欧洲联邦主义:传统与理念

联邦主义最早产生于欧洲,并经历了从神学联邦主义到政治联邦主义的转变。在大陆欧洲的联邦主义渊源中,"欧洲观念"和"权力分散"(subsidiarity)是对欧洲一体化产生重要影响的两个理念,并似乎决定了欧洲统一进程要经历从联合、联盟到联邦的过程。英国的联邦主义思想因其更少宗教色彩而成为现代联邦主义的重要组成部分,并在实际上对欧洲历史的和现实的联合具有更大、更直接的影响。欧洲联盟已经走过50年的历程,梳理和分析欧洲联邦主义的传统与理念,不仅有助于深化对联邦制本质的认识,对于理解欧洲一体化和欧洲联盟的历史发展进程也是非常必要的。     

简述新制度主义政治学方法

新制度主义是西方20世纪六七十年代在经济学中兴起的一种思想流派,在80年代又从经济学领域扩展到政治学和社会学领域。概括了西方新制度主义的主要三大理论流派,包括理性选择制度主义、社会学制度主义和历史制度主义。并由此总结了新制度主义政治学的方法论特点。     

护国运动百年忆梁汤刎颈之交北大核心

护国运动已过百年。白1915年12月25日蔡锷将军在云南首举义帜,1916年3月15日广西独立,4月12日海珠惨案爆发,5月8日军务院成立,6月6日袁世凯病亡,历时半载的护国运动取得最后胜利。     

论意象主义的诗学主张

意象主义是一种浓缩性极强的诗歌形式，其在节奏、选材、语言、意象的提出和处理方面的艺术主张和审美意识都体现出意象主义对传统诗歌诗学的反叛，而这种革新又很好地配合了20世纪现代主义文学的主题表达。     

论《联邦党人文集》所体现的宪政思想

<联邦党人文集>在西方立宪主义发展史上的地位是无可替代的,它从学理上、经验上和历史上极具权威地对美国宪法的总体设计和每一项重要条款都作了审慎的探究和精细的分析,令人信服地揭示了美国宪法"实质上的优点".     

社会主义从科学到伦理的嬗变——大历史比较视野下社会民主主义发展趋势的演化

19世纪中后期,在马克思主义指导下,社会主义实现了从空想到科学的飞跃。社会民主主义早期的科学属性,体现在它在19世纪中后期与科学社会主义是同义语。半个世纪后,修正主义使社会民主主义呈现出伦理色彩,但其内核仍是科学社会主义,只是放弃了革命道路而转向改良主义。20世纪中叶,民主社会主义使社会民主主义伦理属性系统化,悖离了唯物史观。冷战结束后,"社会民主"(社会-主义)和"进步主义"使社会民主主义进一步树立了伦理标杆,"返祖"回归到自由主义左翼立场。社会民主主义向何处去值得深入研究。     

美国联邦政府公共行政管理中的三大主要问题

美国联邦政府公共行政管理面临着三个特别突出的问题。第一是“新联邦主义”进入困境。“新联邦主义”作为联邦政府向州政府分权的一种形式，联邦政府把项目和财政责任从联邦政府移向州政府，给州政府带来沉重的负担，衍生出了很多新的矛盾和问题。第二是解除规制带来了混乱。社会性规则和经济性规则是用来帮助实现一系列的公共目标和保护公众利益的，过度的规制束缚了社会的活力；但是同样如果过度地解除规制，也会产生大量的问题。第三是私有化没有象所期望的那样带来应有的效应。随着公共服务私有化的推进，许多问题都严重地暴露出来了，现在美国民众对私有化的批评主要集中在公共产品和服务的质量方面。     

近代中国文化的演变与中国共产党的起源

中国共产党是在共产国际的直接帮助和指导下、以马克思主义作为指导思想并按照俄国布尔什维克党的模式建立起来。同时,中国千百年所形成的民族传统文化在近代的发展和演化,成为中国共产党诞生的内在思想逻辑。近代传统使中国马克思主义运动具有儒家文化浓厚的泛道德主义色彩和张扬主观能动性等初始特点。     

浅析新制度主义及其对国际政治学的启示

新制度主义在旧制度主义基础上,更加注重对个体偏好和行为的分析,同时又对行为主义和理性选择主义进行了批判性的反思,逐步形成了理性选择制度主义、历史制度主义和社会学制度主义三个流派。新制度主义有助于国际政治学中的新自由制度主义和建构主义的产生和理论阐释,对分析国际政治中的制度规范有一定帮助。     

纵向分权与中国成就:一个多级所有的解释

探讨中华人民共和国成立70年成就的促成因素时,不可忽略经济社会管理领域中事权的纵向分权。现有文献在对中国纵向分权之于经济社会发展影响的评价上存在对立,对立双方论者的方法论却是一致的:基于蒂布特模型的联邦主义。蒂布特模型构建了一个地方政府充分竞争并导致最优的地方公共产品供给的机制,本质上是美国式纵向分权的联邦主义的理论表达。蒂布特模型以事务性质进行纵向分权,它不符合中国以重要性程度作为基本依据的纵向分权,后者的原则表述为"统一领导,分级管理"。中国纵向分权的成功,从实践层面来看,是因为它能够有效地应对动态、非常态以及跨区域事务治理的挑战。而从根本上讲,是因为它符合人类事务多级所有这一客观存在的普遍现象。多级所有应当成为我们理解社会经济现象的一般性理论。     

The State of U.S. Federalism, 1999-2000

Federalism has rarely been a key national campaign issue, andthe presidential campaign of 2000 was no exception. Althoughthe candidates talked of a key state-local issue—education—itwas in the context of the popular concern over the quality ofschools, rather than federalism issues of governmental responsibilityfor education. However, one aspect of federalism was evidentin the presidential campaign. The first president of the newmillennium may get a chance to name at least one U.S. SupremeCourt justice. Given the slim 5–4 majorities on most federalismcases, the appointment or appointments could be pivotal. Meanwhile,in the Congress and state Capitols, technology and globalizationissues forced a rethinking of traditional intergovernmentalfiscal and regulatory functions.     

