An Incomplete Victory: The Implications of QT v Director of Immigration for the Protection of Gay Rights in Hong Kong

QT v Director of Immigration is the most important decision on gay rights in Hong Kong since the unequal ages of consent between heterosexuals and homosexuals were held to be unconstitutional 10 years ago. The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong affirmed the right of same‐sex couples married or in a civil partnership overseas to be treated on an equal basis with married heterosexual couples. This note considers the strengths and shortcomings of the Court of Appeal's reasoning, in terms of its potential significance both to the rights of sexual minorities and to the wider protection of human rights by means of the common law.     

Apology and Retraction: Questioning Fundamentals: Leyland Daf and the “Ownership” of Charged Property

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Retraction . Modern Law Review 67: 5, 832‐843 .
Online publication date: 1‐Sept‐2004. The note entitled ‘Questioning Fundamentals: Leyland Daf and the “Ownership” of Charged Property’, 1 which appeared in the September issue of the Review has, through the sole fault of the author, failed to acknowledge the use of an article written by Dr Riz Mokal entitled ‘Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges: The Separate Funds Fallacy’ 1 posted on the SSRN Electronic Library in April 2004. Any views that appear similar between these articles belong to Dr Mokal. It is sincerely hoped that Dr Mokal will accept this apology for the lapse in properly acknowledging his views.     

Remedies for Breach of Trust

The decision of the Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co confirms the approach taken by Lord Browne‐Wilkinson in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns: where a trustee misapplies trust assets, a beneficiary is limited to a claim for equitable compensation for losses caused by the trustee's breach of duty. This seems to be a departure from traditional equitable doctrine, which held that the beneficiary could falsify the trustee's unauthorised disbursement and bring a claim for an ‘equitable debt’. This note considers the impact of the decision of the Supreme Court, and how the law regarding ‘equitable compensation’ might continue to develop.     

Law reform across the commonwealth: A new voice

This article examines the proviso to the ‘alternative remedies’ provision/clause in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. It does so from two perspectives emerging from the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this area. In the first, exemplified by Harrikissoon v Attorney General, the applicant brings a constitutional motion for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms in circumstances where he may have an alternative remedy at common law or under statute. In that decision, the Privy Council delineated the scope of this proviso under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, effectively importing an ‘alternative remedies’ clause from the use of the word ‘may’ in section 14(2) of the Constitution. This article examines, first, what Harrikissoon decided; second, whether its reasoning is acceptable given the wording of the section; and, third, the limitations accepted by subsequent decisions of the Privy Council. In the second perspective, the applicant makes a similar application for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms arising from or occurring during the course of proceedings already begun. The locus classicus is the decision of Chokolingo v Attorney General and forms part of the wider concern of the courts to prevent its processes being abused where the applicant makes a collateral constitutional challenge rather than pursuing an ordinary appeal. This article also aims to examine the decisions that pre‐dated Chokolingo in order to understand its jurisprudential underpinnings; to explore that decision to determine what the Privy Council in Chokolingo decided; to consider the similarities and differences between the reasoning therein and that of the Privy Council in Harrikissoon; and to consider the extent to which the principle enunciated in Chokolingo has been extended or limited in subsequent decisions of the Privy Council.     

Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt

The ‘reasonable doubt standard’ is the controlling standard of proof for criminal fact finding in several jurisdictions. Drawing on decision theory, some scholars have argued that the stringency of this standard varies according to the circumstances of the case. This article contends that the standard does not lend itself to the ‘sliding‐scale’ approach mandated by decision theory. This is supported through investigation of the concept of ‘reasonableness’. While this concept has mostly been studied as it operates with reference to practical reasoning, scant attention has been given to the meaning that it acquires when referred to theoretical reasoning. Unlike in the former case, reasonableness does not in the latter depend on the reasoner's attitudes in favour of the outcomes of a decisional process. Therefore, since criminal fact finding is an instance of theoretical reasoning, the question whether in this enterprise a doubt is reasonable is not susceptible to a decision‐theoretic approach.     

