The Rise of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Effective Financing Approach for Infrastructure Investment?

The rise of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China has spurred heated debates about their purpose and effectiveness. This article traces the fluctuation of China's PPPs over several decades and finds that PPPs have played a supplementary role in China's infrastructure investment, as a response to the pressures of fiscal shortfalls and government debts. The resurgence of PPPs in recent years aims to bridge the infrastructure gap and alleviate ballooning local debts. These expectations, however, are hard to realize. China's PPPs mainly involve state‐owned enterprises and place increasing financial burdens on the government. The central government has taken measures to attract private sector investment to mitigate the financial risk, but the prospects for PPPs remain unclear.     

Government Support Programs and Private Investments in PPP Markets

ABSTRACT:

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become an important tool for investing in and developing public infrastructure and services. However, many developing countries have failed to attract sufficient private investment from the PPP market. This article uses data from 4,484 PPP projects across 130 developing countries to investigate if and how distinct types of government support can attract more private investment. Results showed that capital, revenue, and in-kind subsidies directly provided from governments attract more private capital, while indirect supports through government guarantee policies do not. The institutional quality of a country enhances the positive relationship between direct government support and private PPP investments. Further, risk allocation plays a mediating role between government supports and private investment.     

The political cost of public–private partnerships: Theory and evidence from Colombian infrastructure development

Infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) eschew traditional public management to provide distributive goods worldwide. Yet, in Colombia, the context of our study, both the promise of and voters' experience with PPPs hinder incumbent parties in elections when theories of distributive politics expect otherwise. We argue that negative experiences with PPPs introduce a sociotropic turn in individual voting: bad experience crowds out the possibility that promising a new project will improve a voter's own welfare. Studying what are, to our knowledge, all 109 Colombian PPP projects between 1998 and 2014, and over 8,700 individual survey responses, our evidence shows that vote intention for the incumbent executive or his party decreases as experience with more PPPs in respondents' districts increases. Our analysis and results introduce an important agenda for research into the political significance of these legacies of new public management.     

When new public management fails: Infrastructure public–private partnerships and political constraints in developing and transitional economies

Amidst calls for more scrutiny of the failure of infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs), uncertainty about how we can measure failure remains, and little systematic evidence illuminates its likelihood. Our mixed‐methods design explores the notion of failure and identifies the conditions under which it happens. The first phase of our research employs documentary analysis and semistructured expert interviews, and identifies project cancellation as capturing the most severe occurrences of failure. A second phase statistically analyzes a unique World Bank data set capturing the provisions of over 4,000 infrastructure PPPs launched between 1990 and 2015 in 89 countries. We find robust evidence supporting the theoretical claim that PPPs are less likely to be canceled in countries with more veto points among their political institutions to restrain politicians from intervening in policy implementation. Cancellation is a rare, but valid indicator of failure, and the importance of veto players clarifies how political risk operates in this context.     

International advocacy for contract-based public private partnerships through case studies: a re-interpretation of Southern Cross Station,Melbourne

In response to urban infrastructure deficits, international organisations, such as the United Nations, encourage governments to harness private finance. Contract-based Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) represent one policy option enabling infrastructure to be privately financed and constructed, and for service provision to occur. With PPPs also a contested policy option, private sector policy intermediaries advocate for their adoption, including through the selective promotion of case studies. In recognition that favourable case study narratives may leach out local context, a multi-dimensional analytical framework is introduced distinguishing between de-institutionalised, aspatial, non-historical, uncritical and non-futuristic perspectives. Recently the private sector-led World Economic Forum published ‘Harnessing Public-Private Cooperation to Deliver the New Urban Agenda’, which reported upon the PPP-led development of Spencer Street (or Southern Cross) Station in Melbourne, Australia. In deploying the framework, this paper concludes that case study narratives can be reductionist and locally detached in various ways. The role of policy intermediaries in the transfer of policy information therefore requires carefully interpretation, not least because of the malleable use of case studies to reveal desired conclusions.     

An Evaluation of Private Sector Provision of Public Infrastructure in Australian Local Government

Private sector provision of public infrastructure in Australia at all levels of government, including local government, has steadily increased over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, this method of providing public infrastructure remains controversial. This article seeks to provide a critical review of the arguments surrounding private sector provision of infrastructure in Australian local government. It examines both the case for private sector provision of municipal infrastructure in Australia and the major arguments advanced against this approach to infrastructure development. Given the conceptual argumentation and empirical evidence on private municipal infrastructure provision, it is argued that policy makers should employ a nuanced performance evaluation framework to assess the benefits and weaknesses of private provision on the basis of the specific type of infrastructure in question and the kind of services it provides rather than simply endorse carte blanche privatization.     

Redistribution tax under non-benevolent governments

I analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system. I employ these assumptions: members gain special benefits in the majority; parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers; the member's utility function is given in a quasi-linear function; the government's objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and I classify governments according to the weight. The four main results are: a stable majority dose not support myopic government; the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers; the stable transfer of non-benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority; and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority, because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy.     

