A Conception of Moral Rights and Its Application to Property and Welfare Rights*

Abstract
This article deals with the conceptual features and the rational justification of moral rights. For this purpose, the author starts with a common classification of rights, i.e., the distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam . He argues that rights of the first kind can be justified by a two-fold application of the principle of universalizability, while the latter are based on moral rules concerning special social relations, rules which themselves are founded on the principle of universalizability. This distinction, however, does not suffice to cover a further category of rights that play a very important role in social life, namely the rights of community membership, i.e., the particular rights that exist between the members of a social community. These rights cannot be derived from universalizability alone, but, instead, are based on the idea of social justice. This paper provides a short account of the main principles of social justice, and tries to apply them to property and welfare rights.     

The Trouble with Moral Rights

It is usually argued that moral rights are severely handicapped by their inconsistent entrenchment in common law and civilian legal systems. This article argues that the main trouble with moral rights protection is that the justifications for the existence of these rights are riddled with internal inconsistencies generated by the vagaries of copyright exploitation. Harmonising moral rights protection or using moral rights justifications cumulatively may not resolve the theoretical inconsistencies. Copyright protection must therefore be seriously overhauled if moral rights are to be widely perceived as vehicles for protecting authors' rights.     

The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation,Official Acknowledgment,and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court of Human Rights, 1996–2006

This article examines the domestic impact of supranational human rights litigation on acknowledgment of state violence in the context of macroprocesses of global governance. The article's argument is that the impact of supranational human rights litigation on the process of acknowledgment must be seen through counternarratives on state violence. The article undertakes a detailed textual analysis of the truth claims and denial strategies that emerged from the European Court of Human Rights proceedings on state violence during Turkey's struggle against the armed group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It assesses these in the context of the human rights reforms that were created following pressure from European-level governance processes. The article argues that attention must be paid to agency in acknowledgment and truth-telling processes, and points to the limits of technical-bureaucratic forms of human rights reform interventions in the context of state violence.     

The Reciprocity Theory of Rights

This article provides an explanatory account of a central class of moral rights; their normative grounding, the conditions for their possession and forfeiture, and their moral stringency. It argues that interpersonal rights against harm and rights to assistance are best understood as arising from reciprocity relations between moral agents. The account has significant advantages compared with rivals such as the interest theory of rights. By explaining the differential enforceability of rights against harm and rights to assistance, the reciprocity theory helps to refute an argument made by Cecile Fabre that the poor may have a justification for engaging in war against the affluent to compel them to fulfil their duties of assistance to the poor.     

人权的革命与革命中的人权——对罗伯斯比尔人权观的重新解读

本文在介绍了罗伯斯比尔关于人权的基本观点后,分析了罗伯斯比尔人权观中存在的内在矛盾,并结合法国大革命的历史背景着重探讨了导致罗伯斯比尔人权理想和人权实践形成巨大差距的原因。本文认为造成罗伯斯比尔人权观的悲剧既与其思想中存在的民粹主义和道德理想主义密切相关,也与那时的人权是一种人权革命后的人权和革命中的人权这一事实有着极为重要的关系。     

Accommodating Children's Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era

This article considers why so little case law currently acknowledges that children have recognisable rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and argues that the family courts are not meeting the demands of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this regard. It suggests that a reinterpretation of the 'paramountcy principle' in the Children Act 1989 should be accompanied by a radically different judicial approach to evidence relating to children's best interests. The article considers the difficulties that such an approach might produce when applied to teenagers intent on refusing life-saving medical treatment. It further argues that the courts should call on the substantial body of rights jurisprudence to provide legal and moral support for this revised approach.     

Fundamental Rights: Between Morals and Politics

Starting from the impossibility of understanding fundamental rights from the standpoint of natural law doctrine or positivism, the author tackles the issue of rights from a realistic point of view, that is to say from the perspective of law and politics on the one hand, and from the perspective of public morality, on the other. Thus the foundation of fundamental rights is the meeting point of conceptions of social morality that are current in the modern world and the political aspect of the conception of pluralist democracy. Moreover, fundamental rights are considered an instrument to enable the social and moral development of human beings.     

Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal

This article examines a widely publicized corporate accountability and human rights case filed by Burmese plaintiffs and human rights litigators in 1996 under the Alien Tort Claims Act in U.S. courts, Doe v. Unocal , in conjunction with the three main theoretical approaches to analyzing how law may matter for broader social change efforts: (1) legal realism, (2) Critical Legal Studies (CLS), and (3) legal mobilization. The article discusses interactions between Doe v. Unocal and grassroots Burmese human rights activism in the San Francisco Bay Area, including intersections with corporate accountability activism. It argues that a transnationally attuned legal mobilization framework, rather than legal realist or CLS approaches, is most appropriate to analyze the political opportunities and indirect effects of Doe v. Unocal and similar litigation in the context of neoliberal globalization. Further, this article argues that human rights discourse may serve as a common vocabulary and counterhegemonic resource for activists and litigators in cases such as Doe v. Unocal , contrary to overarching critiques of such discourse that emphasize only its hegemonic potentials in global governance regimes.     

Negative governmentality through fundamental rights: The far side of the European Convention on Human Rights

This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protection ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as negative governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of negative governmentality by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency (Section 2 ). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to them (Section 3 ). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4 ). Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5 ). The essay concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6 ).     

Ferrajoli on Rights

The author considers the distinction drawn by Ferrajoli betweenrights and their guarantees to be an important acquisition forpost-Kelsenian legal theory, but criticises the distinction drawn between fundamental rights and patrimonial rights, in particular contesting the hypothesis that non-disposability/inalienabilityis a characteristic of fundamental rights. On the contrary, Joribelieves that there is a substantial symmetry between fundamentalrights and patrimonial rights, because patrimonial rights can beseen as guarantees of the fundamental right of equal legal capacity.He also argues that the distinction between fundamental and patrimonial rights cannot be drawn solely on the formal terrain, but must beextended to their contents and their ethical importance. Finally,he studies Ferrajoli's thesis of citizenship: in his opinion, theabolition of citizenship hoped for by Ferrajoli would lead to asort of imperialism of rights, ethically a position fraught withproblems, in the light of the ethical value of individual autonomy.     

Corporations as Moral Agents: Trade-Offs in Criminal Liability and Human Rights for Corporations

This article argues that a common way of defending corporate criminal liability creates a dilemma: it provides a strong justification for giving human rights to corporations. This result follows from approaches to punishment and human rights which predicate each on the status of moral agency. In short, if corporations are moral agents in a sufficient sense to attract criminal liability, they are eligible holders of human rights. The article also discusses the doctrinal application of this philosophical claim. Drawing on US jurisprudence, it illustrates how the European Court of Human Rights might deploy corporate moral agency as a theoretical foundation for its otherwise weakly-reasoned attribution of human rights to corporations. If proponents of corporate criminal liability are dissatisfied with these conclusions, they face difficult policy trade-offs: they must abandon the doctrine, or adopt alternative approaches to punishment or human rights.     

Law and Institutional Legitimacy in the Practice of Human Rights

The Heart of Human Rights develops an account of human rights as legal entities that serve important moral purposes in a legitimate international human rights practice. This paper examines Allen Buchanan’s general concept of institutional legitimacy and aims to expand that concept by emphasizing its connection with several ideas developed in the book about the nature and function of a system of international human rights. When it incorporates those ideas, Buchanan’s ‘Metacoordination View’ can be seen to set a standard of legitimacy not only for assessments of an international scheme of human rights institutions, but also for the basic institutional structures of domestic states. Furthermore, we can see how the nature and function of human rights in the international practice of human rights bears on legitimacy assessments of particular domestic institutions.     

Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act

This article argues that resistance to the Human Rights Acthas built up in the context of disputes relating to childrenand that such resistance is founded in the attachment of thecourts to the welfare or paramountcy principle as currentlyconceived—the principle that the child’s welfareautomatically prevails over the rights of other family members.It argues that the failure to take account of Convention argumentscould only be a legitimate stance if there was no conflict betweenthe demands of the welfare principle and those of the Conventionguarantees, but that in fact the approach of the European Courtof Human Rights differs considerably from that of the UK courtssince it seeks to balance the rights of different family members.The article goes on to argue that, taking account of the Strasbourgstance and of the already established domestic recognition ofthe presumptive equality of competing qualified Convention rights,it is time to accept the adoption of a new model of judicialreasoning in the context of disputes over children—the‘parallel analysis’ or ‘ultimate balancingact’.     

