GENDER AND THE HIDDEN LIFE OF INSTITUTIONS

New Institutionalism has shown that the ‘rules of the game’ are crucial to structuring political life in terms of constraining and enabling political actors and influencing political outcomes. A limitation of this approach, however, has been its overemphasis on formal rules, with much less attention paid to how informal rules work alongside and in conjunction with formal institutions to shape actors and outcomes. This article contributes to an emerging literature that highlights the importance of informal institutions by bringing into focus one element that has been hidden in these debates – the influence of gender norms and practices on the operation and interaction between formal and informal institutions. It highlights some of the key benefits of a gender analysis for understanding political institutions in both their formal and informal guise and considers some of the challenges in building a research agenda that requires new methods and techniques of inquiry.     

Co-Investment and Clientelism as Informal Institutions: Beyond ‘Good Enough’ Property Rights Protection

How do we explain high rates of investment in the production of oil palm in Indonesia under conditions of legal uncertainty and uneven protection of property rights? This article argues that what are commonly seen as deficiencies in the formal institutional environment actually enabled investment, but only when informal institutions were able to provide investor assurances. Although the finding that informal institutions provide investor assurances is not new, this study addresses outstanding questions about how such informal institutions work. An examination of the micro-level details of informal institutions in the oil palm industry shows that informal institutions frequently grouped under umbrella terms such as ‘patronage’ or ‘relational ties’ are not uniform. Rather, two types of informal relational tie operate to provide investor assurances: clientelistic and co-investment. Although they serve similar purposes, clientelistic ties work well only under restrictive conditions and are vulnerable to decay. Co-investment, in contrast, is a more robust informal institution, especially when political power is fragmented. Although co-investment provides investor assurances under conditions of legal uncertainty, it remains a particularistic solution and does not guarantee generalized public interest protections.     

The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes

How do informal institutions influence the formation and function of formal institutions? Existing typologies focus on the interaction of informal institutions with an established framework of formal rules that is taken for granted. In transitional settings, such typologies are less helpful, since many formal institutions are in a state of flux. Instead, using examples drawn from post-communist state development, I argue that informal institutions can replace, undermine, and reinforce formal institutions irrespective of the latter’s strength, and that the elite competition generated by informal rules further influences which of these interactions dominate the development of the institutional framework. In transitional settings, the emergence and effectiveness of many formal institutions is endogenous to the informal institutions themselves.     

‘I Know My Rights,but Am I Better Off?’: Institutions and Disability in Uganda

Uganda is internationally recognised for both its legal and constitutional provisions for people with disabilities, and the presence of disabled persons’ organisations that provide informal advocacy and support. Using a unique dataset of 579 Ugandans with physical disabilities, we develop a conceptual framework on social capital to investigate the factors correlated with knowledge of formal institutions that target disability. In examining whether this knowledge results in higher incomes we find that gender matters. A woman’s education and membership of external networks are correlates of knowledge; higher levels of this knowledge are associated with substantially higher levels of income.     

Limits of regulatory governance change in the post-developmental state: Korean telecommunications market restructurings from a comparative perspective

This study explains the limits of institutional transformation in Korea from the developmental state to a post-developmental state, in terms of regulatory institutions instead of developmental institutions. The Korean state has taken advantage of the government's discretionary policy changes and power formed by both informal state institutions and informal policy networks, while the regulatory state has placed a special emphasis on social consensus as well as political support for changes of market institutions. New market rules and laws have also been inefficient and ineffective for fair market competition. Limits of regulatory governance change have occurred due to misalignments between informal regulatory institutions in the developmental state and formal regulatory institutions in the post-developmental state. State managers have created discretionary state intervention in policy implementation, politicized the roles of regulatory agencies, and brought ministry-type regulatory state institutions back in. The establishment of effective market institutions has failed due to informal market institutions (unfair and illegal market practices) that have interfered with the policy implementation of new formal market regulations.     

ELECTED MAYORS: LESSON DRAWING FROM FOUR COUNTRIES

Countries can and sometimes do copy the institutions and practices of other countries in order to address problems and issues that they have in common with them. The office of directly elected mayor has become an increasingly common feature of local government throughout the developed democracies, spreading from its largely American origins to a range of European states. This paper develops a matrix for the analysis of elected mayors in different countries using as its horizontal axis the formal, informal and individual attributes of elected mayors and, on the vertical axis, their governmental, governance and allegiance roles. The matrix is then applied to analyse studies of elected mayors in four countries: the United States, England, Germany and Greece, in an attempt to derive comparative lessons applicable to the countries included in the analysis, as well as to countries considering or in the process of developing directly elected executive mayors. The issues examined include improving the internal co‐ordination of local authorities’ departments, the need for network management in increasingly fragmented or ‘hollowed out’ local government systems and the ways in which mayors attempt to secure their political survival and that of the offices they hold, by securing and retaining the allegiance of voters and stakeholders. It also explores the benefits and dangers of concentrating much formal power and informal influence in a single pair of hands. Its conclusions are offered both to demonstrate ways in which comparative studies of political institutions can be developed and in the hope that they may be of use to mayors and those concerned with the development and reform of local government and governance.     