Transparency of Risk and Reward in U.K. Public–Private Partnerships

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) are an increasingly common mechanism for the renewal of public sector infrastructure, although in the United Kingdom, these have been criticized as representing poor value for money. An inherent assumption of much of this criticism is that a corollary of detriment for the public sector is benefit for the private sector. This paper highlights the difficulty of objectively verifying the many criticisms and assumptions regarding risk and reward associated with PPPs. Public and private sector disclosure policies and systems are analyzed and we conclude that neither sector practices openness and transparency. This results in a democratic accountability deficit in the public sector and a lack of meaningful data being made available to stakeholders in private companies.     

Hybrid annuity model: Hamming risk allocations in Indian highway public–private partnerships

A new public–private partnership (PPP) model, that is, hybrid annuity model (HAM) was introduced in 2016, to revive investments in the Indian highway infrastructure and to remedy the troubled relationship between the public and private sectors. This model marked a significant policy departure in the management of long‐ and short‐term public interest, which is inherent to public utilities and service delivery. Through a dispassionate lens, this paper critically examines the extent to which HAM has fulfilled its stated objectives. The analysis of project award data provides mixed empirical evidence of HAM's early success. As a positive policy imperative, HAM has been able to attract private participation in highway infrastructure by readjustment of risk allocations, and hence, it is a welcome step forward in improving public affairs. Worryingly though, HAM also brought about extensive de‐risking of the private sector, with evidence of rendering risk retention, that is, “skin‐in‐the‐game” by the less significant private infrastructure investors, and thereby adversely impacting development priorities. We find that HAM has taken the reengagement of private sector two steps back in management of PPP affairs. Recognizing that a true performance assessment is unlikely at this early stage of HAM introduction, the paper adopts a more analytical stance in identifying possible pitfalls based upon the telltale signs presented by project bidding and award data. This study offers fresh insight and course correction on the role of government and other stakeholders in this newly introduced PPP template.     

Effects of Public Ownership over Firms' Size and Overstaffing Problems

A model is presented to analyse the impact ofownership over the problem of excess of employmentgenerally found in public firms. A government has toprovide a service or build an infrastructure, underuncertainty about the valuation of the project byconsumers. Three possible ownership schemes areconsidered for the provision of this service: astate-owned firm, a private firm with a completecontingent contract, or a private firm with anincomplete contract. In all three schemes, the agentthat chooses the size of the project is always thegovernment, without any asymmetries of information.Even though multiple solutions are feasible and nodefinitive conclusion is found to be valid for allstates of nature, an evaluation of outcomes shows thata private firm tends to underprovide infrastructure orservices more often, while under public ownership thefirm is typically larger. If incomplete contracting isadded to the private firm case, the model exhibitssolutions in which outcomes could be socially worsethan those obtained by a public firm. Only changes inthe voting behaviour of workers and contracting costsare required in this model to derive these results.Thus, the paper provides an example that ownershipper se may have an effect on the size andefficiency of firms, even under symmetric informationconditions, an extreme that has been generally deniedin the literature on public firms and privatisation.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

Information Sharing for Infrastructure Risk Management: Barriers and Solutions

There is a public interest in ensuring that infrastructure systems are appropriately protected and prepared for disruptions. While infrastructure protection is usually viewed as a public responsibility, infrastructure risk management actually requires a high degree of cooperation between the public and private sectors, particularly in the sharing of information about risks to infrastructure. Discussions with Chief Security Officers across sectors of the US economy reveal the complexity of the task, as they describe at length the private sector's requirements of multiples types of information about a range of potential threats. While the US government has established many mechanisms for sharing information, barriers remain that inhibit both the private and public partners from obtaining the information needed to protect infrastructure. Overcoming these barriers requires new thinking about the intelligence generation process, the mechanisms and practices upon which the process relies, and the responsibilities of those in the private sector who participate in it.     

Madhya Pradesh Housing & Infrastructure Development Board: affordable housing via public–private partnership mode

The Madhya Pradesh Housing & Infrastructure Development Board (MPHIDB) is a state‐owned entity in Madhya Pradesh State of India with the mandate of providing housing for citizens, particularly for those in the low‐income segment. MPHIDB has been constructing houses on its own using the traditional engineering and procurement contract (EPC) model. In July 2015, it was exploring the possibility of creating affordable housing units via public–private partnership (PPP). The advantage of involving private sector is that MPHIDB can tap into creative energy and construction efficiency of the private sector and deliver the best results within the given set of time and resource constraints. The proposed structure of PPP is that the private partner will be given a portion of land in lieu of the affordable housing units that it will build and transfer to MPHIDB. However, there are trade‐offs involved in doing the project in PPP mode instead of EPC mode. The main advantages of a government body like MPHDIB doing the project on its own are as follows: (a) It is able to better manage regulatory risks in terms of getting clearances, land acquisition, and so forth; (b) it can raise finances at lower interest rates than what is charged for private sector entities; and (c) the entire land parcel is available to construct houses, and hence it can get more housing units per unit of land. The Commissioner (CEO) of MPHIDB had to decide whether to go for PPP or EPC model, and if he opted for PPP, how should the PPP be structured?     

Public Values in Public–Private Partnerships

Although public–private partnerships (PPPs) are frequently analyzed and lauded in terms of efficiency, their impact on public values is often neglected. As a result, there is little empirical evidence supporting or rejecting the claim that PPPs have a negative effect on public values. This case study provides valuable insight into the relationship between public values in PPPs and the circumstances affecting the degree to which public values are upheld. Research findings demonstrate that whether public values are at stake in PPPs cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Rather, public values can be threatened, safeguarded, or even strengthened depending on the project phase and the specific facet of the public value under scrutiny. Insight into which circumstances influence the safeguarding of public values in DBFMO (design–build–finance–maintain–operate) projects unravels the strengths and weaknesses of PPPs in terms of public values, providing public managers with a starting point for optimization.     

Political Ideology and Social Services Contracting: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

Theoretical perspectives on the ideological influences on government contracting predict that local governments controlled by right-wing political parties will contract out a higher proportion of services than those controlled by left-wing parties. However, empirical evidence on the impact of political ideology on contracting out remains inconclusive. To cast new light on this important issue, the authors apply a quasi-experimental research design to contracting choices in children's social services in English local government. Because local governments in England are largely divided along partisan lines, it is possible to estimate ideological effects using a regression discontinuity design that captures changes in political control at 50 percent of the seats gained in local elections. The regression discontinuity estimates reveal that left-wing controlled local governments exhibit a marked aversion to private sector involvement in service provision and a clear preference for in-house service provision. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.     

A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Specialist PPP Units’ Methodologies for Conducting Value for Money Appraisals

Governments throughout the world are turning to public?private partnerships (PPPs) as a means of providing new infrastructure. The decision to adopt a PPP over conventional government procurement is usually based on a value for money (VfM) appraisal, but this analysis is conducted differently in different countries. This article describes the correct way to conduct VfM analysis if the goal is to minimize the present value of the costs to the Treasury and if the goal is to maximize social welfare. It then compares the documented methodologies of nine specialist PPP units. It identifies four ways in which these methodologies depart from either of the correct approaches, and shows how each departure favors the PPP option. Finally, it shows how the UK approach might be augmented to determine the best value to society.     

A new framework for testing the effect of government spending on growth and productivity

Does government spending have a positive or negative effect on economic growth? The results of earlier empirical studies give mixed results. In this study we suggest a new method for testing the effect of different kinds of government expenditure on productivity growth in the private sector. The focus on productivity in the private sector and the use of disaggregated data makes it possible to avoid or mitigate a number of methodological problems. The major conclusions, which are quite robust, are that government transfers, consumption and total outlays have consistently negative effects, while educational expenditure has a positive effect, and government investment has no effect on private productivity growth. The impact is also found to work solely through total factor productivity and not via the marginal productivity of labor and capital.     

Policy Agendas for South Korea's Broadband Convergence Network Infrastructure Project

Broadband holds a critical position in the progress of economic and social indicators by connecting consumers, businesses, and governments. South Korea has consistently been the global leader in broadband deployment since 1999. In the last 10 years, the Korean government has pursued several strategies for its broadband policy. The purpose of this article was to explore South Korea's implementation of its Broadband Convergence Network (BcN) project with special emphasis on its objectives of achieving media convergence, ubiquitous connectivity, and coordination among network stakeholders. The study uses the theoretical framework of institutionalism to identify factors that help explain how the policy agenda for the BcN was implemented. The BcN is Korea's most recent high‐speed Internet infrastructure project and is envisioned as a conduit through which broadband services, applications, and content will flow to reflect a robust high‐speed Internet infrastructure. This broadband infrastructure project began in 2004 as a consortium that includes the government and private sector firms. This infrastructure was launched as a three‐phase project. The first phase of the BcN extended from 2004 through 2005, the second phase extended from 2006 through 2007, and the third phase extended from 2008 through 2010.     

When public principals give up control over private agents: The new independence of ICANN in internet governance

In 2016, the United States (US) government relinquished its long‐standing delegation contract with the Internet Corporation for Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private organization that governs the technical infrastructure of the internet. This presents a puzzle as the US not only gave up a power resource, but also relinquished the possibility, as a public principal, to hold the private agent ICANN accountable. I argue that public principals have incentives to leave control in the hands of private stakeholders when a delegation contract is exposed to external pressure by powerful outside states and the probability of extensive policy changes by the privatized agent is limited. The analysis shows that the unilateral US control over ICANN was strongly challenged by other states and private actors. Instead of granting a greater role to rising powers in internet governance, the US gave up its unilateral influence after internal reforms limited the risk that an independent ICANN could deviate too far from former policies.