How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

“The Big Society,” Public Expenditure,and Volunteering

The debate on volunteering has paid insufficient attention to the relationship between public spending and volunteering. The importance of this relationship is highlighted by the British government's “Big Society” plan, which asserts that an increase in volunteering will compensate for the withdrawal of public agencies and spending. This idea is based on the widely held belief that a high degree of government intervention decreases voluntary activities. This article uses a multidisciplinary approach to improve understanding of how public spending affects the decision to volunteer. A theoretical model conceptualizes this relationship in terms of time donation by employed individuals. The model is tested empirically through an econometric analysis of two survey data sets and interpretative analysis of narratives of local volunteers and public professionals. The results suggest that volunteering is likely to decline when government intervention decreases and that a collaborative approach to sustaining volunteering is needed.     

Federal Government Reform: Lessons from Clinton’s “Reinventing Government” and Bush’s “Management Agenda” Initiatives

Newly elected presidents oftentimes set out to reform the executive branch. This has been the norm for more than 100 years, and indications are that the next president will follow this pattern. The authors have had firsthand experience over the past 15 years with White House–led government reform efforts. They provide their insights on President Bill Clinton’s reinventing government initiative and President George W. Bush’s management agenda efforts. Based on their experience, they offer lessons to the next president’s team on what they might do to get a reform effort started successfully and how to get reform initiatives implemented and sustained.     

The Legitimacy of U.S. Government Agency Power

A synthesis of the work of two political and legal scholars, John Rohr and Lon Fuller, properly balances constitutional and managerial values, supplementing other theories that offer useful but insufficient support for American government agency legitimacy. Agencies reflecting that balance would strengthen their legitimacy—a particularly valuable goal in an era of low confidence in American government. Rohr's focus on the constitutional oath of office and American regime values, and Fuller's insistence that law must serve human needs, leave a great deal indeterminate and discretionary but nevertheless set boundaries. Bureaucrats who risked or sacrificed their jobs to avoid transgressing those boundaries offer models of loyalty to the Rohr‐Fuller balance of values. The behavior of officials in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in thwarting measures that could have averted the financial crisis of 2007 offers a model of bureaucrats who violated those boundaries.     

Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment,Dissipation, and Loss

Norton Long's 1949 essay, “Power and Administration,” has a complicated legacy. First, analysis reveals both support for and important refinements of Long's arguments since the article's publication. Second, Long's claim has proven problematic that competition among agencies for power would bring more coordination and a cross‐agency sense of purpose to the federal government. Third, the bureaucratic pluralism that he explained and defended produced special interest biases that were off‐putting to large segments of citizens and thus helped create an unsupportive political environment for needed capacity building in the federal government. Fourth, by not considering how institutions “coevolve,” Long failed to warn that “horizontal power” building by individual agencies would provoke efforts by elected officials to enhance their control over bureaucracy in ways that, over time, diminished their collective sources of power. Finally, much remains to be done before what Long called a “realistic science of administration” incorporating the “budgeting of power” exists in public administration.     

Representation,agendas and institutions

Dynamic agenda representation can be understood through the transmission of the priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The pattern of representation in policy agendas is mediated through institutions due to friction (i.e., organisational and cognitive costs imposed on change) in decision making and variation in the scarcity of policy makers' attention. This article builds on extant studies of the correspondence between public priorities and the policy activities of government, undertaking time‐series analyses using data for the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1951 to 2003, relating to executive speeches, laws and budgets in combination with data on public opinion about the ‘most important problem’. The results show that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions are subject to less friction (i.e., executive speeches subject to few formal rules and involving a limited number of actors) and declines as friction against policy change increases (i.e., laws and budgets subject to a greater number of veto points and political interests/coalitions).     

The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

Retrofitting the Administrative State to the Constitution: Congress and the Judiciary's Twentieth-Century Progress

One of the twentieth century's "big questions" for United States government has been how best to retrofit, or integrate, the full-fledged federal administrative state into the constitutional scheme. The public administration orthodoxy initially advocated placing the executive branch almost entirely under presidential control; Congress and the federal judiciary responded otherwise. Congress decided to treat the agencies as its extensions for legislative functions and to supervise them more closely. The courts developed an elaborate framework for imposing constitutional rights, values, and reasoning on public administration practice. As the challenge of retrofitting continues into the twenty-first century, public administrators might profitably play a larger role in the constitutional discourse regarding the administrative state's place in constitutional government.     

