, and their future prospects. International relations (IR) theory is deployed around these varied security predicaments, with power and perception particularly evident in IR realism, geopolitics, constructivism, and security dilemma dynamics. Balance-of-power theory is complemented by balance-of-threat considerations. India's hedging strategy towards China and China's own strategy of transition point to each country looking to their own respective rise for the mid century.     

East Asian Economic Growth and its Implications for Regional Security

Rapid economic growth in East Asia is changing the nature of international relations in the region. In the economic sphere, mercantilist policies of promoting exports and limiting imports contributed to economic tensions between rapidly growing economies in the region and the region's major trading partner, the United States. These tensions over bilateral trade issues began between Japan and United States, moved on next to South Korea and Taiwan, and have now moved from there to China. In the security field, economic growth in China is leading to a major shift in the balance of power in the region. China's steadily increasing GDP is being accompanied by a comparable rise in its military expenditures despite the fact that China faces no obvious external threats at the present time. China's long term desire to be able to defend against any outside power probably means that this increase in defense expenditures will continue for the next decade or two. North Korea continues to be a threat to stability in the region but only because of its capacity to do enormous damage in one last suicidal attack. The one area where China's rising military expenditures could lead to major confrontation on terms very different from those that would occur today is Taiwan.     

“A Cat’s Paw of Indian Reactionaries”? Strategic Rivalry and Domestic Politics at the India–China–Myanmar Tri-Junction

ABSTRACT

Ostensibly driven by concerns over a military standoff with China similar to Doklam, India increased military deployment at the Myanmar tri-junction. This article assesses the inevitability of systemic factors such as rivalry with China in determining India’s approach on border issues. It asks why India sought formalization of its boundary with Burma in 1967. Given its territorial disputes with China, resolving the Burma boundary should have been high priority. Still, it took India two decades after independence to broach the subject. Based on fresh archival and interview data, this article answers the question by examining the India–Burma Boundary Agreement. A three-party territorial dispute, the making of this agreement witnessed simultaneous interplay between states with visible power differentials, and various stakeholders within India’s polity and bureaucracy. The article argues that even when inter-state competition is apparent, domestic factors may be more important in triggering foreign policy change.     

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,trade, and the roles of Iran,India and Pakistan

This article seeks to explore the implications of Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran. Not in terms of power-politics or as a counterbalance to the USA as this has been explored elsewhere, but what practical problems such an expanded organization could help solve, what opportunities it could realize, and how SCO's engagement in trade is a function of favourable political and bilateral developments in the region. It is argued here that the trade, infrastructure and energy sectors are of particular importance and that substantial potential gains could be realized if coordination is improved. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that China, Russia, Pakistan, India and Iran may have lower standards of democratic development and economic transparency than the West. What is the motivation behind the SCO's engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran? Should this engagement be conceived only in terms of balancing US unipolarity or are there legitimate concerns of increasing regional cooperation in Eurasia?     

Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy in Vietnam from the 1990s to the Early Twenty-First Century

In Vietnam, Taiwanese (In this article, 'Taiwanese' refer to all the citizens in Taiwan, although Taiwanese may not be a perfect usage for all the inhabitants in Taiwan. For example, some 400,000 natives of JinMen County live and work in Taiwan Province who might not identify with Taiwan Province. Also, many Vietnamese women in the ROC marry 'Taiwanese.' Perhaps it will take a few decades, if not longer, for all the inhabitants in Taiwan to identify with "Taiwanese.") businesses have led the Taipei government in the movement to ??Go South.?? They have served as pioneers, surrogates and middlemen for Taiwan??s economic diplomacy in Vietnam. Vietnam's 'Doi Moi' (Open Door) policy, inaugurated in December 1986, encouraged greater openness to economic investment from abroad. Compared with China, Vietnam enjoys the privilege of better access to the European market. Vietnam has become the only country in Southeast Asia that can parallel China in terms of trade and investment at the turn of the century.     

