Anti‐Corruption Watchdog Accountability: The Limitations of Judicial Review's Ability to Guard the Guardians

Anti‐corruption watchdogs form an important part of integrity measures in Australia's system of government. Integrity theory places anti‐corruption watchdogs in a fourth branch of government and as a part of a national integrity system as a way of understanding how they detect and prevent corruption and promote integrity. Integrity theory claims that an important part of the oversight of watchdogs occurs through judicial review of watchdog decisions by the courts. However, it fails to recognise the unique limitations when undertaking judicial review of watchdog decisions. This article submits that it is important to recognise these limitations to properly assess the effectiveness of a national integrity system and a fourth branch of government. The article explores the unique limitations of the court's ability to hold watchdogs to account and offers suggestions for managing these limitations.     

The National Integrity System: assessing corruption and reform

This article builds on a Transparency International (TI)‐sponsored research study funded by the Dutch Government into the National Integrity System (NIS) in practice. The NIS is a framework approach developed by TI that proposes assessing corruption and reform holistically. The NIS not only looks at separate institutions or separate areas of activity or separate rules and practices, but also bases its perspective on institutional and other inter‐relationships, inter‐dependence and combined effectiveness. The study involved 18 countries, using in‐country researchers and an overview report. This article assesses the findings of the study to consider how the approach can work in practice, and what the approach can reveal about the causes and nature of corruption as well as the implications for reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sectarian Rebellions in Post-Transition Nigeria Compared

The Boko Haram, a radical Islamic group based in north-east Nigeria, has killed over 1,000 people since mid-2011. This article explores the historical origins and structural drivers of Boko Haram and puts them into context. It argues that the Nigerian government's coercive response to Boko Haram has perpetuated a cycle of violence and undermined endogenous sources of moderation based on cultural, institutional, and political conditions. State repression to implement a counter-terrorism strategy has radicalized the group, created incentives to find international sympathizers, and contributes to fragmentation that impedes political solutions. A comparison with rebellions in the oil producing Niger Delta helps identify some barriers to and opportunities for conflict resolution.     

A candidate for relegation? Corruption,governance approaches and the (re)construction of post‐war states

The article discusses the place of anti‐corruption in the post‐war donor agendas. It uses examples from a set of country reports to demonstrate the divergence between the rhetoric and reality of donor‐led initiatives, and the delivery of reform through the governance approach of which addressing corruption has been a part. It suggests that dealing with corruption has often been diluted or downplayed within the wider approach. Within the debate to revise that approach, corruption may be relegated further down the agenda. While recognising the complexity of the post‐war reform process, and the demands from the multiple tasks and volume of funding being addressed by a range of domestic and external actors, the article suggests that failure to address corruption within any new approach in favour of what are considered more pressing reform issues may well cause problems for the future. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

E‐participation Opportunities and the Ambiguous Role of Corruption: A Model of Municipal Responsiveness to Sociopolitical Factors

Municipalities ostensibly scale the ladder of e‐participation improvement to gain legitimacy. However, research has not yet addressed how e‐participation initiatives are affected by serious legitimacy concerns such as corruption. One municipal response to corruption is to use e‐participation offerings as a remedial effort to gain citizen trust, but window‐dressing strategies might also be used. In this article, the authors attempt to make sense of this ambiguity by hypothesizing that the effects of perceived corruption on e‐participation offerings depend on the type of e‐participation as well as the level of local social capital and local public accountability demand. Analysis of data from 104 municipal websites in South Africa between 2013 and 2017 reveals support for two moderation mechanisms: (1) a positive remedial response to corruption in the presence of strong social capital and (2) a negative avoidance response to corruption in the presence of high demand for accountability.     

Confronting the Governance Challenges of Developing Nigeria's Extractive Industry: Policy and Performance in the Oil and Gas Sector1

The issue of economic growth and human development has been a central concern in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria's extractive industry, and this has featured prominently in the agitations and generalized restiveness in the Niger Delta, the oil‐producing region. While many studies have focused on these problems, policies aimed at confronting them have not received much broad attention. This article bridges this research gap by holistically focusing on the solution to the problem. In doing this, the article examines the policies during the Obasanjo administration from 1999 to 2007 in order to critically assess the efficacy or inefficiency of the policies in reversing the general problem now known as the “resource curse,” and to offer a better understanding of the deeper political, social, and economic issues that drive outcomes. The article finds that while significant efforts were made to avoid the boom and bust cycle of oil and lower volatility by de‐linking public expenditure from oil revenue through the “oil‐price‐based fiscal rule,” generally, progress in this area was not matched by improvement in the other areas examined by this study, notably peace and safety of lives and oil/gas installations, the development of the oil‐producing region, environmental security and sustainability, and the transparent and accountable use of oil/gas revenues.     

Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement

The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market‐oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co‐development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulation. Extending the conceptual framework of institutional theory about formal and informal rules, and using public procurement in China as an example, this article shows that formal tendering rules and regulations may be modified, circumvented, or replaced by informal ones which facilitate corruption. The article identifies four corruption schemes through which procurement actors may distort competition processes and mechanisms under the guise of formal rules. Consequently, public procurement in China displays the structural outlook of market competition, but not its essential substance.     

Reassessing the Impact of Civil Society: Nonprofit Sector,Press Freedom,and Corruption

The notion that a strong civil society helps to fight corruption has become a cornerstone of governance policy. Yet, a continuing dearth of empirical research, which tests this general proposition and probes the relevant causal mechanisms, feeds rising skepticism of current policy initiatives. This study theorizes the relationship between civil society and corruption, arguing that civil society's impact depends to a large extent on its ability to generate sufficient public pressure which, in turn, depends on the press being free. Analysis of cross‐national and longitudinal data shows that civil society strength is indeed inversely linked to the level of corruption, but the impact is highly dependent on press freedom. This conditioning effect affirms the importance of the public pressure mechanism. These results explain the need for policy to target both civil society and press freedom in promoting accountable governance and sustainable development.     

FIGHTING CORRUPTION WITH SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS' POTENTIAL TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Given the poor track record of traditional anti‐corruption initiatives, donors and governments are increasingly looking at how civil society can fight corruption in public administration. Social accountability mechanisms intend to perform this role by holding officials directly accountable through citizen engagement. However, this article argues that social accountability mechanisms are only capable of reducing corruption systemically if they activate horizontal accountability and sustain it through the sanctioning mechanisms of electoral accountability. A comparative case study analysis using the cases of the Ugandan Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and the Bangalore Citizen Report Card is applied to test this hypothesis. The Tanzanian Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and an example of citizen engagement in Mumbai are employed as shadow cases to provide additional evidence for the hypothesis. The results indicate that social accountability mechanisms must be inclusive, broad, with public effect and embedded in other accountability relationships to fight corruption effectively. Electoral accountability is key, and support to social accountability mechanisms should therefore always be well placed within a broader agenda aimed at strengthening democratic governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

IS ALL CORRUPTION DYSFUNCTIONAL? PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Many anti‐corruption organisations work from the notion that both petty and grand corruption axiomatically results in negative consequences. However, few studies have asked citizens to evaluate the effects of different scales and types of corruption. This article investigates how rural people in Papua New Guinea associate dysfunctional or functional consequences to different types and scales of corruption. It draws on findings from focus groups conducted in four provinces of the country. The article finds that most examples of corruption considered by respondents were perceived as dysfunctional; however, marginalised respondents considered small‐scale corruption as functional—if the acts described benefitted marginalised people. These findings suggest that it is critical that anti‐corruption organisations understand and respond to the constraints faced by poor and marginalised people when operating in weak states. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DANGER ZONES OF CORRUPTION: HOW MANAGEMENT OF THE MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRACY AFFECTS CORRUPTION RISKS IN POLAND

This article examines the relationship between management of the ministerial bureaucracy and the risk of high‐level corruption in Poland. Four danger zones of corruption in the ministerial bureaucracy are distinguished, comprising the personalisation of appointments, the emergence of multiple dependencies, the screening capacity of the personnel system and the incentive of bureaucrats to develop a reputation of honesty and competence. Empirically, the article investigates the case of Poland from 1997 until 2007 and sets the findings in a comparative East Central European perspective. The article shows that corruption risks in the ministerial bureaucracy increased in most but not all danger zones after 2001 and, in particular, during the period of the centre‐right governments that were in office between 2005 and 2007. The increase in corruption risks is reflected in Poland's deteriorating corruption record during the same period. The conclusion discusses the findings with regard to alternative causes of corruption and the relationship between civil service professionalisation and corruption in other East Central European countries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Localization,Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols Shaping Bribe Offers in Azerbaijan

The article analyses a neglected side of corruption – citizen-initiated bribe offers in Azerbaijan. The main rationale for taking a citizen focus on corruption is to identify whether citizen choices support state-led anti-corruption initiatives. Drawing on a survey of 1002 respondents, the research shows that ‘tolerance of corruption’ is high among the population in Azerbaijan. Logistic regression results show that bribe offers among citizens are associated with localization and formal value orientations. This means that the respondents pro-actively use bribes and readily bend laws to their own local interests. Thus, bribe offers constitute around half of the entire variation in corruption in Azerbaijan. Therefore, a successful fight against corruption cannot be confined to the eradication of only bureaucratic bribe demand, but needs to take into account corruption choices of the population too.     

Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of Government on Municipal Corruption

While trust in government at all levels is at an all‐time low, actual corruption at the municipal level has been declining. One factor often credited with this decline is the introduction of the council‐manager form of government. One of the key reasons the council‐manager form was created in the early 1900s was to act as an antidote to the corruption prevalent in the big‐city machine politics of the era. Despite this, no one has tested whether the council‐manager form has in fact influenced the decline in corruption rates. This article uses a rare events logit model to analyze corruption convictions in municipalities between 1990 and 2010 to determine which factors, including form of government, affect the probability that a corrupt act will occur. The findings indicate that municipalities with the council‐manager form are 57 percent less likely to have corruption convictions than municipalities with the mayor‐council form.     

EXPORTING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE TO RUSSIA

The failure of US initiatives to build local/regional economic development capacity in Russia following the fall of Communism has been partly blamed on national factors, Russian culture, and American consultants. Much of the failure, however, probably resulted because American approaches to economic development—‐highly successful in other contexts—could not work during Russia's transition from a command economy to its current state. Such things as promoting entrepreneurship, developing public‐private partnerships, creating a market economy, accessing start‐up capital, attracting foreign investment, overcoming bureaucratic corruption and high taxation, working within the rule of law, and negating organized crime either should not have been done, or could not have been done, leaving many of our programs ineffective. We ask whether the Russian deviations from the U.S. model have any implications for the current situation facing state and local development policy in the U.S.     

Assessing political will for anti‐corruption efforts: an analytic framework

This article focuses on analyzing political will as it relates to the design, initiation, and pursuit of anti‐corruption activities. The article elaborates an analytic framework for political will that partitions the concept into a set of characteristics/indicators, and elaborates the external factors that influence the expression and intensity of political will in a particular situation. The conceptual model identifies the links among the characteristics of political will and these external factors, and traces their resulting influence on the support for, design of, and outcomes of anti‐corruption reforms. The conceptual framework for political will draws upon analysis and field experience with implementing policy change in a variety of sectors, including anti‐corruption. The article closes with recommendations on the practical applications of the framework. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Do Intrinsic Motivations,Work‐Related Opportunities,and Well‐Being Shape Bureaucratic Corruptibility?

A large body of research focuses on the institutional factors that shape country‐level corruption and the effectiveness of macro‐level anticorruption measures; however, corruption at the individual level remains understudied and thus poorly understood. This article examines the underlying causes of and mechanisms through which individual government bureaucrats engage in corruption. The researchers develop a framework that incorporates intrinsic motivations, work‐related opportunities, and work‐related well‐being to test the ways in which these micro‐level factors shape bureaucrats' propensity to engage in corrupt behaviors (or corruptibility). Using survey data from more than 1,300 Chinese public employees, the authors identify direct and indirect effects on corruptibility and discuss theoretical and practical implications.     

Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance

This article argues that the difference between poor countries and rich countries has to do with governance rather than resources. In emphasizing the importance of public administration in explaining economic success and failure, the author examines three general theories of governance (organizational, cultural, and structural‐functional) presented in Ferrel Heady's textbook in comparative administration. Political elasticity theory is introduced as a way to reconcile and overcome the weaknesses of these theories and to explain a number of unresolved questions in the literature having to do with decentralization, corruption, democracy, culture, and globalization, using comparative case studies (the Netherlands and Ghana, Singapore and Jamaica, and Japan and Nigeria). The implications of political elasticity theory for foreign aid are suggested at the conclusion, illustrated by a comparison of Spain and Mexico. What ties these case studies together is the heretofore unnoticed and/or unexplained fact that as countries prosper, political power takes on “rubber‐band” and “balloon” characteristics.     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Australia's National Integrity Systems: Introducing a New Blueprint

Australia is sometimes regarded as having well‐developed systems for protecting and promoting public integrity. Nevertheless the functioning of modern integrity systems is not particularly well understood, in Australia or internationally, and to be complacent about their state of health is obviously to court danger. In this introduction Frank Costigan, who as a royal commissioner in the 1980s pioneered new strategies for exposing institutional corruption and organized crime, introduces the results of the Australian National Integrity System Assessment — a collaborative Australian Research Council project seeking better ways of mapping and evaluating the institutions and processes dedicated nationally to ensuring integrity and accountability. The result is a new blueprint for key reforms and continual improvement in Australia's integrity systems over coming years.