Denmark's referendum on the euro: The mouse that roared ... again

Just as they had almost a decade earlier, Danish voters on 28 September 2000 went to the polls and sent Shockwaves through the European Union by rejecting a government‐sponsored referendum on joining the EU's single currency, the ‘euro’. Danes said ‘Nej’ to the embattled currency, casting new doubt on their country's commitment to the European project and emboldening eurosceptics throughout the continent and across the English Channel. The decision to remain outside the eurozone is notable for the humiliation it caused Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his government, as well as for the impetus is gives to a two‐tier EU. The ‘yes ‘ camp's failure to keep the campaign based on economic rather than political logic, the euro's precipitous decline, and the EU's sanctions against Austria contributed to the referendum's dramatic outcome.     

How deliberation makes better citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro

Abstract.  This article presents results from a Danish national Deliberative Poll on the single European currency. A representative sample of 364 Danish citizens assembled to deliberate on Denmark's participation in the single currency. As a quasi-experiment, the Deliberative Poll is an example of deliberative democracy. Four research questions regarding these deliberative processes are analyzed: openness and access, the quality of deliberation, efficiency and effectiveness, and publicity and accountability. The participants' responses reflect a deliberative process characterized by considerable changes in political opinions as the Poll proceeds, increase in level of knowledge and an improved ability to form reasoned opinions. A mutual understanding on the subject matter prevailed among the participants. At the same time, self-interest and domination also appeared during the deliberative process. The article emphasizes the need for further elaboration of the theory of deliberative democracy so that it better reflects these features of 'real-life' politics.     

The electoral connection in Australia: Candidate roles,campaign activity,and the popular vote

Studies of representational roles usually examine elected representatives rather than election candidates and make little attempt to link roles with either behavior or the popular vote that candidates attract. In this paper, we use 1990 Australian data to examine all major party election candidates, and show that candidates identify with three types of representational roles:locals, who focus on articulating local concerns and interests;partisans, who see their role in party political terms; andlegislators, who emphasize the parliamentary role of an elected representative. Incumbents, especially party leaders, focus on the partisan role. Candidates in each of these three types have different views of the qualities that a candidate should possess and emphasize different forms of campaign activity. In turn, these roles have a modest impact on the popular vote that candidates attract, net of other factors. In Australia, incumbents rely on national partisan forces for reelection, while challengers rely much more on their own efforts.     

On referendum voting in Italy: YES, NO or non–vote? How Italian parties learned to control referendums

Abstract. National referendums progressively became a part of Italian political life in the last three decades of the twentieth century. The increased use made of them came as a genuine surprise. Some 53 issues were put before the electorate between 1970 and 2000, the majority following citizen petitions, with a smaller number promoted by regional councils. The so–called 'abrogative referendum,' conceived as a sort of modern–day veto, proved to be a multi–use political tool wielded predominantly by the Radical Party, a political movement largely outside the Italian party system. Parties were the main actors in referendums as far as the mobilisation of voters was concerned. Indeed, the parties gave birth to a variety of alignments, some supporting mobilisation and competition, while others encouraged abstension and effective demobilisation. By virtue mainly of the constitutional rule that requires 50 per cent turnout for the result to be valid, the vote on 18 issues was declared void. Many lessons can be learned from the Italian experience, and one in particular is of special interest to all who value the survival of liberal democracies: all electors are equal, but in referendums non–voters are more equal than the voters.     

The quality of referendum debate: The UK's electoral system referendum in the print media

This paper analyses the quality of debate surrounding the UK's 2011 electoral reform referendum as represented in the print media. It first considers how debate quality in the context of a referendum campaign may best be conceptualized. It then uses content analysis of media coverage to investigate three aspects of that debate: its quantity; the balance between Yes and No arguments; and the quality of reason-giving. It finds that the quantity of debate was comparable to other recent electoral reform referendums. Coverage was predominantly, but not overwhelmingly, hostile to change. The different indicators of the quality of reason-giving present a mixed picture. The paper concludes by considering how the analysis could be extended through further comparison with other cases.     

