Two Schools of Legal Idealism: A Positivist Introduction*

Abstract. The author focuses his attention on two schools of legal idealism: the so‐called Sheffield School and the “discourse ethics” school. In order to emphasize the valuable facets of each school, the author analyzes four different points: (1) the claim to correctness as a necessary feature of law, (2) the connection between correctness and validity, (3) the qualifying or classifying status of this connection, (4) and the desirability of adopting the “Radbruch’s Formula.” Finally, the author analyzes the weaknesses of each theory. **     

On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality.     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

Gardner on Legal Reasoning

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive.     

On the Connection between Law and Morality: Some Doubts about Robert Alexy’s View

The paper aims at a critical discussion of Alexy’s conception of the relationship between law and morality, which is known to insist on their necessary connection. After a brief recapitulation of this conception, the author scrutinizes three of its essential elements: the thesis of the dual nature of law, the argument from law’s claim to moral correctness, and the idea of an objective morality. Finally, he sketches his own position which, in some respects, resembles Alexy’s view, but also differs from it in certain relevant points.     

Tocqueville's Question. The Role of a Constitution in the Process of Integration

Starting from the contemporary processes of “fragmentation of societies” (pluralization of individual lifestyles, the increasing ethnic‐cultural diversity, de‐solidarity, the melting away of political loyalties) and of “dissolution of the nation” (the erosion of the monopoly of the state, economic globalization), the author examines Tocqueville's question about what holds society together. This problem of integration is analysed in the perspective of social and legal sciences. Accordingly, the author stresses that solutions to such a problem should come from a constitutional theory which is open to debates and answers developing in other disciplines, thus obtaining relevant information concerning the role of law and of constitution for integration. 1 Abstract by Antonino Rotolo.
     

Exploring the Sources of Authority Over the Word Meaning in Transgender Jurisprudence

This paper looks at transgender identities and the law in the context of marriage in common law jurisdictions. It particularly focuses on the nature and sources of authority over word meaning as well as the role of language and definition in classifying transgender individuals into a legal category. When it comes to the legal question of who may marry whom, and what the terms “man” and “woman” actually refer to, there is no statutory definition of the terms “man”, “woman”, “male” and “female”. This has put the onus on judges, especially those who needed to decide whether a transgender person can marry in his/her affirmed sex, to interpret these terms. Two lines of cases in transgender jurisprudence are examined so as to have a close study of how the courts construed these terms and classified transgender people into a category. The first concerns United Kingdom cases, namely Corbett v Corbett (1971), Bellinger v Bellinger (2003) and the Hong Kong case W v Registrar of Marriages (2010), (2011) & (2013). The second consists of Australian cases such as Secretary, Department of Social Security v State Rail Authority (1993) and Re Kevin (2002). This paper discusses these issues by analyzing and comparing different cases in transgender jurisprudence as well as examining how these issues play out in contemporary Hong Kong.     

The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?*

Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched.     

Law school accreditation in the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union: what steps for the future?

Legal education reform has recently emerged as a key component in the rule of law promotion in the former Soviet Union republics,1 1. See Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, Jr, Educating Russia's future lawyers—any role for the United States? (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 17, 18–19, arguing that the core building block of the rule of law rests on legal education. See John M. Burman, The role of clinical legal education in developing the rule of law in Russia (2002) Wyoming Law Review at 90, 101, stating that reform of the legal education is the most effective way of creating a culture of law. See Peter J. Sahlas & Carl Chastenay, Russian legal education: post-communist stagnation or revival? (1998) 48 Journal of Legal Education 194 at 194, arguing that “a system of legal education can do more than teach the society's rules to successive generations: it can inspire values of justice and promote social progress”. See also Mark Dietrich, Three foundations of the rule of law: education, advocacy and judicial reform, in: Law in Transition (London, EBRD, Autumn 2002), at p. 57, available at: http://www.ebrd.com/ pubs/law/lit/english/aut02.pdf. The author points out that reform of legal education is the single most important reform to be undertaken in the NIS region. If law students are not taught how to think critically, question authority and be guided by the ethical values of the profession while in law school, it is difficult to expect that they will become honest advocates, judges or prosecutors in the future. View all notes now sovereign and independent states collectively known, for the purpose of this paper, as the New Independent States (NIS). Scholarly articles and international forums2 2. See Europe and Central Asia Division of the Legal Department, World Bank, Selected Issues (2001) Challenges and Strategies. The World Bank Forum on Legal and Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 33; see also Dietrich, op. cit., at 58. View all notes suggest that legal education reform could be advanced by developing and implementing accreditation procedures for law schools, updating law school curricula, establishing transparent and rigorous grading standards, and retraining the law faculty. This paper discusses just one of these measures, namely the development and implementation of quality evaluation and accreditation procedures for law schools in the NIS region. In order to explore this issue in detail, the paper has been structured into six parts.