China's Economic and Social Development and the International Scene

China's phenomenal economic growth had a tremendous impact on the international scene, in terms of both China's international behavior and the state of the international system. China has become a welcomed presence in the international community in many ways. However, there are also consequences of growth that cause international concern: the rapid growth of its military capability without accompanying improvements in transparency, strengthened ties with problem states caused by growing domestic energy demands, and possible diversion of domestic discontents abroad that might be intensified by growing nationalism. In terms of the international system, the most notable is China's expanding presence in the surrounding region, but it is not leading to a China-centered region because of other important concurrent developments. The growing relationship between China and another rapidly rising power, India, and the US involvement with both countries are leading to the formation of a new triangular relationship in Asia.     

Energising ties: The politics of oil

India's growing energy needs are a key driver of commercial and diplomatic initiatives with Africa. It is also an area in which competition is rife with China and the US, but also other global players. The article details developments and production in Africa's energy sector and suggests ways that India could improve its relationship with the continent in this regard.     

Japan's Policy for East Asia

Japanese foreign policy six decades after the end of World War II stands at a crossroads. The forces of globalization and the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem to herald the end of the unipolar post-Cold War international system and the emergence of a new era defined by multi-polarity and multilateralism. Such global trends are manifest most clearly in Japan's own backyard, where phenomenal region-wide economic growth, a gradual redistribution of power (in particular the rise of China and India), and the increasingly important role of multilateral cooperation and regional institutions are dramatically transforming East Asia. This trend shows no signs of slowing down, much less reversing itself; nor would it be in Japan's interest to pursue any policy that seeks to do so. Nevertheless, the transformation itself remains almost on auto-pilot, lacking a clear long-term guiding vision. After presenting a brief overview of Japan's past policy toward the region, the goal of this paper will be to articulate such a vision through a series of policy proposals through which to ensure future peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia.     

China,globalisation and the World Trade Organisation

This article claims that membership of the WTO will help industrialisation, rather than make China more dependent. Hedley Bull's realist paradigm helps to understand why China joined this organisation, any counter arguments are wishful thinking. Friedrich List's ideas for self-reliant industrialisation were used successfully by Mao Zedong, but globalisation has changed development strategy. Globalisation, if handled wrongly can make China jobless, voiceless, rootless, ruthless and futureless. If handled right, it can strengthen independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. The Chinese government needs stable external, as well as internal economic conditions. There are benefits for the vast majority of Chinese, but there are also possible disadvantages. David Ricardo's “comparative advantage” has not really helped Less Developed Countries, on the other hand, China should not become a crumbled “Somalia,” this means that China has to engage with globalisation, and this means also the WTO. After all, agency does exist and globalisation is a “two-edged sword.”     

INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY AND THE ‘SINO-INDIAN GREAT GAME’

Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.

The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptions of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.     

India and Vietnam compared: Family planning and everyda ylife

Abstract

In India and Vietnam, as in North America, the term “family planning” refers mainly to birth control. There is, however, a broader sense in which this term may be used, namely governmental planning for the welfare and happiness of families, and for democracy and social justice among their members. In this sense family planning is very prominent in Vietnam, but largely absent in India. It is in this sense that I prefer to use the term, although I will first discuss birth control in the overall context of planning for the size of families, as well as for the nation's population growth.     

Burma,China and the Myth of Military Bases

Abstract

Since the advent of a new, more outward-looking military government in 1988, Burma has come to occupy a position of considerable importance in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment. Burma's burgeoning relationship with China has attracted particular attention, not least because of the stream of reports in the news media and, to a lesser extent, academic literature, claiming that China has established several naval bases and intelligence collection stations in Burma. This apparent intrusion by China into the northeast Indian Ocean has strongly influenced the strategic perceptions and policies of Burma's regional neighbors, notably India. The reported facilities have also been cited as evidence that Burma has become a client state of China, and as proof of Beijing's expansionist designs in South and Southeast Asia. A close examination of the available evidence, however, suggests that there are no Chinese military bases on Burmese soil, a fact conceded by senior Indian officials in 2005. China still has a strong strategic interest in developing its bilateral relations with Burma but, based on this analysis, it would appear that China's presence in Burma, and its current influence over Burma's military regime, have been greatly exaggerated.