Federalism and Party Interaction in West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria

The federalism established in the constitutions of the FederalRepublic of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, in addition tothe common language of these countries, distinguishes them fromthe other West European countries, which lean toward centrallyorganized states. After examining the historical foundationand development of the federal systems in the three countries,the article analyzes the segmentation, federal-state interaction,and intraparty effects of political parties in them. While federalismis strengthened by the heterogeneity and regional solidarityof the political parties in Switzerland, federalism has becomea pure "party federalism" in the Federal Republic of Germanyand Austria.     

What is the Future of the Federation?

Federalism has proved enduring in Australia, despite predictions of its imminent demise. Yet new challenges of internationalism and social movements are cutting across old political boundaries and eroding the sovereign nation state. This article, which draws on ideas developed at length in my recent book A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1995), argues that the characteristics of federalism may prove surprisingly compatible with social and international trends.     

Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories

In an earlier attempt to compare federalism and consociationalism,I found that, both conceptually and empirically, they do notcoincide but that they do overlap to a significant extent. Inthis second comparison, my point of departure is that both conceptsentail a rejection of majoritarian democracy. Eight characteristicsof non-majoritarian democracy—or consensus democracy—canbe identified: (1) executive power sharing, (2) balanced executive-legislativerelations, (3) strong bicameralism, (4) multiparty system, (5)multi-dimensional party system, (6) proportional representation,(7) federalism and decentralization, and (8) a written constitutionand minority veto. Consociational theorists tend to emphasizethe non-majoritarian attributes of power sharing, proportionalrepresentation, and multi-partyism, whereas federal theoristsstress the non-majoritarian characteristics of strong bicameralismand rigid constitutions, in addition to federalism itself. Asimilar pattern is revealed by a factor analysis of these variablesin twenty-two democratic regimes. Although consociationalismand federalism are non-majoritarian in nature, they representclearly different dimensions of non-majoritarianism.     

Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Center and the States

India's federalism during the last 50 years had two phases:three decades of centralized federalism followed by cooperativeand competitive federalism. Unitary features of India's Constitutionand planned development led to strong central dominance in thefirst phase, with the states in a subordinate position. Themomentum of impressive initial growth did not last. The late1970s saw a weakened Congress party, the emergence of coalitionpolitics, and a shift in the Center-states power balance. Growthfollowed liberalization and moves toward decentralization, butthis was accompanied by an accentuation of regional disparitiesand fiscal imbalances. A major factor in the negative resultshas been weaknesses in the intergovernmental transfer system.Desirable reforms, which maintain moves toward decentralizationand greater states' autonomy, are explored here.     

European elections—Greece

This article discusses the implications for the German federal system of incorporating the new Länder of eastern Germany following German unification in 1990. It begins by examining the relationships between federation and Läander — commonly termed ‘cooperative’ federalism — which developed in the Federal Republic after its foundation. It then discusses how the integration of the new Länder in the east has added to and seriously exacerbated a range of tensions which had begun to emerge in ‘cooperative’ federalism prior to 1990, before moving on to outline the Länder contribution to the debate on reforming the federal system which was made possible under the terms of unification. This debate was, it is argued, an opportunity missed by the Länder — or, more precisely, was one they were incapable of taking ‐ to shore up and strengthen their position as an effective counterbalance to the federation in united Germany.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Federalism and Community in the American Context

The rise of modern federalism was shaped significantly by desiresto protect smaller, diverse communities against forces of imperialcentralization. The protection of community liberty was seenas a prerequisite for protecting individual liberty as well.As such, a federal polity was seen to be a limited self-governingcommunity of entrenched self-governing constituent communities.The rise of the idea of national community and the ideologyof the cosmopolitan nationstate, however, eroded the legitimacyand authority of local self-government and, thereby, federalism.Constituent communities also came to be seen as oppressive,especially of individual rights. Yet, desires for local self-governmenthave maintained a strong hold on public opinion, and recentextensions of individual rights, particularly voting rights,coupled with policy weaknesses of the national government andmodernization of state governments appear to be renewing possibilitiesfor revitalizing federalism as a self-governing community ofself-governing communities.     

The State of American Federalism, 1993-1994

National political energies in 1993–1994 were focusedon major initiatives promised by the Clinton administrationduring the 1992 presidential campaign, especially health-carereform and crime. From the perspective of the states, federalgovernment action in these (and other) policy areas raised seriousquestions about preemption and mandates. The administration'sofficial pronouncements on federalism have suggested a strategyof decongestion and decentralization. Thus far, its actionshave fallen short of empowerment, taking instead the path ofregulatory waivers. Frustrated with the federal government,states and localities continued to engage in policy experimentation.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.