The Creative Commons licences through moral rights provisions in French law

Since 2002, Creative Commons has been continuously evolving in order to create a licensing scheme that not only fulfils the needs of the author but also stays compatible with already existing national copyright laws. The extent of the respect of moral rights provisions has always been highlighted during the licences’ evolution. This Article first examines whether moral rights are expressly mentioned in the licences and if so, what their treatment is. Each element of the moral rights in the French system will be considered in order to verify their compatibility with the Creative Commons licences. In this context, it will be also asserted whether some existing clauses in the licence contradict with the moral rights of authors. The Article will conclude that although a more flexible interpretation of moral rights provisions is needed when dealing with open content licences, it is essential that Creative Commons addresses the aspects of the licences that are identified as problematic in relation to moral rights. Finally, it will be demonstrated that regardless of the legal status of the licences, the authors' responsibility towards their rights is what will ultimately be the safeguard of their creations' path.     

Human Rights,Linguistics and the Law: The UK and Beyond

This article examines mediarepresentation of cases decided in respect ofthe United Kingdom Human Rights Acts (1998).These representations suggest that only somepeople are deserving of human rights. Further,a distinction between legal human rights andhuman rights is made because of this problem ofaccess. Indeed, before one can be clear abouthow to protect human rights in a legal context,one has to be clear about what human rights areuniversally and uncontroversially.     

著作人格权制度的反思与重构

作品和作者人格之间的关系是全部著作人格权理论的逻辑起点,在此基础上形成的著作人格权制度缺少强有力的支撑理论,存在着严重的理论缺陷。在实践中,著作人格权制度既与民法人格权制度之间存在着难以调和的冲突,破坏了人格权制度的统一性,也不利于保障作者的私益和社会文化发展利益。这就需要将署名权、完整权、发表权等权利从民法人格权制度框架中解放出来,从经验出发,通过考察这些权利的实际功能,将其界定为专属于作者的各种辅助性权能,重新建构作者专属辅助权制度体系。     

Moral Rights in the Digital Age: New Possibilities for the Democratization of Culture

This paper is concerned with the impact of digital technology on the moral rights of authors. The ability to reproduce, modify and redistribute artworks through information technology has made it extremely difficult for authors to monitor the use of their works and, where problems arise, to assert their moral rights. In spite of these difficulties, however, this paper argues that moral rights are actually growing in importance because of new technologies. It is precisely when the capacity to manipulate works is greatest that concerns about artistic integrity and the preservation of cultural heritage become most pressing. This paper suggests that technological change calls for a new approach to moral rights: the focus in the future should be on cooperative efforts between authors and their public to protect culture. Technology has the effect of 'democratizing' the relationship between author and audience by allowing the audience to participate more directly in the creative process with the author. Despite the potential threat to artistic integrity, this transformation should nevertheless be embraced by authors and artists for its positive implications for cultural vitality in the longterm.     

Liberalism and Minority Rights. An Interview

The interview focuses on Kymlicka's major area of research, i.e., the issue of minority rights. Kymlicka explains why the rights of national minorities have been traditionally neglected in the Western political tradition. He argues that these rights promote individual freedom, and so should be seen as promoting liberal democratic principles. The interview covers many issues including the relationship between ethno-cultural groups and other forms of "identity politics"; how to individuate cultural groups with legitimate claims to minority rights; whether something like a "cosmopolitan view" can seriously challenge the need for minority rights; what are the dangers of building transnational political institutions such as the EU for democratic citizenship; what are the bases of social unity in multination states and what are the limits of toleration of illiberal minorities.     

Medical Samaritans: is there a duty to treat?

This article argues that doctors and other health care professionals should be obliged to provide emergency treatment to those in immediate and nearby need regardless of the absence of any prior professional relationship between the parties. It concludes that the common law should accordingly recognize a specific duty of 'medical rescue'. It examines some of the conventional objections to affirmative duties, finding them unconvincing in this particular context. It draws on two recent appellate decisions, one Australian and the other English, for support, as well as on more general arguments concerning moral sentiment, professional ethics, public expectation, and respect for human rights.