Does Agency Autonomy Foster Public Participation?

Allocation of public resources is an area in which considerations of both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy are likely to be present. Public administrators are often blamed for being too devoted to the norms of bureaucratic ethos, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and top‐down control, and less so to the norms of democratic ethos, such as inclusiveness and bottom‐up decision making. This article examines whether managers in agencies with greater budget autonomy are more likely to include the public when allocating resources. Because participation offers an opportunity for agencies to enhance the legitimacy of their decisions, it is expected that the value of citizen input will increase with the degree of agency autonomy. Using data on the practices of citizen participation in budgeting in two state departments—transportation and environment—this study finds that agencies with a higher degree of autonomy tend to be more open to public comment than agencies with more centralized budget processes.     

Public Information and Regulatory Processes: What the Public Knows and Regulators Decide

Because bureaucratic agencies may be less transparent in their decision processes than legislatures, most states have developed processes to incorporate input from regulated communities and other parties potentially affected by regulations. Administrative agencies may encourage democratic practices to increase legitimacy and accountability of the bureaucracy and improve decision‐making processes. However, rules governing the regulatory process vary by state, with some incorporating more open practices than others. Understanding these dynamics is increasingly important, as the rulemaking process has become central to policymaking over the past several decades, with a large portion of policymaking authority delegated to administrative agencies. Drawing from regulatory documents, rulemaking comments, media coverage, and interviews with regulators in 14 regulatory decision processes across five states, this study finds that while states vary in their approach to providing access to information, there are overriding patterns that reduce the role of citizens and the overall transparency of regulatory processes.     

Strengthening Local Government Leadership and Performance: Reexamining and Updating the Winter Commission Goals

The Winter Commission report of 1993 stressed cities with the mayor‐council form of government and emphasized removing barriers to executive authority in large cities. In order to assess and update the report, it is important to recognize that a majority of cities with populations over 100,000 use the council‐manager form, in which restrictions on the executive and fragmented authority are unlikely to be present because of the constitutional principles on which the form is based. There has been progress toward improved leadership in both forms of government and substantial management change, including the incorporation of reinventing government and e‐government practices, and large counties are more likely to have an elected or appointed executive. An emerging issue not considered by the commission but in line with its purpose is the increasing challenge of governing expanding metropolitan and megapolitan regions.     

Ministerial Advisers and the Politics of Policy‐Making: Bureaucratic Permanence and Popular Control

The advent of ministerial advisers of the partisan variety – a third element interposing itself into Westminster's bilateral monopoly – has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of ministerial advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s – and in particular machinery of government design – was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of ministerial advisers in the policy‐making process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the ‘politics of policy‐making’. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of ministerial advisers to policy‐making in executive government.     

Reinventing government through on‐line citizen involvement in the developing world: a case study of taipei city mayor's e‐mail box in Taiwan

Since the 1980s, a global administrative reform movement is reshaping the relationship between citizens and state. A major concern is how government can be more responsive to the governed through citizen participation. However, the more citizens participate, the more costly it is to govern. And the application of new information and communication technology (ICT) seems to be a cure for this limitation. In this research, authors take the Taipei City Mayor's e‐mail‐box (TCME) in Taiwan as a case to illustrate the complex relationships among citizen involvement, e‐government and public management. After a series of empirical investigations, the authors show that although ICT can reduce the cost of citizen involvement in governing affairs, it cannot increase citizens' satisfaction with government activities without reforming the bureaucratic organisation, regulatory structure, and managerial capacities of the public sector. The results could be helpful to public managers in planning and evaluating online governmental services in the developing countries. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Civil service policies in Indonesia: An obstacle to decentralization?

Decentralization of a substantial portion of development activity under Indonesia's New Order has been attempted in the context of centralizing civil service reforms. This analysis, based on field observation in two areas distant from the ‘bureaucratic centre’ of Java, South Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara in early 1986, shows some ways in which the structure of the civil service and recent policies governing it have handicapped regional governments in their attempts to develop an apparatus capable of managing decentralization. For example, the structure often leads local officials to prefer rank over technical qualifications in appointments to managerial positions. The analysis also shows how they cope and attempt to maintain their legal prerogatives vis-à-vis the central government. In conclusion policy recommendations are offered that would help to achieve a better balance between the New Order's concerns for centralization and decentralization.     

From quiescent bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate

Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process‐tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state‐based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state‐based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.     

Spillover Effects: Immigrant Policing and Government Skepticism in Matters of Health for Latinos

To what extent do people become less trusting of the government under threatening policy contexts? The authors find evidence that Secure Communities, a bureaucratic program that enhances immigrant policing through collaboration between local law and immigration enforcement agencies, spurs mistrust among Latinos but not non‐Latinos. This article focuses on the politics of immigration and health, two issue areas marked by large‐scale bureaucratic developments over the last 50 years. The authors argue that a major consequence of expanding immigrant policing is its trickle‐down effect on how individuals view public institutions charged with the provision of public goods, such as health information. The results indicate that Latinos in locales where immigrant policing is most intense express lower levels of trust in government as a source of health information. Through a policy feedback lens, the findings suggest that the state's deployment of immigrant policing conveys more widespread lessons about the trustworthiness of government .     

发展型政府理论与香港实践

发展型政府都将经济发展作为国家政策制定的重中之重,并且采取有力措施来实现经济发展目标。香港是典型的小经济体,对外在环境有非常大的依存度,一直关注如何维持与中国内地、周边、亚太地区乃至世界经济的良好互动。在把握有关发展型政府理论的脉络及主要观点的基础上,深入探讨发展型政府理论在香港的实践与CEPA框架下香港政府扮演的四重经济角色以及可能存在的风险。认为,应该从增强香港经济自主性、制度建设和增加内地与香港抵御金融风险的能力等方面入手,进一步完善CEPA。结论部分探讨了在CEPA框架下,内地和香港的各级政府成为更加有效的发展型政府的途径以及对两岸经济关系的启示。     

What Do Bureaucrats Like Doing? Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform

How do bureaucrats respond to administrative reform in relation to their overall administrative goals? The authors test the bureau‐shaping thesis, which holds that bureaucrats’ preferences for certain kinds of roles and tasks motivate their support for bureau reform. Drawing on attitudinal and behavioral data from a survey of English local government officials, the findings underscore how bureaucrats with different interests and motivations sort themselves into job types. Their preferences drive support for reform, which, in turn, strengthens the executive structure of English local government. Drawing on the literature on bureaucratic responses to institutional reform, the authors offer a more nuanced portrayal of bureaucratic preferences in line with the bureau‐shaping model. A key conclusion: political principals need improved empirical awareness of bureaucratic preferences when undertaking public institutional reforms.     

Homeland Security: The Difference between a Vision and a Wish

The U.S. government is considering how it should reorganize for homeland security. Consequently, attention has focused on the new Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Much debate focuses on two issues related to OHS: (1) whether the OHS should be a separate executive agency; and (2) whether the OHS director has sufficient authority to direct changes in policies and resource allocation of other departments and agencies. The authors believe the emphasis on these areas of interest is misplaced as measures of the eventual success of the OHS. Rather than focusing on these political issues, this article outlines several questions about how the OHS might approach its complex mission and highlights some organizational and bureaucratic realities that are likely to survive the debate over placement of the OHS within the executive branch and the authorities of the OHS director. This article concludes with a discussion of some organizational tools that the OHS or any coordinating office will require to fulfill its mandate.     

Customer-Oriented E-Government

Abstract

E-govemment's next phase-a seamless, customer-oriented Web presence-faces more formidable barriers to development than did earlier advances. Progress toward customer-focused e-government requires fundamental organizational changes to existing bureaucracies, so that the government's Web presence can be comprehensive, efficient, and easy for citizens to use. To compel individual “stovepipe” agencies to develop a combined Web presence, chief information officers must be able to focus political and bureaucratic resources on making government websites truly customer-centric. The rewards for success in this next stage of e-government are significantnot only will it benefit citizens directly, but integrated e-government can also make offline government more efficient and effective.