Using the Citizen to Bring the Refugee In: Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi (ONEM)

The decision of the CJEU in Zambrano was seen as another example of an over‐active judiciary in Luxembourg. This comment suggests, on the contrary, that the case has too little reasoning to open any ‘floodgates’ but that in setting out a new logic for EU citizenship, the Opinion offers an approach which limits the global approach to free movement case law and uses citizenship status to include rather than exclude the refugee.     

Grant's Application: it's time for a new approach to a "public interest" exclusion from patentability

This article reviews the recent IP Australia decision in Grant's Application [2004] APO 11 about an innovation patent for a way of protecting assets against a loss of ownership as a result of a legal liability. The significance of this decision was to expose the tortured reasoning necessary to exclude from patentability an invention that was arguably contrary to the "public interest". The article asserts that the effect of the decision revoking the patent was correct, but that the reasoning points to a need to reconsider the "public interest" limits on patentability. The article then considers the approach that should be adopted in formalising a "public interest" exemption from patentability that is practical and generally applicable.     

Out on a Limb: Appointing a Parenting Coordinator with Decision‐Making Authority in the Absence of a Statute or Rule

This Article addresses the issue of whether a court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator (PC) with decision‐making authority in the absence of a statute or court rule. The Article identifies possible sources of authority for the appointment of a PC with decision‐making authority in a state with no authorizing statute or court rule. It also provides a paradigm for constructing an appointment that allows for the benefits of Parenting Coordination but does not delegate decision‐making authority to an extent that it would constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court may find some authority allowing the appointment in (1) its equitable authority over child custody and visitation, (2) its authority to enforce its own orders, or (3) its authority to appoint other extrajudicial assistants such as a special master or mediator.
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court must craft an appointment that delegates enough decision‐making authority to the PC for parenting coordination to be effective yet, at the same time, not so much decision‐making authority as to render the appointment an impermissible delegation of a judicial function, specifically:
  • The PC's role should be limited to assisting the parties in implementing custody and visitation terms already decreed by the trial court.
  • A PC should be appointed only if the parties to the divorce consent to the appointment or if the trial court makes a finding that the case is a high‐conflict case.
  • The parties must have the opportunity for the trial court to meaningfully review any decision of the PC so that the trial court retains ultimate decision‐making authority.

     

Attribution in Company Law

In Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) v Nazir (No 2), the Court of Appeal held that the ex turpi causa defence was inapplicable by refusing to attribute the fraud of the directors and the sole shareholder to the company in connection with the company's claim against them and third party co‐conspirators. It is significant that the court has not only clarified the law in relation to attribution, but it did so by rejecting the majority's reasoning and endorsing the dissenting judgment in the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm). This article evaluates the decision in Bilta by critically examining the fundamental principles and policies that apply to the three distinct circumstances under which corporate attribution should or should not take place.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

In Search of Indicators of Detective Aptitude: Police Recruits’ Logical Reasoning and Ability to Generate Investigative Hypotheses

Previous psychological research on criminal investigation has not systematically addressed the role of deductive and inductive reasoning skills in decision-making in detectives. This study examined the relationship between these skills derived from a cognitive ability test used for police recruitment and test scores from an investigative reasoning skills task (Fahsing and Ask 2016). Newly recruited students at the Norwegian Police University College (N = 166) were presented with two semi-fictitious missing-person cases and were asked to report all relevant hypotheses and necessary investigative actions in each case. The quality of participants’ responses was gauged by comparison with a gold standard established by a panel of senior police experts. The scores from the deductive and inductive reasoning test were not related to participants’ performance on the investigative reasoning task. However, the presence or absence of an investigative “tipping-point” (i.e. arrest decision) in the two cases was systematically associated with participants’ ability to generate investigative hypotheses. Methodological limitations and implications for police recruitment and criminal investigative practice are discussed.     

Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

On the Relation between Form and Substance in Law

Abstract. In this paper the author deals with some theoretical aspects of Robert Summers' last book ( Summers 2006 ). In particular, he concentrates on the hazy relationship between form and substance in Summers' theory. In order to analyze some major difficulties entailed in the thesis that form and substance are different and independent things, the author discusses three specific questions: (1) the difference between form and substance; (2) the possibility of a form meant to be value‐neutral; (3) how to distinguish a form‐centered approach from a formalistic approach when one has to interpret a statute. This last question is dealt with through examples taken from two legal decisions. * * Abstract by Marco Goldoni.
     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence*

This paper examines the concept of coherence and its role in legal reasoning. First, it identifies some problem areas confronting coherence theories of legal reasoning about both disputed questions of fact and disputed questions of law. Second, with a view to solving these problems, it proposes a coherence model of legal reasoning. The main tenet of this coherence model is that a belief about the law and the facts under dispute is justified if it is “optimally coherent,” that is, if it is such that an epistemically responsible legal decision‐maker would have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. Last, looking beyond the coherence theory, the paper explores the implications of the version of legal coherentism proposed for a general theory of legal reasoning and rationality.     

Trust Parties’ Uniquely Easy Access to Rescission: Analysis,Critique and Reform

Parties to trusts currently enjoy easier access to judicial avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes and inadequate decision‐making than other persons. The principal doctrinal basis for this advantage has shifted from the rule in Re Hastings‐Bass to rescission in equity. The article argues that this advantage is normatively unjustified, and recommends a uniform legal framework to govern the avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes or inadequate decision‐making, whether or not a trust was involved. Under this framework, dispositions resulting from laypersons’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should be avoided, subject to appropriate defences, whenever that causative nexus is present, while dispositions resulting from professionals’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should only be avoided where the mistake or deliberative flaw was so serious as to render the transferee's retention of property transferred unjust.     

Statistical Evidence,Assertions and Responsibility

The legal system has been ambivalent about naked statistical evidence. Addressing this ambivalence, the article explores the epistemological status of naked statistical evidence and its normative and practical implications. It is suggested that since naked statistical evidence cannot generate knowledge, it cannot be the basis for assertions of facts; and assertions of facts are practically and legally important: they are essential in order to establish the court's responsibility for its decisions and its errors. Such responsibility is needed in order to maintain the legitimacy of the legal system; to avoid unfairness to defendants; and to ensure that legal decision‐makers have no valid claims against the decision‐making arrangement. As a result, the legal system is inclined to avoid statistical evidence altogether.     

Me Voici,here I Am,Here I Stand,I Can Do No Other

This article offers a Levinasian reading of the case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland (1993). My contention is that the judicial reasoning that gave rise to the decision that Anthony Bland should die was driven by an ontological imperative I submit from a Levinasian perspective the decision was ethically indefensible because it failed to recognise Anthony Bland as the other. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Darwall,Habermas, and the Fluidity of Respect

What moral commitments do we manifest when we make claims upon one another? The practice of claiming is inescapable, and so any normative presuppositions of that practice are similarly inescapable (at least on pain of self‐contradiction). This inquiry thus promises an Archimedian point from which to address intractable moral disagreements in modern society. Whatever we happen to differ about, we can be shown to agree about these premises, and therefore to share commitment to whatever can be derived from these premises. The most prominent developer of this approach is Jürgen Habermas, who has sought to ground, inter alia, religious and cultural rights on this basis. I will argue that the strategy cannot resolve disagreement in the way Habermas hopes, and that this has been shown, perhaps inadvertently, by Stephen Darwall, who for very different reasons seeks to work out the premises of the practice of claiming (and who never discusses Habermas). Darwall has no apparent interest in finding a universally convincing basis for resolving moral controversies. He seeks to address, not the practical problems of a pluralistic society, but some specialized, albeit important, questions of metaethics, having to do with what kind of entity a moral claim is 1 1 These are the focus of a symposium on Darwall's book The Second Person Standpoint (Darwall 2006) in Ethics 118 (Oct. 2007). To avoid misunderstanding: I am not here attempting a comprehensive comparison of Darwall and Habermas, but only juxtaposing their views on a single important issue.
. Both Habermas and Darwall think that discourse presupposes a kind of respect among persons. Darwall, however, shows that respect is too fluid, and takes too many possible forms, to ground any but the most trivial specific moral claims.