?Part I provides a brief overview of legal education in the Soviet Union, thus placing the issues tackled in this paper into a historical perspective. Part II describes the main changes occurring in the higher education system in general and legal education in particular in the NIS region after 1991, emphasising new challenges that privatisation of the higher education sector posed to the quality of legal education, thus triggering an urgent need for quality-assurance and accreditation mechanisms. The currently existent NIS practices of licensing, evaluation and accreditation of academic institutions, including law faculties within multi-disciplinary academic institutions, as well as separate law schools, are described in Part III. Parts IV and V adopt a comparative approach to accreditation by providing an overview of accreditation procedures in the United States, and the recent initiative and trends in quality evaluation and accreditation in Western Europe. Drawing upon the information provided in Parts I–V, Part VI offers concrete suggestions and recommendations for improving the implementation of accreditation procedures in the NIS region. The materials contained herein represent the opinions of the author and editors and should not be construed to be the view of either the American Bar Association or the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. The views expressed herein have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the ABA and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the ABA. Nothing contained in this report is to be considered as the rendering of legal advice for specific cases, and readers are responsible for obtaining such advice from their own legal counsel. This report is intended for educational and informational purposes only. Research performed on Westlaw country of West Group. View all notes     

More Norms,Less Justice: Refugees,the Republic,and everyone in between

The paper argues for conflating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as two sides of a work-in-progress postcolonial state. To be sure, aliens, refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons are separate legal entities. Nevertheless, this fragmented normative regime stands testimony to more laws and less justice. Many Asian states have no domestic refugee law. India, a common law system, takes a case by case approach as refugees are given “temporary shelter on humanitarian considerations”. Ironically, a work-in-progress postcolonial state sustains even de jure citizens as de facto stateless persons; the erstwhile Indo-Bangla enclaves for more than half a century were an apt example. Surely, the raison d’être of international law on refugees is to end human suffering, if needed, by transcending the absence of positive laws. A constitutional and political desire to minimise human suffering alone could cut the rigour of such positivist legal narratives. The Delhi High Court seemingly walked that path in Koul v Estate Officer noting “refugees and IDPs appear to be similarly situated”. Rising terrorism has made states increasingly believe in a security narrative all the same. A simultaneous emergence of a demographic anxiety particularly in India’s North-eastern states increasingly pits aliens and refugees against the domiciled indigenous and tribal people.     

The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of methodological or conceptual positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the neutrality thesis in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism.     

原则理论与法概念争议

法理学中法概念之争的中心议题在于法律和道德在概念上是否存在必然联系,或者说法律效力和道德正确性之间是否存在必然联系。为了证立联系命题,阿列克西在其早先的原则理论的基础上提出了原则论据,后者包括安置命题、道德命题与正确性命题。在逐一检讨了这三个命题的恰当性以及其与联系命题间的关联度后可以认为,原则论据无法用来证立联系命题。但这并不表示联系命题就必然失败,因为原则理论可以别的方式来证明它。法概念的争议是有关法律效力判准的争议,最终是政治哲学上的争议。     

“Iraqnophobia”: A Biomedical History of State-Rearing and Shock Doctrine in Iraq

The history of Western foreign policy in the Middle East has long assimilated Arab culture to sickness. Specifically, the biological episteme of “contamination” has shaped American foreign policy in the Gulf for decades. In so doing, the US Government continually borrowed references from the natural sciences to frame its foreign policy, leading some commentators to claim that biology supplanted philosophy and religion as the primary political category. The article analyses the semantics of Iraqnophobic metaphors, from the British experience of “nursing” Arabs at the close of the First World War to the recent “shock doctrine” of American therapists. First, the paper will concentrate its attention on the metaphors of disinfection and surgical resection. Second, it will address the metaphors of lustration, State-rearing and scientific recovery. Finally, it will explore Iraqis’ rebellion against their self-appointed tutors and doctors. Elaborating on the belligerents’ nursing and biomedical metaphors, the following pages address the life cycle of foreign “legal transplantation”, “antibody” resistance and “immunosuppressant” counterinsurgency in Iraq.     

Consequences of legal risk communication for sanction perception updating and white-collar criminality

Objectives

Scholars have long emphasized that communicating, or “advertising”, information about legal sanction risk is necessary for the success of deterrence-based crime policies. However, scant research has evaluated whether direct communications about legal risk can cause sanction perception updating, the updating of ambiguity in sanction perceptions, or changes in persons’ willingness to offend. No prior studies have evaluated sanction perception updating for white-collar crimes.

Methods

To address this research void, the current study analyzes data from an experiment embedded in a recent national survey (N?=?878). Multivariate regression models estimate the effect of providing participants with information about the “objective” arrest risk for white-collar offenses on their sanction perceptions.

Results

The findings provide the first evidence that such information, when it is inconsistent with individuals’ prior beliefs, causes them to update: (1) their perceptions of the certainty of arrest; (2) their ambiguity about arrest risk; and, indirectly, (3) their willingness to commit white-collar crimes.

Conclusions

The results imply that individuals are willing to incorporate relevant information into their subjective beliefs about sanction risks. Importantly, however, they also make meaningful distinctions about the value of new information for understanding criminal risks.

     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.