Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union

In the current debate on the future European order, the European Union (EU) is often described as an "emerging federation." This article claims that federalism is not exclusively useful in deliberating about the future of the EU. Non-statecentric conceptions of federalism provide a better understanding of the current structure and functioning of the European system of multilevel governance than most theories of European integration and international relations do. We combine political and economic perspectives of federalism to analyze the "balancing act" between effective political representation and efficient policy-making in the EU. Drawing on the examples of Germany and Switzerland in particular, we argue that the increasing delegation of powers to the central EU level needs to be paralleled by strengthened patterns of fiscal federalism and an empowered representation of functional interests at the European level. Without such "rebalancing," the current legitimacy problems of the EU are likely to intensify.     

Changing Forms of Federalism and Party Electoral Strategies: Belgium and the European Union

The introduction of federalism to a political system changesthe locus of power and offers new incentives to political parties.However, the way in which the new system is introduced influencesthe strategies of parties under the new federal arrangements.When federalism emerges through decentralization, the processencourages a greater focus on regional interests and regionalstrategies by parties. When federalism emerges through centralizationof authority, parties are encouraged to use a federal strategy,emphasizing common interests and common bonds across regions.Using Belgium and the European Union as examples, this articletraces changing party strategies in the wake of institutionalchange.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.     

Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A european constitutional perspective

The principle of subsidiarity through its re-affirmation in the Treaty of Maastricht became an integral and central part of European constitutional law. Its relationship to ecological issues, however, has so far not been explored. Subsidiarity is a general principle of organization. It can apply to all areas of policy: financial, agricultural, technological, education, defense, economic development and, e.g. environmental policy. The principle of subsidiarity is silent about the specific purpose, direction or content of a particular policy. Whatever be the purpose of any such policy, the principle of subsidiarity requires that it be carried out within that context which is the smallest viable one in which the objective can successfully be attained. When a task is too complicated for a small unit such as an office or a firm to be successfully performed, that unit has to be augmanted to the point where the task can be effectively performed. Likewise, if an organization is too large to successfully handle particular problems as its procedure may be too cumbersome or as it lacks sufficient detailed information or experience repeated recurrences of problems it has tried to settle, then a different organizational form must be found, preferably an existing one, which is closer to the problem at hand and able to carry out the policy. With the shift in responsibility will also travel the access to resources with which to carry out the task. Since ecological units rarely co-incide with political units, the principle of subsidiarity poses a specific challenge to politicians and administrators who have to decide on assignments of tasks and responsibilities as well as funding within the different echelons and among the different Member States of the European Union. This essay explores those tasks and, in particular, advances the notion of establishing ecological tax units.     

Mueller on European Federation: A Reply from the Perspective of Australian Federalism

Dennis Mueller has recently made a significant contribution tounderstanding issues of federalism and confederalism in theEuropean Union – from a particular public choice point of view. Hefurnishes an important and provocative discussion of therelationship between the decision-making rules embodied in aconstitutional convention (or other means of drafting a form ofunion for constituent states) and the decision-making rules whichwill be contained in the constitution which is the outcome of thatconvention. However, Mueller's veiled preference for a certainideal form of federalism for Europe tends to reduce the parametersof his discussion, and gives his article an unrealistic and narrowfocus, despite its ambitious scope. The present article exploressome of the latent complexities in the public choice analysis anddesign of European integration, particularly by drawing on thewider experience of working federations and theory of federalism,using the unique and synthesizing Australian experience as a pointof departure. It argues that Mueller's analysis is biased towardsthe reduction of decision-making costs of European governance, andthus undervalues the external costs that may be imposed throughexcessive central government.     

A Demos for the European Union?

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by – sometimes even confused with – the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes , whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?     

A European Public Choice perspective

Invited lecture in honor of Gordon Tullock at the meeting of The Public Choice Society in New Orleans, 15–17 March 1991.     

Five Danish referendums on the European Community and European Union: A critical assessment of the Franklin thesis

Abstract. Denmark had five referendums in the period from 1972 to 1998 dealing with Danish membership in the European Community, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the Edinburgh Agreement and the Amsterdam Treaty. Did the Danes really address these issues and involve themselves actively in the policy–making process on a vital issue or did they merely vote for or against the current government? The latter option represents the 'second order' elections argument advanced by Mark Franklin and others (see Franklin's article in this issue). If correct in this instance, it may have important and negative consequences for the potential of referendums to involve citizens more directly in the way they are governed. In this article, the Franklin thesis is assessed on the basis of data on voting behaviour in five Danish referendums on Europe and the democratic implications of these findings are discussed.     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

Institutional Arrangements and Logrolling: Evidence from the European Union

This article illustrates how voting rules used to pass a piece of legislation and the structure of the legislation, in terms of whether or not it has single or multiple issue dimensions, influence the frequency and the purpose of position changes in legislative negotiations. Through analysis of data on a set of legislative proposals negotiated in the European Union, I show that position changes are less common under unanimity rule than under majority rule. More importantly, I argue and show that when the negotiated legislation is multidimensional (i.e., contains multiple issues) and the voting rule is unanimity, position changing is a lucrative strategy for legislators. Multidimensional legislation creates opportunities for logrolling, and legislators’ veto power under the unanimity rule enables them to exploit these opportunities. Accordingly, under this scenario, legislators often engage in what I call a within‐legislation logroll and secure favorable legislative outcomes.