Elite defection and grassroots democracy under competitive authoritarianism: evidence from Burkina Faso

One determinant of the success or failure of political revolutions is whether there is a split among the ruling elites. Elite defections in a competitive authoritarian regime can tip the balance in favour of regime change and democratization. This article examines when and why elites defect through the case of Burkina Faso. In October 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was forced to step down after 27 years in power and multiple term limits contraventions. We propose a new theory linking growth in democratic attitudes at the grassroots to elite defection from hegemonic parties. We argue that a broad increase in popular democratic attitudes can both decrease the costs and increase the benefits of elite defection, creating conditions that enable elites to rescind their loyalty to the regime. We support this argument with interviews with ruling-party defectors in Burkina Faso and two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data. Our findings demonstrate that democratic attitudes can grow under competitive authoritarian regimes, and that these citizen attitudes can impact regime change by increasing the likelihood of elite defection.     

Violence and the breakdown of the political settlement: an uncertain future for Bangladesh?

Abstract

We explore the dynamics of the elite political settlement in Bangladesh after the democratic transition in 1991 and its impact on the elite interactions in the arena of competitive electoral democracy. We trace the history of how a political settlement around regime succession developed in the mid-1990s, and then experienced difficulties in multiple stages, and finally broke down in 2011. Violence was instrumentally used, by the ruling elites and the main opposition party, to influence the processes of negotiations around the succession of power. We argue that ‘partyarchy’—where political parties exert informal control of the party through formal processes and institutions—and dynastic rule prevent the political elites from reaching a stable settlement around regime succession. We also show how the changes to the rules of the game around regime succession have led to a qualitative shift in the extent and nature of violence in the political domain, and explore why democratic consolidation remains elusive.     

US Aid and gender equality: social movement vs civil society models of funding

Despite the fact that the assumed link between women’s empowerment, peace, and democratization has taken a firm hold in both theory and practice, the effectiveness of funding empowerment remains highly contested in the literature on gender, war, and democratic transformations. Drawing upon over a decade of fieldwork, this article offers lessons from the Balkans for funding women’s empowerment, with a particular focus on postconflict political transitions. I argue that there are two fundamentally different approaches to funding women’s empowerment, what I call the civil society model and the social movement model, and I lay out theoretical reasons why the social movement model is more likely to achieve enduring political change. I then provide a case study of how the United States government promoted elements of the social movement model in Croatia and Serbia as part of its democratization assistance, focusing on the challenges and promise of this approach.     

Civil society,democratization and development (II): Two country cases

Part II of this article applies the definition of ‘civil society’ and explores the hypotheses about its political role in the process of democratisation developed in Part I, in the context of two country case studies, South Korea and Zambia. These are chosen because of the contrasts in their developmental performance and in their level of socio‐economic development. In both countries, the forces of civil society played a major role in the transition to a democratic regime, but the prospects for sustainability vary. In the South Korean case, certain elements of civil society have grown along with the industrialization process and constitute a powerful force both to prevent an authoritarian reversion and to deepen the democratic process, in spite of the continuing strength of state elites left over from the ancien regime. The prospects for democratic sustainability are also improved by the maintenance of a growth momentum. In Zambia, however, the social and economic situations are still dire, the democratic elements of civil society are weak and divided and the state itself is in a ruinous condition. This leads one to be more pessimistic about the longer‐term prospects of democratic politics there. The article concludes by raising the issue of how democratic systems, once established, may be shaped to enhance both their political survival and their developmental capacity, with particular emphasis on the relationship between the state, political society and civil society.     

The social factory of democracy in underdeveloped Spain

This article aims to analyse the contribution made by Christian movements towards constructing a democratic citizenship in an authoritarian context in the backward province of Albacete. Our study attempts to analyse the efforts made by grassroots Catholic sectors to foster democratic enclaves free from the interference of the Francoist state in 1960s and 1970s Spain. These alternative social spaces enabled new habits of civil resistance that confronted the socio-cultural hegemony of authoritarian values. As a result, throughout these years, various social groups started to challenge the sense of the regime's impregnable unity. This grassroots experience with the “power of the powerless” laid the foundations for negotiations among the political elites during the transition to democracy in Spain.     

