The Swedish jury system in press cases: An offspring of the English trial jury?

In the area of press freedom the English influence has for more than 200 years been strongly felt in Sweden. The introduction of a jury system in press cases in 1815 was clearly inspired by the English example. The Swedish variant had, admittedly, some strange features but it was nonetheless, in essence, a jury. Thus it should, historically and systematically, be looked upon as an offspring of the English trial jury.

Since 1815 the Swedish jury has grown more ‘English’ in some respects. Those greater similarities notwithstanding, there are still important differences between the two systems. At least two of the differences are the result of Swedish innovations.

In 1949 the Swedes in the new Freedom of the Press Act included a provision, stating that the court of first instance not only may but must review a verdict of conviction. If also the court convicts and, consequently, fixes the penalty, the defendant can always take the case at least to the appropriate court of appeal. Thus, there is a double‐check or even a triple‐check against an unwarranted conviction. From the defendant's point of view the Swedish jury system can be described as fool‐proof.³⁵

In 1949 the Swedes also introduced a new method of choosing the jury. The jurors are drawn by lot but not, as in England, with the electoral register as the starting point but from a panel chosen by politically elected councils. Furthermore, one third of the jurors must be present or former lay assessors. Through that method of selecting the jurors the Swedes have reasonably counteracted the traditional charges that juries are ignorant or confused or both. On the other hand, the Swedish system may be sensitive to political influence on the administration of justice since the composition, not exactly of this or that jury but of the whole panel, is the indirect result of political elections. However, once more, unwarranted convictions are almost certainly reversed by the courts.

With their method of choosing the jurors the Swedes also avoid a problem which has, in recent years, caused considerable disquiet in Great Britain ‐ jury vetting. The ancient practice of ‘Stand by for the Crown’ is still a reality in English courts. How often the prosecution uses its right to influence the composition of juries by vetting proposed jurors is not known. However, the practice has caused serious concern among lawyers. ‘The fear of “packed” juries is still with us’, to quote an expert in the field, John F. McEldowney.³⁶

The Swedish jury in press cases is certainly not the most important or the best known offspring of the English trial jury ‐ that is, of course, the American jury. However, the Swedish jury has survived for more than 165 years and is still going strong. It is quantitatively of modest significance ‐ there are in ‘normal’ years no more than a dozen cases in the country. However, the jury has an umbrella effect outside the printed media, i.e. what you are allowed to say in a newspaper or in a book you can almost certainly say at a public meeting or on a stage.

In recent decades the Swedish jury has shown a considerable capability of development. It has approached the English model on some points while, at the same time, making innovations on others. It is possible that Sweden during the 1980s may somewhat expand the jury system within the area of free speech, i.e. outside the printed media.     

Doing Justice: Perceptions of Gender Neutrality in the Jury Selection Process

There is a paucity of research on juries in general including the jury selection process. Very little of it examines the effect of gender. This study surveyed 138 potential jurors to determine whether jurors believed they were excluded from jury service due to gender. Additionally the study assessed whether gender affected attitudes about women serving on juries and whether perceptions about women and jury service were associated with general views about the fairness of the justice system. Findings suggest that gender had little effect on jury service or views about women serving on juries, but views about women and their role in jury service was associated with perceptions of general fairness in the system, regardless of the respondent’s gender. These findings point to the need for a more complex understanding of gender when examining the jury selection process.     

A quota jury: affirmative action in jury selection

It is not too naive to believe that the use of affirmative action policies in the jury selection for the Rodney King beating trial of White police officers would have prevented the uprisings that followed their acquittal. The public outrage and riots that followed the verdict demonstrated the need for affirmative inclusion of racial minorities on jury trials to preserve and restore the public’s confidence and legitimacy of verdicts in racially motivated cases. While racially mixed juries offer many benefits, current jury selection procedures fail to provide much protection to members of racial minorities in criminal trials. From the source list to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the current selection procedures provide almost no protection to racial minorities. The issue of preferential treatments of racial minorities in education, employment, and business has divided the nation and even some minority communities themselves. Affirmative action in jury proceedings and trials, however, has yet to receive much deserved attention and critical scrutiny. This article empirically examines public perceptions of possible applications of affirmative action mechanisms in criminal jury proceedings, focusing on the uses of mandatory racial quotas to engineer racially integrated juries in criminal trials. Three different types of racially mixed juries—the jury “de medietate linguae,” the Hennepin jury model, and the social science model—are examined, and the public’s perceptions of affirmative mechanisms ensuring minority participation on juries are analyzed. This article argues that the affirmative mechanism to secure racially mixed juries is essential to both the appearance and substance of fairness in criminal jury proceedings, and both the Hennepin model and the social science model are overwhelmingly supported as the ideal types of affirmative jury structures in creating racially heterogeneous juries.     

Fair and impartial railroad: The jury,the media,and political trials

The clash between social movements and political authority is often played out in the court rooms in criminal cases which are loosely described as “political trials.” While prosecutors, judges, and defendants rarely agree as to the “political” nature of a particular case, all parties usually regard the jury as the pivotal factor. The jury, of course, is enshrined in Anglo-American legal theory as the final check against suppression of liberty by the state. Plea bargaining is out of the question when the very legitimacy of the state is challenged and when dissident defendants are determined to use the trial process as a means of political expression. The crucial question is whether the jury has in fact lived up to its Constitutional role.The article attempts to answer this question at two levels. First, the history of political trials in the United States is reviewed with the general finding that radicals have faced juries which were both grossly unrepresentative of the general population and typically hostile to the ideas, life styles, and social origins of the defendants. Second, the article considers in some detail the impact of media coverage on potential jurors on one particular recent political case, the 1977–1978 trial of accused “guerrilla-bombers” Richard Picariello and Eduard Guilion in the Federal District Court of Southern Maine. The survey opinion data presented for this case strongly indicate that any chance of a fair trial for the defendants was compromised by effects of sustained hostile media coverage before the onset of the trial. Finally, the article considers available remedies in the form of either legislative reforms designed to ensure representative juries, or voir dire procedures aimed at eliminating biased jurors. A review of these remedies offers little hope that future political trials will be substantially fairer than in the past. Moreover, the direction of current criminal justice reforms, as in the proposed S-1722 Federal Criminal Code, promise to criminalize further important forms of political expression.The conclusion is not that jury trials should be avoided or minimized, since judges are apt to be even more predisposed against dissidents. Rather, the point is that the social and ideological biases which intrude especially in political trials are rooted in the political economy of capitalism which underlies the legal system itself. The jury system remains the best available defense against legal repression, but “justice” must ultimately await the outcome of continued social struggle, rather than further refinements of legal process.     

Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause

The judge in a jury trial is charged with excusing prospective jurors who will not be impartial. To assess impartiality, prospective jurors are typically asked whether they can be fair. Using an experimental paradigm, we found that small changes in jurors' self‐reported confidence in their ability to be fair affected judges' decisions about bias but did not affect the judgments of either attorneys or jurors. We suggest why a judge's role and unique relationship with jurors is likely to foster a decision strategy based on reported juror confidence, and we discuss the implications of our analysis for current legal debates over jury selection practices. Unexpected patterns in our results also highlight the ways in which perceptions of impartiality are affected, in part, by the social characteristics of the observer.     

First-ballot votes,predeliberation dispositions,and final verdicts in jury trials

This study examines the proposition that first ballots predict jury verdicts inaactual juries, an oft-cited finding from Kalven and Zeisel, and the explicit assumption by Kalven and Zeisel that first-ballot preferences are equivalent to predeliberation opinions, referred to as the liberation hypothesis. Interview data from respondents who had served on felony juries indicate that first ballots do predict jury verdicts at a high level. However, it is probable that influence occurs in juries prior to the first ballot, making it unlikely that the distribution of votes on the first ballot is equivalent to the individual inclinations of jurors at the time they enter into deliberation, which casts doubt on the liberation hypothesis. Methodological issues in the study of real juries on these topics are discussed.     

A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size

In a series of opinions in the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that juries smaller than 12 persons would be constitutional if they performed no differently than traditional 12-person juries. In a meta-analysis, we examined the effects of jury size on the criteria the court specified as the basis for making such comparisons. A search for all relevant empirical studies identified 17 that examined differences between 6- and 12-member juries. The total sample for the 17 studies was 2,061 juries involving some 15,000 individual jurors. Among other findings, it appears that larger juries are more likely than smaller juries to contain members of minority groups, deliberate longer, hang more often, and possibly recall trial testimony more accurately.     

Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy on jury decisions

To determine the influence of expert testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitnesses, a two-phase study was conducted. In the first phase, 24 community residents served as jurors on four six-person juries. A burglary case was tried in 120 District Court. El Paso, Texas. Two juries heard all the evidence including the expert testimony of a psychologist and the other two heard all of the testimony except that of the psychologist. During the second phase, 24 student jurors constituting four six-person juries viewed a videotape of the trial. Two of these juries saw the entire proceeding from the first phase including the expert testimony and the remaining two saw all but the expert testimony. All juries acquitted the defendant; however, those who heard the expert testimony significantly lowered their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification as well as its overall importance to the trial. Further, those juries that heard the expert testimony spent a significantly longer time discussing eyewitness identification as well as other relevant evidence. No differences between community residents and college student juries were obtained.The authors wish to thank Judge Brunson Moore, Mr. David Jeans, Mr. Ricky Glenn Smith, Detective James Christianson, D. Steven Cooper, Rachel Hanna, Daniel Torres, and Patricia Tetreault. All of these people participated in the trial and without them this research could not have been conducted. This research was supported by Gift Funds of the Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso.     

The basis of citizen's perceptions of the criminal jury

Two studies examined citizens' perceptions of the criminal jury and their evaluations of 6- or 12-person juries operating under unanimous or majority decision rules. Study 1 was a telephone survey of 130 adult citizens in which respondents evaluated alternative jury structures in the abstract. In Study 2, students were asked to evaluate jury structures for a hypothetical trial in which they were either the defendant or the victim in a crime with a mild or serious outcome. In both studies, jury size and decision rule were related to ratings of procedural cost, and the severity of the crime moderated procedural evaluations. In Study 1, juries were preferred to judges and the 12-person unanimous jury was preferred over other jury structures when the crime involved was serious. In Study 2, there were no direct effects due to variations in jury structure, but subjects appeared to trade off procedural cost and thoroughness of deliberation as a function of the seriousness of the crime. Procedural fairness emerged as the strongest independent predictor of desirability for jury procedures, and fairness was related to representativeness and accuracy. The role manipulation did not influence subjects' responses. In both studies, respondents were very supportive of the jury as an institution, despite a perception that erroneous jury verdicts do occur.     

Changing views of jury power

This article highlights the major events and empirical research in the continuing debate over the power and competence of the jury in civil and criminal trials. The concept ofjury nullification, the power of the jury to return a verdict based upon their moral conscience despite the evidence and the law, is used as a convenient filter to discuss the legal and behavioral assumptions about jury power and performance. The legal, historical, and even behavioral contexts reflect a bipolar theme in the level of trust Americans have exhibited towards the jury system. One pole reflects the notion that juries lack predictability and rationality in their verdicts and are moved by emotional concerns. Antipodally, juries have been thought to reflect an historical competence at applying common sense notions of equity and rationality to conflicted and ambiguous cases. This article traces the history of these two views of jury power and competence. A critical review of the empirical research that may inform the debate about the jury's competence in both criminal and civil arenas is provided.     

Representation through Participation: A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations

Fully participatory jury deliberations figure prominently in the idealized view of the American jury system, where balanced participation among diverse jurors leads to more accurate fact‐finding and instills public confidence in the legal system. However, research more than 50 years ago indicated that jury‐room interactions are shaped by social status, with upper‐class men participating more than their lower‐class and female counterparts. The effects of social status on juror participation have been examined only sporadically since then, and rarely with actual jurors. We utilize data from 2,189 criminal jurors serving on 302 juries in four jurisdictions to consider whether—and in what conditions—participation in jury deliberations differs across social groups. Our results indicate the continuing importance of social status in structuring jury‐room interactions, but also reveal some surprising patterns with respect to race and gender that depart from earlier research. We also find that contextual factors including location, case characteristics, and faction size shape the relationship between social status and participation. We conclude with a critical discussion of our results and urge other researchers to take into account contextual factors when examining how individual juror characteristics shape what happens inside the jury room.     

Juror experience and jury verdicts

Most trial attorneys believe that repeated jury service produces several effects in jurors, one of the most important of which is an increased disposition toward conviction of criminal defendants. However, case law reveals a reluctance to accept the proposition that prior service per se would disquality a juror from sitting on an instant case because of actual or implied bias. The need for direct empirical investigation of the effects of prior jury service prompted the present study, which examined a complete docket of 175 consecutive criminal trials across onecalendar year in a state circuit court which required a 30-day term of its venire. The results indicated that as the number of jurors with prior jury experience increased there was a modest, but significant, increase in the probability of a conviction. Analysis of the relationship between initial verdicts and subsequent service disconfirmed the alternative hypothesis that attorneys deselected jurors on the basis of their first verdicts. Several parameters of experience were also related to foreperson selection. Implications for legal practice and for additional research are discussed.Support for this research was provided, in part, by National Science, Foundation grant No SES-8209479. A portion of this work was conducted while the senior author was a James McKeen Cattell Foundation Fellow.     

THE EFFECTS OF SELECTION SYSTEM ON JURY COMPOSITION

The Supreme Court and judicial scholars have argued that the demographic composition of grand and petit juries is important. To the extent that composition is a function of the selection system used, this suggests that the method of selecting grand and petit jurors is important. This article tests the link between selection system and composition by comparing the representation of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and women on grand juries selected by commissioners with the same three classes' representation on grand juries selected at random from the voter registration lists. For these jurisdictions, only female representation is consistently higher under random selection procedures.     

Race and the decision making of juries

The relationship between race and jury decision making is a controversial topic that has received increased attention in recent years. While public and media discourse has focused on anecdotal evidence in the form of high‐profile cases, legal researchers have considered a wide range of empirical questions including: To what extent does the race of a defendant affect the verdict tendencies of juries? Is this influence of race comparable for jurors of different races? In what ways does a jury's racial composition affect its verdict and deliberations? The present review examines both experimental and archival investigations of these issues. Though the extant literature is not always consistent and has devoted too little attention to the psychological mechanisms underlying the influence of race, this body of research clearly demonstrates that race has the potential to impact trial outcomes. This is a conclusion with important practical as well as theoretical implications when it comes to ongoing debates regarding jury representativeness, how to optimize jury performance, jury nullification and racial disparities in the administration of capital punishment.     

Statistical techniques for juror and jury research

Juror and jury research is a thriving area of investigation in legal psychology. The basic ANOVA and regression, well‐known by psychologists, are inappropriate for analysing many types of data from this area of research. This paper describes statistical techniques suitable for some of the main questions asked by jury researchers. First, we discuss how to examine manipulations that may affect levels of reasonable doubt and how to measure reasonable doubt using the coefficients estimated from a logistic regression. Second, we compare models designed for analysing the data like those which often arise in research where jurors first make categorical judgments (e.g., negligent or not, guilty or not) and then dependent on their response may make another judgment (e.g., award, punishment). We concentrate on zero‐inflated and hurdle models. Third, we examine how to take into account that jurors are part of a jury using multilevel modelling. We illustrate each of the techniques using software that can be downloaded for free from the Internet (the package R) and provide a web page that gives further details for running these analyses.     

The jury: Social and psychological variables

The selection of a jury is an important phase of the American court system. Many lawyers believe that wise choices at this point may mean the difference between winning and losing a case. Various means of selecting jurors have been practiced by attorneys, and there seem to be among lawyers general impressions about the type of people best suited for certain cases. These ideas have most often concerned social, economic and psychological variables rather then genetic factors.The purpose of this study is to add to the limited body of knowledge in this area by identifying and testing some of these variables. The first step was to design a research instrument to gather significant data relating to the jury system. Included in this examination were both psychological and socio-economic information. Also incorporated into the study were questions designed to reveal the respondents’ jury backgrounds. Items sought to disclose how a juror perceived the trial, interacted with the group, and voted.After the construction of the research tool, a survey was made using it in one of the counties of Florida. The interviews were conducted to gather data regarding perceptions of jurors and test the research tool. The people chosen to be interviewed came from the venire furnished by the county clerk. Analysis of the information was conducted. Statistical tests of significance revealed that the people illustrated a strong support for the jury system and a relatively high degree of commonality of attitudes. Comparisons were done on groups voting guilty with those voting not guilty. Voting tests on national origin and income further supported a homogeneity of attitudes. The importance of a trial vote to testing jurors was found.This case study aided in identifying some plausible hypotheses and providing data on the relationship of variables that are of import to understanding the jury system.     

Lesser-included offenses

The positions taken by prosecutors and defense lawyers on proposed jury instructions on lesser-included offenses provide evidence that juries do not follow the law strictly. This paper develops a simple model of expected utility to predict how jurors make their decisions. The model explains a stylized fact that is inconsistent with the idea that juries always follow the law, namely why prosecutors often object to giving the jury the option of a lesser-included offense. We use the model to evaluate the law concerning jury instructions on primary and lesser-included offenses.     

Perceptions of older adult jurors: the influence of aging stereotypes and jury laws

ABSTRACT

The present study examined younger (18–30 years, N?=?100) and older adults’ (66–89 years, N?=?100) responses to a jury duty questionnaire assessing perceptions of jury duty, their capability to serve, and the capability of older adults to serve. We also explored perceptions of the senior jury opt-out law (a law that allows those over a certain age (e.g. 65 years) to opt-out of jury duty). We assessed why participants believe this law is in place and experimentally examined if informing older adults about this law impacted their jury questionnaire responses. Results demonstrated that older adults were significantly more likely to want to serve compared to younger adults; however, younger adults provided lower capability ratings of older adult jurors compared to older adults. Younger adults’ open-ended explanations for these ratings indicated negative aging stereotypes (i.e. in part, believing that older adult jurors are less capable because of declining health and biased beliefs). Older adults also had a significantly lower rate of agreement with the senior jury opt-out law. Although informing older adults about this law did not impact their perceptions of themselves as potential jurors, it did enforce more negative attitudes towards older adult jurors as a whole.     

Studying Perceptions of Juror Influence In Vivo: A Social Relations Analysis

Because of legal constraints and statistical limitations there has been little research on social influence in actual juries. We used Kenny's (1994) social relations model to examine jurors' perceptions of social influence in the jury. After rendering a verdict in criminal or civil court cases, jurors rated how influential each member of the jury had been and provided self-reports of their personality traits. Perceptions of influence in the jury were mostly in the eye of the beholder, with jurors high in Conscientiousness and low in Openness being most likely to report that they were personally influenced by other jurors. There were small but statistically significant levels of consensus in the ratings of how influential the jurors were. To the extent that they did agree, jurors rated extraverted, tall men as most influential.     

Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages

Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (1998) published a simulation experiment intended to study the performance of jurors and juries regarding verdicts on whether punitive damages should be allowed. They concluded that juries were not very competent and discussed the legal policy implications of this conclusion. I identify a fatal conceptual flaw that renders the study irrelevant to legal policy: The jurors were asked to decide law, a decision that is the responsibility of the trial judge, not the jury. I also identify a number of misstatements and unsupported assertions in the article.