Popular attitudes toward the South African electoral system

This article is based on a survey of popular attitudes towards the pure list system that is South Africa's proportional representation electoral system. While the reported findings are broadly positive there are some notable exceptions, located disproportionately among racial minorities and also among sizable numbers of black respondents. Pure proportional representation is unlikely to produce the values that the respondents say they most want from a voting system. The significance of the survey's findings is analysed and reasons are advanced for making changes to the electoral system. The government has opted to retain the status quo for the time being but in the longer term this could be negative for South Africa's democracy     

Crafting competitive party systems: Electoral laws and the opposition in Africa

After the resurgence of democracy in the 1990s, as was the case after independence, dominant party systems are predominant in Africa. This has occurred irrespective of the particular electoral system used. Both scholars and practitioners have so far failed to appreciate the fact that not fragmentation but concentration of the party system is the main challenge and that a choice between proportional representation or a plurality electoral system will do little to change the fortunes of the majority party and the opposition. This article goes beyond the current debate by suggesting that opposition parties in Africa could be crafted through a minority premium, preferably in combination with a majority ceiling. Such electoral engineering would in the long‐term contribute to the emergence of a two‐party system, generally recognized as the environment most congenial to a strong parliamentary opposition. In the short‐term, adoption of a minority premium would increase competitiveness.     

Failure of authoritarian learning: explaining Burma/Myanmar’s electoral system

What explains why some authoritarian governments fail to take all the steps they can to preserve their positions of power during democratic transitions? This article examines this question using the example of the leading pro-military party in Myanmar, which lost badly to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the transitioning elections of 2015. This article argues that a key to understanding how the military failed to perpetuate its power in the electoral sphere resides in its choice of electoral system. In 2010, the military junta chose an electoral system, first-past-the-post, that was distinctly ill-suited to preserve its power. We explore several hypotheses for why this occurred and ultimately conclude that the military and its allies did not understand electoral systems well enough to act strategically and that they overestimated their support relative to the NLD. This failure of authoritarian learning has important implications for understanding authoritarian politics, democratic transitions, and the challenges faced by authoritarian governments seeking to make such transitions.     

The choice of electoral systems in new democracies: a case study of South Korea in 1988

Most theories about electoral system choice are based on the experiences of Western European countries, many of which shifted from majority/plurality rule to proportional representation (PR) at the turn of the twentieth century. This article aims to explain the choice of the South Korean legislative electoral system in 1988 as an example of electoral institution choices in new democracies, which may be different from those in the Western European countries. Through analysing multiple steps leading to the choice of a single-member district plurality voting system, this article suggests three potentially generalizable findings. First, in new democracies, labour parties can only induce old parties to shift to a proportional representation system if they have mobilized the working class prior to democratization. Secondly, parties in the developing world at times face unusual systems that are neither majoritarian nor fully PR. Under such unusual systems, party size would not be a reliable predictor for the party's preference over electoral institutions. Finally, when parties choose a legislative electoral institution in a presidential system, parties tend to prefer an institution that helps them in the subsequent presidential election even though the institution might harm them in the upcoming legislative election.     

Electoral reform and public policy outcomes in Thailand: the politics of the 30-Baht health scheme

How do changes in electoral rules affect the nature of public policy outcomes? The current evidence supporting institutional theories that answer this question stems almost entirely from quantitative cross-country studies, the data of which contain very little within-unit variation. Indeed, while there are many country-level accounts of how changes in electoral rules affect such phenomena as the number of parties or voter turnout, there are few studies of how electoral reform affects public policy outcomes. This article contributes to this latter endeavor by providing a detailed analysis of electoral reform and the public policy process in Thailand through an examination of the 1997 electoral reforms. Specifically, the author examines four aspects of policy-making: policy formulation, policy platforms, policy content, and policy outcomes. The article finds that candidates in the pre-1997 era campaigned on broad, generic platforms; parties had no independent means of technical policy expertise; the government targeted health resources to narrow geographic areas; and health was underprovided in Thai society. Conversely, candidates in the post-1997 era relied more on a strong, detailed national health policy; parties created mechanisms to formulate health policy independently; the government allocated health resources broadly to the entire nation through the introduction of a universal health care system, and health outcomes improved. The author attributes these changes in the policy process to the 1997 electoral reform, which increased both constituency breadth (the proportion of the population to which politicians were accountable) and majoritarianism.     