Role and place of the parliament of Kazakhstan in the system of checks and balances

This article examines the system of checks and balances in post-Soviet Kazakhstan in general and the role of the Parliament of Kazakhstan in that system in particular. As opposed to the scientific mainstream in Kazakhstan which explains established system of checks and balances as a result of formal constitutional reforms, this article undertakes broader analytical framework and examines the system of checks and balances in Kazakhstan taking into account a correlation of formal and informal practices. The goal of the article is to show that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan the separation of powers is established without proper checks and balances. The inference drawn from the article is that the separation of powers in Kazakhstan is blocked by the strong constitutional and informal powers of the President, which allows him to control and interfere in affairs of all branches of power.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Oil Industry in the Russian Arctic: Global Norms and Neo-Paternalism

Examining the oil and gas industry in the Russian Arctic, this article investigates the gap between corporate social responsibility (CSR) as articulated in corporate offices and implemented at the local level. In Russia, global CSR norms interact with weak formal institutions and the strong informal expectations of state officials and local communities that companies bear responsibility for welfare and infrastructure. As a result, the concept of citizens as ‘stakeholders’ is underdeveloped. Instead, local residents remain subjects within a neo-paternalist system of governance that mimics some elements of the Soviet past. Compensation for damages to indigenous peoples has blurred legal obligations and the voluntary nature of CSR. However, the CSR in the region is constantly developing and formal methods of compensation may assist in clarifying the scope and practice of CSR.     

Constructing a social safety net in Africa: An institutionalist analysis of colonial rule and state social policies in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

This article attempts to explain why, despite nearly identical cultural and economic landscapes and the potentially homogenizing pressures of globalization, social policies differ in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, two neighboring countries in West Africa. In Ghana, the government has generally attempted to strengthen the informal social welfare systems of the extended family and community through a more decentralized social policy, whereas the government in Côte d'Ivoire has tried to replace these informal social networks with the centralized arm of the bureaucracy. The article shows how different legacies of colonial rule produce these divergent social policies in a complex and iterative process over time. While domestic institutions do mediate the effects of globalization, the domestic factors highlighted in this article are not the formal political institutions cited in most studies. Rather, the analysis reveals the critical role of informal institutions, or normative frameworks, that existed under colonial rule and continue to endure in the post-colonial state. The article also contributes to current theories of institutions by showing how formal and informal institutions dynamically interact in the construction of the state and the African family.     

Institutions and Bribery in an Authoritarian State

Scholars have suggested that corruption could serve as a substitute for property-protecting institutions in developing countries, but very few empirical studies have been conducted to test this theory. Most existing studies on the determinants of corruption are cross-national, rely on perception-based measures, and focus on economic development, regime type, and market structure as explanatory variables. Little is known about why corruption occurs in an authoritarian state at the micro level. We theorize bribery as a bargaining process between a firm and a rent-maximizing public official, and we assume that graft-paying firms face different sets of rules and regulations, which govern firms' costs and benefits of bribing. We test the hypothesis that firms' bribes are determined by the rigor of their internal auditing control and the quality of property-protecting institutions. We use entertainment and travel costs directly observed in a large-scale firm-level survey in China as a proxy for corruption. Our study implies that firms operating in a weak property rights regime rely on political connections as a substitute for formal legal protection. The findings shed light on the literature on property rights, corruption, and East Asian development.     

The Unintended Consequences of Structural Change: When Formal and Informal Institutions Collide in Efforts to Address Wicked Problems

Significant restructuring of bureaucracies has occurred to facilitate joined-up working. This article draws on new institutionalism to explore the rationale behind the use of structural change for the promotion of joined-up working. It argues that a strong institutionalized myth has emerged which has created isomorphic pressures in the public sector to instigate structural changes in the name of vertical integration. These combine with informal institutions in ways that can be both productive and unproductive, highlighting the need to find a balance between formal institutional change and informal institutionalized practices, which often go unacknowledged as a powerful influence on policy.     

Feminists and Technocrats in the Democratization of Latin America: A Prolegomenon

Women's movements made important contributions to ending the period of authoritarian rule in Latin America, but their participation in the reconstruction of democratic politics has been more limited than expected. This paper argues that the enormous influence exerted by technocratic elites in the democratization process in Latin America has represented an obstacle to the improvement of women's status in the region. Gender-biased assumptions and practices have been only partially addressed, in part because the policy-making process is under the control of economists, a professional group with a particularly unfriendly stand towards gendered analysis. It is suggested that reforms within economics may help in the task of making democracy more responsive to the demands of women.     

Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends

Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively ‘hybrid’ institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.     

Neo-patrimonial practices and sustainability of authoritarian regimes in Eurasia

The article analyzes authoritarian regimes within the post-Soviet territory in terms of informal practices (clannishness, clientelism and patronage) and their characteristics used by political leaders to form a power coalition. It has been argued that any of these informal practices determine a power coalition of a certain size, which is consequential for regime sustainability. Power coalitions formed on the basis of a clan-like nature is the least effective way to retain power and generally leads to regime destabilization. Clientelism, which allows for forming a power coalition on a wider basis, is a more effective strategy in terms of regime sustainability. Maximum regime sustainability is reached when patronage practices are used, which require more material resources and are only accessible to a limited number of wealthy states.     

Which Institutions are Good for Your Health? The Deep Determinants of Comparative Cross-country Health Status

We extend the literature on the deep determinants of economic development by focusing on life expectancy, instead of income per capita, as an indicator of economic development, and by examining the role of informal, as well as formal, institutions. Our empirical results suggest that formal and informal institutions are substitutes. Improving informal institutions has positive effects on life expectancy that are statistically significant for most countries and stronger than the effects of improving formal institutions. The gains from improving informal institutions are greatest for countries in which institutions are weakest. Geographical factors also help explain cross-country variation in life expectancy.     

Stalinism and Executive Power: Formal and Informal Contours of Stalinism

Abstract

One of the key characteristics of Stalinism was the relationship between its formal and informal aspects. This is reflected clearly in the way in which, over time, the formal institutions of rule were supplanted by more informal mechanisms of decision-making. However, although the formal institutions seemed to atrophy, they were not abolished, but continued to become the basis upon which the post-Stalin leadership rested. The essay explains why one of those institutions, the Politburo, was maintained despite its atrophy as a decision-making organ, explaining this principally as a result of both strategic and tactical considerations.     

Legal change in post-communist states: Contradictions and explanations. Introduction

Reformers had high hopes that the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would lead to significant improvements in legal institutions and the role of law in public administration. However, the cumulative experience of 25 years of legal change since communism has been mixed, marked by achievements and failures, advances and moves backward. This special issue of the journal Communist and Post-Communist Studies documents the nuances of this process and starts the process of explaining them. This introductory essay draws on the findings of the articles in this issue to explore the impact of three potential explanatory factors: regime type, international influences, and legal (or political) culture. Regime type matters, but allows for considerable variation within authoritarian and democratic states alike and the possibility of reversals. The influence of international organizations (like the European Union) is also far from predictable, especially once states have joined the organization. Finally, legal cultures and political traditions play a large role in explaining developments in individual countries, but there is nothing inevitable about their impact.     

Europeanization and changing patterns of governance in Ireland

In order to examine institutional change in Republic of Ireland (hereinafter referred to as 'Ireland' or 'the Irish case') as a consequence of European integration, this article looks at the adaptation of national institutions subsequent to EU membership. A new institutionalist approach is taken towards the definition and discussion of institutions in order that the analysis may encompass the broadest range of changes consequent to EU membership: in relation to national structures; decision-making patterns; socialization processes; and overall 'system change'. The analysis uses the organizing concepts offered by Bulmer and Burch (1998) in their evaluation of the impact of Europeanization on national systems of public administration in Britain. According to this framework, 'institutions can be analysed in terms of four gradations moving from the formal, through the informal, to the normative and cultural' ( Bulmer and Burch 1998 , p. 604).     

Access to What? Legal Agency and Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America

Abstract

In this paper I issue a call for a primary focus on expanding and strengthening alternative, community-based justice systems, as a strategy for securing the full benefits of legal agency to indigenous and other culturally distinct groups. I do so because what lies within the formal justice system – the very system to which so many well-meaning programmes promise access – is, for these groups and their members, often partial justice at best. Efforts to increase the space governed by autochthonous justice are more likely to produce true legal agency for both the communities and their members, although they raise important issues for included subgroups, such as women or culturally nonconforming groups. Somewhat paradoxically, indigenous groups’ engagement with the very apex of formal systems, through constitutional litigation, has been one avenue for increasing that space, thus reflecting the exercise of collective legal agency in the pursuit of collective and individual legal agency.     

Violence and Urban Order in Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria

This article examines the interaction between politics and informal institutions of order in two of Africa’s most violent and crime-ridden cities, Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria. In both cities, governments have failed to provide basic public services and security to citizens, especially to those who reside in informal settlements or slums. A variety of informal institutions, including ethnic militia and block-level vigilante groups, fulfill security and enforcement roles in these relatively ungoverned urban spaces. This article examines the differences in the character and organization of these “specialists in violence,” and it argues that these differences are often integrally linked to the political strategies and aims of elites. The article makes two primary contributions to existing understandings of informal order in violent cities in the developing world. First, I find that organizations seemingly organically linked to local communities, such as ethnic militia, are strongly influenced by national-level political struggles. Violent organizations can gain a foothold and degree of legitimacy by appealing to traditional loyalties, including ethnicity, but organizations with these advantages are also attractive targets for cooptation by political actors. Secondly, both direct state repression and electoral use of militia lead to more predatory forms of interaction between these groups and local communities.