Economics, ideology and vote: Southern Europe, 1985–2000

Abstract.  This article analyses the role of economics in voting behaviour in Greece, Portugal and Spain. First, it describes the objective economic conditions in these countries and investigates the degree to which they reflect the electorates' economic perceptions. Second, a multilevel model of voting behaviour for Greece, Portugal and Spain is tested to determine if, as expected, economics is more important than social and political cleavages. This approach allows one to assess the effects of both individual voters' economic perceptions and objective economic conditions to determine which are more important, and to compare their effects with social and political cleavages. With the exception of Greece, the economic voting model will also be tested under different political conditions (i.e., type of government in each country).     

Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Comparative studies of preferential electoral systems have paid much attention to the incentives for personalized instead of party-centered campaigns, but they have largely ignored how some of these systems allow “allocation errors” and so create incentives for parties to “manage” the vote and intraparty campaigns. We discuss how the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and single transferable vote (STV) systems create these incentives, and we illustrate the degree to which they affect actual electoral results across seven preferential electoral systems. The analysis reveals statistically significant differences in the vote inequality among incumbent cohorts (members of the same party and district), indicating the strong influence of vote division incentives over candidate-centered electoral environments. The results also have important implications for comparative research on legislative turnover and the incumbency advantage.     

Economic effects on the vote in Norway

A body of accumulating evidence appears to support the finding that collectivist economic concerns and assessments of government economic performance directly influence voting behavior independent of other predispositions and cleavages. This seems reasonable and is well documented across both cultures and time periods. What remains more inconclusive is how to explain fluctuations in the electoral impact of personal economic worries. Our comparison of Norwegian and U.S. data has suggested that cognitive, social and political factors may all influence this association. The political information and cues for connecting the two spheres may be absent for most elections and for most people. Nevertheless, in some elections and under certain conditions individual economic worries can have a significant, independent impact on election outcomes. A major goal of future political-economy research, therefore, should be to specify more completely those factors that facilitate the linkage of personal and collectivist economic concerns.     

How to vote,whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the Brookings Institution and the University of Michigan School of Law, and useful comments on an earlier draft by Randall Calvert, Morris Fiorina, Rodney Fort, Amihai Glazer, Keith Krehbiel, Thomas Romer, Kenneth Shepsle, Rodney Smith, Barry Weingast, the UCI Public Choice Study Group, and the Hoover Workshop on Collective Choice.     

Political learning during the 2000 U.S. presidential election: The impact of the campaign on the gender gap in political knowledge

We examine how political campaigns influence individuals’ levels of correct, incorrect, and don’t know responses and the gender gap in political knowledge during the 2000 American presidential campaign. Using data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), we demonstrate that as the campaign progresses the electorate provides more correct answers and fewer incorrect answers. Moreover, the political campaign significantly reduces (and possibly eliminates) the direct effect of sex on political knowledge. While the political campaign decreases the number of incorrect answers provided by both men and women, the number of correct answers provided by women increases. Our findings highlight the importance of the political campaign in determining relative levels of political knowledge for men and women.     

Politicians,voters and democracy: The 2011 UK referendum on the Alternative Vote

At the 2010 UK election, Labour proposed a referendum on changing the House of Commons electoral system from single member plurality to the Alternative Vote. Subsequently, a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, yet it was Labour's policy on electoral reform that was implemented. The paper explains why this proved to be politically convenient for Labour's opponents. At the same time, however, holding the referendum reflected an emergent de facto convention that significant constitutional change should only be introduced after it has secured popular endorsement. The paper assesses whether the dynamics of public opinion during the AV referendum suggests that voters' eventual decisions about constitutional questions reflect their views about the merits of the relevant arguments.     

Elite division and voter confusion: Australia's republic referendum in 1999

Abstract. Although a majority of Australian voters favour the introduction of a republic, in the November 1999 referendum a majority of them nevertheless voted to retain the monarchy. This article explains the background to this apparently perverse outcome. The central problem was asking the Australian electorate to make a complex, technical choice about the system of government, in the absence of clear partisan cues. As a result, republicans were divided on the method of election for the head of state, effectively resulting in three separate groups of voters favouring change. Using survey data collected just after the referendum, four hypotheses are tested to explain the result. The most important influence on voting was views about whether or not to sever the link with Britain, followed by the positive and negative aspects of the proposed change, and the cues presented by the leaders of the respective YES and NO campaigns. The interaction between these factors enabled political elites opposed to change to manipulate the result in their favour.     

Economic self-interest and the vote: Evidence and meaning

The issue of personal economic self-interest — people responding politically to changes in their financial well-being — has been a central focus in the economic voting literature. In a recent article, Kramer (1983) contended that people may be acting in a personally self-interested manner despite findings to the contrary from survey research analyses. In another article, Sears and Lau (1983) argued that findings of economic self-interest from survey data may be artifactual and that self-interested behavior may be even weaker than previously thought. In this paper I review the literature on economic self-interest and attempt to determine to what extent people do act on the basis of their financial well-being and under what conditions this is most likely.     

Interests and information in referendum voting: An analysis of Swiss voters

Abstract. Referendums impose considerable informational demands on voters. Recent theoretical and empirical research has emphasized the different shortcuts and heuristics they may employ in deciding how to vote. Relying on a substantial series of votes at the national level in Switzerland, we provide empirical tests on how Swiss voters cope with the informational demands in referendum voting. We combine simple heuristics, like partisan cues and endorsements, with indicators of instrumental interests to explain citizens' choices in a series of votes.     

Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform

Campaign advertising can provide benefits to constituencies when used to fund the distribution of useful information, but voters can be harmed if candidates finance such advertising by trading policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions. We report data from novel laboratory campaign finance experiments that shed light on this tradeoff, and that provide rigorous empirical evidence on formal campaign finance theory. Our key finding is that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly-financed campaigns, and that the nature of this difference is qualitatively consistent with formal models’ predictions.     

One voter and two choices: The impact of electoral context on the 2011 UK referendum

There is a debate in the literature on referendum voting as to whether these occasions are opportunities for voters to express issue preferences in the absence of partisan politics or whether they simply serve as referendums on the current government. In part, this latter, second order account is assumed to be driven by the amount and content of media coverage, and hence information about the referendum, that is available to voters. In this paper, we address the second order question and demonstrate that holding elections concurrently both reduces the amount of media attention to the second order contest—the AV referendum in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland where national elections were held—and moderates media priming, thereby affecting the salient cues in the decision making of voters in those contexts.     

A probit analysis of the Senate vote on Gramm-Rudman

The Leviathan theory of government was seemingly contradicted when the U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction law. This study analyzes the Senate vote on Gramm-Rudman to try to determine whether legislators acted in their own self interest. A prisoner's dilemma argument explains how Senators made themselves better off by limiting their own spending abilities. A probit analysis shows how voting for deficit reduction was consistent with the personal incentives faced by individual legislators. The eventual failure of Gramm-Rudman to eliminate the deficit reveals a need to consider institutional as well as constitutional means of controlling government.     

Partisanship and principle: Voters and the New Zealand electoral referendum of 1993

Abstract. In a two–stage referendum process, in 1992 and 1993, New Zealand voters authorised a radical change from a plurality electoral system to proportional representation. Although ad hoc groups, not the major political parties, led the debate for and against the change, the nature of the issue ensured that partisanship had a strong effect on voters' choices. Yet many voters were also guided by their political principles and values, including fairness of representation on one side, and preference for single–party, decisive governments on the other. Experience of proportional representation since 1996 has resulted in a fairly high level of uncertainty toward electoral change, independent of partisanship. Values and partisanship, however, remain the two stabilising influences.