Are powerful presidents always popularly elected? Implications for separating semi-presidentialism from parliamentarism

The traditional conception of semi-presidentialism stipulates that powers are shared by a popularly elected president and a prime minister, who is responsible to parliament. In recent years, an increasingly popular strategy has become to disregard the power dimension and define semi-presidentialism only with regard to whether the president is popularly elected or not. Based on a principal-agent framework the present study sets out to test the relationship between the mode of election and the powers of the president in democratic republics where the government is dependent on the legislature for survival. Findings indicate that although powerful presidents most often are popularly elected there are also instances where a non-popularly elected president shares executive powers with the prime minister. This makes it difficult to define semi-presidentialism only with regard to how the president comes to power.     

Naming the Nation: A Critical Analysis of Names in Polish Political Discourse

This article offers a critical discursive analysis of proper names used in Polish political discourse, focusing on six addresses to the nation made by prominent public figures of the Polish political scene?the president, prime minister, and the primate of the Catholic Church. The names used in the speeches did not function merely as means of referring to places or persons. The speakers used them to construct an ideologically preferred reality. Those used by the president of Poland ''embellished'' the Communist past of the country and showed his political (post-Communist) option as a viable proposal for Poland. The speeches made by the primate of Poland created a politically uncontroversial image of the country, with the head of the Catholic Church positioned as a moral authority. Finally, the visible absence of names in the prime minister's speech represented the etatistic view of Poland.     

Where Will Russia''''s Domestic and Foreign Policies Go under the "Medvedev-Putin Tandem"?(detailed abstracts)

Why is it called the "Medvedev-Putin Tandem"? Russia's constitution stipulates that president is the head of state who shall be responsible for defining and supervising the implementation of the political,economic,diplomatic,and security guidelines and policies,while prime minister is the head of government who shall be     

Caudillismo along the Nile

The “coup-volution” of 2011 removed President Mubarak but not his authoritarian regime, which is now guided by his successor, President Abd al Fattah al-Sisi. Both autocrats, there are nevertheless important differences between these two presidents and their respective regimes. Sisi’s tougher authoritarianism is analogous to the Latin American prototype of “delegative democracy”, a stalled phase of democratic institution-building in which voters delegate their authority to the president, who rules unconstrained by a balance of institutional powers. The primary feature of what in the Egyptian case might better be termed “delegative authoritarianism” is the decision-making autonomy of the president, who perceives himself as the “embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests”. This results in erratic, inconsistent and ineffective policymaking, which isolates the president yet more from institutions and political forces, while causing the entire polity to be suffused with a deep cynicism. Although the most probable scenario is that Sisi will continue for the foreseeable future as Egypt’s delegative dictator, as a one-man band his regime is inherently unstable and prone to coups, coup-volutions and outright revolutions.     

Briefly Noted

The argument is commonly made that television has changed the character of parliamentary elections. Its ever more central role in election campaigns outside the United States is held to have “presidentialized” parliamentary elections because it is a medium that projects personalities more effectively than ideas or policies. A comparison of the electoral roles of the Australian prime minister and the U.S. president indicates that both leaders are held personally accountable for government performance. However, such “presidentialism” appears to have little to do with television in Australia or in the United States. Television‐dependent citizens in both countries are less susceptible to the campaign appeals of chief executives than the rest of the voting public. Both leaders, but especially the president, do have an electoral impact. Counter to expectations, however, this impact makes itself felt in both cases among those voters who are not dependent on television for their political information and cues. Party identification seems to insulate the television‐dependent more successfully against leader effects.     

Party systems in Latin America: institutionalization,decay, and collapse,edited by Scott Mainwaring

Although coming of age under a totalitarian regime drastically reduces the chances of acquiring democratic values or supporting democracy, factors other than the formal nature of the political regime shape political values as well. The informal structure of the political regime, which consists of rules developed in political practice and economic and human development, may shape individual values and attitudes and produce different attitudes towards democracy in different totalitarian regimes. This article focuses on the effect of early socialization on the support for democracy among citizens who have been ruled under two different non-democratic regimes. We compare the dynamics in Spain and Romania during the post-totalitarian period with the aim of identifying how coming of age operated in these two different totalitarian regimes and how each type of non-democratic regime affected the legitimacy of the new democratic rule. Using survey data from various sources (Standard Eurobarometer, Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer) that allow both longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons, we decompose the social change in support for democracy over the post-totalitarian period in both countries using cross-classified fixed effects models. The analyses demonstrate the different effects of socialization on support for democracy in these two different totalitarian contexts.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.     

The “Anglo-Saxon” Orientation of Wartime Hungarian Foreign Policy: The Case of Antal Ullein-Reviczky

The political élite of Hungary included a group that expected British and American support for Hungarian revisionist claims after the Paris Peace Conference. Their acknowledged leader was Count István Bethlen, the prime minister from 1921 to 1931 and an adviser to Regent Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy until 1944. This analysis investigates a largely forgotten member of this group. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, a diplomat and scholar, shifted from being a Hungarian nationalist with an anti-Nazi attitude towards secret efforts to establish political relations with Britain during the Second World War. Press chief of the Foreign Ministry and the prime minister’s office, Ullein-Reviczky’s last appointment was Hungarian minister at Stockholm in 1943–1944. Both the Germans and the British put little trust in a man whose wife was the daughter of a British diplomat, yet who maintained superb connexions in pro-German Hungary. He changed his mind gradually when he realised that the price for revising the Treaty of Trianon was unacceptable. His long journey through international politics made him a significant player in a global drama, also assisting Raoul Wallenberg’s mission to Budapest. It is a political odyssey worth remembering.     

Political Liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade Democracy

In considering political liberalization in post-Bourguiba Tunisia since 1987, it is hard to argue the case for the reforms initiated by his successor, President Bin Ali, without noticing their limitations and even contradictions. In a world characterized by increasing democratization, the Tunisian example seems to buck the global trend, despite several noteworthy achievements - periodic elections, licensed political parties, sustained economic growth and stability. To a considerable extent the analysis of Bin Ali's 'façade democracy' here confirms this assessment, owing especially to the exclusionary and corporatist character of the democracy. Bin Ali's much hailed 'era of change' may well be not much different from the regime of his predecessor. Like Bourguiba, Bin Ali continues to exclude Islamists and other potentially formidable opposition from more secular forces from political participation and contestation. Similarly, the start of a presidential campaign by the ruling party to amend the constitution, in 2001, to enable Bin Ali to remain president beyond his constitutionally mandated second and last term which ends in 2004, gives a strong sense of déjà vu: Bourguiba's presidency-for-life.     

‘No‐party’ politics and local democracy in Africa: Rawlings’ Ghana in the 1990s and the ‘Ugandan model’

Ghana's decentralised form of administration run by elected District Assemblies was created in 1989 by Jerry Rawlings’ military government. As in Uganda under Museveni's National Resistance Council regime, it was inspired by populist theories of participatory, community‐led democracy which idealised the consensual character of ‘traditional’ village life and rejected the relevance of political parties. The Assemblies remain by law ‘no‐party’ institutions, notwithstanding Ghana's transition to multi‐party constitutional democracy in 1992. Their performance since 1989 is examined in the light of the question: to what extent can the Ugandan ‘no‐party’ model continue within a context of party competition, given that it assumes the all‐inclusive and non‐conflictual character of community politics? The conclusion is that the contradictions between the no‐party consensual model, de facto ruling party domination and the reality of local conflict have created significant difficulties for the Assembly system. Participation has declined and conflict‐resolution been made more difficult, whilst the legitimacy and transparency of resource decisions have been undermined.     

埃斯特拉达：菲律宾特色民主的产物与替罪羊

菲律宾被罢黜总统埃斯特拉达（以下称埃氏）是菲律宾历届当选总统中得票率最高的“民选”总统,曾被菲律宾人评价为继50年代马克赛赛总统之后最受群众欢迎的总统。然而,在执政后仅一年多便遭致来自各派势力的激烈反对,并成为亚洲第一位遭受弹劾的总统,最终在民变、政变、军变的压力下黯然交出了政权。埃氏作为民选总统,政治生涯在任期仅二年半期间发生了如此戏剧性的变化,其中缘由值得深思。本文试图从菲律宾特色民主为出发点,探索埃氏这位民选总统倒台的原因,并对菲律宾特色民主“EDSA第二次人民力量”的后遗问题进行一些初步的探讨。     

The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine

In the past two years Ukraine has held new elections for both its parliament and president. Some might claim that these elections are evidence of democratic progress. However, elections are only a necessary, not sufficient component of democracy, and to make judgements about democratic consolidation solely on the basis of elections is to fall victim to the fallacy of 'electoralism'. While it is true that Ukraine does possess an electoral democracy, democratic consolidation remains elusive and is susceptible to a variety of problems. These include a weak civil society and weak political parties, regional divisions, unstable political institutions and a lack of the rule of law. By some measures Ukraine may even have regressed from 1994, as an oligarchy has consolidated itself and authoritarian trends are readily discernible.     

Is successful democracy promotion possible? The conceptual problem

There is a standard academic consensus that semi-presidentialism is perilous for new democracies. In particular, this is because semi-presidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of ‘cohabitation’ between a president and a prime minister who are opposed to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and subvert the rule of law. This article examines the evidence to support these two arguments. It finds very few cases of cohabitation in young democracies and only one case where cohabitation has led directly to democratic collapse. By contrast, it finds more cases of divided minority government and more cases where divided minority government has been associated with democratic failure. However, the article also finds that young democracies have survived divided minority government. The conclusion is that, to date, there is insufficient evidence to support the long-standing and highly intuitive argument that cohabitation is dangerous for new democracies. There is more evidence to support the much newer argument about the dangers of divided minority government. Even so, more work is needed in this area before we can conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently perilous.     

尼赫鲁眼中的中国文化——“20世纪印度名家与中国文化”研究系列之一

尼赫鲁曾经在他的代表作<印度的发现>中对中国文化作过多方面的专门论述,他对中国文化有一种亲切之感.他还探讨了中印文化交流的问题.尼赫鲁晚年对中国文化的疏远来自于印度现实政治发展与国际政治局势的制约.本文对此进行了初步探讨.     

The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes,Political Opponents,and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009

To encourage the spread of democracy throughout the developing world, the United States provides targeted aid to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations. This study examines the calculations behind the allocation of democracy assistance, with special attention to the role of regime conditions and policy compatibility in the provision of aid. We argue that both concerns—the opportunity for successful democratization and critical goals related to containing and countering political opponents—are central to democracy aid allocations. We theorize how these two concerns determine the amount of aid allocated, operationalizing these concepts using measures of the original democracy level, change in the democracy level, and policy compatibility. We find support for our argument in tests of US democracy aid allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1981–2009.     

From contention to social bargaining: labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

The main objective of this article is to examine how the links between trade unions and affiliated political parties of the left influenced the strategies of labour during the transition and the early years of democracy in Spain. It argues that political partisanship is a key factor for understanding the unions' strategies. After a period of intense labour conflict during the transition to democracy, labour mobilization decreased and Spain's unions and other social actors initiated distinctive processes of social bargaining, starting in 1979. The central argument is that the relationship of unions and political parties in the authoritarian and transition periods was a major factor in conditioning strategies in the post-authoritarian period. In the end, the consolidation of Spanish democracy has led to the strengthening of the main trade unions. Contrary to what happened in other historical periods they used this power to contribute to governability and the consolidation of the new democratic regime.     

从民主党更换首相看日本政局走向

鸠山由纪夫作为首届民主党政权的首相闪亮登场,然而由于执政经验不足、＂超速＂调整对美政策、无法兑现政治承诺及深陷＂政治献金＂丑闻等原因,其政权中途夭折,但鸠山＂开路先锋＂的作用不可低估,可称为民主党政权的奠基人。菅直人临危受命,一举扭转民主党的不利局面,内阁支持率和政党支持率均迅速回升。菅直人将以建立强有力的经济、财政、社会保障体系作为三大内政课题,以日美、日中、日韩关系作为三大外交主线。但由于民主党在7月参议院选举中失利,菅直人政权的执政前景不容乐观,但尚不能威胁到民主党的执政地位。     

Dealing with populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece

ABSTRACT

The Great Recession triggered an unprecedented level of political turmoil in Greece, leading to a major readjustment of the party system and the near disappearance of the once mighty socialists of PASOK. Gradually, SYRIZA – a radical-leftist-turned-populist party – rose to become the key electoral player under the aegis of its young and popular leader, Alexis Tsipras. SYRIZA eventually won two general elections in 2015 and ruled together with the populist radical right Independent Greeks (ANEL) as junior partner, a coalition of great analytical significance, representing the first ever governing alliance of left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Europe. This contribution investigates reactions to the SYRIZA-ANEL government, giving special emphasis to measures undertaken by domestic and external actors. A key finding that warrants further research is that, under the same conditions of economic crisis that bring populists to power, economic institutions and material constraints can play an important role in taming populist actors and socializing them into the standard rules of the liberal democratic regime.