Elections and democratization in Honduras since 1980

Although Central America returned to electoral rule during the 1980s, lack of participation, political violence and militarization meant that democracy remained decidedly limited. This articles outlines the particularities of the transition to constitutional government for the case of Honduras, and examines the role of successive electoral processes on prospects for democratic consolidation, focusing on the relationship between electoral processes and the nature of the party system. It is maintained here that whilst the longevity of the bipartisan system has been an important element of stability, the nature of the two dominant parties (Liberal and National) has hindered the consolidation of a more democratic politics. However, the article also argues that successive elections have been the catalyst for limited modernization of the party system and have increased citizenship confidence in the electoral process, and that this ‐together with a gradual reduction in the influence of the military ‐ has strengthened future prospects for deepening democracy. None the less, the article concludes that unless a new relationship is established between political parties and civil society to ensure a more representative and participatory form of politics, democracy will remain limited in Honduras.     

Authoritarian Elections in Egypt: Formal Institutions and Informal Mechanisms of Rule

In recent years, electoral processes in non-democratic settings have been analysed either within the framework of transitology or disregarded entirely by scholars of comparative politics. Analysing the Egyptian case, this article proposes a different conceptual framework. The interaction between electoral institutions and authoritarian dynamics is conceptualized in terms of the relationship between formal and informal institutions. In the Egyptian authoritarian political system, informal mechanisms of neopatrimonial rule not only take precedence over formalized rules and procedures but integrate formal electoral institutions into the authoritarian system. Drawing on empirical evidence from legislative elections under the rule of President Husni Mubarak, this article identifies three main functions for electoral processes in non-democratic settings: (1) Electoral contests serve to periodically renew channels of clientelist inclusion, drawing both voters and deputies into networks of patronage culminating at the top of the political system. (2) Formal inclusion of parts of the opposition into the electoral arena enhances the range of means available to the ruling elite in order to control these actors. (3) Pitted against each other in electoral contests, individual members of the ruling elite's lower echelons are effectively controlled and tied to the informal structures of rule. Thus, the principal traits of the Egyptian neopatrimonial regime remain unchanged, with formal electoral processes subverted by informal institutions of authoritarian rule to an extent as to fulfil distinctly authoritarian functions.     

Civil society and democratization: a counter-case from India

This article assesses whether civil society promotes democratization, as has been argued implicitly or explicitly in the political discourse, following the publication of Putnam's Making Democracy Work. The theorists of “third-wave” transitology have advocated civil society as the indispensable instrument for the survival and sustenance of democracy. This article, however, argues that civil society is not necessarily a democratic force. It may or may not have positive implications in regard to democratization and the functioning of democracy. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in the tribal-dominated south Rajasthan, this article analyses the case of Rajasthan Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad (RVKP), a Hindu(tva)-oriented non-governmental organization (NGO), to demonstrate how civil society could also be anti-democratic. It shows that by utilizing development as a medium of entry, the RVKP has not only successfully presented itself as a counter-force against the “threatening others”, such as Muslims and Christians but also mobilized electoral support for the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In return, the BJP-led state government has provided economic, political and legal support to the RVKP and facilitated the Hindutva politics at the grassroots level. The article concludes that in the context of Rajasthan, a conservative state has collaborated with an exclusivist civil society organization – the consequence of which has not just been the spread of violence and demonization of religious minorities but also a serious undermining of cultural pluralism and democratic values of Indian society.     

The role of infrastructural and coercive state capacity in explaining different types of electoral fraud

While effective state capacity can reasonably be considered a necessary condition for democratization, strong states do not automatically produce democratic regimes, nor do they guarantee their survival. Far from being sufficient conditions for democracy, strong or capable states are also thought to be indispensable for the maintenance of autocratic rule. The present article puts to the test the hypothesis that a certain level of state capacity is needed to engage in effective electoral malpractice, using general and more specific indicators of electoral fraud. This article proposes two opposing mechanisms through which state capacity can influence the quality of elections: through infrastructural state capacity and coercive state capacity. The article demonstrates that electoral fraud is more likely in countries where infrastructural state capacity is weak and that coercive state capacity plays a more ambiguous role than previously thought. The analyses also reveal that different factors are at work when looking at precise types of electoral malpractice rather than general measures: voter and candidate intimidation, fraudulent tabulation of votes, unfair media coverage of campaigns and vote buying seem to engage different sets of facilitating structures.     

Variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism: evidence from the Russian Federation

Despite the burgeoning comparative literature on electoral authoritarian regimes, fewer studies have accounted for the emergence of hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes at the subnational level. This article examines the variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism with data from the Russian Federation. First, the article shows that by using a comparative regime classification most Russian subnational cases can be classified as electoral authoritarian between 1991 and 2005. Yet, there are considerable differences in competitiveness between the electoral authoritarian regimes. The article accounts for this variation by drawing on both comparative electoral authoritarianism literature as well as more context-specific explanations. Statistical analysis on 192 subnational electoral authoritarian cases shows that the determinants of Russian subnational authoritarian stability are rather similar to those found in cross-national studies. Subnational (non)competitiveness in Russia appears to be related to the structure of the regional economy and natural resource rents, and to a lesser degree to the specific Russian federal context. Authoritarian “know how” also plays a role in authoritarian regime building. The findings of the article contribute to the literature on electoral authoritarianism, subnational democratization and Russian subnational politics.     

Cross‐cutting issues and the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan

This article examines the cause of Taiwan's recent successful democratic consolidation. It argues that cross‐cutting issues in the electoral process allow democratic systems to periodically generate new winners. The prospect of reasonable certainty to win gives different political groups, including previously anti‐system or semi‐loyal groups, incentives to adhere to the democratic rules of the game. This process contributed to the democratic consolidation in Taiwan. More specifically, the non‐mainstream faction of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, which initially opposed democratization, and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which wanted more radical constitutional and political reforms, came to accept the post‐transition democratic regime due to the emergence of new electoral issues. New issues surrounding corruption and socio‐economic reforms allowed both the non‐mainstream faction of the KMT and the DPP to advance their interests through the democratic electoral process.     

Setting Aside the “Others”: Exclusion amid Inclusion of Non-dominant Minorities in Peace Agreements

This article analyzes the exclusion-amid-inclusion of “Others” within territorial power-sharing arrangements. While territorial power-sharing is often used to accommodate national minorities, it risks excluding non-dominant minorities at sub-state levels of governance. The article charts how negotiated settlements have addressed this dilemma by formally acknowledging the plurality of non-dominant minorities within territorial power-sharing arrangements, including de facto minorities and other “non-aligned” or less politically relevant minorities. Using the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, this article conducts a qualitative content analysis of 1518 peace agreements from 1990-2016, to shed light on the EAI dilemma within negotiated settlements in divided societies.     

Reverse coattail effects in undemocratic elections: an analysis of Russian locomotives

This article argues that the effectiveness of the tactics ruling parties use to control the electoral arena may depend on the electoral experience of its subordinates. To substantiate this point, the work examines Russia’s “locomotives” – the practice of placing regional governors on the list of the ruling party, United Russia, during national legislative elections. It argues that electoral payoffs also came from select regions without locomotives. Given the move to appointed governors, list exclusion likely indicated gubernatorial vulnerability. As a result, governors left off United Russia’s list may have responded by seeking to demonstrate their electoral utility, and those with longer tenures were more likely to succeed in these efforts. An analysis of the 2007 Duma elections shows that United Russia’s vote share was higher in regions where long-serving governors were left off the list. Since Russia’s appointment system dramatically changed the gubernatorial corps between 2007 and 2011, the article also considers changes in the effects of list placement over time. It finds that the relationship between list exclusion and higher vote shares for United Russia disappears as governors with electoral experience were removed from office.     

Demographic manipulation in the Caucasus (with special reference to Georgia)

The author discusses political developments in the Caucasus region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The focus is on the events in Georgia that led to the war in South Ossetia (particularly in Abkhazia), and the author suggests that this development is the latest in a 200-year history of demographic manipulation of minority peoples by the region's two major powers, Russia and Georgia. Parallels are drawn between the Georgian war in Abkhazia and Russia's war in Chechenia. The author questions the value of the principle of territorial integrity, and suggests that alternative principles safeguarding the rights of ethnic minorities would be more appropriate in these circumstances.     

Centripetalism and Electoral Moderation in Established Democracies

Centripetal approaches to ethnic conflict management seek to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation by making politicians dependent on the electoral support of groups other than their own base. There is an ongoing debate about the utility of such approaches, including which kinds of electoral systems can best promote moderate and centrist politics in deeply divided societies. Neglected in this debate, however, has been the experience of ethnically diverse established democracies utilizing centripetal electoral models. This article examines historical evidence from Australia, and recent natural experiments with subnational electoral reform in the United States, which lend support to centripetal claims that preferential, “ranked choice” or “instant runoff” voting can encourage electoral moderation and address political polarization.     