Electoral institutional change and democratization: You can lead a horse to water,but you can't make it drink

Drawing on evidence from first and second elections in emerging democracies, this article addresses issues pertinent to understanding the interplay between institutional design and change on the one hand and on the other hand the course of the democratization process, its background and concomitants. Because the electoral system (understood broadly, that is, not only as seat allocation rules) is often seen as an institution conducive to the legitimation of emerging ‐ and therefore fragile ‐democracies, it is important to examine how the development of the electoral system has influenced the democratic transition outcome, in a number of cases. Cases considered include Kenya, Mongolia, Nepal and Tanzania, while comparisons with countries outside the third world such as Bosnia‐and‐Herzegovina and South Africa throw additional light on the argument. By seeking to avoid both the fallacy of electomlism and the fallacy of anti‐electoralism, the article argues that the electoral system is a crucial factor behind the unsatisfactory course of the democratization process in many countries. More emphasis should be put on sustaining the different prerequisites of democracy, while simultaneously more effort should be put into the preparation of elections, in order to progress beyond simple and inadequate electoral democracy. The technical refinement of the electoral process, while far from sufficient to guarantee democratic development, can be a step in that direction. Credible and transparent elections are conducive to internal legitimacy and the dynamic of the political‐electoral process will gradually bring along more contestation, more participation, and the enjoyment of more rights and liberties.     

Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics

This article addresses the conceptual challenges involved in mapping political regimes. The first section offers a critique of regime typologies that adopt a uni-dimensional approach to differentiating between political regimes. The second section shows why a two-dimensional typology is better grounded in liberal democratic theory as well as for analytically grasping the empirical variation between political regimes and regime change. The penultimate section proposes a classificatory scheme on the basis of a clear set of defining attributes of the two constitutive dimensions of liberal democracy – electoralism and constitutionalism. Equipped with this two-dimensional classificatory device the article proceeds in the last section to propose a regime typology with four main types of regime: democratic, constitutional-oligarchic, electoral-autocratic, and authoritarian. This provides a conceptual map in which the categories and subcategories developed by the literature on hybrid regimes can be located and analytically related to each other. The last section further divides the category of democratic regimes into four subtypes: liberal, constitutional, electoral, and limited.     

Absolute politics and judicious pragmatism: political culture in democratization by reforma

Comparing the political cultures of Spain and Greece before and during the dictatorships, the article seeks to explain the different outcomes of the regimes’ self-transformation attempts, the one that succeeded (Spain) and the other that failed (Greece, the little-known “Markezinis experiment”). Its position is that the abandoning of hard-line ideological stances that have been called “absolute politics”, which was the main contributor to the Spanish Reforma’s success, did not work in Greece due to the persistence of the post-civil war and pre-dictatorial cleavages in both elites and civil society, thus rendering the mellowing of confrontation lines and the consensual politics necessary for the negotiations and mutual concessions between elites and counter-elites unfeasible. The result was, in contrast to the Spanish reforma Pactada, a reverse to authoritarianism perpetrated by the hard-line officers, prolonging the regime for eight crucial months.     

Indonesia's democratic stagnation: anti-reformist elites and resilient civil society

As Egypt and Tunisia begin difficult democratic transitions, comparative political scientists have pointed to the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, as a role model. Seen as a stand-out exception from the global recession of democracy in the pre-2011 period, Indonesia has been praised as an example of a stable post-authoritarian polity. But a closer look at Indonesia's record in recent years reveals that its democratization is stagnating. As this article demonstrates, there have been several attempts to roll back reforms introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While not all of these attempts have been successful, Indonesia's democratic consolidation is now frozen at 2005–2006 levels. However, the reason for this democratic stasis, the article argues, is not related to Diamond's notion of societal dissatisfaction with bad post-authoritarian governance. Opinion polls clearly show continued support for democracy despite citizen disgruntlement over the effectiveness of governance. Instead, I contend that anti-reformist elites are the main forces behind the attempted roll back, with civil society emerging as democracy's most important defender. This insight, in turn, questions the wisdom of the decision by foreign development agencies – in Indonesia, but other countries as well – to reduce their support for non-governmental organizations and instead intensify their cooperation with government.     

Opportunities and constraints: comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the coloured revolutions

Nearly two years after removal of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia and Egypt are still in transition: gains made by early 2013 remain tenuous, and whether democracy takes root remains to be seen. This article identifies variables affecting these states' prospects for democratic development by drawing lessons from the post-communist coloured revolutions of the early 2000s, when democratic forces had difficulty consolidating initial gains. Based on these cases, we suggest that choices available to political actors, in particular the ability of democratic opposition forces to maintain unity and support a common transition platform, and their success in removing old regime elites, will be crucial in the post-Arab Spring environment. However, we also examine structural variables, including the nature of the ousted authoritarian regime and external leverage, which point to differences between the coloured revolutions and MENA uprisings and suggest limits to cross-regional comparison.     

Pathways of Islamist adaptation: the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ lessons for inclusion moderation theory

The Muslim Brothers’ transition from religious movement to majority-seeking party in Egypt’s post 2011 democratic experiment offered a key test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. While the MB’s increasing religious and organizational conservatism at new electoral thresholds appears to challenge the hypothesis, I argue that it was the result of strategic adaptation based on functional alternative interpretations of political opportunity that did not require a trade-off between power-seeking and expressive goals, constrained by prior pathways of electoral adaptation, and shaped by the ambiguous political incentives of democratic transition. This article shows that the MB, like other religious parties, has alternated between strategies for electoral adaptation, challenging expectations of linear evolution; that majority-seeking sometimes encourages intra-movement dynamics that are radicalizing as well as moderating; and shows that expressive goals and identity remain important to religious parties even in office, and make some paths of adaptation more attractive while precluding others. While the case affirms the relevance of political learning mechanisms predicted by inclusion-moderation theory, the divergent outcomes of this learning suggest the need to focus on the contexts and motivations that set movements along one of multiple possible adaptive pathways.     

How well ordinary citizens understand democracy: the case of the South Korean electorate

How do mass citizens understand democracy? Are they capable of distinguishing it from its non-democratic alternatives? Does their understanding about democracy matter? To reveal the contours of cultural democratization in South Korea, this article addresses these questions largely overlooked in earlier survey-based studies. Analyses of the 2010 Korea Barometer survey indicate that all segments of the Korean electorate, including the young and the college-educated, are neither accurately nor fully informed about what distinguishes a democratic regime from its non-democratic alternatives. Moreover, the study provides strong evidence of democratic learning in that an increase in democratic knowledge leads to committed support for democracy. The findings together imply an urgent need to improve the quality of civic education for the development of democratic political culture in Korea and new democracies.     

Between Scylla and Charybdis: religion,the military and support for democracy among Egyptians, 2011–2014

Democracy as a form of civilian rule must navigate a path between clerical and military powers, both of which are highly engaged in the politics of post-Mubarak Egypt. The authors ask in this article how mass support for democracy changed in Egypt between 2011 and 2014, and how this support is connected with views on religion and the role of the military. This question is important for understanding the prospects for democracy in a major state in the Arab world. It is also of comparative interest because of what change in the social and ideological drivers of mass attitudes may tell us about the nature of democratic support more generally. The authors’ analysis is based on nationally representative surveys of Egyptians in 2011 after the country’s first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections and in 2014 after the removal of the Islamist President Morsi. The findings indicate that Egyptians in large numbers favour both democracy and unfettered military intervention in politics. The authors also observe important shifts in the social bases of support for democracy away from religion but also from economic aspiration. Negative political experience with democratic procedures in 2011–2013 seems to be the strongest factor behind the observed decrease in democratic support.     

The liberal in liberal democracy

This article argues that much of the work on democratization and democratic consolidation is obscured by a conceptual fog, when at the very least some of this confusion could be ameliorated by parsing out components that are obviously liberal in nature. An admission of the importance of liberalization and liberal consolidation as distinctly different in form and measurement from democratization and democratic consolidation are the first steps to better research on the varieties of causation that constitute and propel the dissolution of more authoritarian regimes towards more liberal democratic regimes. Acknowledging that the liberal in liberal democracy is unpopular for some, and that liberal democracy does not necessarily mean American liberal democracy, go a long way to freeing these terms from ethnocentric misconceptions, as well as cementing analytical clarification. Though all modern democracies have both liberal and democratic components, democratic consolidation does not guarantee liberal consolidation.     

A theory of democratisation through peace-building

Abstract

This contribution presents a theory of democratisation through peace-building. Peace-building is seen as an interactive process between external peace-builders and domestic elites; whether a post-war state develops into a democracy or not depends to a large extent on the outcome of the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders. It is argued that domestic elites typically face many constraints which make adopting democratic reforms a risky and costly proposition. Also, peace-builders usually have much less leverage over domestic elites than one would expect given their resources and man-power. High adoption costs and low leverage explain the outcome of the interaction between peace-builders and domestic elites often results in a peace which is not democratic. The paper uses an analysis of 19 major peace-building missions for exemplifying the theory.     

Democracy through War?

This article brings together three strands of democracy research which have thus far seldom been informed by one another: the empirical research associated with the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, the juridical-normative questions of legality, and moral-philosophical reasoning about just war. Linking the statistical analysis of the democratic peace to the findings of comparative research on democratization and to the normative debates occurring in law and philosophy on just and legitimized wars, there is an inescapable conclusion that: jus ad bellum and jus post bellum criteria must be closely tied. The protection of people threatened by mass murder and brutal violations of human rights requires not only a short-term military intervention, but also the intensive support to establish sustainable rule of law and democracy. External actors intervening for humanitarian reasons equally have a duty to contribute to long-term sustainable state- and democracy-building. Forced regime change and an international trusteeship protectorate can become legitimate and necessary means to guarantee justice after war and to reconcile jus ad bellum principles with duties post bellum. A premature withdrawal of intervening forces, for example in Afghanistan or in Iraq, would amount to a flagrant violation of external actors' post-war duties.     

The role of nonformal education in promoting democratic attitudes: Findings from Senegal

Civic education has been considered a way in which the behaviours and attitudes associated with democratic citizenship can be fostered among the members of a society. Since the emerging democracies are hard-pressed to develop a political culture supportive of democratic rule, civic education has been identified as one way such a political culture can be constructed. Recent studies, however, point to the limited reach of such programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on survey data, others have failed to find even a relationship between formal education and democratic attitudes in parts of Africa. On the other hand, despite the prominence nonformal education has gained in many developing countries, such as those in Africa, the effect of nonformal education on political attitudes has not been subject to empirical testing. Using data from a survey involving a probability sample of 1,484 Senegalese citizens, this article examines the effects of education, both formal and nonformal, on political attitudes among rural Senegalese. Both nonformal and formal education are found to increase the likelihood that people will embrace democratic, tolerant attitudes in Senegal.     

U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia

Under the Pentagon's current Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the United States is reducing its forces in several major Cold War base hosts and establishing a global network of smaller, more flexible facilities in new areas such as Central Asia, the Black Sea and Africa. Drawing upon recent evidence from the Central Asian base hosts of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this article cautions that these new U.S. overseas bases, despite their lighter footprint and regardless of the prevailing security situation, risk becoming enmeshed in the local struggles and political agendas of elites within these hosts. Periods of turbulent democratic transition and regime instability may encourage host country politicians to challenge the legitimacy and terms of the U.S. basing presence for their own political purposes. These are important lessons for U.S. planners who are simultaneously promoting democratization while they negotiate basing and military access agreements in these same politically volatile hosts.     

South African election posters: Reflecting the maturing of a democracy?

Abstract

The South African democracy has survived three national and provincial elections and three local elections, since 1994. In comparison to other young democracies in Africa, South Africa has experienced a relatively stable transition to democracy. However, the ruling ANC has not been under pressure from opposition parties. Although this has helped pave the way, a dominant governing party does not necessarily encourage the growth of a mature, democratic political culture. The assumption of this article is that political parties in developing societies have a normative obligation to do more than canvas votes during election campaigns. Political parties should also be instrumental in fostering a democratic political culture by communicating democratic values, encouraging participation in the democracy and enabling voters to make an informed electoral choice. Although political posters contribute mainly to image building, the reinforcement of party support, and the visibility of the party, posters are the agenda setters or headlines of a party's campaign – it is therefore argued that political parties in developing societies also need to design political posters responsively, in order to sustain the democracy. In general it seems that the poster campaigns of parties have matured since 1999, in the sense that there was less emphasis on democratisation issues in the past, and the campaigns conformed more to the norm of Western political campaigning.     

Conquering versus democratizing the state: political Islamists and fourth wave democratization in Turkey and Tunisia

What do we learn from Turkey and Tunisia regarding the relationship between political Islamism and democratization? Variables identified by current research such as autonomy, “moderation”, and cooperation with secular actors can cut both ways depending on various political-institutional conditions and prerogatives. Particularly, the article argues that preoccupation with “conquering the state from within as opposed to democratizing it” has been a key priority and intervening variable undermining the democratizing potential of the main Turkish and Tunisian political Islamic actors – primarily the AKP and Ennahda. These actors have prioritized acceptance by and ownership of their respective nation states over other goals and strategies, such as revolutionary takeover or Islamization of the state and confrontations with state elites. This has led to a relative neglect of designing and building institutions, whether for Islamic or democratic transformation. Hence, while contributing to democratization at various stages, these actors have a predisposition to adopt and regenerate, reframe and at times augment the authoritarian properties of their states. Research should ask how secular and religious actors can agree on institutions of vertical and horizontal state accountability that would help to address the past and present sources of the interest of political Islamists in conquering rather than democratizing the state.