Electoral violence prevention: what works?

Elections are in theory democratic means of resolving disputes and making collective decisions, yet too often force is employed to distort the electoral process. The post-Cold War increase in the number of electoral authoritarian and hybrid states has brought this problem into relief. In recent years the prevention of electoral violence has played an increasingly large role in the democratic assistance activities undertaken by international agencies, following increased awareness within the international community of the specific security challenges that elections entail. However, there has to date been little systematic evaluation of the success of different electoral violence prevention (EVP) strategies in reforming electoral institutions so as to enable them to maintain the peace during the electoral period. This article assesses the effectiveness of two common types of international EVP activity. Using a new global dataset of EVP strategies between 2003 and 2015, this article finds evidence that capacity-building strategies reduce violence by non-state actors, whereas attitude-transforming strategies are associated with a reduction in violence by state actors and their allies. The findings are relevant both for understanding the dynamics of electoral violence, and also for policymakers and electoral assistance providers in the international community who have responsibility for the design of democratic assistance projects in states at risk of electoral violence.     

The OSCE and ethnic conflicts in Estonia,Georgia, and Tajikstan: A search for sustainable peace and its limits

This article analyzes some of the experiences of the OSCE in Estonia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Conflicts in these three countries followed the demise of the Soviet Union and had basic aspects in common: actual and potential border claims; the presence of a large number of national minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighbouring kin‐ethnic states; as well as conflicting claims of national self‐determination and territorial integrity. By comparing and contrasting these cases, this article discusses the implications of the OSCE's approach and its limits in the context of the former Soviet Union, and offers some policy recommendations for the future OSCE's activities in this region. The central arguments are as follows: the OSCE has played a significant role in building a sustainable peace in the former Soviet Union where few European institutions have attempted to intervene; and that while being heavily influenced by Russian policies, the OSCE's activities in the CIS were not simple reflections of Russian interests.     

Strategic ballot removal: an unexplored form of electoral manipulation in hybrid regimes

The literatures on electoral manipulation and rejected ballots have yet to engage one another in a compelling manner. This article provides the theoretical foundations for rejected ballots as electoral manipulation by exploring incidents of suspicious rejected ballot rates and practices around the world with a special focus on Zambia. Not only did the rate of rejected ballots in Zambia double between the 2015 and 2016 presidential elections, but a disproportionate increase was observed in president’s home province. Leveraging an original dataset, the article models a largely unnoticed form of electoral manipulation: the strategic rejection of opposition ballots by biased polling officials. Analysis reveals that more rejected ballots were associated with increased vote shares for the ruling party in the president’s home province, indicating probable electoral manipulation. Raising awareness around this difficult to detect, but likely pervasive, form of manipulation should help to improve electoral quality in hybrid regimes.     

Electoral institutional change and democratization: You can lead a horse to water,but you can't make it drink

Drawing on evidence from first and second elections in emerging democracies, this article addresses issues pertinent to understanding the interplay between institutional design and change on the one hand and on the other hand the course of the democratization process, its background and concomitants. Because the electoral system (understood broadly, that is, not only as seat allocation rules) is often seen as an institution conducive to the legitimation of emerging ‐ and therefore fragile ‐democracies, it is important to examine how the development of the electoral system has influenced the democratic transition outcome, in a number of cases. Cases considered include Kenya, Mongolia, Nepal and Tanzania, while comparisons with countries outside the third world such as Bosnia‐and‐Herzegovina and South Africa throw additional light on the argument. By seeking to avoid both the fallacy of electomlism and the fallacy of anti‐electoralism, the article argues that the electoral system is a crucial factor behind the unsatisfactory course of the democratization process in many countries. More emphasis should be put on sustaining the different prerequisites of democracy, while simultaneously more effort should be put into the preparation of elections, in order to progress beyond simple and inadequate electoral democracy. The technical refinement of the electoral process, while far from sufficient to guarantee democratic development, can be a step in that direction. Credible and transparent elections are conducive to internal legitimacy and the dynamic of the political‐electoral process will gradually bring along more contestation, more participation, and the enjoyment of more rights and liberties.     

When do electoral institutions trigger electoral misconduct?

Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like proportional representation. However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms.